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When Is a Terrorist Not a Terrorist?: American and Chinese Media Portrayals of the Chinese Uighur Minority Pre and Post 9/11
Senior Seminar Final Paper
Anna File

> Like the Tibetans, the Uighurs have fought Chinese domination for centuries. Like the Tibetans, the Uighurs face threats from Han Chinese in-migration, communist development policies, and newly strengthened anti-terror measures. And like the Tibetans, the Uighurs resist Chinese domination with domestic and international protest that, in Beijing's eyes, makes them dangerous separatists.[1]

Over the past sixty years the Uighur population in China has faced a variety of complex issues, both domestically and internationally. In large part due to their geopolitical positioning as inhabitants of Xinjiang Province as well owing to several issues with their Muslim faith, Uighurs have constantly been at odds with the Communist traditions imposed upon them by the central Chinese government. Not only do problems with their religion affect them nationally, but more recently with the trend towards suspicion of Muslim groups by Westerners, the Uighurs are in a seemingly helpless position. This paper hypothesizes however, that this has not always been the case, and that the politics of 9/11 in particular have changed the tone of articles towards Uighurs in a negative way, especially within American media. In terms of Chinese media coverage, it was originally suggested that Uighurs were always negatively portrayed in newspaper coverage, and that post 9/11, media attacks on Uighurs would become even more aggressive due to the increase in fear that Americans felt towards Muslim fundamentalists as opposed to Communists (a fear that may have been felt by the Chinese towards Muslim fundamentalists as well). As the findings of this paper will later reveal however, an almost opposite approach was discovered after careful observation of related Chinese news articles.

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[1] Bob, Clifford "Merchants of Morality" *Foreign Policy*. No.129 (2002) pp. 36

In order to explore this thesis, the main concentration will be on the Uighurs as they are portrayed in American and Chinese media sources, namely in newspapers and news agencies. Focusing on newspaper articles will provide factual information on the Uighurs, as well as give a feel for how Americans and Chinese might each perceive the ethnic group as evidenced by the way those stories are presented. Coding for the tone of each article will help to identify at what point in modern Uighur history the attitude of American media changes in a negative direction (if at all), as well as whether or not Chinese media approaches portray a similar shift. By utilizing these media sources, a data set will be created from which inferences can be drawn about tone shift, highlighting Uighur activities in Xinjiang and comparing their coverage.

Religious Background

Uighurs, of course, are not the only Muslim minority that can be found within China. There are a total of ten minorities in China that are characterized by their faith in Islam of which the Uighurs are the second most populous (8.4 million people). The Hui people are the largest Muslim minority group in China (9.8 million people), yet unlike their Uighur counterparts, the Hui are geographically scattered throughout China whereas the Uighurs are concentrated in the Western portion of Xinjiang province. Despite their connection through faith, the Uighurs are elevated to a different level of importance due to their geographic positioning in the western bordering regions. Together the Hui and Uighur make up almost 90% of the total population of Muslim minority people in China while the Kazak (1.25 million people), Dongxiang (814,000), Kyrgyz (161,000), Salar (105,000), Tajik (41,000), Uzbek (17,000), Bonan (17,000) and Tatar (5,000) people make up the remaining 10%. On the whole these minority groups reside in the Western

Chinese provinces of Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet (many Tibetans practice Islam as opposed to the more popularly recognized Tibetan Buddhism), and Xinjiang, an area known as the "Quran Belt." As mentioned above however, there are significant populations of several of these Muslim minorities that can be found residing in the larger cities of China including Xi'an, Chengdu, and Beijing.

Muslims in China have long been at odds with Chinese rule, especially in recent decades due in part to the incompatibility of Islam and Communism. In American politics it is generally accepted that there should be some sort of line drawn between church and state due in part to the otherwise large influence that religious groups might have over political decisions, yet in the modern Chinese tradition there is hardly need to discuss a "line" since religion and the church are not thought to have any kind of political weight. Unlike many other countries with large religious groups driving certain policy decisions, China is one of the least religious countries in the world with 8-14% of its population professing as atheist, while a 59% majority are irreligious.[2] Although the better part of the Chinese population is not religious, the government does recognize five official religions in its "White Paper-Freedom of Religious Belief in China": Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism. In discussing the repression of certain religious groups in China, it is important to keep in mind studies such as Amnesty International's "China: The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called "heretical organizations"[3] which demonstrates how other religions, such as the Falun Gong and many sects of Christianity, do not even enjoy what few freedoms are granted to the five

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[2] Zuckerman, Phil. "Atheism: Contemporary Rates and Patterns", *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism*, ed. by Michael Martin, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK (2005)

[3] "China: The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called 'heretical organizations'" http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA17/011/2000 (2000)

above mentioned faiths. While religion is downplayed in China, it is still a defining factor for groups such as the Uighurs and merits discussion due to the various problems that are at times associated with its practice in China.

A specific example of this inability for coexistence between the Uighurs and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can be found in issues of land reform. When China in the early 1950's set about redistributing land and communizing the economy, "*Waqf* (or religion endowed) land belonging to mosques was at times confiscated, and the education system thenceforth strove to emphasize Marxism-Leninism at the expense of Muslim…customs and tradition. This policy generated a strong opposition among the Muslims who remained, on the whole, dedicated to their Islamic values and to their attachment to Universal Islam."[4]

The above mentioned scenario outlines just one of the many ways in which Muslims are set apart from their communist, secular, Han Chinese equivalents. While this differentiation is clear, the demarcation between Uighurs and other Muslim minorities is perhaps less obvious.

Differentiating Uighurs From Other Chinese Muslims

The Uighurs geographic placement in Western Xinjiang has been a major factor in distinguishing them from their Muslim brothers within China. Rich in minerals and estimated to hold one-third of China's oil resources, Xinjiang is becoming an increasingly important area for a country whose voracious appetite for energy sources will soon force the nation to look into domestic supplies rather than importation from unstable areas. The "dangerous separatist" tendencies of the Uighur leave Beijing

[4] Israeli, Raphael. "The Muslim Minority in the People's Republic of China" AsianSurvey. Vol. 21, No. 8 (1981) pp. 903

nervous about the possibility of losing such a vital resource were the province of Xinjiang to successfully break away from China.

Another important aspect of Uighurs concentration in Western Xinjiang is the fact that the Xinjiang region borders many "dangerous areas", mainly Central Asian countries containing large diasporas of Chinese Muslim minorities:

> Indeed, the CCP in power soon realized that the major minority groups dwelled in border areas of the PRC, thus posing a serious problem to its territorial integrity should separatist movements be allowed to voice their grievances against Beijing... China's schism with the Soviet Union, far from closing the ranks of the Chinese with their minorities, on the contrary brought into focus the realization that the problem of national minorities in general, and in the northwest in particular, was inexorably linked with China's national defense. Thus ensuring loyalty to, or at least the passive acceptance of, CCP rule within the minority areas became one of the primary concerns of the communist regime...The specter of any unrest among the...Uighurs of Xinjiang...is enough to raise grave concerns in Beijing.[5]

These border tensions force Beijing to keep a constant watch over the Uighurs, especially in light of their separatist successes in the late 1940's-mid 1950's when Uighur forces declared the Xinjiang region as an independent East Turkestan. The fear of a repeat of these uprisings puts the Uighurs near the top of the list for increased surveillance and oppressive policies.

Yet another reason for there to be increased importance placed on the Uighurs is the volatility of the region created by nuclear testing in Xinjiang. Bitterness towards Chinese authorities has been greatly amplified due to "serious environmental pollution as a result of 20 years of testing of nuclear weapons in the Turfan-Kuerla region and contamination of Lake Bositeng, China's third largest lake," which has become "yet another cause for indigenous resentment and protest against Chinese authority."[6]

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[5] Israeli, Raphael. "The Muslim Minority in the People's Republic of China" AsianSurvey. Vol. 21, No. 8 (1981) pp. 912

[6] Harris, Lillian Craig. "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in The Islamic World" *The China Quarterly.* No. 133 (1993) pp. 117

The list of grievances from the Uighur people is long, but some of the farthest reaching problems have stemmed from the push by Beijing of in-migration of Han people into Uighur-dominated areas. In order to encourage Chinese national "unity" there has been "governmental encouragement of Han migration and settlement into the minority zones. Although immediate assimilation of the minorities was not at hand, the Chinese central administration in this way could reinforce its grip on the peripheral minority areas."[7] This call for Han migration has been met with astounding success: "The Han population rose from roughly two hundred thousand in the mid-1940s to some six and a half million in 1995- an increase from 5% to 38% of the region's population."[8] However, this influx of Han Chinese has created a myriad of problems for the Uighur people that are not met to the same degree by other Muslim minorities.

In terms of farming, for example, Uighurs are now constantly faced with scarcities in resources. One researcher observed "[I]n every rural township I visited around Korla, Aksu, Kashgar, Yecheng, Hetian and Qiemo,...Uighur farmers complained bitterly about the increased scarcity of water created by the influx of Han farmers. Numerous Uighurs from this area share the view that the Han [immigrants] take their limited resources. The allocation of water resources very often leads to conflicts between the two communities."[9] In this way, Han in-migration has presented a direct threat to the Uighurs way of life as well as to the livelihood of their families.

As for education, this has also suffered with the arrival of Han migrants:

> [T]he education system has had to accommodate a growing number of the newcomers' offspring, often at the expense of ethnic-minority students and classes...Degradation of

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[7] Israeli, Raphael. "The Muslim Minority in the People's Republic of China" AsianSurvey. Vol. 21, No. 8 (1981) pp. 911

[8] Bovingdon, Gardner. "The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang" *Modern China.* Vol. 28, No. 1 (2001) pp. 45

[9] Becquelin, Nicolas. "Xinjiang in the Nineties" *The China Journal.* No. 44 (2000) pp.84

> the ethnic-minority educational facilities, increased political pressure on teachers and students, and fewer job prospects make them feel increasingly discriminated against. Only "*minkaohan*" (minority students educated within the regular system) are said to have a reasonable chance of escaping discrimination.[10]

In the same vein, "new restrictions forbid meetings between Muslim clerics and foreigners and prohibit the teaching of sensitive subjects such as Uighur history and the doctrine of *jihad* ("holy war"[11])."[12] Limitations and controls over the practice of Islam and the celebration of Muslim holy days have been a point of contention between the Chinese central leadership and the Uighur people.[13]

All of these issues have combined to make for a very bitter relationship between Uighur people and Han Chinese. The problems stated above have been fomenting almost since Communist liberation in 1949 so that "today, of course, Uyghurs (Uighurs) are painfully aware that Hans look down on them as ill-educated, boorish, violent, and backward."[14] This extreme tension between not only regular Han Chinese migrants and Uighurs, but between Uighurs and the central government in Beijing as well, is yet another factor that sets Uighurs somewhat apart from the other Muslim minorities in China.

Research Design

While much of the above information references Uighur opinion specifically, we must now turn our focus to American and Chinese perceptions of this minority group. In attempting to pinpoint tone changes in media representation of Uighurs, we must identify two specific episodes in modern Uighur history that will serve as observation points.

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[10] Becquelin, Nicolas. "Xinjiang in the Nineties" *The China Journal.* No. 44 (2000) pp.85

[11] It has been suggested that this definition is somewhat imprecise and still contested. The original meaning, which still applies to many today, is "struggle or striving against evil desires and injustices".

[12] Harris, Lillian Craig. "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in The Islamic World" *The China Quarterly.* No. 133 (1993) pp. 121

[13] Israeli, Raphael. "The Muslim Minority in the People's Republic of China" AsianSurvey. Vol. 21, No. 8 (1981) pp. 913

[14] Bovingdon, Gardner. "The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang" *Modern China.* Vol. 28, No. 1 (2001) pp. 51

When precise events are being examined, it will become easier to identify marked shifts in opinion and tone.

The two periods were chosen based on two criteria: 1) Salience of events to an international audience (as measured by the number and frequency of articles available for a certain time period) and 2) time periods that can be marked on each end by a significant event (ie. for the period 2001-2008, 2001 marks the events of 9/11 which this paper proposes may cause a shift in tone of articles about Uighurs, and 2008 is important because of several violent protests leading up to the Olympics as well as the release of Uighur detainees from Guantanamo) with several months before and after so as to be able to better measure for shifts once the event takes place.

Before delineating the first of the two periods which will be observed, it is helpful to understand some of the history preceding those times so as to provide a broader framework for understanding. A defining period in Uighur history was between the years 1944-1955. In 1944 the Uighurs were able to successfully declare independence from China through the help of a Soviet-backed operation, yet in 1949 the area then known as Turkestan was reabsorbed into China. In 1955 the area was reclassified as an autonomous region, a status that it still holds today. Autonomous regions in China were defined as "early as 1952, [when] the Chinese government issued the Program for the Implementation of Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People's Republic of China, which included clear provisions on such important issues as the establishment of ethnic autonomous areas and the composition of organs of self-government, as well as the right of self-government for such organs."[15] Briefly after this period,

[15] Government White Papers "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China, II: The Political Status of Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities and the Establishment of Ethnic Autonomous Areas, (1): The

> [I]n 1962, following attempts to organize communes in Xinjiang, perhaps as many as 80,000 Uighurs and representatives of other nationalities fled the region after mass riots and sought refuge across the border in the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1980s, resistance to Chinese authority has increased, a phenomenon reflected in more careful attention paid to Xinjiang by central Chinese authorities.[16]

It was during those years from the early 1960s to mid 1980s that resentment and unrest was slowly building within Xinjiang until it erupted again in the 1990s. Although it would have been useful to code articles from this time period as well, it was unfortunate that only one newspaper had online records dating that far back in modern history making comparison between papers impossible.

The first period of interest, then, will span from 1990-1998, a time when "the dissatisfaction of the ethnic population, echoed by local cadres, was reflected in a growing number of small-scale, isolated 'sudden incidents' (*tufa shijian*)."[17] Beginning this period of observation in 1990 is important not only because of the heightened media attention towards China following the Tiananmen Square Massacre, but also because the unrest mentioned earlier "came to a head in an insurrection at Baren, a small township near Kashgar in April 1990...The uprising took three days to quell and resulted in more than 30 deaths and numerous casualties. It constituted a turning point in Beijing's suspicions that it faced an ethno-nationalist separatist threat."[18] Significant instances of violence also occurred in 1995 following a political assassination and in 1997 due to mounting tension surrounding the handover of Hong Kong as well as the death of economic reformer Deng Xiaoping. "The provincial governor, Abdulahat Abdurixit, admitted publicly in March 1999 that '[s]ince the start of the 1990s, if you count

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Political Status of Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities " Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, (2005)

[16] Harris, Lillian Craig. "Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in The Islamic World" *The China Quarterly.* No. 133 (1993) pp. 115

[17] Becquelin, Nicolas. "Xinjiang in the Nineties" *The China Journal.* No. 44 (2000) pp.69

[18] Ibid

explosions, assassinations and other terrorist activities, it comes to a few thousand incidents.' In 1998 alone, internal Party sources indicated that over 70 serious incidents occurred, causing more than 380 fatalities; and in the first three months of 1999, 27 incidents were reported with more than a hundred victims."[19] Implicated in several of these violent activities was the CIA, whom some suggest funded a number of the attacks. This covert connection may influence the tone of the American pieces written about Uighurs during this period.

The second and final period will cover 2001-2008. It is during this time that we expect to find a drastic shift in the general attitude of Americans towards Uighurs as reflected by American newspaper articles. During this time period the main events to highlight include the events of 9/11/2001, the 2002 labeling and placement of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement on the international terrorist watch list (the result of a deal made by the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the United States, which would vilify the movement in exchange for support from China to enter into the Iraq War), and the protests and riots (including several fatal attacks by and on Uighurs) during the spring of 2008 leading up to the Beijing Olympics. It is hypothesized in this paper that the importance of this period lies in the drastic attitudinal changes of American media towards fundamentalist Muslim groups immediately following 9/11. This conjecture should be identifiable in news reports as a shift in the negative direction with regards to Uighurs. As for Chinese media sources, it was expected that similar shifts would be revealed, but the propagandistic nature of these news outlets influenced the tone of articles in a much different way.

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[19] Becquelin, Nicolas. "Xinjiang in the Nineties" *The China Journal.* No. 44 (2000) pp.86-87

Research Method-News Sources

In order to begin understanding the articles pulled from the two aforementioned periods, newspaper choices will have to be narrowed so as to condense the sample. The four newspapers that were observed in this study were selected on the basis of three criteria: 1) national importance, as measured by circulation figures; 2) representation of the spectrum of ideological points of view, and 3) coverage extending throughout the periods of history mentioned above (1944-1955, 1990-1998, and 2001-2008) (Petersen, 2005, p. 526-527). Using these standards, the following papers and agencies were chosen:

- *The New York Times*- With a circulation of 1,000,665 daily and 1,438,585 on Sundays, this liberal leaning publication has a long history of reporting from within China as far back as the mid 1800s. *The New York Times* is also an "elite daily newspaper to which both Washington and Beijing pay close attention."[20]
- *The Wall Street Journal*- With a circulation of 2,069,463 daily, this newspaper will offer a more conservative viewpoint when gathering articles. Like *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal* has been reporting from within China since the late 1800s.
- *The China Daily*- This state-run publication established in 1981 is considered the English language mouthpiece for the Chinese government. *The China Daily* has the widest circulation (200,000 per issue, of which a third goes to readers abroad) of any English-language newspaper in the country.
- *Xinhua News Agency*- The official news agency of the People's Republic of China, Xinhua employs 10,000 people and provides up to 25% of the content for such major Chinese papers as *The People's Daily*. Xinhua reports directly to the Communist Party of China's Propaganda Department and Public Information Department.[21]

There are many studies already in existence that have focused on media comparisons and the importance of the media in forming the opinions of those who regularly use

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[20] Li, X., & St Cyr, C. (1998). Human rights in China: A pawn of a political agenda? A content analysis of *The New York Times* (1987-96). Gazette, 60, pp.531

[21] It is important to note that articles written and produced by the *Xinhua News Agency* are primarily meant for foreign consumption and may carry inherent biases in this sense. Many Chinese newspaper alternatives do exist, but a great deal of these papers are produced only on a regional scale. The language barrier was also a factor in choosing news sources as many of the regional papers were solely printed in Chinese with none of the English translations that make *Xinhua* an attractive choice. In terms of time and resources, *Xinhua* became the better alternative.

specific sources (television, newspaper, online blogging, etc.). Some studies focus on linguistic issues, such as Ron Scollon's "Generic variability in news stories in Chinese and English: A contrastive discourse study of five days' newspapers" which primarily highlights subtle differences in how English names are translated into Chinese as well as how quotation formulas are used and what the textual frame means for how and why different word choices might be used.[22] These observations may become useful when using Chinese sources translated into English (such as *The China Daily*).

Another way that these studies are structured is through frame analysis. Framing news stories is an important way of categorizing the "take home message" of different pieces of news and how that frame might appeal to different audiences and how it would translate to those readers. Specific to the aims of this paper are studies that are related to "China specific" frames in American media and how those might alter the overall tone of a piece. "Research on the U.S. newspaper coverage of China has shown the presence of a clear China frame, which has been modified occasionally to fit changes in the elite ideology...the predominant frame in covering China has been that of 'anti-communism'".[23] The anti-communist frame is an important one to understand for this paper since it is hypothesized that an anti-Muslim fundamentalist frame may in fact be strong enough to override the anti-communist frame in the case of post 9/11 attitudes towards both communism and Muslim fundamentalism. Along the same lines, "anti-

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[22] Scollon, R. Generic variability in news stories in Chinese and English: A contrastive discourse study of five days' newspapers. Journal of Pragmatics, 32, (2000) pp. 777

[23] Akhavan-Majid, R., & Ramaprasad, J. Framing and ideology: A comparative analysis of U.S. and Chinese newspaper coverage of the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women and the NGO Forum. Mass Communication and Society, 1, (1998) pp. 135

communism remains an important principle for US media, which use it, in part, to arrive at the distinction between good and evil."[24]

Human rights frames will also be essential when taking into account news stories on the Uighurs since the vast majority of those articles will probably mention human rights violations since examples of those abuses seem to be so readily available in China. "Both the US government and US media marginalize dissent in friendly countries and play up human rights violations in unfriendly and communist countries."[25] Again, it is assumed from this information that human rights violations would be readily highlighted because of their occurrence in a communist country for which we have multiple examples of an anti-communist frame.

A final frame that will be important to keep in mind during the study of the articles presented for this research is the sensationalist frame. "In each society, the political system is a paramount structural apparatus for building its media narrative. The media always favor an unusual event full of drama, suspense, emotion and vivid images."[26] In the case of the articles chosen for this research, they will most generally report on incidences of violence and emotional pain that will surely be picked up on through this frame.

The research discussed above is only a small portion of the larger discourse surrounding the framing of news. Those China-specific frames mentioned above will be helpful in deciphering subtle meanings and tones when analyzing articles, but for our

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[24] Li, X., & St Cyr, C. (1998). Human rights in China: A pawn of a political agenda? A content analysis of *The New York Times* (1987-96). Gazette, 60, pp.533

[25] Li, X., & St Cyr, C. (1998). Human rights in China: A pawn of a political agenda? A content analysis of *The New York Times* (1987-96). Gazette, 60, pp.533

[26] Pan, Z., Lee, C.-C., Chan, J. M., & So, C. Y. K. (1999). One event, three stories: Media narratives of the handover of Hong Kong in cultural China. Gazette, 61, pp.100

purposes the focus will be more on specific news categories, direction (tone), quote sources, and prominence of the piece within the newspaper.

Research Method-Article Coding

After the articles have been gathered from the four news sources previously discussed, each story will be coded for several different variables. First, the individual piece will be placed into its specific news category:

- Politics- Topics relating to diplomatic relations between countries, meetings between international political leaders
- Government- Topics relating to domestic government decisions, convening of domestic government bodies and legislation related to either ethnic minorities or areas that minorities inhabit
- Economics- Topics relating to "Go West!" campaign, foreign direct investment, industrial projects, agricultural output, factory matters, wage disputes, railroads built into Western China, and migrant labor
- Culture- Topics relating to cultural festivals and celebrations, music, and the arts
- Crime/Justice- Topics relating to non-political and political crime, police brutality, law enforcement corruption, and executions
- Unrest- Topics relating to observable tensions that, while not resulting in direct violence, are still significant and highlight strains between ethnicities, religions, etc.
- Tourism/travel- Topics relating to travel to Xinjiang and Uighur dominated areas
- Religion- Topics relating to issues surrounding observance of religious holidays, activities in mosques, reports of those allowed to go on *hajj*, and restrictions on religious activity and movements
- Human Rights- Topics relating to questions about human rights as well as violations of human rights, human rights activists and significant achievements in the realm of human rights
- Military/defense- Topics relating to military exercises, large scale military movement, negotiations and settlements
- Other- Topics relating to issues not covered in the above mentioned categories. These include book reviews, art reviews, editorials, advertisements, obituaries, wedding announcements, dining and other human interest stories.[27] [28]

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[27] Yu, X. What does China want the world to know: A content analysis of CNN World Report sent by the People's Republic of China. Gazette, 58, (1997) pp. 179-180

[28] See appendices for specific numbered coding of each variable

Once the articles are each placed in their specific category, they are then each to be coded for news direction, or tone. "News direction in content analysis refers to the attitude expressed toward any symbol by its user. Expressions of attitude are usually categorized as favorable (positive, supportive), unfavorable (negative, critical), or neutral."[29] For the purposes of this study, we are coding each story as supportive, critical, or neutral:

- Supportive- News stories that show stability and strength in either politics or the economy, as well as unity of society and cooperation among people. "For example, events and incidents which depicted China, or any group or individual as progressive, successful, peace-loving, moral, intelligent, lawful, unified or as exercising leadership."[30]
- Critical- News stories that highlights instability in the political or economic realm as well as weakness, social conflict and disorganization. "For example, events and incidents that depicted China, or any group or individual as backward, domineering, immoral, impractical, unlawful, disunified or lacking in leadership."[31] [32]
- Neutral- News stories that were neither supportive nor critical, due to lack of controversial material.

If there are any sources quoted within the article, those too are to be coded in a specific way. Quotes are first be categorized as either coming from a Chinese, American, Uighur or "Other" source. If the quote comes from a Chinese, American, or Other source, that quote is coded as coming from either:

- Government/military officials
- Academics/experts in the field
- Military/law enforcement officials
- Participants/activists/first hand witnesses
- Others[33]

For Uighur quote sources, because they do not have an independent government or military, their quotes will be coded as coming from either:

- Witnesses (includes interviewees with "every day" occupations)

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[29] Yu, X. What does China want the world to know: A content analysis of CNN World Report sent by the People's Republic of China. Gazette, 58, (1997) pp. 180
[30] Ibid
[31] Ibid
[32] See appendices for specific numbered coding of each variable
[33] Ibid

- Activists (includes pro-Uighur religious figures)
- Other [34]

Lastly, the articles are coded for factual information that can help to identify the prominence of the article within the publication. This result can then be used to recognize how important that news was deemed to share with the American public. The aspects of the article that will be coded include:

- Article title
- Name of newspaper/magazine
- Year
- Date
- Number of paragraphs/words in article
- Article placement (front page, back page, etc.)[35]

For articles that fall into the "Section A" category, the specific page number will also be coded for. For articles in any other section the specific page number will not be recorded.

By coding for all of the different aspects of the articles as mentioned above, we expect to notice a marked shift in tone as well as sources consulted and prominence of the story within both American and Chinese news sources. Hypothesized here is the idea that post-9/11, there may be more mention within the articles of religion, more articles categorized as military and political (as opposed to cultural or tourism), more articles that fall into the critical grouping rather than supportive or neutral, and greater prominence in placement in the newspaper due to the increased interest in Muslim fundamentalism.

American Newspaper Data Analysis

For this portion of our analysis, *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* were observed. Between the two papers, 270 articles were read and coded, providing a wide sample from which to draw inferences about tone change in the articles.

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[34] Ibid
[35] See appendices for specific numbered coding of each variable

In terms of the attitudes of the articles observed, there was a higher percentage of negatively coded articles in *The Wall Street Journal* than in *The New York Times*, a possible reflection of the more conservative viewpoint towards Muslim fundamentalism:

The New York Times			*The Wall Street Journal*		
Attitude	# of Articles	% of Total	Attitude	# of Articles	% of Total
(Supportive) 1	66	32%	1	15	21%
(Critical) 2	9	4%	2	9	13%
(Neutral) 3	126	62%	3	45	65%

In each case there was a high percentage of neutral news articles. For this neutral category, while many stories did simply use unbiased language, there was a surprisingly large number of pieces that alternately used very negative language in reference to the Uighurs, but then in an effort to present the opposing view, also presented a great deal of supportive language. In the cases where both supportive and negative word choices were used, the article was coded as neutral.

More important than the total percentage of negative and supportive news articles, however, is where those negative news articles were found within the overall narrative of newspaper articles. A major finding of this study was that, in both cases, an overwhelming majority of the negative news pieces were found immediately following 9/11/2001. In both newspapers, the articles in the month of September were almost all negative, but once October began the articles published had more or less settled back into a more neutral area. Again, many of these neutrally coded articles did tend to outline both negative and supportive viewpoints rather than simple facts that would allow the readers to form their own opinion. In the table below, a chronological portion is pulled from the coded sample to highlight tonal changes in the period between April 23, 2001 and

December 7, 2001. In it we see the article titles, the dates of their publication, and the corresponding number used to code for either supportive, critical, or neutral tone.[36]

The New York Times

Wang Enmao 87, Who Ruled A Rebellious Chinese Province	2001	23-Apr	3
Discover China In the New Century	2001	10-Jun	1
World Briefing	2001	29-Jun	3
Being the Host Keeps the Pressure on China	2001	14-Jul	3
United States Backs Plan to Help Chinese Evade Government Censorship of Web	2001	30-Aug	3
Waiting Nervously for Response	**2001**	**16-Sep**	**2**
Taliban Enlisting Eager Recruits of Many Lands	**2001**	**28-Sep**	**2**
Fearing Unrest, China Presses Muslim Group	2001	5-Oct	1
China Seeks World Support in Fight With Its Muslim Separatists	2001	12-Oct	1
The War, The Press and Bin Laden	2001	12-Oct	1
Bush Meets Jiang	2001	20-Oct	1
Feverish Protests Against the West Trace to Grievances Ancient and Modern	2001	22-Oct	3
UN Official Fears China Uses Terror War as Front for Abuses	2001	10-Nov	1
China Wary on Middle East, Criticizing Both Palestinians and Israelis	2001	5-Dec	3
Eons of Tension Crowd a Remote Chinese Tomb	2001	6-Dec	3
US Official Praises China for Its Cooperation in Rooting Out bin Laden's Terror Network	2001	7-Dec	1

Although only two of the articles are negatively coded, this still represents a large shift considering that before this point only four articles had been coded negatively from 1990-1998. It also seems that the events of 9/11 may be a direct cause for this shift. The example set by *The New York Times* is made even more apparent when observations are made of *The Wall Street Journal*:

[36] See appendices for specific numbered coding of each variable

The Wall Street Journal

China Pursues a Great Games of Its Own- Seeking Political Stability And Energy, Beijing Courts Central Asia	2001	14-Jun	1
Bloc Including China, Russia, Challenges U.S. in Central Asia- Members Agree to Combat Militant Islamic Groups and Share Intelligence	2001	18-Jun	1
China, in Strategy to Fight Separatists, Cultivates Taliban	**2001**	**13-Sep**	**2**
Where Do the Critical Players in an Afghan Attack Stand? From the UAE to China, Nations in the Region Have Range of Interests	**2001**	**18-Sep**	**2**
War Aims	**2001**	**20-Sep**	**2**
Trade is China's Carrot to Muslim Separatists- Beijing Paris Commerce, Political Crackdown In Restive Xinjiang	**2001**	**21-Sep**	**2**
Beijing to Get Still Tougher on Separatists- For US, China's Help In Fighting Terrorism Carries Its Own Price	2001	12-Oct	3
Pacific Nations Will Seek US Leadership in Shanghai	2001	16-Oct	1
China Sees More Extremists Being Trained by bin Laden- Beijing Raises Its Estimate Of Domestic Separatists With Afghan Link to 1,000	2001	12-Nov	3
China Provides Extensive Breifing on Spearatists in Xinjiang Province	2001	15-Nov	2
China Monitors Muslims to Avert Protests- But Beijing Adds Efforts to Explain Support For War in Afghanistan	2001	23-Nov	3

Again, all articles immediately following 9/11 are negatively coded and only after the initial hysteria of that month died down did the articles again seem to assume a more neutral stance. Also, it is important to note that these four negative articles make up 50% of the total negative articles coded over the years 2001-2008 and all four are found within this one month alone. These findings seem to indicate that the events of 9/11 did have a strong impact on the initial reporting of Uighurs and that the anti-Muslim fundamentalist frame did in fact trump the anti-Communist frame during this episode.

As for news categories, *The New York Times* generally gave a more broad overview of topics related to Uighurs with many articles related to travel and food as opposed to unrest and human rights. *The Wall Street Journal*, on the other hand, focused almost solely on issues of unrest, human rights, and politics.


New York Times # of Articles
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Politics
Government
Economy
Military
Unrest
Crime
Tourism
Culture
Religion
Human Rights
Other


Wall Street Journal # of Articles
25
20
15
10
5
0
Politics
Government
Economy
Military
Unrest
Crime
Tourism
Culture
Religion
Human Rights
Other

Prevalence of stories in the actual newspaper was also indicative of a shift in trends of perceptions towards Uighurs following 9/11. In *The New York Times* a total of 63% of stories fell into Section A, and of those 39% were found in pages 1-5 of A. Many of the articles that were not published in Section A were found instead in human interest sections such as Travel, Dining, Weekend, etc. This can be compared to 2001 alone when 55% of the articles were in Section A.

Conversely, *The Wall Street Journal* actually did little to no reporting of Uighurs pre-9/11. What stories were published only briefly mentioned Uighurs as part of a broader narrative about economy in Central Asia, political relationships with Russia, etc. So between 2001 and 2008, coverage of Uighurs virtually exploded with 94% of stories found in Section A. Of those, only 36% were in pages 1-5. In 2001 a full 100% of articles related to Uighurs were in Section A.

As for length of the articles in each newspaper, there was a large variance in number of paragraphs. In *The New York Times* some stories ran as long as 78 paragraphs, but those lengthier articles were generally attached to special sub sections of the newspaper that read more like magazine feature stories. The shortest articles were only one line (coded as one paragraph). These were mostly found in the "Corrections" sections of the newspaper. Overall, the average number of paragraphs in each *New York Times* story was 17.2 paragraphs while the median was 15.

The Wall Street Journal ran slightly shorter stories in general, with none exceeding 52 paragraphs. Again, one line (coded as one paragraph) articles were common in "Corrections" or "World-Wide" portions of the newspaper. The average number of

paragraphs for stories related to Uighurs in *The Wall Street Journal* was 13.2 paragraphs, and the median was 10.

Numbers and statistics aside, there were also a great deal of interesting variations in general word choices between the two newspapers when covering the Uighur minority. *The Wall Street Journal* was much more likely to use language such as "violent separatism", "assassinations", "jihadis" and "Muslim fundamentalism" when describing Uighurs. The newspaper also commonly made connections between the Uighurs and al-Qaeda and often commented on how Uighurs were in direct contact with Osama bin-Laden. These kinds of inferences were sure to raise negative images in the minds of readers, thereby swaying them to formulate a more negative overall viewpoint of Uighurs. However, *The Wall Street Journal* did provide several very supportive articles, especially when written reference to human rights abuses or protests prior to the Olympics.

The New York Times seemed to take a softer approach and appeared careful not to make hasty connections between Uighurs and terrorist groups and other violent insurgencies. In fact, the largest difference found between the two newspapers was the careful attention paid by *The New York Times* towards differentiating between the Uighur ethnic minority, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). When violence in Uighur-dominated areas was discussed it was almost always in reference to the actions of the ETIM which, while made up of Uighurs, does not by any means involve *all* Uighurs.[37] *The Wall Street Journal* rarely made any such distinction, but in most articles

[37] This in turn raises larger questions about the actual percentage involvement of Uighurs in the ETIM as well as the possible percentages of Uighurs actively practicing Islam. In the same vein, it would be useful to have numbers or percentages related to how many Uighurs are not practicing or are less devout. Unfortunately, further research is needed to ascertain these results.

The New York Times made sure to articulate the difference. By choosing not to highlight this difference, *The Wall Street Journal* may have created negative opinions about Uighurs as an entire minority rather than dividing it into its component parts. Because of the choice not to make this distinction, Uighurs were seen as negative and the articles were coded accordingly.

American Newspaper Conclusions

The evidence gathered from newspaper articles in *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* conclusively substantiated the hypothesis that media perceptions of Uighurs did change following the events of 9/11. While these opinions were not sustained over time, there was still an obvious shift immediately following 9/11. What *was* sustained, however, was interest in the Uighur minority. Following 9/11, there were regularly published articles and consistent coverage, whereas in the years before 2001, there had only been sporadic news related to the Uighurs.

What was most important in developing observable trends was not necessarily numbers, however, but rather the subtleties of language and word choice found in the articles. As discussed above, negative sounding word choices and connections made to terrorist organizations made a great deal of difference in the overall tone of the description of the perceptions and attitudes presented about the Uighur minority. These word choices were influenced by political climate as well as popular public opinion at the time, but ideology also seemed to play a role.

Additional research is needed to verify these claims. Coding articles from more newspapers will provide additional information to authenticate the findings of this paper.

With the evidence available, however, the data do point to a shift, albeit a small one, due to the events of 9/11.

Chinese News Sources Data Analysis

Moving on to the Chinese news sources that were observed for this paper, we see a much different set of results and approach to portraying the Uighur minority. Differences are apparent primarily due to the fact that China's media freedom has been some of the most restrictive in the world. In fact, in the 2008 Press Freedom Index, China was ranked as 167 of 173 (or 6 countries up from the worst media censorship in the world), while the United States came in at 43 out of 173. This fact must be taken into account when analyzing the results obtained from coding of Chinese newspapers. Several of the problems associated with using heavily censored newspaper articles will be discussed further below.

The two news sources that were coded were *The China Daily* and the *Xinhua News Agency*. *The People's Daily* (or *Renmin Ribao*) was also coded, but unfortunately only a small sample of articles was available (9 in total) in English translated form. Because the sample for *The People's Daily* was so small in comparison with the other sources, the results were inconclusive and therefore left out of the final analysis.

In *The China Daily*, a total of 149 articles were coded. An initial search for the keyword "Uighur" in the LexisNexis database resulted in 782 related articles. By adding the search keywords of "ethnic" and "minority" the sample was reduced to a total of 110 articles. Downsizing the sample in this way was important because it eliminated potentially irrelevant articles that may only use the word "Uighur" in the context of the "Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region," which is often used in reference to oil pipelines

that run through the area. Since the Uighur minority specifically was the focus, these types of extraneous articles were removed from the sample. Another sample was also added to the initial total of 110 articles, that being a sample where the keyword "terrorism" was added to that of "Uighur". Several of the articles had appeared in the first sample set and were therefore not coded a second time. Despite some overlap, the final sample size became 149 articles.

Similarly, in the *Xinhua News Agency*, 156 articles were coded using the same sampling method. The initial result after searching for "Uighur" alone yielded 977 results. By adding "ethnic" and "minority," this sample too was reduced to a smaller size of 155. A search for "Uighur" and "terrorism" produced 59 results. Due to the fact that many articles in this database were duplicates as well as the fact that there was a strong overlap between articles tagged with the word terrorism and those already found in the first sample, the final count was 156 articles.

Of all of these articles, the breakdown by article type was as follows:


China Daily Article Topics
Number of Articles
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Politics
Government
Economy
Culture
Crime/Justice
Unrest
Tourism
Religion
Human Rights
Military
Other
Article Type
Series1


Xinhua News Agency Article Topics
Number of Articles
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Politics
Government
Economy
Culture
Crime/Justice
Unrest
Tourism
Religion
Human Rights
Military
Other
Article Types
Series1

In *The China Daily,* there was a disproportionate number of articles related to issues of culture and fine arts. Within this category were many news pieces regarding the resurgence of Uighur ethnic music and dance as well as the importance of Uighur cultural festivals and foods. In total, 33 of the 149 articles, or 22% of all the articles in *The China Daily* were cultural in nature. The "Other" category also yielded quite high results due to the large number of human interest stories that fell into this grouping. Article types that were coded as "Other" included pieces on foreign education, AIDS awareness, genealogy, natural disasters, philanthropy projects, and daredevil performances.

Articles on human rights and unrest, the categories that were most highly cited in *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*, remained the lowest of all article types written on in *The China Daily*. Those articles that did pertain to human rights were generally related to the Chinese government's reactions to human rights pieces on China written by the American government or Western European powers. Almost all other human rights articles were Chinese government press releases on the state of human rights in China- an assessment that always proved to be positive. The situation with the *Xinhua News Agency* proved to be somewhat different in terms of article type breakdown, but like its counterparts in *The China Daily*, still relied heavily on cultural pieces and human interest stories. The one major difference was the number of government-related articles (44 out of 156 or 28%). The reason for this increase in reporting of government legislation was due to the meticulous reporting done of each legislative decree related to minority people as well as the extensive coverage given to government aid packages that would increase education opportunities for Uighurs as well as to expand their religious freedoms. New campaigns and legislative meetings were given a great deal of attention

and therefore raised the number of articles related to government. The "Other" category in the *Xinhua News Agency* dealt with a wide variety of issues within the news source. Some of the topics found in this group dealt with study abroad experiences, general health, archaeology, celebrations of the founding of different counties, and the announcements of translations of various textbooks and speeches into Uighur.

Looking now at the tone of the articles that were coded, we see results that are vastly different from those found in the American newspapers above. Rather than a variance in articles that were coded, we see instead that the articles were almost exclusively supportive or neutral, and even those that were coded as neutral could in many cases also be seen as somewhat positive, a problem that will be discussed later on. The final breakdown and percentages of supportive, critical, and neutral articles are as follows for both *The China Daily* and the *Xinhua News Agency*:

The China Daily

Attitude	# of articles	% of total
(Supportive)1	82	55%
(Critical) 2	6	4%
(Neutral) 3	62	41%

Xinhua News Agency

Attitude	# of articles	% of total
1	72	46%
2	0	0%
3	84	54%

The numbers of supportive articles appear to be shockingly high, especially when compared with *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal,* whom hardly had a third of their articles falling into the supportive category. The reason for these high numbers of supportive articles appears to be due to the propaganda nature of both *The China Daily* and the *Xinhua News Agency*. Being closely monitored by the central government appeared to produce a certain type of story and with these two news sources as examples that clearly seemed to be the case. While not necessarily supportive of the

Uighurs in many of the articles coded, the tone was definitely supportive of the government and their concerted efforts to "improve" the lives of the Uighurs. The majority of the articles extolled the benevolence of the central government for ensuring a myriad of religious rights, cultural preservation projects, and economic campaigns to bring in more foreign direct investment, therby raising the standard of living of the Uighurs. A counter argument was never produced, and the assumption was that all Uighurs wholeheartedly accepted the influx of Han migrants and the "respect" shown for their religion and ethnic traditions in terms of education, food preferences, etc. Of course, as discussed previously, there are many Uighurs who do not look at these "advancements" as gifts at all, but rather something that is being forced upon them.

In this sense, it seems that these articles should be coded as neutral since they deal more with praising the government than the Uighurs, yet thinking back to the original criteria for coding an article as supportive, we must remember that a supportive article is one that covers "[n]ews stories that show stability and strength in either politics or the economy, as well as unity of society and cooperation among people. [Supportive articles include] 'For example, events and incidents which depicted China, or any group or individual as progressive, successful, peace-loving, moral, intelligent, lawful, unified or as exercising leadership.'"[38]

Chinese News Source Conclusions

Indeed, one of the major themes in the Chinese articles discussing Uighurs was the idea that they are all united as a "peaceful and harmonious" people who gladly welcome the Han Chinese and think of them as part of their larger family. Blanket

[38] Yu, X. What does China want the world to know: A content analysis of CNN World Report sent by the People's Republic of China. Gazette, 58, (1997) pp. 179-180

statements were also commonly used to describe ethnic minorities as a single, united force with common interests and goals that run in line with those of the Chinese central government. This method became most frequently seen in articles related to separatism in Xinjiang. Several quotes include,

> Ethnic groups in China firmly oppose separatist activity since it runs counter to historical values, violates Chinese law and is against the common will of the people, a senior officer in charge of ethnic minority affairs said yesterday.[39]
>
> Xinjiang is now getting more stable, as people of all ethnic groups in the region were "resolvedly" opposed to any separatist and terrorist activities.[40]
>
> "Terrorists are now hated and detested in Xinjiang," regional Chairman Ismail Tiliwaldi said. "They are like rats running onto the street, and everyone is screaming: 'Smash them!'"[41]
>
> (In reference to the World Uyghur [Uighur] Youth Congress) [t]he terrorist groups are meeting in Munich with other "Eastern Turkistan" separatist forces in order to set up a unified organization for terrorist and separatist activities, which not only endangers China's ethnic unity and security, but also poses a potential threat to world peace and stability.[42]

In all of these examples, the readers are given the impression that all Uighurs and other related ethnic groups are in a firm alliance to expose and crush any separatist or terrorist force in the Xinjiang region, despite the reality that some Uighurs within China are involved in the ETIM, the main terrorist group that is referenced in *The China Daily* as well as *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal.* The World Uyghur Youth Congress (which was also referenced above) however, has primarily been a peaceful organization aimed at discussion as evidenced by their mission statement which reads: "The main objective of the World Uyghur Congress is to promote democracy, human rights and freedom for the Uyghur people and use peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic

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[39] *China Daily*, "Minorities Experience Progress" March 1, 2005
[40] *China Daily*, "Noose Tightening on Xinjiang Terrorists" March 10, 2007
[41] *China Daily*, "Xinjiang Cracks Down on Terrorist Threat" August 26, 2005
[42] *China Daily*, "German Police Urged to Curb Terrorists" April 17, 2004

means to determine their political future."[43] Yet it, too, is demonized as a force attempting to break apart the unity and harmony supposedly enjoyed by all Uighurs and other ethnic groups in China.[44] It is important to note that a similar tactic has been used with regards to the Tibetan situation. In articles on that topic the Dalai Lama is the one consistently targeted as an evil, "splittist" force, with aims to bring Tibetans back to a feudal state. Yet, according to those same articles, all Tibetans are resolutely determined to keep the Dalai Lama's influence out of their region and to continue living their happy lives.[45] [46]

There does seem to be one positive outcome of this type of delineation between separatist forces and Uighur nationalism, however. Whereas in *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal,* we saw at times that Uighurs were automatically implicated in any kind of action taken by the ETIM, in *The China Daily* and the *Xinhua News Agency* we see instead an almost painful attention to detail in the sense that whenever the ETIM is mentioned, soon after there follows a sort of disclaimer that the Uighur minority is in no way in alliance with that force. If a Uighur was involved in an attack by the ETIM, the author was quick to make the distinction that Uighurs despised the ETIM and that this particular culprit must have been some sort of outlier.

It appears that there may be several propaganda related reasons for this firm delineation rather than what American audiences might see as something closer to "political correctness." By creating a firm line between the two groups (Uighur and

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[43] World Uyghur Congress, http://www.uyghurcongress.org/En/AboutWUC.asp?mid=1095738888, (2005)
[44] *China Daily*, "German Police Urged to Curb Terrorists" April 17, 2004
[45] *Xinhua News Agency*, "Can Dalai Lama's Lie Deceive the World For Long?" March 29,2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/29/content_11092239.htm
[46] Xinhua News Agency, "Dalai Lama's utter distortion of Tibet history" March 11,2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/11/content_10987232.htm

ETIM) the Chinese central government seems to have found an effective tool in vilifying a small and obscure faction while continuing to give the impression that Uighurs are pleased with their situation, thereby possibly keeping racial tensions at a low. Were the articles instead written in a way that demonized the entire Uighur population as ungrateful with separatist tendencies, this tone might create an ingrained distrust of Uighurs within other Chinese people, raising ethnic tensions and the possibility for internal conflict. The depiction of Uighurs having the full backing and support of the central government also creates the image for readers that were a Uighur to seem dissatisfied with his or her position in life, it must be due to ungratefulness and ignorance, not the consistent inequalities and repression that we see exposed in academic scholarship on the subject. In both of these ways the readership of *The China Daily* and the *Xinhua News Agency* is left with a positive feeling about the state of domestic unity in China and a warm feeling towards minority people, many of which do not return or share the sentiment.

It was for all of the above reasons that coding for the tone of articles became difficult and vague at points. What was also made complicated by this overly positive approach was the identification of any sort of attitudinal shifts post 9/11. This shift, unfortunately, became almost impossible to measure due to the fact that only one (*Xinhua News Agency*) of the sources offered articles pre-2002. However, the trend suggests that even if those articles had been available in *The China Daily*, the content and attitudinal approach would have been fairly consistent, if not the same, as the trends that were discussed above. One item of note in this regard, however, is that even though the *Xinhua News Agency* provided articles starting in 1997, the ETIM is still not mentioned once

until 2002 when articles relating to the group began to become more frequent. This absence of reporting suggests that either the existence of the group was kept quiet (though this is unlikely, given the public statements made by Xinjiang officials about death tolls and terrorist attacks pre-2002) or the fact that the ETIM has historically been somewhat loosely organized made the central government unwilling to entertain the possibility that the ETIM could ever be a plausible threat. Many scholars in the field allude to the idea that the ETIM could very well not even exist anymore due to its already disorganized leadership and faction-like system management. These assumptions, of course, require further field research to come to any concrete conclusion as the nature of the ETIM and the Chinese central governments willingness to talk about them.

It is unfortunate that a post 9/11 shift was incalculable due to lack of information, yet a great deal of insight can still be gained from reading and understanding the propaganda approach of *The China Daily* and the *Xinhua News Agency.* The position of *The China Daily* and the *Xinhua News Agency* was definitely affected by its close connection with the central government, but it was that approach to the Uighur minority that was eye-opening and suggested that further questions must be answered regarding the style and use of Chinese propaganda and its effect on its populace.

Areas for Further Research

Other areas where further research could be conducted are related to collection of data, particularly with reference to the Chinese news sources. The way the data is organized in LexisNexis meant that there was no available page or section numbers; thereby making coding for prominence impossible. Word counts were obtainable but difficult to compare next to number of paragraphs as presented in the American

newspaper articles. Also, in future studies it would be useful to create a category for "government documents," as those seemed to disproportionately fill the "Other" section in the Chinese news source coding portion.

Availability of articles was also a hindrance in collecting data. Originally three time periods were coded for instead of two, the third being from 1944-1955. Unfortunately, only *The New York Times* carried consistent coverage of the Uighurs during this time. *The People's Daily* turned up a disappointingly small portion of articles to code, which was especially regrettable since the addition of a third paper to each category (*The Chicago Tribune* would be added to the American newspaper sample) would have created a better sample from which to draw results.

Also, as articles were coded during this study, it became increasingly apparent that comparing American coverage of an international issue with Chinese coverage of a domestic issue was simply not comparable. The majority of American readership has no experience with Chinese ethnic minorities and therefore must be more broadly informed. While American articles may more balanced, they are also missing in complexities of the situation and tend to lump some categories together unnecessarily to the detriment of overall understanding. These results pertaining to anti-Muslim fundamentalist frames in fact raised other questions related to how American news media differs in its coverage of Muslim fundamentalism on both a domestic and an international level. Conversely, if measuring from a Chinese Communist standpoint, perhaps coverage would also differ if the Muslim fundamentalist in question was found outside of China. Unfortunately, as this study stands now, the information, particularly with regards to article type, is somewhat skewed since we are dealing with domestic treatment of a domestic issue from the

Chinese side, and international treatment of an issue that is both domestically Chinese and internationally related at the same time.

Yet another group of questions that is raised by this study have to do with the influence of new media. While coding articles from these newspapers have resulted in interesting findings, to what extent do they actually affect a population, and to what extent are these words even read? Internet blogging, online forums, round the clock television updates, etc. are becoming increasingly attractive ways to gather news while newspapers consistently decline in circulation.[47] Does mixed media have the potential to make these types of studies obsolete?

Despite these problems and areas in need of further research, there were still important findings, particularly from the American media side. Small yet discernable shifts were seen in article tone as evidenced by newspaper treatment and prominence of the articles in the American newspapers. While similar shifts were not observable in the Chinese media, it was precisely that absence of shift which made the Chinese case an interesting one. In this situation, the effects of propaganda as a political tool have yet to be completely realized, but in time perhaps similar studies can shed some light on the issue. One can hope that advances in the liberalization of the Chinese media will lead to a more realistic treatment of the Uighur minority in China and that that increased awareness will in turn create more pragmatic and reasonable legislation and general approaches to the Uighur people. Though the American media may be a more balanced source as compared to its Chinese counterpart, we are now also aware of the inherent

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[47] Perez-Pena, Richard. *The New York Times*, "Newspaper Circulation Continues to Decline Rapidly" Oct 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/business/media/28circ.html

flaws in its reporting of international news in which there is often required a subtle understanding and nuanced perception of the issues at hand.

Codebook

Article Page Number

*1= Section A (for early newspaper articles with no sections, pages 1-5)
2= Section B (for early newspaper articles with no sections, pages 6-15)
3= Section C (for early newspaper articles with no sections, pages 16-25)
4= Section D (for early newspaper articles with no sections, pages 24 and up)
5= Section E
6= Other (including special supplemental sections with no letter section labeling)

*For articles in Section A, the page number within Section A was also recorded

Category

1= Politics
2= Government
3= Economy
4= Military
5= Unrest
6= Crime
7= Tourism
8= Culture
9= Religion
10= Human Rights
11= Other

Attitude

1= Supportive
2= Critical
3= Neutral

Quote

1= Yes

2= No

Quote Source

1= Chinese

2= American

3= Uighur

4= Other

5= Quotes from Multiple Sources

If 1 (Chinese), 2 (American) or 4 (Other):

1= Government Official

2= Military Official

3= Expert/Academic

4= Activist

5= Other

If 3 (Uighur):

1=Witness

2= Activist

3= Other

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