The philosophy of mind has historically been concerned to a large part with two central phenomenon of human experience. The first is the intentionality of our mental states, the fact that they seem to be meaningful. The second is the fact that humans are conscious beings. Not only do we receive and process information, we seem to be aware of the experiences which constitute our input and are cognizant and in control of many of the processes which are performed upon this information. It is of obvious interest how we manage to have intentional mental states and be conscious beings. Traditional discussion of these phenomena has usually relied upon the postulation of a mind which implies a dualist ontology. The presumption of a mind, which is composed of non-physical, mental, substance makes these problems relatively easy to solve. Mental substance which is by nature unobservable can serve just about any purpose which we can imagine for it, including possesing meaning and constituting consciousness.



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