Honors Projects

Searle and the Nonderivability Thesis

Rick Harrison — Wed, 11 May 2011 14:00:32 PDT

This paper contributes to the defense of the nonderivability thesis; that is, the thesis that no set of purely descriptive statements can entail an evaluative statement. Thus, it is impossible to give objective justification of any value judgment.

Can We Communicate Ultimate Reality?

David M. Newcomer — Wed, 11 May 2011 14:00:31 PDT

This paper examines the function of communication, philosophy, and religion and moreover, their necessity to the awareness of being.

The Atonement in Modern Thought

Martha Ellen Perry — Wed, 11 May 2011 14:00:29 PDT

This paper compares Rudolph Bultmann and Emil Brunner, and combines and analyzes existentialism, theology, and demythologizing.

Epistemology in western thought

Richard Harold Higgs — Wed, 17 Mar 2010 06:55:17 PDT

This paper begins with a study of the philosophical thought preceding Platonism and Aristotlianism [sic], in order that we might have a clear understanding of the issues with which these two men dealt. It is essential for us to understand Platonism and Aristotlianism [sic] for two reasons: first, it is within the framework of thought of these two men that succeeding philosophy has largely worked; secondly, if one understands the issues with which these men struggled, he will understand the issues with which modern philosophy deals. Therefore, some space in the paper has been allotted to the thought of these men.

Physicalism and Phenomenal Experience

Nicholas Timme '08 — Tue, 07 Oct 2008 14:29:10 PDT

Within this paper a physicalist account of phenomenal experience is presented in a roughly four part process. First, Levine's "explanatory gap" and Kripke's argument against type-identity physicalism are presented as examples of anti-physicalist arguments to be countered. Kripke's arguments request an explanation for the felt contingency of the statement 'pain is C-fiber firing.' Levine's explanatory gap is the inability of statements like 'pain is C-fiber firing' to explain within physicalist theories why C-fiber firing feels like pain. In the second part a physicalist account ofphenomenal experience is presented. This account relies upon a formalization of the mereological structure of events. A relation between events called the 'observation relation' is introduced and used to formalize observations made in everyday life. In the third step this account of events is used to defeat Kripke's argument and Levine's explanatory gap. Kripke's argument is overcome by providing an explanation for the felt contingency ofthe statement 'pain is C-fiber firing.' Levine's explanatory gap is defeated by clarifying the question "Why do C-fiber firings feel like pain?" and showing that asking this question is essentially inappropriate. Thus, the physicalist's inability to explain why C-fiber firings feel like pain is not a failing of physicalism. In the fourth part the physicalist theory of phenomenal experience is compared to some classic views of phenomenal experience from Rosenthal, Nagel, and Dennett.

Demonstratives and Cognitive Significance

Adam Simon '08 — Tue, 07 Oct 2008 14:29:09 PDT

As interesting as it is, my aim in this paper, however, is not to mark the various trends that have come and gone in the history of semantics. Rather, I consider how semantics has treated a small portion of language that involving demonstrative expressions in order to flesh out how semantics simpliciter has fallen on a mistake; or more accurately, a misdiagnosis. This misdiagnosis has either led incorrect semantic treatments of demonstratives, or has created a "shadow-sickness"; which is bound to be left untreated b)' any account semantics can give, because those accounts process machinery ill-equipped to deal with such a sickness. To push the medical metaphor a bit further, the former result of the misdiagnosis is like the doctor who, after being mislead by one of a patient's symptoms, is led to offer the wrong method of treatment. The latter result of the misdiagnosis is like the specialized doctor who, upon encountering a patient with two distinct illnesses, is misled into trying to treat both illnesses; though one happens to be outside of her specialization.

How To Account For Externalist and Internalist Intuitions

Denise Yehnert '91 — Tue, 07 Oct 2008 14:29:08 PDT

In his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Laurence Bonjour criticizes advocates of externalist versions of foundationalism. According to Bonjour, "externalism reflects an inadequate appreciation of the problem at which it is aimed."l With this in mind, Bonjour sets out to argue that externalism is not an acceptable theory for the foundationalist to appeal to in his attempt to solve the regress problem. In order to avoid a complete stalemate over doctrine, Bonjour's attempt to argue that externalism is unacceptable proceeds as an appeal to intuition. As such he allows that"although this intuition may not constitute a conclusive objection to the view, it is enough... to place the burden of proof squarely on the externalist." Bonjour's criticism is aimed at the externalist conception of justification. I contend that Bonjour's demand of proof can be met by the externalist. Moreover, as I shall argue, the proper conception of justification involves the use of both internalist and externalist requirements. To establish my contention I shall draw the internalist/externalist distinction with regard to justification and examine the intuitive strengths of each. Having completed these tasks we shall find that a proper epistemology incorporates a level distinction between non-epistemological claims on the first level and epistemological claims on the second level. Justification on the first level, I shall argue, warrants externalist requirements, while justification on the second level warrants internalist requirements.

The Role of Fault in Defensive Killing

Adam Betz '06 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:41 PDT

This paper deals with the conditions of liability to self-defense. When I use the term liability, I mean moral liability. This is different from desert. If I am liable to be killed in self-defense, it does not follow that I deserve to be killed (say, as a means of punishment). In short, desert entails liability but liability does not entail desert. My use of the term in this paper may be stated succinctly as follows: if killing a person will neither wrong him nor violate his rights, he is morally liable to be killed. A person poses an unjust threat when he threatens harms that are neither justified nor excused. A person is culpable for an unjust threat if he intends the threat he poses, is a morally responsible agent, and there are no mitigating circumstances, such as duress, that excuse his actions. A person is at fault, but not culpable, for an unjust threat if he is a morally responsible agent, has acted unreflectively, recklessly, though not maliciously, in a way that poses risks to others. Though culpability entails fault, fault does not entail culpability; as I will explain later, a person does not have to be culpable in order to be at fault for an unjust threat.

Paternalism: A Search for Acceptable and Applicable Principles of Intervention

Jennifer L. Browning '93 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:40 PDT

At seven-thirty-one A.M. on Saturday morning I am awakened by a phone call from mom, "Oh honey--it's a beautiful sunny day that knew you wouldn't want to sleep through. Now that you are awake go outside and breathe the morning air....No, no, that's ok, I'll wait...you go ahead and do that.." After I breathe and get mom off the phone I reach over and turn on my stereo. As New Age music fills the room I remember when my roommate switched the George Winston music I fall asleep to with a subliminal weight-loss tape. (I lost five pounds that week--gained it back plus five more the next week). I grab my shoes and head toward the door--I don't want to be late for skydiving class--but as I am leaving my friend W. pulls into the driveway blocking my car. She jumps out, pulls me into her car and drives away, saying "Skydiving is for dangerous fools. I am taking you to play bingo instead."

More than likely you or I would not wake up to a day like this one, but the example is meant to illustrate something important. Paternalism is a common phenomenon, one we probably encounter more often than we realize. Even though we do not always realize them as such, thoughts and judgments on paternalism are employed in decisions we make in day-to-day situations about how to treat people. An investigation of this liberty-limiting principle, then, should be of practical interest to everyone, not just philosophers interested in theory. I will investigate the subject of paternalism by looking at a variety of definitions and examples, exploring the autonomy-based antipaternalist positions of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, and finally, incorporating the ideas of Christine Korsgaard, a neo-Kantian philosopher, on personal identity into an argument for a Kantian version of respect for autonomy. Finally, I will present some general guidelines for paternalistic interference that can be applied practically.

Kuhn's Model of Revolutionary Science: Evidence for a Coherence Criteria of Truth

Angela Burnette '97 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:39 PDT

Kuhn argues that a paradigm generally emerges from among such competing schools as the result of a particularly attractive or powerful accomplishment that places one school in a better position than the others. With the establishment and common acceptance of one particular theoretical structure, researchers can direct their observations and experiments in accordance with the ontological and methodological landscape provided by the agreed upon paradigm. Under such guidance, scientists are in a position to judge the value of various observations, and delineate between important lines of investigation and those without promise. Thus normal science, in contrast to its "immature" precursor, is characterized as purposeful, directed, and capable of advancement just in light of the fact that a paradigm exists as a qualifying standard.

Minding the Mental: Intentionality, Consciousness, and Daniel Dennett in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

Matthew T. Dusek '97 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:37 PDT

The mind. Sanctum sanctorum of subjectivity. Soundstage of the mental. Consciousness' cockpit. Romping-grounds of the intentional. A great deal, it would seem, rides on the notion of mind. It's not just that naughty children never do, or that people when irritated often claim to have half-a-one. Though perhaps telling in other ways, it isn't so important that while we all think we lose ours from time to time, we rarely-if ever-doubt that we had one to begin with. Solipsists are perfectly willing to doubt that anyone else actually possesses one, but no one suspects that everyone but herself has one. The reason seems clear and distinct as Cartesian water; it just makes sense, which is another thing that minds are rumored to be responsible for. One could go on and on-the idioms seem endless-but nevermind.

Sex and Gender Through an Analytic Eye: Butler on Freud and Gender Identity

Anna Gullickson '00 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:34 PDT

In her book. Gender Trouble, Judith Butler reinforces the conception held by many feminist philosophers that gender identity is not natural but rather culturally-constructed. Butler supports this conception of gender mainly by reading (and misreading) Freud. I will undertake a critical reconstruction of Butler's claims about gender identity which are based on Freud. In order to complete this project, I will outline (J) currents of feminism leading us to this question of the constructedness of gender, (2) Freud's theories, especially his account of sexual development and (3) two of Butler's main criticisms of Freud. Through this exploration, I will explain Butler's use of Freud in constructing a theory ofgender identity.

Climbing Down the Ladder: Inwardness and Abstraction in Wittgenstein's Philosophy with Reference to Kierkegaard

Lisa Hoelle '05 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:28 PDT

Both Soren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that there are some truths, located beyond the boundaries of rational understanding, which cannot be communicated directly to others. Wittgenstein was influenced by his reading of Kierkegaard's texts on these matters, and accordingly he, like Kierkegaard, has a place in his philosophy for the importance of inwardness in knowing paradoxical truths. A move of 'inwardness,' for Kierkegaard, is an action that requires a personal and absolute belief that can't be explained directly to others, while 'paradoxical truths', as Kierkegaard uses the phrase, refers to propositions that we regard as incomprehensible but true (one of his examples is the claim that Christ is both fully God and fully human). For Kierkegaard, we express inwardness when we actively and fully invest ourselves in believing a paradox. It is clear that Wittgenstein also believed that we can understand some things in a non-standard, non-objective way. The passages in which he discusses this kind of nonobjective understanding, however, are notoriously obscure.

Hume's Objection to the Thomistic Doctrine on Suicide

Emily M. Kelahan '05 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:28 PDT

In "Of Suicide," David Hume argues against the dominant Thomistic doctrine on suicide. Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologica, I-IL Q64, Art 5, argues that suicide is morally impermissible because it violates three kinds of duties: one's duty to God, to others, and to oneself. Arguing from within the Thomistic framework, Hume exposes the inconsistencies of Aquinas's theory and refutes Aquinas's arguments against suicide. In this paper I look at only the arguments concerning the ways in which suicide violates a duty to God.

My strategy is as follows. First, I argue that G.R. McLean's interpretation of Hume in his paper "Hume and the Theistic Objection to Suicide" is not only philosophically unsound, but also departs significantly from the text of "Of Suicide." I then offer my own interpretation of Hume's arguments in "Of Suicide," which both avoids the problems that McLean's interpretation faces and is closer to the text. Finally, I raise and respond to one possible objection to my interpretation of Hume's argument. Ultimately, I intend to argue that Hume's attack on the Thomistic doctrine on suicide is actually an attack on the broader Thomistic framework, and that to read "Of Suicide" in isolation from Hume's other works leads to error.

The Power and the Promise of Ecofeminism, Reconsidered

Elizabeth Mayer '94 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:27 PDT

Ecofeminism is one of the newest varieties of feminism, and it seems to be one of the brightest. There's something appealing in combining feminist and ecological concerns, and something positively seductive in the implied possibility of one big solution out there somewhere that will end not only the oppression of women but the abuse of nature as well. There seems to be something right about ecofeminism too: it points out that our culture has formed a conceptual association between women and nature which certainly does seem to exist and certainly does seem to have undesirable consequences. And it points out a dichotomy between humans and nonhuman nature that is fundamental to our culture's world-view--this also certainly seems to exist and also certainly seems to have undesirable consequences.

Normative Failure in Blackburn's Ruling Passions

William R. Porter '05 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:26 PDT

In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn advances an ethical theory that welds his quasi-realism to a Humean-Smithean theory of moral sentiments. This paper concerns the latter Humean side of Blackburn's theory, specifically Blackburn's attempt to provide a normative ethical theory. This attempt largely involves getting over the tallest obstacle to any defender of Hume: the famous sensible knave problem.

Two Problems in the Philosophy of Mind

C.J. Summers '96 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:25 PDT

The philosophy of mind has historically been concerned to a large part with two central phenomenon of human experience. The first is the intentionality of our mental states, the fact that they seem to be meaningful. The second is the fact that humans are conscious beings. Not only do we receive and process information, we seem to be aware of the experiences which constitute our input and are cognizant and in control of many of the processes which are performed upon this information. It is of obvious interest how we manage to have intentional mental states and be conscious beings. Traditional discussion of these phenomena has usually relied upon the postulation of a mind which implies a dualist ontology. The presumption of a mind, which is composed of non-physical, mental, substance makes these problems relatively easy to solve. Mental substance which is by nature unobservable can serve just about any purpose which we can imagine for it, including possesing meaning and constituting consciousness.

An Atheological Apologetic

Joyce A. Lazier '91 — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:45:23 PDT

In his article, "Atheological Apologetics," Scott Shalkowski argues that there is no reason to believe that the theist necessarily has the burden of proof in the debate of God's existence. The strength of his argument lies in his assumptions about facts, knowledge, and justification, positive and negative existence claims, and the relevance of context in a debate. First, Shalkowski argues against Anthony Flew who states in his book, The Presumption of Atheism, that general features about knowledge claims "entail the theist (who is the affirmative side of the debate) to first, introduce and defend his proposed concept of God; and, second, to provide sufficient reason for believing that this concept of his does in fact have application." Flew uses his claims about knowledge and justification to support what he calls the "presumption of atheism." Secondly, Shalkowski is concerned with the distinction drawn between positive and negative existence claims. He argues that there is nothing intrinsic to positive claims that saddles them with the demand for grounds that exempts negative claims from the same demand. He rests this argument on the concept of context relativity and tries to show that in certain contexts the negative existence claims have a burden for grounds that positive ones do not, and therefore concludes that there is nothing intrinsic to positive claims that suggests that they should bear the burden of argument. I will argue first, that a presumption of atheism is justified but it is not the same presumption of negative atheism that Flew argues for. I do not take Flew's presumption of atheism because Flew does not believe that context plays a role in the application of this presumption and I feel that this is a necessary ingredient to the presumption. Second, Shalkowski's parallel between positive and negative existence claims is ill-founded, and his main point about context relativity ignores the relevance of what today's context is and consequently damages his own position. Further, I will argue that in a scientific era, with the help of rational tools like Ockham's Razor, the presumption for theism is irrational and a presumption of atheism in the traditional sense is justified.