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CROATIA'S LEAP TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY IN THE PARLIAMENT: RULES VERSUS PLAYERS

By Josip Glaudic

A number of political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors have been identified as having an effect on the level of women's parliamentary representation. Studies concentrating on the most prosperous longstanding democracies accentuate the importance of political factors, whereas most of the studies that include less developed nations suggest a more pronounced role for socioeconomic and/or cultural factors. Conclusions about the relevance of a particular group of factors become much less clear-cut when tested on a sample of nations such as the post-communist bloc, which does not clearly belong to either camp. This study examines the effects of political factors using what Lijphart calls the controlled comparison method in a single post-communist country: Croatia. Since Croatia represents a single cultural and developmental 'container,' changes in its levels of women's parliamentary representation must be attributed primarily to some other factors. The conclusion of this study is that the immense increase in the proportion of female representatives in Croatia cannot be attributed to the changes in its electoral system. Rather, it can be ascribed partly to the ideology of the party in power and partly to the ability of women to, with the help of non-governmental organizations, form inter- and intra-party unions which have put significant pressure on all party leaderships to nominate more women to office.

Contrary to recent trends seen in most Western democracies, newly democratic Eastern European nations have witnessed a decline in levels of women's parliamentary representation in the period after the fall of communist rule. The decreases range from the extreme case of Romania, which saw its level of women's parliamentary representation initially shrink by 30.8 percentage points, to the less pronounced example of Poland whose level initially shrunk by 6.7 percentage points (Chart 1 provides a more detailed description of these dynamics).

Chart 1. Proportion of women in some Eastern European parliaments

Note: Women of Croatia and Slovenia were previously elected to the parliament of SFR Yugoslavia.
Though subsequent elections have in many cases reversed the trend, the region-wide average remains below the levels seen in many of the established Western democracies (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2000).

In Eastern Europe, where parliaments have been the center of democratization and political life, the failure to include women has important ramifications for the quality of the emerging democracy. As Darcy, Welch, and Clark (1994, 15-17) indicate, increasing the representation of women can affect the quality of democracy in a number of ways. Firstly, it is questionable how well a male-dominated parliament can truly represent the interests of women and address the issues that tend to be of greater importance for them. This argument appears to be supported in the context of Eastern European parliaments since it can easily be argued that throughout the process of transition they have not appropriately addressed what are generally considered “women’s issues” (education, social security, health care, etc.). Secondly, due to their different professional experiences, women have knowledge and insights into some matters that men do not have. Not utilizing that expertise by fostering greater parliamentary representation of women weakens the scope of the legislature’s decision-making powers. Thirdly, it is argued that the quality of political leadership will necessarily improve if women fully enter into political competition simply due to the larger pool of individuals competing for office. And finally, more equal political representation of women contributes to the legitimacy of the political system because it increases its ability to represent all strata of the society, which is particularly salient in the context of fledgling democracies. Given the importance of these issues, scholars have tried to identify the factors that encourage or inhibit women’s access to political power.
A number of political, socioeconomic and cultural factors have been identified as having an effect on the level of parliamentary representation of women. Studies concentrating on the most prosperous longstanding democracies accentuate the importance of political factors, whereas most of the studies that include less developed nations suggest a more pronounced role for socioeconomic and/or cultural factors. Conclusions about the relevance of a particular group of factors become much less clear-cut when tested on a sample of nations such as the post-communist bloc, which does not clearly belong to either camp and has a very particular cultural and socio-demographic legacy. That is why the purpose of this study is to expand the literature dealing with the bloc of newly democratic countries by examining the effects of the political factors on the level of women’s parliamentary representation.

Although some studies do attribute a formidable level of importance to such political factors as the time of women’s suffrage (Rule 1981) and the degree of political democracy (Paxton 1997), most attention in the literature has been given to the structure of the electoral system, the partisan composition of the legislature, and potential institutionalization of the position of women in politics (e.g. quotas). One of the implications of that research has been that women can expect greater success in electoral competitions conducted under party list PR rather than single-member district rules. As Kenworthy and Malami (1999, 237) argue, “parties are more likely to nominate women for office, and voters are more likely to vote for them, if women represent only part of a larger group of candidates.”

Most of the theoretical arguments for district magnitude’s positive effect on female representation stem from the assumption that as district magnitude increases, election strategies change (Matland 1993, 738). An increase in district magnitude ought to make it easier for party decision-makers to slate female candidates for a couple of reasons. First, as district magnitude
increases, the exclusion of women from the party’s list of candidates increases the danger of a negative reaction from voters. Second, it ought to be easier to slate women in districts with large magnitudes because then entrenched male interests within the party do not need to be deposed in order for women to be placed on party lists. In other words, balancing a ticket is much easier when district magnitude is large.

However, the explanatory power of district magnitude has been questioned. A number of studies have found at best modest effects of district magnitude on female representation (Welch & Studlar, Matland 1993). Several possible explanations for the inconsistent results in the literature have been found, one of these being the ‘party magnitude explanation’. Some authors argue that it is the party magnitude (the number of seats a party expects to win in a district) that makes a difference in the levels of women’s representation. As Matland and Taylor (1997, 189) point out, it is possible to have a system with high district magnitude, but where many parties win just a few seats, as in Israel. Briefly put, the availability of ticket-balancing dynamics primarily depends on the number of seats parties have a realistic chance of winning. Naturally, parties’ expectations about electoral results depend on the number of effective competitors. One electoral system feature that has consistently been found to limit the number of electoral competitors is the threshold. Thresholds basically set a lower parliamentary entry limit, thereby blocking legislative representation of smaller parties and consequently increasing party magnitude for major parties.

In addition to the characteristics of the electoral system, some researchers have focused on party-level factors to explain cross-national patterns in political representation of women. As Miki Caul (1997, 1) maintains, “parties differ in the number of women they nominate, where they rank women on party lists, and the proportion of women that they send to parliament.” She
furthermore concludes that leftist and New Left ideologies, high levels of women activists within the party and gender related candidate rules all enable parties to contribute to increasing the level of women’s representation. Her findings in general mirror the commonly accepted perception of the influence of parties on female political representation. However, some researchers have argued that partisan differences may have become less important in recent years. Matland (1998), for example, finds that the party composition of the parliament had no effect on the level of women’s representation among the developed Western democracies as of 1990. Nevertheless, in spite of those indications we can infer that party-level factors potentially do have a decisive effect on the level of women’s parliamentary representation and therefore warrant ample scrutiny.

Another set of political factors that warrants ample scrutiny deals with the institutionalization of the position of women in politics. Studies have shown that implementing gender quotas has obvious positive effects on the levels of women’s parliamentary representation. However, it still remains questionable whether gender quotas have a positive or a negative long-term effect on the public perception and level of acceptance of female politicians. Women in office do provide good role models for new generations of potential female politicians, but only if their performance is exemplary. However, if they are put in positions of power without experience and necessary skills in an attempt to satisfy quotas- the public is likely to perceive all women politicians unfavorably. It is important to note that quotas are not the only way the position of women in politics can be institutionally strengthened. Women’s organizations, both within and outside of political parties, can offer a support mechanism of immense value during the nomination processes.
RESEARCH DESIGN: APPLYING THE CONTROLLED COMPARISON METHOD

Devising effective controls for socioeconomic and cultural elements is of essential importance for the credibility of research dealing with political factors. Arend Lijphart (1994, 78) outlines the most widely accepted way to deal with that problem. He claims that the comparative method (which he also labels as the method of controlled comparison) can potentially solve that problem by focusing on cases that differ with regard to the variables one wants to investigate, but are similar with regard to all other important variables that may affect the dependent variables.

Croatia provides an ideal test case, because all of its post-communist elections were conducted under different electoral rules. Furthermore, Croatia has over time witnessed an unprecedented rise in the level of women’s parliamentary representation. The percentage of women in the Lower House of the Croatian Sabor has risen from 7.9% in 1995 to a formidable 20.5% in 2000, making Croatia the first Eastern European country to surpass its pre-transition level of women’s parliamentary representation. Croatia is now the highest-placed Eastern European country on IPU’s “Women in National Parliaments” ranking, above such developed countries as Canada, United Kingdom, and United States. Cultural explanations cannot account for this change over time. Like many other post-communist countries, Croatia’s political culture is marked by a widespread “re-traditionalization” of social values. While traditional values about proper gender roles certainly have an impact on women’s access to political power, political culture is a relatively stable attribute and therefore cannot explain the dramatic rise in female representation. Commonly identified socioeconomic factors also cannot effectively account for the increase in the proportion of women MPs. Throughout the 1990s women did not gain greater access to higher education and legal and business strata of the workforce. In fact,
Croatia’s economic depression has been much more detrimental for women. Their unemployment levels have grown more than men’s have, and the income gap between genders has actually been widening. From what the literature about the effects of socioeconomic factors suggests, we should actually have expected even lower levels of women’s parliamentary representation as the result of the 2000 election. Having controlled for these “usual suspects,” it becomes possible to isolate the effects of political factors.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Since Croatia used different electoral systems for its three post-independence elections, the first section elucidates the effects of particular features of those electoral systems. The impact of the ideology of the party in power is tested through the statistical analysis of the parties’ inclinations to nominate women in all three elections. In the third and final section, an attempt is made to shed light on the issue of institutionalization of women’s intra-party positions through a series of interviews with female party leaders and examinations of parties’ statutes, leadership compositions, and electoral programs.

**TESTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM EFFECTS: THE SIMULATION APPROACH**

The role of the electoral system factors such as district and party magnitude, threshold size, and general design (proportional representation vs. single-member districts) in Croatia’s leap toward parliamentary gender equality is tested through a series of electoral simulations. Briefly put, all three electoral laws are applied to the results of all three elections in order to identify their potential effects on the level of women’s parliamentary representation. The basic purpose of the simulations is to identify the potential effects of different electoral system features on the level of women’s parliamentary representation by answering repeated iterations of the
following question: ‘What would have been the level of women’s parliamentary representation as the result of the ___ (1992, 1995, or 2000) election if the ___ (1992, 1995, or 2000) electoral system was in place?’ In order to be able to grasp the practical implications of all simulations, we need to be familiar with the main features of electoral systems used for Croatia’s three post-communist elections.

In 1992, Croatia used a hybrid electoral system for electing 120 members of the Sabor’s Lower House. Half of MPs were elected from party national lists, whereas the other half were elected from 60 single-member districts. The national list party threshold was three percent. A hybrid electoral system was also used in 1995. However, this time 80 out of 108 MPs were elected from party national lists, whereas the remaining 28 were elected from single-member districts. A three-level threshold system was used for the 1995 election: the barrier for single parties was 5%, for two-party coalitions 8%, and for ‘three and more’-party coalitions 11%. Finally, the 2000 election saw the introduction of the multi-member district system. Croatia was divided into 10 electoral districts, which elected 14 MPs each. (Table 1 concisely presents the

| ‘60+60’ (1992) | System | size of the Lower House: 120 |
| '10*14' (2000) | System | size of the Lower House: 140 |
| Note | for all three elections minority and diaspora votes not considered |

Note on the names assigned to different electoral systems: In order to avoid confusion, the electoral system used for the 1992 election will be labeled as ‘60+60’; the electoral system used for the 1995 election will be labeled as ‘80+28’; and the electoral system used for the 2000 election will be labeled ‘10*14’.
features of all three electoral systems) It is important to note that all three elections had special provisions for the election of minorities and participation of Croatia’s diaspora in the electoral process. However, for the purposes of this study, those particular provisions were not addressed because they would have unnecessarily skewed the results.

The simulation approach rests on two basic assumptions. The first assumption is that party gatekeepers have full control of the candidate nomination process. If that was not the case and the nomination process was decentralized, it would have been impossible to predict candidate placements because the balance of influence of different nomination centers would have changed depending on the electoral system in use. The second assumption is that parties are good predictors of electoral results. This assumption enables us to infer that parties are well aware of the type of nominations they are bestowing upon their candidates. If we accept these simplifying assumptions, we can relatively easily predict candidates’ identities (or at least their gender) in our simulations depending on the type of their nomination. Knowing the nature of nomination processes of most major Croatian parties and the level of attention they give to public opinion makes these assumptions appear reasonable.²

THE EFFECT OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM FACTORS UNCOVERED

As a first stage in the simulation process, all nominations were classified according to the widely accepted nomenclature as mandate, fighting, or ornamental³ depending on the level of competitiveness associated with them. In the second place, since it was assumed that parties are

² Croatian Democratic Union’s nomination process for the 2000 election basically consisted of a 2-day party executive board meeting. Nomination processes for opposition coalitions were no different. As far as the level of parties’ attention to public opinion is concerned, it suffices to say that most of them employ a number of independent resources to track voters’ preferences throughout the pre-election period.

³ Mandate seats are essentially as good as a direct ticket to the legislature; fighting seats are contested by two or more parties/candidates, the outcome of that contest being highly uncertain; ornamental seats are those where a candidate has virtually no chance of winning.
good predictors of electoral results (and that they form their tickets accordingly), those electoral
results, being very similar to party predictions, were used in determining party intentions in
nominating certain candidates. For example, if a certain candidate received a mandate
nomination in the 1992 election conducted under the original ‘60+60’ electoral system, that
candidate was assumed to have received a mandate nomination in the same election conducted
under the ‘80+28’ (1995) or the ‘10*14’ (2000) electoral system. Other assumptions regarding
the simulation process depended on the design of particular simulations.

*Simulations for the 1992 Election*

The party scene for the 1992 election was extremely fragmented. In total, members of
nine parties and one independent candidate were represented in the Lower House of the Sabor as
the result of the 1992 election (Consult Appendix Table 1 for the basics about major Croatian
parties). However, the great majority of the seats was reserved for only one party: Franjo
Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). HDZ won 31 out of 60 national list seats with
44.71% of the popular vote. It also won 54 out of 60 SMD seats, bringing its parliamentary
majority to a formidable 85 out of 120 seats or 70.83%. Next in line was the Croatian Social
Liberal Party (HSLS), whose 17.72% of the popular vote won it 12 out of 60 national list seats.
HSLS also won 1 of 60 SMD seats, bringing its total to 13 out of 120 seats or 10.83%. All other
parties attained representation through their national lists, barely crossing the 3% threshold
barrier. One notable exception was the coalition of regional parties, which won 4 out of 60 SMD
seats in the Istria region.
Simulation 1992/1995\(^4\)

This simulation yielded potential electoral results different from the original 1992 results. Since a greater proportion of total seats was generated from the national lists, opposition parties generally fared better (except for HSS and the Regional Coalition, which would not have crossed the higher thresholds imposed by the 1995 system). Table 2 presents the complete party results of this simulation. Although this simulation yielded better results for the opposition parties, it did not yield a greater proportion of female representatives. Out of five ‘original’ 1992 female representatives, only two maintained that position in this simulation. Two of the three female representatives of HDZ would have lost their positions if the ‘80+28’ electoral system was in place for the 1992 election. Their original nomination positions were highly competitive and, since there was a smaller number of available seats for HDZ representatives under the ‘80+28’ system, they most likely would have not been placed in winnable positions. Another female representative who would have lost her position was the representative of the Regional Coalition. She would have lost her place because her national list would not have crossed the higher threshold. The only gain for women would have been a new representative from SDP who would have entered the parliament because SDP would have gotten more seats from the national list.


As was the case with Simulation 1992/1995, this simulation also yielded potential electoral results different from the original 1992 results. Since the district magnitude was relatively large, proportionality was higher than in the original 1992 election and consequently

\(^4\) Note on the names assigned to different simulations: the first number in the name designates the year of the simulated election, whereas the second number designates the year of the applied electoral system. So, for example, ‘Simulation 1992/1995’ means that it is the simulation of the 1992 election conducted under the electoral law originally used for the 1995 election (‘80+28’).
opposition parties generally fared better (Table 2). This simulation also yielded a greater proportion of female representatives. Out of five ‘original’ 1992 female representatives, three maintained that position in this simulation. One of the three female representatives of HDZ would have lost that position if the ‘10*14’ electoral system was in place for the 1992 election due to the high level of competitiveness of her original nomination position. Since there was a smaller number of available seats for HDZ representatives, as was the case in the previous simulation, this representative most likely would have not been placed in a winnable position. Again, as was the case in Simulation 1992/1995, the female representative of the Regional Coalition would have also lost her position. She would have lost her place because the regional party she represented did not fare well in its region (9th and 10th district). However, women would have gained four new representatives from HSLS and SDP who would have entered the parliament because their parties would have gotten more seats overall.

Table 2. Final Simulation Results for the 1992 Election by Party

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>70.83</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSLS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.83</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see from Table 2, although there is no extreme variation between the impacts of electoral systems on the level of women’s representation, having a ‘10*14’ electoral system in place for the 1992 election would have probably yielded the highest proportion of female representatives to the Lower House of Sabor, most likely because of increased proportionality...
resulting from a relatively large district magnitude. An ‘80+28’ electoral system would have
most likely yielded the lowest proportion of female representatives, partly because of a high
threshold system and partly because of a smaller number of seats overall. What is interesting to
note is that the HDZ, which implemented all three of these electoral systems, appears to have
chosen wisely in 1992: their majority was the greatest exactly under the original ‘60+60’ system.

*Simulations for the 1995 Election*

As in 1992, the party scene for the 1995 election was also extremely fragmented. Members of ten parties were represented in the Lower House of Sabor as the result of the 1995
election. However, five of those ten parties participated in the election as a coalition, thereby
lowering the number of effective ‘electoral players’ to six. Furthermore, all opposition parties,
apart from HSP, joined forces in slating SMD candidates. That attempt to jointly overthrow
HDZ resulted in some opposition SMD candidates being backed by bizarre groupings of parties,
ranging from extreme left to extreme right. However, in spite of the collective opposition effort,
HDZ once again emerged as the winner with 63 out of 108 seats or 58.33%. Forty-two (out of
80 possible) of those seats were won through the national list, whereas the remaining 21 (out of
28 possible) were won through SMDs. The five-party opposition coalition was next in line with
18 seats, 2 of which were won through SMDs. HSLS won 12 seats, 2 of which were won
through SMDs. The 1995 election saw a moderate improvement for SDP (direct successors of
the former League of Communists), which won 10 seats (2 through SMDs) or 9.26% - a
significant improvement compared to 2.5% of the seats in 1992.

*Simulation 1995/1992*

As was the case in both 1992 simulations, this simulation also yielded potential electoral
results different from the original ones. Opposition parties generally fared better, but unlike in
Simulation 1992/1995, this time it was so because a greater proportion of total seats was generated from the single-member districts. Such a finding becomes understandable if we note that in 1995 opposition parties fared relatively well in single-member districts because of their joint appearance. Furthermore, two other opposition parties would have entered the parliament in 1995 if the '60+60' electoral system was still in place because of a lower entry threshold.

Table 3 presents the complete party results of this simulation. Although this simulation yielded better results for the opposition parties, it did not yield a greater proportion of female representatives. In fact, the number of female representatives remained the same, which, because of an increase in the size of the legislature, resulted with a lower proportion of female representatives.

Simulation 1995/2000

This simulation did not yield drastically different results from the original ones. This simulation's only big winners were the members of the five-party opposition coalition, who saw their parliamentary share increase by more than six percentage points. Complete party results of this simulation can be seen in Table 3. This simulation did not result in any drastic changes in the level of women's parliamentary representation either. Three more women would have been elected in 1995 if the '10*14' electoral system was in place, primarily because of higher total number of seats available. However, exactly because of an increase in the total number of seats available, the proportion of women in parliament changed only slightly.

As can be seen from Table 3, although there is again no drastic variation between the impacts of electoral systems on the level of women's representation, having the 2000 electoral system in place for the 1995 election would have probably yielded the highest number of female representatives to the Lower House of Sabor, just as in the case of 1992 election simulations.
Furthermore, it appears that keeping the 1992 electoral system for the 1995 election would have probably not changed the number of female representatives. What is interesting to note is that HDZ appears to have chosen an electoral system sensibly in 1995 as well as in 1992. Their majority was greatest, again, exactly under the original system.

Table 3. Final Simulation Results for the 1995 Election by Party

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20.83</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSLS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDU</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HND</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Simulations for the 2000 Election

The 2000 election marked the end of HDZ's decade. An opposition coalition of six parties was formed prior to the election with the intent of dethroning HDZ from power. However, immediately prior to the election, major coalition partners SDP and HSLS decided to run together and separately from the other four coalition members. New SDP/HSLS alliance won 71 out of 140 seats or 50.71%. Roughly two thirds of those seats belonged to SDP and one third to HSLS, in accordance with their pre-election agreement. The other opposition coalition won 24 out of 140 seats or 17.14%. HDZ for the first time since it came to power in 1990 became an opposition party, winning 40 seats or 28.57%. The remaining 5 seats went to the rightist coalition of HSP and HKDU.

Simulation 2000/1992

This simulation yielded potential electoral results much different from the original ones. If the '60+60' (1992) electoral system had remained in place for the 2000 election, SDP/HSLS
alliance could have expected a much greater proportion of seats, while all other competitors could have expected a smaller proportion of seats (Table 4). However, very little variation could have been expected in the level of women’s representation. Although HDZ would have lost 4 of its 7 female MPs, the total proportion of women in parliament would have remained practically the same.

Simulation 2000/1995

This simulation yielded potential electoral results not very different from the original ones (Table 4). Very little variation could have also been expected in the level of women’s representation. Although HDZ would have lost 4 of its 7 female MPs and SDP/HSLS would have lost 3 of their 18 female MPs, the proportion of women in parliament would have been practically the same.

Table 4. Final Simulation Results for the 2000 Election by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPIHSLS</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24.17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSP/HKDU</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see from Table 4, there is again no significant variation between the effects of electoral systems on the proportion of women in parliament, although their numbers do change depending on the number of seats available overall. Once again, the HDZ appears to have chosen an electoral system shrewdly, since the proportion of seats they won was greatest under the system that was actually used.
SIMULATION RESULTS: LIMITED, YET SUGGESTIVE

It is important to understand the limitations of the simulation approach. Although simulations yield numerically defined answers, those have to be taken with caution. In the context of a small legislature and a low number of female MPs, a single questionable step in the process of design or execution could result in different final outcomes. Great care was taken at each stage to follow the stated assumptions: that party gatekeepers have full control of the candidate nomination process and that parties are good predictors of electoral results. Those assumptions were given further credence by the HDZ’s apparent success at electoral engineering, as it was consistently able to control its nomination procedures and predict electoral outcomes. Furthermore, while it is difficult to predict the size and nature of electoral coalitions, in Croatian politics coalitions have formed well in advance of electoral changes.\(^5\) HDZ had maintained firm control of electoral system design and changed it, to a great extent, in response to political balance alternations. It is therefore safe to assume that parties have not shifted their coalition strategies in response to changing electoral rules.

The results, as shown in Chart 2, are suggestive of a slight positive effect of the ‘10*14’ (2000) electoral system on the proportion of female representatives, particularly in the case of simulations for the 1992 election. Reasons for that lie primarily in the higher proportionality of the ‘10*14’ system. As can be seen from the section below on the ideology of the party in power, opposition parties continuously nominated more women than the ruling HDZ, hence the positive impact of increased proportionality on the level of women’s representation is understandable. Additionally, the overall number of representatives elected under the ‘10*14’ electoral system is higher than in the other two systems. The greater number of available seats

\(^5\) For example, SDP and HSLS signed a coalition agreement in August of 1999, whereas the electoral law for the 2000 election was voted on in October of the same year.
usually implies greater possibility for female candidates to be nominated and consequently elected. Even if the greater number of female candidates elected does not necessarily translate into their greater overall proportion, the ‘10*14’ electoral system would still be regarded as more favorable to women than the other two systems because of its beneficial long-term effect on the supply of experienced female candidates.

![Chart 2. Final Simulation Results: Percent of Women in Parliament](image)

However, the impact of the ‘10*14’ electoral system on the level of women’s representation in the Lower House of the Sabor should not be exaggerated. The ‘10*14’ system cannot be credited with the surge in the level of women’s representation in the 2000 election. As Chart 2 demonstrates, the proportion of women MPs would have been virtually identical after the 2000 election no matter which electoral system was used. Though certain aspects of the system may have been relatively woman-friendly, we must look to other factors in explaining the success of women in the 2000 election. Potential explanations could lie in the ‘ideology of the party in power’ theory, which basically states that good electoral performance of leftist parties directly implies a higher proportion of female representatives.
IDEOLOGY OF THE PARTY IN POWER: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

The specific characteristics of Croatia's electoral systems (small legislature) and dynamics of electoral competitions (great discrepancies between numbers of seats won by particular parties) have made comparing different parties' nomination practices regarding women extremely difficult. Comparing parties' shares of female mandate, fighting, and ornamental candidates, for example, would have yielded confusing and misleading results because of huge discrepancies in the number of seats of particular category available to different parties. In 1992, for example, the HNS slated a woman in one of its four mandate seats, which would have technically made HNS's share of women in mandate seats a formidable 25%. However, such a figure would have been misleading, especially if we note that HNS slated a total of 5 women among its 119 candidates, or only 4.2%. That is why the only acceptable way of comparing parties' attitudes toward nominating women is by total shares of female candidates (Chart 3⁶).

⁶ In Chart 3, parties are presented by ideology from left to right, SDP being most left wing and HSP being most right wing. Although there are some elements in the 4+ Coalition that are more left wing than HSLS, the Coalition was placed further to the right because of a very dominant role of the conservative Peasant Party (HSS). Also, for the purpose of forming this chart, SDP's and HSLS's candidates were analyzed separately for the 2000 election. Furthermore, for the 1992 election, candidates of parties that in subsequent elections joined the 4+ Coalition were analyzed jointly. Also, HSP's figure for 2000 is for its joint lists with HKDU.
As we can see from Chart 3, parties to the left end of the spectrum have been outperforming parties to the right end in the proportion of female candidates. This is consistent throughout all three elections and goes to support most of the literature’s findings. The only notable discrepancy to this trend is the 4+ Coalition, which has been slating a lower number of female candidates than its ideological orientation would suggest. However, such a finding becomes understandable if we realize that a coalition of four parties needs to satisfy the desires of usually male leaderships of all four of those parties with the same number of seats available as available to other single parties.

Taking into account the findings regarding the relationship between party ideology and the proportion of female candidates, it would be safe to assume that the level of women’s parliamentary representation would have been significantly lower in 2000 if the rightist parties fared better. In fact, if the balance of popular support between HDZ and the opposition had remained the same in 2000 as it was in 1995, the proportion of women in parliament would have dropped to 12-14%, as opposed to the original 20%. However, it is important to note that those 12-14% are still significantly higher than 8% in 1995 or 5% in 1992. Furthermore, it is important to note that proportions of female candidates have over time risen across the party spectrum (Chart 6). Therefore, although ideology of the party in power does seem to partly account for the variation between different levels of women’s parliamentary representation, it cannot be fully credited for the gradual rise in the proportion of women in the Lower House of Croatian Sabor. Some other factors had a decisive role in increasing the proportion of female representatives, particularly in the 2000 election.

\[\text{Rough estimate based on the 1995 popular vote.}\]
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF WOMEN’S INTRA-PARTY POSITIONS

One study dealing with the 2000 election party programs rightfully concludes that, had the electoral success of women in 2000 depended on their parties’ programs—there simply would have been no success to speak of (Zenska Infoteka). Compared with previous elections, the 2000 election programs actually show a significant drop in parties’ interest for issues concerning women’s position in the society. While most parties’ programs for the 1995 election featured special sections devoted to women, issues of gender equality received very little attention in 2000.

The conservative Peasants’ Party (HSS) and nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) stayed true to their ideologies and featured a traditional family-related women’s agenda in their electoral programs. But even leftist SDP, in its joint electoral declaration with HSLS, devoted only two sentences to the issue of women’s equal access to power:

“For SDP and HSLS gender equality is one of the key determinants of a democratic and just society—society in which power and responsibility are equally distributed, society in which women equally participate in the decision-making process. We support legally guaranteeing women’s equality in the workplace and in political life.”

However brief, this statement signifies a potentially very important factor in the electoral success of women in 2000. Although we can only speculate about what the authors meant by “legally guaranteeing women’s equality in political life”, there is strong evidence that at least SDP wanted it to indicate a support for the institutionalization of women’s level of political representation in the form of quotas. Indeed, SDP’s political program outright proclaims that the Social Democrats support intra-party women’s quotas.

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8 Electoral Declaration of SDP and HSLS for the 2000 election, p. 7-8.
SDP supports mandatory gender quotas in its executive bodies. We hold that that is the only way to expand the present horizons, forms and means of action and to establish developmental programs that are practical and in tune with reality.\(^9\)

In fact, according to *Be Active, Be Emancipated* (BaBe), a group for promotion and protection of the human rights of women in Croatia, SDP, HSLS and HDZ all proclaimed to have informal gender quotas prior to the 2000 election.\(^{10}\) From what we know about male party leaders in Croatia and elsewhere, we can reasonably conclude that, if they truly did pledge support for informal gender quotas, they must have been faced with some strong external incentive for change of attitude towards women's access to political power. There is compelling evidence that the drive for change came from women themselves.

Arguably the greatest difference between the nomination processes for the 2000 and the previous elections was that women were significantly better organized. In fact, three of the major four parties- SDP, HDZ, and HSS formed intra-party women's organizations.\(^{11}\) Obviously, the agenda of those organizations differ depending on their parties' ideologies. However, all three of these women's organizations put significant emphasis on improving women's positions within their parties and the society as a whole.

SDP's Social-democratic Women's Forum (SOFZ) is arguably the strongest of these three organizations. It was formed in January of 1995 under the motto "We are taking what is ours: half of heaven, half of earth, half of power!" As Ms. Dubravka Biberdzic, SOFZ's vice-president and member of SDP's central committee, claims, the main reason for forming SOFZ was to unite women in a common goal of improving gender equality within SDP and the society in general. Ms. Biberdzic further claims that SOFZ has been extremely successful, particularly in training

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\(^9\) SDP's Political Program, p.10.

\(^{10}\) In their December 20\(^{th}\), 1999 *Elektorine* publication, BaBe claims that SDP's informal quota was 40%, HSLS’s 35%, and HDZ’s 25%. If those figures are correct, not even one of the parties actually fulfilled its promise: about 27% of both SDP’s and HSLS’s candidates, and only 14% of HDZ’s candidates were women.
and lobbying for female candidates within the party and promoting female candidates in the public.

The Peasants' Party's women's organization, Croatian Heart, was also formed with a goal of placing more women into positions of power within the party. As Croatian Heart's president Dr. Ruzica Radovic claims, the male conservative grip on power within HSS was and still is extremely strong. That is why a joint approach of all women within the party was absolutely essential for enabling any kind of improvement in intra-party gender equality. The organization was formed in 1998 and has so far had more success in organizing educational, cultural, and humanitarian activities for women than in exerting any recognizable pressure on the party leadership during elections. However, Dr. Radovic claims that the women of HSS will have a much greater say in the upcoming local elections and will actually seek an implementation of a 30% quota.

HDZ's Union of Women "Katarina Zrinski" is the youngest of the three women's organizations. It was formed in December of 1998 for the same reasons as SDFZ and Croatian Heart - to activate women in pursuing their political interests through the Union and the party. However, the greatest achievements of the Union of Women has not been in the sphere of elections, but rather in organizing campaigns on issues 'of the interest to the nation', as the Union's vice-president Jadranka Cigelj proclaims. In fact, Ms. Cigelj acknowledges that, although the Union of Women did exert some organized pressure on the party leadership during the formation of the party lists, the most important reason why there was an increase in the proportion of women among HDZ's candidates in the 2000 election was the strong leadership of the Union of Women president Jadranka Kosor, who, through her membership in the party's

11 Official HSSL materials make no mention of any women's organization within the party. Their party leadership was also unavailable for comment.
executive council, managed to greatly influence the nomination process. However, a relatively strong showing of HDZ’s women in the 2000 election generated some backlash from the party’s established male leadership, thus it is questionable whether women will be able to maintain their positions in the nomination process for the upcoming local elections.

The most interesting thing that surfaced during the interviews conducted with all three female party leaders was that they all, disregarding their broader ideologies, spoke with the same contempt for the post-independence re-traditionalization movement and with similar vigor for working towards change. Another extremely important point that became apparent throughout the interviews was that politically active women of all parties worked together towards the achievement of a common goal of higher representation. Dr. Radovic, Ms. Cigelj, and Ms. Biberdzic all stress an immensely important role non-governmental organizations played in connecting women across political lines, training female candidates, raising the awareness of a need for greater gender equality in politics, and exerting substantial additional pressure on predominantly male party leaderships to work towards change.

One of the most prominent women’s organizations that works on advancing women’s position in the society is the already mentioned Be Active, Be Emancipated (BaBe) group formed in 1994 in Zagreb. According to its coordinator Martina Belic, the group developed not only from anti-war and POW mothers’ organizations from the early 1990s, but also as a continuation of a string of feminist organizations that were active in Croatia in the 1970s and 80s. The feminist movement in Croatia was actually one of the strongest in Eastern Europe during those two decades (Renne, 166). Although its activities were redefined and weakened in the early 1990s due to the war, it was rejuvenated with the financial assistance from non-governmental organizations from the West during the mid-1990s, and was hence able to return to its core
activities of raising women’s consciousness about their rights and improving the level of gender equality in all spheres of the society, particularly politics.

The organization BaBe, for example, formed the Women’s Ad Hoc Coalition for monitoring political parties’ attitudes towards women and their electoral performances. It also tried pushing for a model of parliamentary gender quotas similar to the one recently implemented in France. Although it was unsuccessful in that endeavor, it managed to bring the attention of the parties and the public to the issue of gender equality. Finally, and most importantly, BaBe organized training programs for women of all parties and ideologies on such things as public speaking, running campaigns, consensus-building, lobbying, etc. It therefore comes as no surprise that Ms. Belic identifies BaBe and other women’s organizations as the main reasons for a dramatic increase in women’s representation in 2000.

CONCLUSIONS

In reference to the title of this study, it appears that ‘players’ had a more pronounced role than ‘rules’ in Croatia’s leap toward parliamentary gender equality. Electoral simulations suggest a rather limited influence of electoral system factors on the level of women’s parliamentary representation in Croatia. On the other hand, ideology of the party in power can be partly credited with variations in the proportions of female MPs resulting from 1992, 1995, and 2000 election. As mentioned above, if the balance of popular support between HDZ and the opposition had remained the same in 2000 as it was in 1995, the proportion of women in parliament would have only been 12-14%. Nevertheless, those 12-14% are significantly higher than 8% from the 1995 election. That difference can be reasonably attributed to the ability of women to mobilize and forge intra- and inter-party connections with significant assistance from
women’s non-governmental organizations. Exactly because they were organized, women were able to exert significant amounts of pressure on parties to work towards gender equality.

In addition to identifying the reasons for the rise in women’s representation in 2000, it is also important to attempt to draw conclusions about the prospects of maintaining or even improving the current proportion of female MPs. Interestingly enough, all four of the interviewees seemed to believe that what happened in 2000 was not an anomaly but a sign of a trend that will bring even greater gains for women in Croatian politics. There is certainly compelling evidence that suggests they are right.

First of all, women that were elected to the parliament in 2000 were not elected by accident or simply because of pressures for intra-party quotas. As Ms. Biberdzic rightfully claims, they were capable, educated, recognizable candidates with long service to their parties, who took on leadership roles in the parliament. In fact, female MPs are presiding over six out of twenty parliamentary committees, including the Committee for Internal Affairs and National Security, Committee for the Economy and Development, and Lawmaking Committee— all considered to be some of the most important parliamentary bodies. Secondly, although women of HDZ are experiencing a certain backlash from the party’s male leaders, women in other parties have made significant progress since the 2000 election. SDP followed its intra-party quota of 40% that is now firmly embedded in the party statute and elected 50 women to the party’s 122-member central committee. Furthermore, Dr. Ruzica Radovic of HSS claims that women of her party will ‘make a stand’ at 30% for the upcoming local elections, to a great extent because they can now point to the successes of women of SDP. Although it is obviously still too early to make firm conclusions about the permanency of the change 2000 election brought, the

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12 Ms. Biberdzic claims that an ideal (and typical) female candidate for SDP is between 30 and 40 years old, has at least a university education, and has at least five years of party service.
evidence is strong enough to suggest that Croatia is on a path to greater gender equality in politics.

**APPENDIX**

**Appendix Table 1. Major Croatian Parties 1992-2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica- Croatian Democratic Union&lt;br&gt;Party in power 1990-1999. Was led by late Franjo Tudjman. Self-proclaimed center-right, although more right than center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HND</td>
<td>Hrvatski Nezavisni Demokrati- Croatian Independent Democrats&lt;br&gt;Party made up of former HDZ members who left the party in 1994. Founded by current president Stjepan Mesic. Center party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka- Croatian Peasants' Party&lt;br&gt;Participated in 1993 and 2000 opposition coalitions. Center party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>Hrvatska Stranka Prava- Croatian Rights Party&lt;br&gt;Far-right party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDU</td>
<td>Socijalno Demokratska Unija- Social Democratic Union&lt;br&gt;Extreme left party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**1995 Coalition**<br>Centrist coalition formed for the 1995 election. Made up of: HSS, HNS, IDS, HKDU, and SBHS (local party from Slavonia). Major coalition partner HSS.

**2000 Coalition**<br>Centrist coalition formed for the 2000 election. Made up of: HSS, HNS, IDS, and LS (Liberal Party formed by former members of HSLS). Participates in the government together with SDP and HSLS. Major coalition partner HSS.

**Simulation 1992/1995 Design**

The difference in the number of single-member districts provided for by the original '60+60' and the '80+28' (1995) electoral systems presented the greatest problem in simulating the 1992 election with the '80+28' electoral system. In order to adjust for that difference, the pertaining electoral laws for the parliamentary elections (Sabor Republike Hrvatske 1992, Ured Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske 1995) were consulted to determine the correspondence between the original 60 SMDs and 28 'new' ones. That made the identification of the level of support for a particular party's candidates in each of the 'new' 28 single-member districts possible. Naturally, the underlying
assumption here was that parties would not have changed the way they participated in the election (by forming coalitions, for example). The original popular vote from the 1992 election was used to identify the number of seats each party won through national lists because voters’ preferences most likely would not have changed with an increase in the size of national lists from 60 to 80. Then the number of mandate, fighting, and ornamental seats for the original and simulated 1992 elections was compared to determine which candidates would have been bestowed with which kind of nominations.

Simulation 1992/2000 Design

As was the case with Simulation 1992/1995, the greatest problem in simulating the 1992 election with ‘10*14’ (2000) electoral system presented the difference in the number of districts provided for by the 1992 and 2000 electoral systems. In order to adjust for that difference, the pertaining electoral laws for the parliamentary elections (Sabor Republike Hrvatske 1992, Zastupnicki Dom Sabora Republike Hrvatske 1999) were once again consulted to determine the correspondence between 60 original SMDs and 10 ‘new’ districts. That made the identification of the level of popular support for a particular party’s candidates in each of the 10 ‘new’ districts possible. However, upon noticing a significant discrepancy in the number of total votes particular party’s candidates received in SMDs and the total number of votes that party received on the national list in the 1992 election, I devised a system of adjusting quotients. 13 Basically, the number of party’s national list votes was divided with the total number of votes its SMD candidates received. The resulting quotients were then multiplied with the party’s ‘simulated votes’ acquired through the adjustment for the number of districts. This method attempted to capture both the national list and the SMD portion of the original ‘60+60’ electoral system results and to translate them into the ‘10*14’ (2000) multi-member district system. Realizing the complexity of this design and hoping that a practical example could clarify any misunderstandings regarding the simulation procedure, Appendix Table 2 was devised. It shows the procedure for determining the number of HDZ’s simulated seats in the ‘new’ 5th district.

Appendix Table 2. Simulation 1992/2000- Practical Example: HDZ’s Seats in the ‘new’ 5th District

| Number of HDZ’s 1992 national list votes | 1,176,437 |
| Number of total votes HDZ’s 1992 SMD candidates received | 978,538 |
| Adjustment multiplier | 1,176,437 / 978,538 = 1.131339 |
| 1992 SMDs included in the ‘10*14’ electoral system’s 5th district: 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th |
| Number of total votes HDZ’s candidates received in those SMDs | 134,612 |
| Adjusted Total = 134,612 * Adjustment Multiplier | 152,292 |
| Resulting number of HDZ’s seats from the 5th district (calculated after doing same calculations for all parties and applying the ‘10*14’ (2000) electoral system law) | 9 |

Simulation 1995/1992 Design

The difference in the number of single-member districts provided for by the ‘80+28’ (1995) and the ‘60+60’ (1992) electoral systems presented the greatest problem in simulating the 1995 election with the ‘60+60’ (1992) electoral system. In order to adjust for that difference, the pertaining electoral laws for the parliamentary elections (Ured Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske 1995, Sabor Republike Hrvatske 1992) were consulted to determine correspondence of 28 original SMDs with 60 ‘new’ ones. That made the identification of the level of support for a particular party’s candidates in each of 60 single-member districts possible. Naturally, the underlying assumption here was that parties would not have changed the way they participated in the election (for example, that they would have still formed coalitions for SMD competitions). Original popular vote from the 1995 election was used to identify the number of seats each party won through national lists because (as was the case in Simulation 13 Naturally, this kind of data manipulation and adjusting would have been unnecessary if the data regarding national list votes in particular SMDs was available for the 1992 election. Then those votes could have been simply added up to get the level of popular support for a particular party in individual districts. However, operating under the assumption that number of votes for a particular party’s candidate do represent voters’ support of that party in general- this particular system was devised.
1992/1995) voters' preferences most likely would not have changed with a decrease in the size of national lists from 80 to 60. Then the number of mandate, fighting, and ornamental seats for the original and simulated 1995 elections was compared to determine which candidates would have been bestowed with which kind of nominations.

Simulation 1995/2000 Design

The design for this simulation was practically the same as the one for Simulation 1992/2000. One of the differences, however, was that it was assumed that parties participated in the simulated election in the same status as they did on the national list portion of the original election. Joint appearance of most opposition parties in the SMD election complicated the design process because it became difficult to discern popular support for particular parties in individual districts. This was so because national list vote data was unavailable on the district level, as was the case for 1992 election. That is why a system of establishing the share of particular parties in the opposition's joint SMD efforts was devised. As in the case of Simulation 1992/2000, a table presenting a practical application of this relatively complex design was created. Appendix Table 3 presents the way of determining the number of HSLS's seats in the 'new' 9th district.

Appendix Table 3. Simulation 1995/2000- Practical Example: HSLS's Seats in the 'new' 9th District

| - | Number of opposition's (all opposition parties that participated in the joint slating of SMD candidates) 1995 national list votes = 1,009,086 |
| - | Number of total votes opposition's 1995 SMD candidates received = 901,248 |
| - | Adjustment multiplier = 1,009,437 / 901,248 = 1.119654 |
| - | Number of HSLS's national list votes = 279,245 |
| - | HSLS's share of the opposition vote = 27.67% |
| - | 1995 SMDs included in the '10*14' electoral system's 9th district: 13th, 16th, and 18th. |
| - | Number of total votes opposition candidates received in those SMDs = 66,293 |
| - | Adjusted Total = 66,293 * Adjustment Multiplier = 74,225 |
| - | HSLS's share in the Adjusted Total = 74,225 * 27.67% = 20,540 |
| - | Resulting number of HSLS's seats from the 9th district (calculated after doing same calculations for all parties and applying the '10*14' (2000) electoral system law) = 1 |

Simulation 2000/1992 Design

Designing this simulation was relatively easy. The greatest problem was, as in the case of all previous simulations, presented by the discrepancy in the number of districts between the original '10*14' and '60+60' (1992) electoral systems. The pertinent electoral laws for the parliamentary elections (Zastupnicki Dom Republike Hrvatske 1999, Sabor Republike Hrvatske 1992) were consulted to adjust for that discrepancy by determining correspondence of 10 original districts with 60 'new' ones. The number of SMD seats acquired by particular parties was determined based on the number of votes those parties received in the appropriate district. As far as the national lists are concerned, parties' popular votes were calculated by adding the number of votes they received in all ten districts.

Simulation 2000/1995 Design

Designing this simulation was also relatively easy. As was the case in Simulation 2000/1992, the greatest problem was presented by the discrepancy in the number of districts between the 2000 and 1995 electoral systems. The pertinent electoral laws for the parliamentary elections (Zastupnicki Dom Sabora Republike Hrvatske 1999, Ured Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske 1995) were consulted to adjust for that discrepancy by determining correspondence of 10 original districts with 28 'new' ones. As was the case in the previous simulation, the number of SMD seats acquired by particular parties was determined based on the number of votes those parties received in the appropriate district. As far as the national lists are concerned, popular vote was calculated by adding the number of votes received in all ten districts.
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