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## Constructing a Common Ukrainian Identity: An Empirical Study

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## **Constructing a Common Ukrainian Identity: An Empirical Study**

### **Introduction**

In *National Identity*, a seminal study concerning nations and national identity, Anthony Smith defines national identity as “a named human population sharing common myths and symbols, historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith 1991, p.14).” According to Smith, these components are absolutely necessary for a nation to function. However, does this definition apply to the experience of all nations? Are there particular historical, geopolitical, or social factors that have shaped the development of a common national identity?

This study will examine the factors influencing the construction of a common national identity in Ukraine. The uniqueness of the Ukrainian case stems from its oppressive Russian-dominated past, its communist experience, and a weak role of nationalism prior to independence. Until 1991, Ukraine lacked the necessary components to be considered a successful nation-state. Literally translated as “borderland,” Ukraine has never had a readily-identifiable common territory or a common people. Harsh assimilatory policies of its rulers have left a sharply divided society, with differing languages, customs, and conflicting identities. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the state of Ukraine proclaimed its independence and set upon a course to build a modern nation - *ex post facto* – by strengthening the national identity of the Ukrainian people.

The first part of this study will examine the theoretical foundations of nations and nationalism as well as outline the general variables that shape collective national identity,

such as language, perpetuated by mass education, and urbanization. In the second part, I will examine these variables in the historical context of Ukraine and the various efforts to bolster national identity in the post-independence period. Regional cleavages and age will also emerge as powerful explanatory factors in the Ukrainian case. The third part will present the expected relationships as well as the operationalization of all variables for the purpose of a regression model. The findings will indicate the importance of language, size of locality, age, and regional variables as the primary factors shaping a common Ukrainian identity. The fourth part will analyze the results, point out any absences of relevant data and suggest necessary improvements for further analysis.

## **I. National Identity and Nation-Building – A Theoretical Perspective**

### ***What is a nation?***

Max Weber argued that it is ethnic ties, unified by a myth of common descent and attached to a political project, that bind an ethnic group into a nation. Thus, the nation is a “prestige community”, endowed with a sense of cultural mission. More recent theorists, such as Anthony Smith and Walker Connor, support Weber’s view that a nation stems from a “self-aware ethnic group (Gerth 1948, p.179).” According to their hypothesis, “potential nations” in the form of distinct *ethnies* have always existed, but have only recently matured into viable nation-states.

### ***Origins of nationalism***

Most historians contend that nationalism, an ideological movement seeking to secure autonomy, unity, and identity for a defined group of people, is a relatively recent phenomenon. The liberation movements in North America and Western Europe at the

end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century are generally cited as the causes for the dramatic shift from absolutism to mass national states (Hutchison 1994, p.5). Essentially, nationalism started a doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty, permeated by neo-classical ideals of patriotism and solidarity. Ernest Renan in his famous 1802 address *Que'est-ce qu'une nation* defined the nation as “a soul, a spiritual principle, ... a daily plebiscite (Renan in Hutchison 1994, p.18).” Thus, the nation exists as a common moral imperative. It is a solidarity sustained by a distinct historical consciousness.

### ***Theories of nationalism***

The formation of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is usually attributed to several factors associated with the rise of the industrialized society, namely urbanization and the introduction of the state-sponsored mass education system.

Benedict Anderson asserts that “the convergence of capitalism and print-technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which set the stage for the modern nation (Anderson 1991, p. 39).” When languages were formalized from rural vernaculars into print languages, only then could the national idea be effectively communicated to form common identities.

Karl Deutsch's theory of social communication supports Anderson's view. Since people are linked by complimentary habits and facilities of communication (such as common language or common myths and memories), Deutsch contends, a nation will emerge when their communicative efficiency is strengthened. Only then, when a measure of effective control over the behavior of its members is established, is a *nationality* formed (Deutsch 1966, p.101, 104-105).

Literacy, then, became the only form for effective moral membership of a modern community in nineteenth-century Western Europe and the minimal requirement for its citizenship (Gellner 1964, p.158). The establishment of a state-run mass-education system served to ensure cultural homogeneity by inculcating patriotic values into its citizenry. According to Ernest Gellner, since the educational machinery must operate in a common medium, a dominant language was chosen to “stamp its products”. Familiar folk symbols as well as common myths and memories were taught to forge common identities. Thus, the new nations were formed “from below”, when the effects of modernization created a popular consensus of the need of common culture to integrate the various elements of the population into a united whole.

The “instrumentalist” approach, particularly advanced by the Marxists, also asserted the vital role of mass-education and urbanization in shaping a common national identity, but interpreted the modernization forces that created nations somewhat differently than the ethnic and cultural theorists. Historian Eric Hobsbawm, in particular, argues that a nation was one of many “invented” traditions by political elites to legitimize power and increase social control over the masses (Hutchison 1994, p. 48). Urbanization provided the perfect breeding ground for national movements in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. The transition from a rural society - tightly regulated by feudal attachments, stable family structure, and the church - to overflowing urban centers bred widespread discontent among the lower classes. The inculcation of patriotic values and “invented traditions”, formed from a patchwork of residual folk cultures, through a mass-education system became the way to fill the identity gap and quell discontent. With the imposition of universal citizenship, the worker could now feel an effective part of the greater collective,

unlike the insignificant role of the peasant during feudalism and monarchy. In reality, the worker remained as economically depressed as the peasant was, while the middle-class intelligentsia (bourgeoisie) benefited from the new economic opportunities provided by the nation-state and the blossoming bureaucracy. Thus, nations were created “from above” by bourgeoisie elements seeking control over the working class (Hobsbawm 1990, p.101-111). Due to the communist experience of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Ukraine, the instrumentalist approach is particularly vital in examining the nation-building process in Ukraine.

### ***Impact of Inherited Cultural Values in Building National Identity***

Change of value systems imposed by mass-education does not produce uniform results in all societies. Cultural theorist Ronald Inglehart defines culture as “a system of attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation (Inglehart 1990, p. 18).” Many societies will react more slowly and with varying effects to broad-sweeping social changes, such as construction of national identities. Despite the best efforts to include varying cultural notions into a coherent national whole, nationalization can often be perceived as a destructive force, alienating one from important inherited values. For example, the Basques will generally be reluctant to call themselves Spanish, while Muslims in Saudi Arabia or Sudan would much rather identify with an overarching notion of Ummah Islam rather than with common identities of their respective nation-states.

### ***Impact of Material Values on Identity***

Inglehart also states that individual’s priorities reflect the socio-economic environment: the greatest subjective value is placed on those things that are in relatively

short supply (Inglehart 1990, p.68). Thus, nations with high prosperity levels are likely to be more concerned with values transcending the immediate economic welfare (Post-Materialism), such as identity. According to most national theorists, favorable economic conditions will generally correspond to higher levels of identification with the nation and the national idea. Harry Johnson argues that nationalist economic policies, designed to increase the economic well-being of its members, tend to foster development of a strong national identity (Johnson 1965, p.182). This theory accords broadly with historical experience of the nation-state.

### ***Cultural Inferiority***

Social psychologist Carl Jung also noted that in the case of less-developed colonial states, people often tended to experience an inherited cultural inferiority complex when a “collective shadow” lead to a perception that the metropolitan power was superior in language, culture, achievements, and other areas. Then, a nation’s own negative qualities could not be turned against the oppressor, so instead they were turned against the nation itself, resulting in further doubting and eventual acceptance of the oppressor’s point of view (Jung in Kuzio 1998, p151). Thus, the colonial dependency would begin to despise its own language and culture. In the case of Ukraine, inherited imperial-Tsarist and communist values served as substantial impediments to instilling a notion of a common Ukrainian identity.

### ***Intergenerational conflict***

Due to difficulty of accepting cultural change, Ronald Inglehart argues that the older generation will be particularly resistant to major and enduring shifts in society:

“The more central and early-learned aspects of culture are resistant to change, both because it requires a massive effort to change the central elements of an

adult's cognitive organization, and because one's most central values become ends in themselves, the abandonment of which would produce deep anxiety and uncertainty. (Inglehart 1990, p.19)"

Thus, age can also serve as a basis of subcultural differentiation. The younger groups, for whom it is much easier to overcome inconsistent early learning, will tend to embrace new values with relative rapidity. As a result of the generational rift, Harry Eckstein asserts that conflicting cultural identification patterns may occur within the age spectrum (Eckstein 1988, p. 798). While empirical confirmations of this theory are relatively scant, many cultural theorists contend that age is an important variable for analysis in the construction of common national identities.

### ***Gender roles***

Tamara Mayer argues that "despite its rhetoric of equality for all who partake in the "national project", nation remains, like other feminized entities – emphatically, historically and globally – the property of men (Mayer 2000, p.4)." The nation has largely been constructed as a "hetero-male project" and imagined as a "brotherhood" (Benedict Anderson). Mayer asserts that the male-dominated nation, which already controls women's sexuality and reproduction, also maps out the contours of their national identity.

But despite women's exclusion from significant power roles in national formation and its political process, women are not excluded from the "national project". In what Mayer terms as the "gender irony", nationalist ideology often defines the nation in the pure, natural, and mother-like female form. The notion of the Motherland is inherent to many nations across the world. As asserted by Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, women are ideological reproducers of the nation in both the physical sense, by giving



birth to the members of the nation, and in the cultural sense as main socializers of children to national values and beliefs (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, p.6-11). Thus, the nation-state will inculcate national values in women through mass-education (in the developed world) and as a traditional obligation (in less developed societies where formal education of women is generally low) because it is a crucial element of that nation's survival.

## **II. Nation-Building in Ukraine: A Historical Analysis**

It is difficult to place Ukrainian nationalism into one particular theory of national development. The concept of a Ukrainian nation was undoubtedly imposed "from above" by a variety of members of the intelligentsia (following Hobsbawm's argument), but would never succeed without the background of modern society (Gellner) and improvement in social communication (Deutsch). Nineteenth century writers such as Taras Shevchenko and Mykola Kostomarov produced works in Ukrainian and formed underground societies to disseminate national thought. Historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky wrote a definitive *History of Ukraine*, asserting a distinct identity rooted in the Kievan Rus, a medieval East Slavic kingdom, and the Cossack glory. But it is the urbanization and mass literacy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that played the most prominent role in shaping a common Ukrainian identity.

### ***Ukrainian nationalism and cultural impediments***

Ukraine declared its independence on 24 August 1991, a proclamation endorsed by a national referendum on 1 December 1991. When over 90% of citizens expressed the desire to remain independent, the country seemed surprisingly united in its national cause. Unfortunately, as Ukrainian scholar Victor Stepanenko concluded in his study, the

historic decision was largely of a socio-economic nature, and that the “national” idea was not the principle motive for the creation of a Ukrainian state (Stepanenko 1993, p.33). Supportive of Inglehart’s theories concerning the difficulty of overcoming established notions, the inherited regional, historical, ethnic, linguistic and religious differences severely limited the potential appeal of modern Ukrainian ethno-nationalism and created the preconditions for a sharp polarization in Ukrainian society.

In his seminal article “The Role of Ukraine in Modern History”, Ivan Rudnytsky declares that Ukraine is a “non-historical” nation because the eclipse of the Ukrainian state by the Mongol conquest of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, and later, by Polish and Russian domination, prevented Ukrainians from developing a continuous elite and, therefore, a continuous notion of statehood” (Rudnytsky 1963). Because independent statehood seemed a remote, unattainable possibility for most of the country’s history, Ukrainian nationalism consisted of intellectuals pursuing a “restorative agenda” of cultural revival and social justice (Prizel 1998, p. 301).

But perhaps the most difficult obstacle in establishing a separate identity in Ukraine has been the historical, cultural, and religious closeness to Russia. Russian people have always treated Ukrainians as “younger brothers” or “country cousins” that, as historian Roman Szporluk famously joked, “you may employ in the family business to perhaps run a branch office somewhere in the country” (Szporluk 2000, p. xxviii).

Following Jung’s theory of accepted cultural inferiority, Taras Kuzio also asserted that:

“Colonial rule usually brings with it negative self-images which developed and were internalized over time... This, in Ukraine’s case, led to a significant portion of the population rejecting its own traditions while adopting the beliefs, attitudes and values of the oppressor. Ukrainians became instrumental in the destruction of their own culture and language which led to passivity and a dependency syndrome (Kuzio 1998, p. 152).”

Most often, Ukrainians tacitly accepted the notion of “Slavic brotherhood” without question. In this paternalist environment, most Ukrainian nationalist claims were often ridiculed, both by their own population as well as the Russian authorities, and then harshly persecuted. For a long time, Russia could not envisage itself without the Ukraine, whom it considered an integral part of its own historic territory.

The development of the common Ukrainian consciousness did not take place until Russia began changing the imperial model of citizenship in the mid-nineteenth century to the national model. This model officially denied any separate identities for Ukrainians and Belarussians and regarded any nascent nationalism as sheer absurdity that threatened the integrity of the empire (Takach 1996, p. 643). As a result, the educational reforms of the nineteenth century banned the use of Ukrainian language in schools, mass media and literary publications. Assimilation provided Ukrainians with the only way to avoid discriminatory policies and to achieve upward mobility.

Unfortunately, the movement for a long time was limited to a small group of intellectuals. In the nineteenth century, Ukraine was an overwhelmingly rural society. According to an 1897 census, only 13.2% of Ukraine was urban at the time and Ukrainians were a decided minority in that environment: while 72.6% of people in Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians, the urban population constituted a mere 17%. Thus, ethnic Ukrainians were mostly to be found lower down the social ladder. The vast majority were peasants (93 %) with extremely low literacy levels (13% overall and only 4% to 9 % in the countryside) and high poverty rates (Krawchenko 1985 p. 11). As a result, the leaders of the movement simply could not mobilize support among peasants who showed little enthusiasm for national ideals and adhered to parochial religious and

local identities (Takach 1996 p. 652). While a significant cultural revival had taken place, very few Ukrainians had still conceived of a common national identity.

### ***Mass-Education and Language***

Following the theories of Deutsch, Anderson, and Gellner, nations can only be formed when establishment of mass-education system, which serves to transmit national values in a common linguistic medium, strengthens communication among the nation's residents. In the Ukrainian case, literacy campaigns became such a vehicle for disseminating national values.

The movement for literacy gained momentum in early twentieth century, when anti-Ukrainian policies were somewhat relaxed by the tsarist and then the Soviet governments. Ukrainian intellectuals now received permission to teach in Ukrainian language, which was a highly effective tool in propagating Ukrainian national identity. Educational societies such as *Prosvita* (Enlightenment), whose membership had grown to a considerable 197,000 by 1914, established schools and reading clubs throughout rural areas of Ukraine and worked to mobilize peasant support for political action (Takach 1996, p.653 - 654).

While the Bolsheviks despised the promotion of any Ukrainian separatist tendencies, the education of the peasant class (regardless of the linguistic medium) was imperative to survival of the Soviet state. Since the Soviet regime inherited an unenviable legacy of cultural backwardness, the first step in promoting communist ideals was to educate Ukrainian peasants. In the period of 1923-1939, "forced Ukrainisation" was instituted throughout the country. By 1939, 85% of Ukraine's population was literate. In comparison to 13% in 1897 and 24% in 1920, the change had been nothing

short of miraculous. The Ukrainian-language school system had now broken out of its narrow confines to become not merely an institution for Ukrainians, but for an entire population of Ukraine. By 1932, 87% of general education schools instituted Ukrainian as their language of instruction. As a result, 88% Ukraine's pupils were educated in Ukrainian. Ukrainian-language books, virtually non-existent in 1897, rose to 79% by 1930 (Krawchenko 1985 p. 86-135).

The cultural revival did not last for long, though. The Soviet government, having witnessed the dangers of Ukrainian national dissent during World War II and the 1950's, instituted Russification and Sovietization campaigns, and assured that Russian schools offered superior education via better funding, equipment, and teachers. By 1974, the number of pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools in Ukraine declined from 81% in 1950 to 60%. In Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, the number of Ukrainian-language schools had declined to 23% of the total (Krawchenko 1985 p. 176, 230). The schools in eastern urban centers were now completely Russified. Russian language was now taught in every school, while Ukrainian language was no longer compulsory. The higher education was fully Russified as well, with only about a third of Ukrainian-language higher education institutions. As a result, only 17% of post-secondary level textbooks in 1968 were printed in the Ukrainian language. The Soviet system offered free choice for a parent to choose the school for their children, but the incentive of a Russian-language education greatly outweighed the Ukrainian-language alternative.

Although still ethnically predominant, Ukrainians constituted a linguistic minority in 1989 because only 43% of the population considered Ukrainian their native language. Over a third of native Ukrainians in 1989 preferred Russian as their language of

convenience. While 59.3 % of Eastern Ukrainians identified themselves as ethnic Ukrainians, only 13% of them spoke Ukrainian. The capital Kyiv in 1989 was 79.7% Ukrainian, and only 45.8% spoke Ukrainian. The number of pupils in Ukrainian-language schools had further declined to 47.5% by 1989. Other tools of cultural reproduction, such as Ukrainian-language mass media, also declined in their relative importance and regional scope (Wilson 1998, p.20-23).

After independence in 1991, the government instituted Ukrainisation policies, focusing on promotion of Ukrainian language and Ukrainian-language media across the country to raise national consciousness. The Ukrainian Languages Law of 1989 had already established Ukrainian as the titular language of the state, required state bureaucrats to use Ukrainian within five years and envisaged a rolling program for the Ukrainisation of higher education by the end of the century (Wilson 1997 p. 156). State programs of 1991 and 1992 reaffirmed these goals and called for an immediate acceleration of the process.

In the early 1990's, major reorganization of the school system took place. Every Ukrainian secondary school now requires instruction of Ukrainian language, whether in primary form (all subjects) or in secondary form (language course). According to the Ministry of Education decree of 1993, the instruction of Russian is no longer compulsory across Ukraine (Arel 1995, p.606). School curriculums were now mandated to teach Ukrainian literature and national history in an effort to inculcate patriotic values. Nationalist history books, once banned, were now the textbooks of Ukrainian history, preaching unique Ukrainian nation and people with Kievan roots and Cossack glory.

Since independence, a new language policy has been in place on Ukrainian TV that aimed toward broadcasting exclusively in Ukrainian. In particular, all news programs in the country are now conducted in the Ukrainian language. The same rule now applies to government-owned print media (Arel 1995, p. 612). In reactionary areas of Western Ukraine, regional authorities even banned a number of Russian-language publications in an effort to promote Ukrainian-language media.

### ***Urbanization***

Rapid industrialization and urbanization swept through Ukraine in the 1930's. The intense tempo of the Stalinist Five-Year Plans required a large urban labor force as well as a number of qualified engineers and technicians. The migration to urban centers radically altered the Ukrainian national composite: by 1939, ethnic Ukrainians had made up a majority of urban population – 58.1%. As a result, the class structure had changed as well. Workers and white-collar staff were now 66.1% and 56% Ukrainian, respectively (Krawchenko 1985, p.119, 133). Perpetuated by a cultural revival, a highly effective system of mass education, and rapid growth of the middle class, the number of Ukrainians in the cities increased rapidly. As affirmed by Gellner's theory, the urban center now became the purveyor of common identity. Only the in western areas of Ukraine, which joined the Soviet Union after the Ribentropp - Molotov Pact in 1939, remained largely rural and isolated from rapid urban development of the east. Ukrainian nationalism there was still highly idealistic and was only exhibited at high-culture levels.

Unfortunately, while the rates of urbanization and the Ukrainian middle class continued to grow at a steady rate into the 1970's, Ukrainian identity began to decline in Eastern and Central Ukraine, mostly due to assimilatory policies of the Soviet

government. In an effort to “dilute” the Ukrainian population, the Soviet government actively encouraged the migration of workers from Russia to Eastern and Southern Ukrainian factories. As a result, between 1959-1970, the overall growth rate of ethnic Ukrainians was 9.72%, while the Russian population grew by 28.71% in the same period (Szporluk 2000 p. 80). By the end of the 1980’s, the Russian population in Ukraine increased by more than 60% since the 1960’s, with most settling in the industrial areas of the east.

### **III. The Success of Nation-Building in Independent Ukraine: An Empirical Study**

In the statistical analysis, I will use individual-level data from the 1996 Eurobarometer survey for Central and Eastern Europe. This year is particularly interesting to examine as a result of President Kuchma’s famous declaration that the nation-building process is complete in Ukraine (Kuzio 1998, p.14). In his speech, Kuchma mostly considered successful political consolidation and distancing of Ukraine from Russia, but also hinted at successful policies of national consolidation as well.

#### ***Hypotheses***

In Section I, Social theorists such as Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson, and Deutsch presented several important factors in national development, including mass-education, urbanization, and linguistic development. Robert Inglehart’s analysis of cultural values, materialism, and intergenerational conflict pointed to income and age as possible determinants of national identity. Tamara Mayer, among others, argued that gender also plays an important role in national formation. In Section II, these variables were



presented in light of Ukrainian national development. Regional cleavages also emerged as a powerful explanatory factor in explaining nation-building in Ukraine.

Drawing from the evidence presented in the literature review, I expect to support the following hypotheses:

**H1: Identification with Ukrainian nationality will increase with the knowledge of Ukrainian language.**

When combined with the mass-education system and the media, I expect Ukrainian language to be the most significant factor in shaping Ukrainian identity. Development of Ukrainian language was a primary determinant of nation-building efforts in Ukraine. Linguistic reform in schools and media mostly targeted a large amorphous Russophone population, inherited after seven decades of Soviet rule, without a conscious national identity (local or Soviet identities), but also hoped to “convert” those who actively identified with Russian nationality (Kuzio 1998, p.104).

**H2: Citizens residing in more urbanized settings are more likely to identify with Ukrainian nationality.**

As postulated by Gellner and Hobsbawm, urbanization is a historical process of modernization that created more effective channels of communication, such as mass-education systems, mass-media, and cultural centers, an environment highly conducive for distribution of nationalist ideals (see Section I). When the urban environment is

employed to promote the national cause, studies have indicated an increase in common national identity. Statistical findings in Ukraine from the 1930's until the early 1960's, when urbanization was complemented by promotion of common Ukrainian identity, support this theory. The trend was predictably reversed in the 1970's, when cultural institutions in urban centers were altered to promote Russian and Soviet values, and has once again been reversed since independence.

**H3: The younger citizens will have stronger attachments to Ukrainian nationality than the older citizens will.**

According to cultural theorists Ronald Inglehart and Harry Eckstein, the older generation is more resistant to social change, which can create a “subcultural differentiation” between the age groups (see Section I). In Ukraine, this theory is particularly valuable in explaining the conflict between the older generation, brought up with communist values and overarching Soviet identities, and the younger generation, who are being socialized in the national-democratic model of the independent Ukraine. Taras Kuzio argues that the older generation will tend to cling to old Soviet and Pan-Slavic identities, often through affiliation with Communist or Socialist Parties of Ukraine (Kuzio 1998, p.157). M.N. Guboglo attributes the phenomena to “nostalgic feelings for a great power that has been lost” and argues that independence signaled the loss of ethnic (Pan-Slavic) as well as civic (Soviet) identities for those who lived most of their conscious lives as citizens of the Soviet Union (Guboglo 1996 p.99-100).

**H4: Residents of Western, Central and Northern Ukraine are more likely to identify with Ukrainian nationality.**

Isolated from the pressures of industrialization and urbanization of the 1930's and having benefited from complete historical absence of Russians, Western Ukraine emerged as the center of Ukrainian culture and the cradle of Ukrainian nationalism. During the Soviet times, Western Ukraine retained its distinct Ukrainian identity in the midst of general decay of that identity in the east. By 1970, 95% of schools and 85% of the print media were operated in the Ukrainian language (Krawchenko 1985, p.230). As a result, the Ukrainian population increased from about two-thirds ethnic Ukrainian to overwhelming 93% by the time of independence.

**H5: Residents of Crimea, as well as Southern and Eastern regions, are less likely to identify with Ukrainian nationality.**

The Crimea also merits special consideration since it has been declared an autonomous republic in 1992, thus rendering itself immune to nearly all identity-strengthening measures. It originally joined the Ukraine in 1954 under Khrushchev's leadership, but its people never identified with the Ukrainian nation. Only about a quarter of Crimean residents considered themselves Ukrainian at the time of independence, and the number has not changed much since. In a 1996 survey, only 27% indicated that Crimea should remain a part of Ukraine (Kuzio 1998, 116).

The Eastern and Southern regions should show negative relationships as well.

Due to deep-rooted Russification and centuries-old Ukrainophobia, often still promoted by the local *nomenklatura*, any affirmative action in the cities of Eastern Ukraine was extremely suspicious and often hostile in the eyes of the predominantly Russophone population.

### ***Variable operationalization***

The following table presents all of the variables employed in the study, followed by a short justification for measurement techniques.<sup>1</sup>

**Table 1: Variables Employed**

<b>Type and Name of Variable</b>	<b>Measurement</b>
DV: <i>National Identity</i>	(0,1): 0-Ukrainian, 1- Other
IV: <i>Ukrainian Language (Primary)</i>	(0,1): 0- Ukrainian, 1- Other
IV: <i>Ukrainian Language (Secondary)</i>	(0,1): 0- Ukrainian, 1- Other
IV: <i>Region</i>	(0,1): REGWEST, RECENTR, REGNORTH, REGSOUTH, REGEAST, REGKYIV, REGCRIME
IV: <i>Type of Community</i>	(1-3): 1-Big City, 2-Provincial town, 3-Rural Area
IV: <i>Age</i>	(1-5): Younger to Older
IV: <i>Level of Education</i>	(1-3): Higher to Lower
IV: <i>Income</i>	(1-11): Higher to Lower

**Identity:** In the survey, the question that respondents answered was “What is your nationality?” About 36 choices of various national groups were given for the respondent to choose. Since I am only interested in Ukrainian identity, the variable was collapsed into a dummy variable of “Ukrainian” and “other”.

**Language:** The survey asks the respondents two questions about language preferences, first as the primary language, and the second as a secondary language. Once again, an array of choices is given, but since I am only interested in “Ukrainian” and “other”, both these variables were collapsed and presented as dummy variables in the study.

**Region:** The various regions of Ukraine were also recoded as dummy variables to measure the impact of each specific one on Ukrainian national identity.

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<sup>1</sup>Gender will not be included as one of the variables in the study. Theoretical discussions in Section I as well as the communist legacy of gender consideration (high levels of education and political representation) do not point to gender as a valid basis of identity differentiation in the case of Ukraine.

### ***Individual Correlations***

The following table presents the individual correlations of the independent variables to the dependent variable using Spearman's rho test, which is most suitable for examining ordinal-level data.

**Table 2: Individual Correlations**

<b>Independent Variable</b>	<b>Correlation Coefficient</b>	<b>Significance (2-tailed)</b>
Language (Primary)	.698	.000***
Language (Secondary)	-.427	.000***
Crimea Region	-.238	.000***
Western Region	.174	.000***
Central Region	.086	.003**
Kyiv	.017	.560
Northern Region	-.002	.949
Eastern Region	.059	.042*
Southern Region	-.078	.007
Type of Community	-.256	.000
Age	-.017	.550
Level of Education	.143	.000***
Income	.074	.010**

Dependent variable: Ukrainian identity

\*\*\* - statistically significant at the .001 level

\*\* - statistically significant at the .01 level

\* - statistically significant at the .05 level

### ***Language***

As expected, the primary language variable has a high correlation levels with Ukrainian identity (.698 and significant at the .001 level), while the secondary language variable has a strong negative correlation at -.427 and is significant at the .001 level as well.

### ***Region***

As predicted, individual correlations in Western and Central region produced positive results, with the West significant at the .001 level and the Center at .01. The Crimea and Southern Ukraine displayed negative correlations: Crimea strongly negative

at -.238 and significant at .001 level and the South negative and significant at the .01 level. The only surprises were the weak displays of Northern Ukraine and Kyiv<sup>2</sup> (no significance) and the positive correlation of Eastern Ukraine (statistical significance at .05 level) with Ukrainian identity.

#### *Type of Community*

Because the questionnaire orders the size from higher to lower density of population, the correlation in this case was negative. As predicted, it was strong (-.256) and statistically significant at the .001 level.

#### *Age, Income, and Level of Education*

While running correlations, there were several surprises in standard demographic variables as well. Contrary to my predictions, age did not prove to be statistically significant, while level of education was surprisingly statistically significant at the .001 level. The income variable was not statistically significant as well.

#### *Logit Analysis*

Further statistical analysis is needed to gain a broader understanding of the impact that the various variables have on producing a common Ukrainian national identity. One way to achieve this is through logit analysis. Since we are estimating the likelihood of one factor upon a respondent's choice of nationality, this analysis is a more appropriate way of estimation because it employs a sigmoid instead of a linear function<sup>3</sup>. In our data, identity is not a continuous variable – you are either Ukrainian or not – as well, so this

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<sup>2</sup> For the regression model, Kyiv will not be included in the estimation since one cannot put all the regions into the equation as dummy variables without violating the assumption that the explanatory variables are not exactly linearly related (Hanushek and Jackson 177, p.104). Instead, the effects of Kyiv will show up as part of the estimated equation's constant term

<sup>3</sup> While linear analysis assumes the variable to be a continuous function, logit and probit analyses assess the values that are concentrated around 0 and 1.

type of analysis would be needed to prevent “nonsense” predictions and more accurately estimate the impact of the independent variables.

In logit estimation, one hypothesizes that the probability of the occurrence of the event is determined by the function:

$$p_i = F(Z_i) = 1 / (1 + e^{-Z_i}),$$

where  $Z$  is defined as a linear combination of the explanatory variables,  $X_1$  through  $X_{13}$ :

$$Z = \text{constant} + \text{Beta}_1 X_1 + \dots + \text{Beta}_{13} X_{13}$$

(Dougherty 2001). Thus, as the  $Z$  tends to infinity,  $e^{-Z}$  tends to 0 and  $p$  has a limiting upper bound of 1. When  $Z$  tends to minus infinity,  $e^{-Z}$  tends to infinity and  $p$  has a limiting lower bound of 0. Thus, there is no possibility of the probability being greater than 1 or less than 0.

The usual method of calculating marginal effect is at the mean of the explanatory variables. Thus,

$$Z = \text{constant} + \text{Beta}_1 M_1 + \dots + \text{Beta}_{13} M_{13},$$

where  $M_i$  is the mean of the variable  $X_i$ .

The marginal effect of  $Z$  on the probability, denoted  $f(Z)$ , is given by the derivative of the logit function:

$$f(Z) = e^{-Z} / (1 + e^{-Z})^2$$

The probability of the individual variables is then given by  $f(Z) * \text{Beta}_i$  (Dougherty 2001).

This number will indicate the exact percentage of impact caused by the individual independent variables.

Table 4 presents the logit analysis output:

**Table 4: Logit Analysis**

Model Summary

-2 Log Likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
706.532	.413	.612

<b>LOGIT ANALYSIS: Marginal Effects</b>					
Variables	Mean	Beta	Beta*mean	Sig.	Marginal Effects
EDUCATION LEVEL	2.8683	0.1172	0.3362	0.414	0.0109
AGE OF RESPONDENT	3.0392	0.2170	0.6595	0.009**	0.0202
TYPE OF COMMUNITY	2.9567	-0.3205	-0.9476	0.020*	-0.0298
INCOME	5.1683	0.0070	0.0362	0.874	0.0007
CRIMEA REGION	0.8400	-0.5806	-0.4877	0.214	-0.0540
WESTERN REGION	0.8575	-0.9428	-0.8085	0.123	-0.0877
CENTRAL REGION	0.8733	-1.1344	-0.9907	0.041*	-0.1055
NORTHERN REGION	0.8133	-0.6816	-0.5544	0.159	-0.0634
EASTERN REGION	0.8125	-0.3509	-0.2851	0.474	-0.0326
SOUTHERN REGION	0.8533	-0.6686	-0.5705	0.178	-0.0622
Ukrainian language (primary)	0.3500	4.6856	1.6400	.000***	0.4359
Ukrainian as second language	0.7917	0.5533	0.4380	.014*	0.0515
			-1.9395		
Constant		-0.2161			
		Z variable	f(Z)		
		-2.1556	0.0930		

Dependent variable: Ukrainian identity

\*\*\* - statistically significant at the .001 level

\*\* - statistically significant at the .01 level

\* - statistically significant at the .05 level

The beta\*mean, Z variable, f(Z), and the marginal effect calculated by author.

**Logit Results**

The age, the type of community, the Central Region, and both the language variables are statistically significant at various levels. The level of education is no longer statistically significant, while the age variable now supports Inglehart's generational



conflict theory. The logit model was also able to reveal the exact marginal effect of each statistically significant variable on the dependent variable. These are the final results:

- 1) **A respondent is more likely to identify with Ukrainian nationality by 2.02% as the age variable increases by one category.**
- 2) **The probability of a respondent identifying with Ukrainian nationality increases by 2.98% as the population concentration increases by one category.<sup>4</sup>**
- 3) **Residents of Central Ukraine are 10.55% more likely to identify with Ukrainian nationality.**
- 4) **A person speaking Ukrainian as a primary language is 43.59% more likely to identify with Ukrainian nationality.**
- 5) **A person speaking Ukrainian as a secondary language is 5.15% more likely to identify with Ukrainian nationality.**

The logit model further supported our hypotheses. The analysis confirmed the significance of language, age, type of community and the Central region variable as well as added a vital component of validity by estimating the marginal effect of each of the independent variables.

### ***Insignificant Variables***

#### ***Western Region***

The evidence presented in the regression is a bit puzzling. Western Ukraine has been the cradle of Ukrainian nationalism since the 1940's, when the highly-nationalistic region of Galicia joined the Soviet Union. As I described before, the region is almost universally Ukrainian-speaking and is home to all the right-wing nationalist parties of

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<sup>4</sup> The survey was coded in the opposite direction: 1-highest concentration, 3-lowest concentration. Thus, the marginal effect appears negative in Table 4.

Ukraine. One factor responsible may be the emergence of historic minorities of Western Ukraine, such as the Poles, Hungarians, and Rusyns (a minority group in the Carpathian Mountains that identifies itself as a separate Slavic group). Generally assimilated into Ukrainians under “Ukrainisation” policies of the 1930’s and early 1940’s, these groups have emerged to assert their distinctive identities during the minority-favorable climate during the post-independence period (Kuzio 1998, p. 165).

#### *Level of Education*

The level of education variable was predictably insignificant in the study. While the studies of national theorists have asserted the importance of mass-education as vehicle to promote national values, level of education is only important at the initial stages of national formation, when high illiteracy levels provide the “raw” products, onto which mass-education imprints its values and beliefs (see Section I). They do not, however, stress the importance of the particular level of education as much as the content of such education. Gellner, Deutsch, and Hobsbawm all assert the importance of mass-education in a common linguistic medium as a primary vehicle of building a common identity. Statistical data in Ukraine from the 1930’s, when literacy campaigns and mass-education in the Ukrainian language was serving to promote a separate Ukrainian identity, is consistent with this theory.

After the repression of the post-war period, mass-education promoted Soviet and Russian values, resulting in the decline of Ukrainian identity. But because the populace was almost universally educated by that time, it would be ridiculous to claim that an increase in the level of education was responsible for producing the shift. The change in values was manifested in other factors, such as the ideological switch to an overarching

Soviet identity and, more importantly, a switch to Russian language as a means of access to higher-level societal benefits. After independence, the trend reversed itself once more toward promotion of a separate Ukrainian identity by reviving Ukrainian language in various spheres of education and cultivation of national values.

Common values promoted by the post-independence reforms, mainly the increase in use of Ukrainian language as a primary means of communication, are the more accurate measures of the success of mass-education in promoting a common Ukrainian identity.

#### *Income*

Social and national theories accord an important role for socio-economic conditions in determining identity (Section 1). In Ukraine, as Taras Kuzio argues, the crisis in identity is undoubtedly linked to the socio-economic crisis that arose during post-independence (Kuzio, 1998 p.150). The inability of the government to provide economic security has aided in sustaining old Soviet and regional identities. However, because of historical regional disparities, social factors, and linguistic development, the individual income has not historically been one of the more determining factors in producing national identity in Ukraine.

## **IV: Omissions, Inconsistencies, and Further Research**

### *Too many Ukrainians?: An important omission of survey data*

The main criticism of these encouraging findings is a lack of important factors omitted in the survey. When the survey asked Ukrainian residents for their nationality, the choices were limited in the way that many citizens might have “forcibly” identified themselves as Ukrainians. Since the choices only included national groups, many

residents may not have had the opportunity to express regional, local, or Soviet identities, which are still widely prevalent across Ukraine, especially in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. As Taras Kuzio states in his study, besides conscious national identities (Ukrainian, Russian or other minority), there are also Soviet, Little Russian and pre-modern identities, which define themselves in terms of “otherness” (not Russian, not Ukrainian, but with no clear idea of what they are). In this case, a better question than “What is your nationality” might have been “What do you most closely identify yourself with” or “What is your homeland”. In absence of those choices in the survey, the residents might have picked Ukraine simply because of residence status, not a genuine attachment. For example, in a 1995 New Democracies Barometer survey (Table 5) that asked the “most closely identify” question, Ukrainian residents chose “my country” in 34% of the cases, while 45% chose “town or district where I live” and another 12% chose the non-existent Soviet Union. Unfortunately, I could not use that survey as it lacked other important data necessary for a regression. In a 1994 Political Portrait of Ukraine general survey that asked the “homeland” question, only 34% of East, South, and Crimea identified themselves as Ukrainians (see Table 6). Thus, an omission of these questions and options in the Eurobarometer survey might have “produced” more Ukrainians that exist in reality.

#### ***The role of language as an explanatory variable in shaping Ukrainian identity***

One can hardly doubt the success of linguistic integration in Ukraine, especially in the Central region of the country. In fact, from 1990-1995 the number of school pupils in Kyiv educated in the Ukrainian language grew from 31% to 64% (Kuzio 1998, p.173). Unfortunately, this process was not uniformly successful in Eastern and Southern

regions. Rates in Eastern cities of Donetsk and Luhansk grew from 3% and 7% in 1990 by a meager 2% each in 1995. Crimea remained with virtually no Ukrainian-language schools whatsoever (0.1% of the total). The Western region, already displaying extremely high levels in 1989, did not matter much in this process.

As a result, this regression model somewhat overstates the role of language in producing a common Ukrainian identity. While the scholars of nationalism predict language to be a crucial factor, many scholars of Ukraine have pointed out the deep divisions that exist in the linguistic landscape of Ukraine. Once again, the survey data might have been a bit exaggerated due to the question posed to the respondents (“What language do you speak?” (1 and 2)). Bilingualism is almost universal in Ukraine, with many considering Ukrainian their first language simply because they use it in the public sphere, as it is required by new language laws. In 1995, 88.2% of the Ukrainian population indicated that they are able to speak, read, and write in the Ukrainian language (Kuzio 1998, p. 180). As Dominique Arel asserts, a language one speaks well may not necessarily be the language most often used in daily intercourse (Arel 1996, p. 82). A better question might have been “what is your language of convenience?” or even “what is your native language?”, which also signals stronger levels of attachment. A 1996 study asking the former revealed that only 18.5% of Easterners use Ukrainian as their “language of convenience” (See Table 7). When the “1994 Political Portrait of Ukraine” survey asked the latter alternative, only 22% of residents of the North East, 29% of the Donbas region of the East, and 15% of Crimeans indicated Ukrainian as their native language (Kuzio 1998, p.179). The “1995 Socio-Political Portrait of Four Ukrainian Cities” indicated that Donetsk (Eastern Ukraine) and Simferopol’ (Crimea) residents

consider Ukrainian their native language only in 19.4% and 9.3% of the cases respectively (See Table 8).

### ***Need for further analysis***

There are several variables missing in this survey that might play an important role in further analysis of Ukrainian identity. Religion is the first of these variables. While most of Ukrainian residents are Orthodox, there has been a revival of the Greek Catholicism (or Uniate Church) and Roman Catholicism in Ukraine. The former one has been especially active in asserting itself as the “true” religion of the Ukrainian nation. Another two variables that should be included are left-to-right self-placement and party affiliation. Here, one can assert that those who support leftist parties are less likely to be Ukrainian than those who support centrist and rightist parties.

### ***Conclusions***

Theorists of nationalism, such as Ernest Gellner, Karl Deutsch, Benedict Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm, have identified increase in mass-communication, a common linguistic medium, and urbanization as primary factors responsible for shaping a common national identity and the emergence of a stable nation-state. While asserting nationalism played a relative weak historical role in the case of Ukraine, these factors were substantially strengthened, especially in the post-independence period since 1991. Other variables, such as age and region, were also predicted to have a substantial effect in shaping a common Ukrainian identity.

The 1996 Eurobarometer survey is used as a basis for a linear regression model and logit analysis to test the statistical significance of these variables in shaping a common Ukrainian identity. As predicted, most variables proved statistically significant

at various levels, especially the language variables. The only surprise was the insignificance of Western region as an independent factor shaping Ukrainian identity.

Due to several problems in question format and choice options, the analysis may have overstated the number of “Ukrainian” respondents as well as the role of language as an overwhelmingly significant factor in the regression. As several other surveys suggest, the language situation is much more complex in Ukraine. Also, there were several variables missing in the survey, such as religion, party preference, and ideology, which might have impacted the formation of Ukrainian identity.

## Appendix

**Table 5**

**Which do you most closely identify yourself with?**

No answer	2%
Town, district	45%
Region	5%
Country (Ukraine)	34%
Europe	1%
Soviet Union	12%
Other	1%

Source: *New Democracies Barometer Survey for 1995*, [www.rs2.tarki.hu/ndb](http://www.rs2.tarki.hu/ndb)

**Table 6**

**What do you consider to be your homeland? (%)**

	<i>North East</i>	<i>East</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Donbas</i>	<i>Crimea</i>	<i>Total</i>
Ukraine	35%	55%	48%	23%	3%	34%
CIS	10%	5%	5%	9%	4%	7%
USSR	21%	17%	23%	34%	37%	27%
Russia	2%	1%	0%	2%	14%	3%
Region	26%	17%	16%	25%	40%	23%
Europe	1%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%
Don't know	5%	3%	7%	6%	2%	5%

Source: Bekeshkina, Iryna. "Stavlennia Nasellennia Skhodu i Pivdnia do Problem Nezalezhnosti". *Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy*, no.9, 1994, p.46.

**Table 7**

**What is your language of convinience?**

	<i>East</i>	<i>West</i>
Ukrainian	18.5%	77%
Russian	81.5%	23%

Source: Arel, Dominique and Valeri Khmelko. "The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine". *The Harriman Review*, v. 9, no.1-2, 1996, p. 82.



Table 8

**What is your native language (mother tongue)?**

	<i>Lviv</i>	<i>Kyiv</i>	<i>Donetsk</i>	<i>Simferopol'</i>
Ukrainian	75.9%	58%	19.4%	9.3%
Russian	22.8%	41.7%	79.6%	82.2%
Other	2.3%	0.5%	1.7%	8.5%

*Source:* "Sotsial'no-Politychnyi Portret Chotyriokh Mist Ukrainy". *Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy*, no.13, 1995, p.69.

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