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The Importance of Mass Culture for Democratization

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The Importance of Mass Culture for Democratization

By: James Melton

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Abstract:

In the last thirty years, the importance of political culture in political science has risen, declined, and has risen again. Although the theories of political culture have been strengthened and refined in this process, modern culture theorists have yet to empirically demonstrate culture’s ability to be used as an independent variable or to make causal claims using culture. This paper makes an attempt to solve these empirical deficiencies in cultural theory by setting up what Brian Barry calls a “critical test.” Using the former USSR and the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, I will test two hypotheses. First, mass values and not elite bargaining caused the transition from communism to democracy in these countries, and second, these mass values were not a result of “rational self interest” or elite manipulation, but they formed through the interaction of different sub-cultures. The first hypothesis will be tested by a quantitative analysis of the relationship between mass political protest and democratization, and to be considered valid, the peak level of democratization should follow the peak of mass political protest relatively closely. The second hypothesis will be tested using a cross-tab between culture and indicators of democratic values from the World Values Survey. To be considered valid, there should be a relatively strong significant correlation with individualist and egalitarian cultures displaying more democratic values than fatalist or hierarch culture. From the data gathered, these hypotheses seem to be valid; however, economic variables seem to play a minimal role as well.
The Importance of Mass Culture for Democratization

In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of theoretical works dealing with political culture. In addition, there have been numerous works that have tried to introduce cultural variables into rational choice theory to make it a stronger theory (Chai 1997, Chai and Wildavsky 1994, Wildavsky 1998). These authors see culture, and political culture, as a way to overcome some of the problems encountered by rational choice theorists and to increase the explanatory power of the theory. There are even some people who go so far as to say culture is essential to understand how people rationally act. As stated by Chai and Wildavsky, "far from saying that culture is the antithesis to rationality, cultural theory states the opposite: Culture is essential for rationality because in many, if not most, situations rational decision making would be impossible without the existence of culturally based preferences and beliefs" (Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 164). However, before any theory of culture can be used in this regard, it must overcome the objections made by Brian Barry in Socialists, Economists, and Democracy. For example, Barry objects that Almond and Vrba used a very deterministic theory of culture in their work, the Civic Culture (Almond and Vrba 1963); in addition, Lipset did not distinguish between the masses and elites (Lipset 1960). These objections have been overcome by improved cultural theory.\(^1\) However, the more empirical and methodological questions posed by Barry, like the how can culture theory show causality or be used as an independent variable, have not yet been answered (Barry 1978). The answers to these questions are essential for the future of culture theory in political science.

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\(^1\) For example, Mary Douglas's Grid/Group analysis overcomes both of these obstacles, as will be demonstrated below
Barry criticizes tests of culture's role in the stability of democracy performed by Almond and Vrba, Eckstein, and Lipset during the 1960's. Although all three of the theories used by the authors are different, in the end, they all make the same fundamental methodological mistake: they can only show correlation, not causality (Barry 1978). There are two main reasons for this methodological dilemma. First, the authors do not set up what Barry calls "the critical test." These authors are all testing culture and the stability of democracy in already established democracies, mostly in Europe. This is a problem, because none of these authors can show that there was a fundamental change in culture that caused democracy to form or stabilize. The second reason is that in a stable democracy there are many different factors causing stability.

Barry seems not to question the fact that culture probably does affect the stability of democracy, but he does not think this effect can be empirically demonstrated. Therefore, in order to test the relationship between culture and democracy, it is essential to set up a critical test and find a way to control for other independent variables that affect stability. ²

The purpose of this paper is to solve the problems brought up by Barry and answer the research question Almond and Vrba, Eckstein, and Lipset all set out to answer: does political culture play a role in the formation and stability of democracy? The political scientists above all tried to explain culture's role in democracy using a cross section of countries with varying forms and levels of democracy, but as pointed out by Barry above, this approach has trouble indicating causality. Consequently, I will not take the same approach as the researchers above, but instead, I will attempt to set up Barry's critical test. In order to set-up a critical test for this question, the researcher needs to demonstrate that culture somehow changed in the transition to democracy and this made the country more suitable for a stable democracy, or that culture did not

² For a more detailed discussion and a diagram showing all the different variables that most likely affect the stability of democracy, see Barry 1978, p. 94.
necessarily change but it was the driving force behind the transition to democracy. The hypotheses in this paper support the latter approach. This paper will be looking at political culture in Eastern European countries and the former USSR between 1980 and 1995. Even though some might be skeptical about looking at the transition period in these countries because there are so many things changing all at once, it is imperative that we look at this time period for two reasons. During this period, many of the intervening variables Barry points out, like past performance of the democracy, propaganda, etc., are not present. In addition, it allows us to look at culture’s influence on democracy before and after democracy is established. Therefore, the initial hypothesis to the research question above is: oppositional mass cultures caused democratization in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. This is a slightly different hypothesis than Almond and Vrba, Eckstein, or Lipset, but it is still testing the same research question in a similar way.

However, because the terms political culture and democratization are not easily definable, these terms need to be defined to better understand what we are trying to test here. Consequently, we must further define these terms to operationalize the above hypothesis. Let us start with theories of democratization that involve political culture. There are basically two competing theories on this issue: a top-down and a bottom-up approach. As pointed out by Larry Diamond, “Incorporation of the political culture variable into analyses of the emergence of democracy has heavily focused on the political elite” (Diamond 1993: 2). The top-down approach Diamond is referring to, advocated by Dahl 1971 and Rustow 1970 among others, states that the elites set up the “rules of the game” and these rules are passed down to the masses. However, as Diamond points out, these authors seem to “generally neglect or altogether ignore mass culture” (Diamond 1993: 11). This is a problem because the citizens are essential for a
legitimate democracy, and in addition, it was the masses that led the transition in many of the Eastern European countries. For example, the Solidarity movement in Poland led the fight for democracy that eventually forced open elections in 1989, and mass exodus from East Germany weakened the economy and political structure enough to allow for peaceful use of mass voice, which led to reform and reunification of Germany. It is for these reasons we will use a bottom up approach in this study, and hopefully gain a greater understanding of exactly what led to the end of communism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR.

The "mass culture" Diamond refers to above is the bottom-up approach to democratization that has been used by several authors when discussing the communist transition to democracy, (Ekiert and Kubik 1998), (Ekiert and Kubik 1999), (Grix 2000), and (Sadowski 1993), but it is rarely discussed in terms of political culture. Under this approach, the masses force the elites to change to a democratic regime through various oppositional methods which will be discussed below. However, it is not as simple as the masses wanting change and the elites granting it. The masses may desire change, but opportunity may not exist so no change occurs (Elster 1989). Therefore, the masses need both the desire and opportunity for the democratic transition to occur. Opportunity and desires in this sense can be seen as two filters for people’s actions. The first filter, opportunity, “is made up of all the physical, economic, legal, and psychological constraints that the individual faces” (Elster 1989: 13).³ The second filter, desires, “is a mechanism that determines which action within the opportunity set will actually be carried out” (Elster 1989: 13). This is important when looking at the differences in predictions between rational choice theory and culture theory, which will be discussed in more

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³ As Oberschall points out, opportunities are, domestic or international, and short-term and long term (Oberschall 1996).
detail later, and when looking at the reason for transition in Eastern Europe and the former USSR.

Next, we need to decide on a theory of political culture. There are several conditions that must be met for any theory of political culture to be operational. The first condition is that it not be deterministic, because deterministic theories of culture cannot explain change or adaptation among culture and, for these reasons, they are not realistic. This means that the culture of a person, group, or nation cannot be pre-determined, or in other words, the culture must be able to change. Next, since we are using a mass theory of democratization, the theory of culture that we use must be able to be operationalized on the mass level. Finally, for culture to either supplement or replace rational choice theory, as mentioned in the introduction, the theory of culture must allow for predictability of actions, and therefore, it must have a limited number of well-defined sub-cultures. Mary Douglas's grid/group analysis meets all three of these criteria, and hence, it is the theory of culture that will be used throughout the rest of this paper.

Now that we have defined the two important terms in our initial hypothesis, we can derive the two hypotheses that will be tested in this paper. The first has to do with the masses. It states: the masses, specifically mass culture, caused democratization in the post-communist Eastern European countries and the former USSR, not elite bargaining. The second hypothesis deals with why the masses developed their attitudes towards democratization. It states: mass

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4 Although there seems to be a contradiction between a non-deterministic theory of culture and a theory of culture that can make accurate predictions of individual's behavior, there is none. By deterministic, I do not mean that the theory of culture changes as changes in the environment arise, but only that the people may move between the different "typologies", that will be described in more detail on pages 7-9 below, as their situation changes. However, once a person picks a typology, we should be able to predict quite well what there actions in various situations will be.

5 For further discussion of these criteria as they relate to Mary Douglas's culture theory, please refer to Chai 1997, Diamond 1993, Douglas 1978, Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, and Wildavsky 1998.

6 Mary Douglas's grid/group analysis is often referred to as cultural theory by political scientists, see Wildavsky, Thompson, and Ellis 1990.
desires in favor of democratization were shaped by culture, not rational self-interest or elite manipulation.

To review, we are essentially testing two separate things in this paper: whether culture or rational choice theory has more explanatory power in explaining democratization in these countries and whether a top-down or bottom-up approach is more suitable to the study of democratization in these countries. If both of these hypotheses are valid, this study should sufficiently establish that mass culture, rather than the elites or “rational” self-interest, has an important explanatory role in democratization. The next section of this paper will provide an explanation of traditional rational choice theory and how it is inadequate to explain mass social movements, like the ones in the countries examined here. This will be followed by an explanation Douglas’s grid/group analysis, how the different sub-cultures of Douglas’s theory will act rationally, and how each of the sub-cultures will react to disappointment or failure in their government using Hirschman’s categories of exit, voice, and loyalty. Finally, the research design for this paper will be explained, followed by the data analysis, and conclusions with suggestions for further research in this area.

Culture vs. Rational Choice Theory:

The primary assumption made by rational choice theorists is that people make choices they expect will maximize their goals, and under a rational choice framework, these goals are selfish and materialistic (Chai 1997). Rational choice theory predicts that in order to maximize their utility, individuals will make decisions that are in their own rational self-interest. If people severely pursue their narrowly defined self-interest, this theory has strong explanatory and

7 Although, it has been recognized that there are many different interpretations of traditional rational choice theory. As stated by Green and Shapiro, “...most practitioners [of rational choice] agree on some, but not all, feature of the definition of rational choice. As a result, there is no single rational choice theory or unambiguous standard for assigning the label ‘rational choice’ to a theory” (Green and Shapiro 1994: 13). However, this definition is the one typically used by rational choice theorists who use a more thin approach.
predictability power and is easily the most parsimonious, falsifiable approach to individual
decision-making. However, critics point out that viewing human nature as solely selfish and
materialistic is much too simple to be realistic, and additionally, they point out that many of the
empirical studies using the rational choice approach have led to inaccurate or indeterminate
conclusions. For example, Green and Shapiro claim, “…to date no innovative theoretical
insights of rational choice theory have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived”
(Green and Shapiro 1994: 3).

In addition to the problems above, rational choice theory has trouble explaining mass
behavior, which is important for explaining the mass movements in Eastern Europe and the
former USSR. Rational choice theory predicts individual behavior, but it does not help us to
explain the behavior of groups of individuals. As pointed out by Olson, and subsequent rational
choice theorists, rational choice theory predicts that the formation of large groups will not occur
without special incentives or coercion (Olson 1965), like the 70,000 individuals who gathered in
the center of Leipzig near the end of the German Democratic Republic (McAdam, McCarty, and
Zald 1996). Moreover, if people do enter into groups, their motivation for joining and remaining
a member of a group is often quite different and possibly even contrary to what the group sets as
its goals. Hence, it is nearly impossible to predict a group’s actions based on the predictions of
its individual member’s actions under a rational choice framework without creating a fallacy of
composition. This has traditionally been a critique rational choice theorists use against group
based theories, but often, rational choice theorists who theorize about group behavior, such as the
behavior of the United State’s Congress, fall victim to this same trap.

One approach that has been taken to overcome the difficulties of rational choice theory
has been to introduce culture into the theory. The modified rational choice approach focuses on
how culture affects the expected utility from different choices by shaping preferences and beliefs. As stated by Wildavsky, “Rationality is culturally controlled in that individuals use their social [context] to filter their environment so they can select appropriate objects of attention and value them accordingly” (Wildavsky 1998: 200). Using this approach, self-interest could possibly be different for each individual, because the way they view their environment through their culture may be different. However, if each individual views his or her environment through a different cultural filter, the modified rational choice approach would lose all of its explanatory and predictability power. Consequently, in order for this approach to work, it is imperative to theorize culture in such a way that allows for predictability of actions and has a limited number of cultures. As mentioned above, Douglas’s grid/group analysis seems like an appropriate theory for this task. Moreover, Douglas’s theory has an even more important benefit: it allows us to overcome the fallacy of composition problem rational choice theory has so much trouble with. In order to explain mass level behavior, it is essential make this connection, and as stated above, rational choice theory has trouble with this step. Douglas’s theory of culture overcomes this obstacle, because her theory allows for group oriented behavior and even puts individuals of the same sub-culture into the same groups. Consequently, based on a person’s sub-culture, the researcher can determine how likely an individual is to join a group, cooperate once within a group, and even explain when different groups will work together. It may seem unclear how this all works now, but the explanation of Douglas’s theory in the next section will help clarify these ideas.

Grid/Group Analysis:

Douglas’s idea of the individual is crucial to understanding her theory for grid/group analysis, because it is the interaction amongst individuals and between individuals and the group
that makes her theory so unique and compelling. It is due to these interactions that a person chooses a particular culture, or typology, which allows for predictability of group as well as individual actions. Therefore, in order to completely understand grid/group analysis, one first has to understand Douglas's view of the negotiating individual. She says,

...the cognitive activity of the real live individual is largely devoted to building the culture, patching it here and trimming it there, according to the exigencies of the day. In his very negotiating activity, each is forcing culture down the throats of his fellow men. When individuals interact, their medium of exchange is culture (Douglas 1978: 6).

This is important, because individuals interact within a certain typology that helps them interpret their environment and make their decisions. Therefore, when Douglas talks about individual's interacting through culture, she is talking about people interacting within and among typologies. To understand how this works and how a person chooses their typology, it is imperative to understand how a typology is formed.

There are two sides to each typology: a “social context” and a “cosmology”. The social context referred to here is “a context conceived in strictly social terms, selected for its permitting and constraining effects upon the individual’s choices. It consists of social action, a deposit of myriads of individual decisions made in the past, creating a cost-structure and the distribution of advantages which are the context of present day decisions” (Douglas 1978: 6). In other words, the social context is the rules or guidelines an individual uses to make their decisions and the institutions that shape and hold those rules in place. Consequently, an individual’s choice about whether or not to join a particular group with a particular typology and associated social context will be determined by the distribution of advantages and disadvantages that a person receives
from being a member of that particular typology, or environment, based on their past decisions. 

Every action and decision a person makes has a cultural element to it, and as a person makes decisions, they are attempting to coerce and influence other individuals to become members of their culture with their decision making pattern. In addition, every individual is shaping their culture based on their particular needs of the day, but Douglas adds, individuals are also being shaped by their culture as well.

Once a person is a member of a typology, the environment begins to shape the individual by providing a cost-structure to influence decisions. In order for an individual to interpret his environment and apply his social context, he needs a set of guiding principles or ideas to guide him. This is provided by the cosmology that is associated with each of the typologies. By cosmology, Douglas means “the ultimate justifying ideas which tend to be invoked as if part of the natural order and yet which, since we distinguish four kinds of cosmology, are evidently not at all natural but strictly a product of social interaction” (Douglas 1982: 5). Based on this definition, each cosmology is the set of ideas developed by a person for interpreting their environment and justifying their actions. In other words, a cosmology is like a cultural filter, it is what a person uses to perceive events that happen in their environment.

Therefore, typologies are a direct measure of the “social context” of a group, and each of the social contexts has an implicit “cosmology”. This is important, because when measuring culture theory, it is imperative to measure the social context and not the cosmology. Mary Douglas states, “Given these four distinctive contexts...the next stage is to elucidate elements of cosmology which are not circularly implied in the definitions of social context and to show that a distinctive cosmological bias is generated by the character of explanations and justifications that

8 Here it is assumed that a person has a choice about what culture they belong to. There are times, especially in the case of the fatalist, that a person may be forced to join a group, or a person may not be allowed in the typology that will give them the most benefit and they chose the next best.
are plausible in each social context" (Douglas 1978: 22). Douglas uses the notion of "grid" and "group" to measure the social context of each typology.

A person's grid and group scores determine the typology in which they have placed themselves. As stated by Mary Douglas in Cultural Bias, "the term grid suggests a cross-hatch of rules to which individuals are subject in the course of their interaction. As a dimension, it shows a progressive change in the mode of social control" (1978: 8). Under this view, grid refers to the level and type of control that members of a group are subject to in their everyday interaction with other members of the group and society, where maximum freedom from control represents a low grid condition and maximum control represents a high grid condition. On the other hand, group refers to the strength of attachment to a group. Mary Douglas says, "The strongest effects of group are to be found where it incorporates a person with the rest by implicating them together in common residence, shared work, shared resources and recreation, and by exerting control over marriage and kinship" (Douglas 1978: 14). Therefore, a strong group score would be where the group infiltrates every aspect of a person's life, and a low group score would be one where a person is free to come and go as he pleases with little or no time or allegiance given to the group. Based on how a particular group scores for these two measures, it is assigned one of four typologies, or subcultures, as shown below.

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9 This idea is furthered by Mary Douglas's belief that grid/group is a polythetic classification. This is a classification that "identifies classes by a combination of characteristics, not requiring any one of the defining features to be present in all members of a class" (Douglas 1978: 15). Therefore, each member may not display all of the characteristics of a typology, but all members should display a majority of the characteristics of a typology. Both of these ideas are important when trying to measure culture using a grid/group framework.

10 The social context for each typology is most clearly laid out on pages 19-21 of Cultural Bias.

11 The leadership of the group can exert control internally or in the case of the fatalists control can be exerted eternally from members of other groups.
Figure 1: The Four Typologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Grid</th>
<th>Fatalist</th>
<th>Hierarchical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Grid</td>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Group</td>
<td>High Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At low grid, low group, a person is in the individualist typology. A person in this typology is free to negotiate amongst fellow members, choose his allies and enemies, and move up or down in the social ladder. At low grid, high group, a person is in the egalitarian typology. This typology has a strong external group boundary, but little or no segregation or division of roles within the group. Each member has the potential to play every role; however, fear of outsiders infiltrating the group is constant and can become overwhelming to members of this typology. At high grid, high group, a person is in the hierarchical typology. This typology has strong internal and external boundaries. Roles are predetermined and fixed, and everyone knows their place and duty in the group. Finally, at low group, high grid, a person is in the fatalist typology. People are sent here by members of the other typologies to do as they are told. Individuals in this typology do not receive the protection and privileges of group membership; however, they are still not free to do as they please because they are subject to the rules set down by their high grid environment. There are people here in all societies, and this is sometimes referred to as the forgotten typology. In any given society, there are individuals in all four typologies depending on which group they belong. This is essential, because it is the interaction

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12 For a more thorough explanation of the different typologies and their social contexts as well as their cosmologies than given below, see Douglas 1978; Douglas 1982; Douglas and Ney 1998; Wildavsky 1987; Wildavsky 1998; Wildavsky, Thompson, and Ellis 1990.

13 An outsider may see segregation, and even distinct leadership, of the group, but since egalitarian's distrust inequality and power, whatever segregation exists will either be ignored or not perceived by the egalitarian group.
between typologies that sets each typology apart from the others. (Douglas 1978, Douglas 1982, and Douglas and Ney 1998)

**Cultural Self Interest:**

In this paper we will be looking at how different typologies will react to regime instability and failure in government. However, before we can do this, we must know how each typology will rationally act in general. Douglas’s theory has very direct implications for rational choice theory, because rationality would be defined differently for each typology. Under a rational choice framework, a person chooses the action out of their opportunity set that is the best means to maximize their utility. However, using culture theory, each person chooses the action in their opportunity set that best promotes their typology’s values. Therefore, each typology can have a different rational action for the same situation. This is Wildavsky’s claim in his book *Culture and Social Theory*: “If, indeed, a cultural theory claims, preferences come from institutions, that is, from the activity of individuals in creating, sustaining, modifying, and rejecting relationships with others, concepts of self interest would vary with the type of institution being built” (Wildavsky 1998: 250). This is explicit in Chai and Wildavsky’s work entitled “Culture, Rationality, and Violence,” where they theorize how each of the different typologies would rationally act. Using Chai and Wildavsky’s model, the rational action of each typology is briefly described below.

The fatalist typology is quite distinct from all the other typologies, because this is where the people are pushed who do not belong to any of the other typologies. The members of this typology see both human and physical nature as unpredictable, and hence, there is no motivation for them to take risks or invest their resources. In addition, they have self-interested

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14 Furthermore, keep in mind that the cosmology is a way to filter their environment, so the opportunities that one typology may perceive may be different than that of another.

15 For a further discussion of how each typology views physical and human nature see Douglas 1978, pages 22-40.
preferences, because they see themselves as able to do little for their own or others welfare. “Given these beliefs and preferences, the behavior of fatalists is rigidly dictated by their existing social and economic roles, and they follow unchanging routines that have provided for survival in those roles in the past” (Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 164). Therefore, so long as the fatalist feels suppressed by the current power structure, the rational action of a fatalist is no action, but even though fatalists are inactive, there is a constant threat to individualists and hierarchs that fatalists may be recruited by the egalitarians. As Wildavsky says, “Since there is always the danger that egalitarianism may grow by recruiting fatalists, the establishment has an added incentive to placate minorities to keep down discontent” (Wildavsky 1998: 210). Hence, to keep the egalitarian opposition from growing, individualists and hierarchs must placate the fatalists into submission, so they don’t abandon their apathetic fatalist stance for an oppositional egalitarian one.

As stated above, individualists are low grid/low group. The people of this typology are bound by few rules or prescriptions and exist in a network of their own making. Individualists, unlike fatalists, have a generally optimistic view of human and physical nature, because they are low grid. Consequently, “rational individualists must have a culturally determined predisposition to believe that many investments will provide a return that exceeds the cost involved,” (Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 165). Moreover, their preferences are generally self-interested, like the fatalists. However, unlike the fatalists, they hold a view similar to that of Adam Smith, because they believe by acting in their own self-interest they will promote the good of all in society. As such, their view of rationality best fits with the traditional assumptions of rational choice theory: a materialistic, selfish individual, and their decisions can be determined
by a simple cost/benefit analysis. Therefore, individuals in this typology will fit under the traditional rational choice framework.

The egalitarians are high group, low grid, and due to this, they are usually seen in a tightly clustered group with very few rules or prescriptions. The most likely way for a group like this to form is “if group members have shared preferences or beliefs that create special incentives for collective action with each other rather than with those outside the group” (Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 165). Due to these conditions, egalitarian groups will tend to be small groups, rather than large groups, because the larger the group the more likely there will be dissent which will cause factions to form within the group and eventually break off. Since egalitarian groups form on the basis of shared preferences and beliefs, consensus is essential for the success of group, and therefore, they seek to eliminate inequality between members, whether it is inequality in duties, wealth, power, or material possession. In addition, they will try to recruit the less fortunate of society that can gain the most from increased equality, even though these members are unlikely to join. Keeping these ideals in mind, it seems that the egalitarian will rationally seek equality and the group’s goals. Therefore, a rational egalitarian will pursue group goals and seek to eliminate inequality within their group and society.

The hierarchists are high group like egalitarians, but they are also high grid. In this typology, there is a strong boundary to enter the group and between different social rankings within the group. People at the top of the social ladder are expected and deserve to have more and people at the bottom of the ladder less. Therefore, hierarchy justifies political inequality,

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16 There is a proportional relationship here between the size of the group and the level of shared preferences and beliefs: the larger the group the stronger the level of shared preferences and beliefs needed to sustain the relationship, while smaller groups will not share their preferences and beliefs as strongly. This is similar, but not the same, as Olson’s beliefs, because here we assume that shared preferences alone are enough for group formation due to the egalitarian’s strong group preferences, where Olson sees the need for shared preferences as well as incentives or punishments for individuals to join a group.
and the parts must sacrifice for the success of the whole. Hierarchical interactions “are promoted by preferences that place an inherent positive value on the welfare of the group as a whole, as well as by preferences that place a negative value on the welfare of those outside the group” (Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 166). Consequently, a rational hierarchical person will make the decisions needed for the survival of the whole.17

Exit/Voice and Loyalty/Silence:

Now, based on what was said above, let us look at how the different typologies will react to regime instability and failure. This is important, because it has direct ramifications on how the transition to democracy will begin. Albert Hirschman categorized individual’s and group’s reactions to disappointment in or failure of authority as exit, voice, and loyalty (Hirschman 1970). Hirschman defines exit and voice as:

...two contrasting responses of consumers or members of organizations to what they sense as deterioration in the quality of goods they buy or the services and benefits they receive. Exit is the act of simply leaving, generally because a better good or service or benefit is believed to be provided by another firm or organization...Voice is the act of complaining or of organizing to complain or to protest, with the intent of achieving directly a recuperation of the quality that has been impaired. (Hirschman 1993: 175-176)

Hirschman defines loyalty as an opposite of exit and voice, where an individual sticks it out through hard times until the authority has time to turn things around (Ellis 1993). Ellis and Wildavsky have separately adapted Hirschman’s concept of exit, voice, and loyalty into the grid/group framework. They both see hierarchy taking a strategy of loyalty to the existing power structure, and neither one classifies the fatalist, which I believe will take a strategy of silence or quiescence.18 However, they had quite different views about egalitarians and individualists.

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17 For a further discussion about how any of the typologies will act rationally, please refer to Chai and Wildavsky 1994, pages 164-166.

18 The fatalist could be seen as in a sense exiting, because he will not show outward support of a failing regime. He sees no benefit for him whether he shows support or not. He believes his situation in a new regime will be much the
Wildavsky saw exit as the sole strategy of the egalitarians and voice the sole strategy of individualists (Wildavsky 1998). Ellis, on the other hand, believed egalitarians would use both exit and voice, and the individualists would use voice first and exit if voice failed (Ellis 1993). Although these views are similar, the differences must be overcome to understand how the different typologies would react to a deteriorating regime.\footnote{The following discussion about the strategy of the individualists and egalitarians is important to determine the difference between them, but for the majority of this paper, it is enough to know that individualists and egalitarians, the low grid typologies, will exit or voice, while the fatalists and hierarchs, the high grid typologies, will be loyal to the existing regime.}

From the above, it is easy to determine that the hierarchs of society would be loyal, either actively or tacitly, to the existing regime under almost all circumstances, but to determine how individualists and egalitarians would react, it is necessary to remember how members of those groups rationally act. Individualists make decisions based on rational self-interest. Consequently, they would be most likely to follow a strategy of loyalty, voice, or exit when each of those is in their self-interest. If the current regime and power structure is functioning effectively and individualists are able to maximize their utility under the existing regime, then they would be loyal. However, if the current regime is failing to function properly, individualists would most likely exit or voice depending on which one of these strategies gave the greatest potential for future gain with the least costs. Alternatively, egalitarians are very unlikely to ever be loyal unless it is an egalitarian regime in power, because they have a strong tendency to oppose individualist's idea of the market and competition, and they will always oppose the unequal social distribution in hierarchies (Wildavsky 1998). Now considering their method of opposition, they are rationally supportive of their group and against inequality, and they need
some level of opposition to keep their group from disintegrating.\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, egalitarians will only exit if they can better oppose the existing power structure from elsewhere (Ellis 1993), and consequently, they will usually opt for voice. Finally, the fatalists are likely to not support any of Hirschman’s strategies, but instead, they will most likely be apathetically loyal to the situation. However, as mentioned above, if the situation becomes too bad, there is the chance that fatalists may be recruited by the egalitarians.

Let us consider the example of a communist country with a deteriorating regime. The hierarchs in this society would support the existing regime, as is the case among the ruling class, while the fatalists would be oblivious to the whole situation and maintain their normal lifestyle. For the low grid typologies, due to severe punishment of dissenters, the cost of voice will be very high for both egalitarians and individualists in countries like East Germany where there was strong and frequent use of force against dissenters. Furthermore, the cost of exit was very high in countries like Poland that were surrounded by other communist countries. This is why the oppositional egalitarians and individualists chose to flee in East Germany, but they chose to stay and voice in Poland. In addition, since the egalitarians are constantly striving to increase their ranks, there would likely be a union between egalitarians and individualists under a common cause, like the Solidarity movement in Poland. This is probably the case in Poland, where all the opponents were unified under the Solidarity movement. Chai and Wildavsky state something similar to these thoughts:

Because of the preference for equality, when egalitarian groups attempt to expand their boundaries to other parts of society, they often try to bring in those who have the most to gain from such goals, that is, those they perceive to be the least

\textsuperscript{20} A strong leader could act as a cultural entrepreneur to keep an egalitarian group together, but as stated by Chai and Wildavsky, "...any unusual accumulation of resources by a subset of group members creates differences between the goals of these members and those of other members. Such differences tend to weaken group boundaries, hence inequality must be avoided at all costs" (Chai Wildavsky 1994: 166). Therefore, a strong leader could help keep the group together, but it is unlikely a leader will have the ability to gain power, due to fear of inequality.
fortunate [in society]...Fatalists do not believe that they can gain from joining a group; hierarchists are content with the group that they belong to. Individualists may join as long as they perceive that personal gains can be made from doing so, but they will leave as soon as the group's goals diverge from their own. (Chai and Wildavsky 1994: 166)

This statement is one example of how grid/group analysis solves the fallacy of composition problem mentioned above. In this example, by knowing a group is egalitarian, Chai and Wildavsky are able to predict that it will be a small group that will need to recruit members from other typologies or align with other typologies to get their voice heard. This important here, because rational choice theory has trouble predicting which groups will align or even if individual groups will voice, where grid/group analysis is perfect for these types of predictions. It is apparent from this quote and the above analysis that the predictions of culture theory make it an appropriate analytical frame to explain democratization; in the next section, we will see if these predictions are validated empirically.

Research Design:

As stated in the hypotheses above, we will be looking at the role of the masses, and specifically mass culture, in the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Therefore, the first thing that must be established is whether or not the masses did play a role. This is essentially the first reformulated hypothesis above: the masses, not elite bargaining, caused democratization in the post-communist Eastern European countries and the former USSR. To test this hypothesis, a method similar to Bratton and Van de Walle will be used. Bratton and Van de Walle looked at the role of mass movements in democratization of Sub-Saharan African countries (Bratton and Van De Walle 1997). In their work, they use trends in political protests and trends in democratization throughout all the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to demonstrate the role of the masses in democratization in these countries. They operationalized the masses
want and desire for democracy as voice through political protest, and they used the Freedom House indicators of Democratic Freedom as an indicator of democracy. To show the relationship between the two, they aggregated protest and the indicators of democracy throughout these countries and the displayed the results using a simple line graph. Next they looked to see that the peak for democracy followed shortly after the peak of protest. This is exactly what we will do in this paper.

Mark Beissinger has collected protest data for Russia (Beissinger 2002), while Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik have collected it for East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (Ekiert and Kubik 1998). The Freedom House indicators of Democratic Freedom are used here for the indicator of democracy (Freedom House 2002). The Freedom House rates each country on a 1-7 scale for their level of political rights and their level of civil liberties. These scores can then be averaged to give each country’s overall level of democratization on a scale from 1 to 7, one being the highest level of democratization and seven the lowest. The protest data as well as the indicators for democracy in these countries will be aggregated and displayed in a line graph to demonstrate the relationship between mass opposition to communism and democratization.

There are two things that are important about this graph. First, the masses importance will be most clearly portrayed if protest peak if followed almost immediately by the democratization peak. Second, it is important to see where the protest peak starts, because this is where the opportunity set changes and the individuals with oppositional values begin to voice their desires.

Being that the second hypothesis is reliant on the first, it will be tested only if the first proves valid. The second hypothesis states: the masses attitudes in favor of democratization

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21 They used the Freedom House indicators, because of the Freedom House’s belief that free and open elections are the first step in democratization. They, as do I, believe this is an integral part of democracy and one of the first steps in democratization, so these indicators are appropriate for their task of explaining democratization.

22 To see how the protest data was collected for these studies please see Beissinger 2002 and Ekiert and Kubik 1999.
were shaped by culture, not rational self-interest or elite manipulation. This hypothesis will be much more difficult to explain, because it is a hypothesis about where the values and desires for democracy in the masses come from. The hypothesis states that these desires and values arise from culture and not rational self-interest or elite manipulation, as shown in figure 2 below.

Therefore, hypothesis two states that step A is what leads the masses to want democracy and that D and E are not factors or exist only minimally. This is difficult to demonstrate for two reasons. First, it is the elites that give the masses the opportunity to express their desires, so it is hard to determine whether or not opening the opportunity set is indeed an act of manipulation. Second, rational self-interest can be reflected in a variety of ways, due the broad interpretations of rational choice theory, and consequently, it is hard to control for rational self-interest.

*Figure 2: Schematic of Hypothesis Two*²³

To test the first part of hypothesis two, it is important to show a connection between culture and democratic values. Inglehart makes a connection between mass values and democracy in his recent article in PS entitled "How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy-And

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²³ For the purpose of this study, we will not worry about demonstrating step B, but only that steps A (hypothesis 2) and a combined steps B and C (hypothesis 1), where masses lead to democratization, exists.
How Can We Measure It? He demonstrates a 0.830 correlation ($R^2$) between a survival/self expression index\textsuperscript{24} he created and the cumulative 1981-2000 Freedom House Index of Democratic Freedom for 77 countries throughout the world (Inglehart 2003). This index rates each person questioned on a scale from −2 to 2, 2 being the highest values that support democracy and −2 being the lowest, of their individual democratic values. Therefore, Inglehart's survival/self expression index seems to adequately represent the values that best promote democracy, and we can test Mary Douglas's grid/group analysis again these to see if a relationship between culture and values that promote democracy. To do this, we will run a simple cross-tab to see if there is a relationship between these values and the different typologies, with the oppositional, low grid typologies being more likely to hold high democratic values than the high grid typologies.\textsuperscript{25} In addition, since we are primarily concerned with the difference between low and high grid typologies,\textsuperscript{26} we will find a Pearson's $R^2$ for the relationship between the survival/self-expression index and individuals grid scores. We will perform these tests for Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Russia in the 1990 wave of the World Values Survey.\textsuperscript{27}

However, this cross-tab and correlation only shows the relationship between culture and democratic values, it does not tell us anything about whether rational choice theory or elite manipulation played a significant role. In an attempt to rule out rational choice theory, we will look at individual's income, using question v227 from the 1995-1997 coded World Values

\textsuperscript{24} This index consists of questions v27 (trust people), v10 (happiness), v197 (homosexuality), v118 (signed a petition), and v1000 (postmaterialist values index) from the 1995-1997 World Values survey codebook (World Values Survey 2000).

\textsuperscript{25} Last semester, I ran a validity test between the different typologies and indicators chosen from the World Values Survey. Since the test showed the indicators were valid, I can use these indicators to come to individual respondents typology. For a list of the questions and how these indicators are constructed, please see appendix one.

\textsuperscript{26} As stated before, the high grid typologies are more likely to be loyal, where the low grid typologies are most likely to be oppositional and demonstrate high survival/self expression scores. Hence, we will be looking for a positive $R^2$ here.

\textsuperscript{27} Some of the questions used to construct these indexes were not given at all to Slovakia and were not given in the 1995-1997 wave to Hungary or Poland.
Survey Codebook (World Values Survey 2000). Income is an important variable, because it may be relied on and it overlaps with many other economic variables, such as property ownership, occupation, class, etc., that rational choice theorists would rely on to explain why it would be in someone’s interest to oppose the communist regime. Here we will be looking for whether or not economic status has a strong correlation with the survival/self expression index, and if so, whether this relationship can be explained using culture or not. In addition, to help rule out and more conclusively determine what caused democratic values among the masses in these countries, we will look briefly at the masses role in East Germany and Poland to determine whether or not they were manipulated into opposition by the elites.

**Data Analysis:**

As stated above the first hypothesis will be tested using protest data and indicators of democratization from Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, East Germany, and Russia. This data is summarized in figure three on the next page. There are two important years indicated by figure three. First, 1990 is the year with the highest level of protest in these countries, and second, 1991 is the year with the highest level of democratization. This supports the first hypothesis. Essentially, this graph indicates that the masses led to a growing level of democratization from 1987, when the protest began, to 1990, the peak of protest activity in these countries. This was immediately followed by increase in democratization in 1989 to 1991, where the peak is located. Therefore, hypothesis one seems to be valid.

The second important point on the graph is 1987. This is important for two reasons. First, the level of democratization began to increase at approximately the same time as protest began, which suggests democratization began as a result of mass voice. Second, this is where
the protest activity began in these countries, which marks the first attempts at mass protest in many of these countries.

**Figure 3:** Level of Democratization and Number of Protest Events 1986-1993
(Russia, Slovakia, Poland, E. Germany, and Hungary)

![Graph showing the level of democratization and number of protest events from 1986 to 1993 for the specified countries.](image)

Before 1987, any protest that broke out was squashed by the Soviet Army or domestic police in these countries, but in 1987, acts of voice were either not as severely suppressed or were not suppressed at all. This marks a change in the opportunity set of the people that led to an increase in protest as long as this new opportunity is available. As stated by Beissinger, "...the 'forces of order' in the USSR in the late 1980's and early 1990's conceived of how order should be created in a particular way, through the predictability of repression and the thickness of institutional presence rather than the harshness of force" (Beissinger 2002: 329). It is easy to see how through this change in the opportunity the people of the countries were allowed to express their democratic values and desires for the first time. Both of the points above are

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28 The protest data is summarized in Beissinger 2002 and Ekiert and Kubik 1999. In addition, the indicators of democratic freedom are given in Freedom House 2002.
important for explaining the protest and what caused these values and desires to be instilled in
the masses, and it tends to agree not only with hypothesis one, but with the second part of
hypothesis two: that culture, not elite manipulation, was the cause of democratization desires.

The second hypothesis states that culture, not elite manipulation or rational self-interest,
caused democratic values and desires for democratization to spread like wildfire through the
people of Eastern Europe and the former USSR. As stated in the research design section above,
Inglehart’s survival/self expression index can be used to demonstrate democratic values, and
Mary Douglas’s grid/group analysis allows us to predict that egalitarians and individualists are
more likely to support democratic values than hierarchs or fatalists. Indeed, this relationship
does exist, as shown in the cross-tab in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Typology versus Democratic Values Favorable to Democracy in Russia, East
Germany, Hungary, and Poland (1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Values</th>
<th>Individualist</th>
<th>Egalitarian</th>
<th>Fatalist</th>
<th>Hierarchical</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>0.74%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>21.20%</td>
<td>22.09%</td>
<td>51.42%</td>
<td>45.28%</td>
<td>30.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>52.72%</td>
<td>53.49%</td>
<td>39.18%</td>
<td>47.17%</td>
<td>48.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.18%</td>
<td>22.67%</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
<td>7.55%</td>
<td>17.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.41%</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance = .000  Phi = .328  N = 2020

(Inglehart 2003)

As shown in this table, 25.59% of individualists and 24.41% of egalitarians scored a 1 or 2 on
the democratic values index, where 7.80% of fatalists and 7.55% of hierarchs scored this high.
In addition, nearly 50% of fatalists and hierarchs scored -1 or -2 on the index, where only
around 22% of individualist and egalitarians scored this low.\(^29\) This is the relationship that is
predicted above, because individualists and egalitarians are most likely to take strategies of exit

\(^{29}\) This relationship is even stronger in the 1995-1997 wave of the World Values survey, which indicates the strength
of the loyalty to the previous regime among fatalists and hierarchs. Although, this strength may have disappeared if
democracy and the free market would have better demonstrated their ability during the period between 1990 and
1995.
and voice (oppositional strategies in support of democracy) in the case of a failing regime, where fatalists and hierarchs are more likely to take loyalist positions in support of the existing regime and against democracy. This table shows a significant relationship as well as a medium to high correlation with a phi of .328. In addition, when we use Pearson’s $R^2$ to test the correlation between grid score and survival/self expression score, we get a significant .336 correlation, which is about medium level. This is in the right direction, because we predict a low grid score should lead to a low survival/self expression score.\footnote{This may not seem quite correct, but the grid score is an ordinal rank from 0-1 with low grid being between 0 and 0.5 and high grid between 0.5 and 1. In addition, when calculating the survival self-expression index, we get an interval score from 1.5 to 5, which 2 equaling 1.500 to 2.208 and -2 equaling 4.302-5.000. The Pearson’s correlation was decided upon, because it is a correlation between two interval sets of data. Consequently, $R^2$ is used to dispel any objections that information may have been lost when the grid and group scores were broke into nominal data and the survival/self expression index were broke into ordinal rankings. Indeed, it does not look like we lost any information by doing this, because the Phi and $R^2$ are nearly identical.} Therefore, the relationship we hypothesized does seem to exist.

However, there may be objections that there is actually another variable causing this relationship, like a spurious relationship or indirect causation, and if we controlled for that other variable, we would lose the relationship between democratic values and culture above. This is a hard objection to overcome, because even though we chose the transition period to eliminate many of the political variables that be intervening, there are still lots of economic variables that could be intervening, as would likely be posited by rational choice theorists and economists. One way to test this objection is to look at the relationship between democratic values and an economic variable, like income, as shown by table 2 on the next page. Although there is not much of a relationship in this chart, there seems to be a slight decrease in democratic values as income increases. There are slightly more upper income people who have democratic values equal to one than lower income people, and slightly more lower income people who have democratic values equal to 0 or -1 than upper income people.
Table 2: Income versus Democratic Values Favorable to Democracy in Russia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland (1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Values</th>
<th>Lowest Decile of Income (1)</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Highest Decile of Income (10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance = .000  Phi = .171  N = 2681

(Inglehart 2003)

Although the above relationship is not strong, it must be accounted for by culture in order for hypothesis two to be valid. In order to do this, we need to run a cross tab that tests culture versus democratic values, but controls for income. This cross tab gives the following correlations and significance levels for each income level.

Table 3: Significance Level and Phi for the Typologies and Democratic Values at Each Income Level in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Russia (1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level (in Deciles)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Phi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.029*</td>
<td>.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.176*</td>
<td>.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.008*</td>
<td>.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.060*</td>
<td>.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.761*</td>
<td>.396</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates an N of less than 200 for that decile

(Inglehart 2003)

For every level of income, there is a correlation above .3, even though some are insignificant due to a low N. In addition, analysis of the cross tab for every level of income indicates that the

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31 This actual cross tab was too large and confusing to display in the paper, but it is given in appendix 2.
relationship is as predicted above: individualists and egalitarians are more likely to have values that support democracy than fatalists or hierarchs. However, there is a little variation with the strength of this relationship throughout the different income deciles. For example, for the 4\textsuperscript{th} decile around 17\% of individualists and egalitarians had democratic values equal to one or two, where in the 7\textsuperscript{th} decile over 30\% of individualists and 23.1\% of egalitarians had democratic values equal to one or two. However, this variation is minimal. Therefore, it can be concluded that income has a very slight impact on democratic values, but this does not negate the impact of culture on these values.

In addition to economic variables, there are some who would argue that the elites who oppose communism are manipulating the masses to protest against the current regime. This is similar to Przeworski's argument. He seems to claim there is friction among the elites on both sides, and the only way for democratization to occur is through manipulation and control of the masses and radical elites that support the radicals and hardliners (Przeworski 1991). However, when we look at the transition in these countries this does not seem to be the case. As pointed out earlier, the change in opportunity after 1987 allowed people to voice their already held values and desires. There is evidence of this in many countries. The best examples are in Poland where the Solidarity movement began during the period of martial law in the early 1980's to voice oppositional values from the underground (Sadowski 1993). Then, in 1989, the Solidarity movement finally was brought above ground to sweep the first open elections since communist rule began.\footnote{It is also interesting that voting was used to overcome communist rule in Poland, because a common method of voice among individualists is voting, rather than violent opposition or mass protest (Ellis 1993).} This is an excellent example of how values can be transformed into action given an opportunity. Another example is in East Germany. Here the Berlin wall was built to stop exit, which was severely hurting the economy and weakening the communist regime there. This
worked very well until 1989, when communism began to falter in East Germany’s neighbors. Then the East German citizens were able to go through other formerly communist neighbors in order to exit into West Germany. This is yet another example of how values were constrained by opportunity, but they were let show after a change in circumstance allowed for a new opportunity set. Both of these cases demonstrate how the democratic values were present in Eastern Europe and the former USSR long before the opportunity set changed to allow individuals to advance their values and desires. This seems to refute the objection that it was truly elite manipulation that caused the masses to protest. Therefore, hypothesis two seems to be valid to the extent that the data demonstrates that culture was definitely important, but as demonstrated above, economic factors seem to play at least a minimal role as well.

**Conclusion:**

To review, the data collected supports the validity of hypothesis one that the masses played a role in democratization, and even though the data demonstrated that economic variables did play a role, the data supports hypothesis two in the sense that it points to cultural factors as important to help explain the values and desires that masses have. There are a couple of things to note though. First, little can be said about causation with this research design and the results given. The most that I am willing to say based on these results is that culture definitely did play a role in the transition to democracy, but we cannot determine if this was a big or small role or if it differed between countries based on the tests performed here. If the 1980 wave of the World Values Survey had included Eastern European countries looked at here, the evidence in support of culture would have been much stronger, because we would have a cross section before, during, and after the transition to democracy. However, we do not know what the attitudes of the
people or their political culture was before the transition, so we cannot say to what extent culture caused democracy.

Second, there is no guarantee that a third variable is not causing both democratization and culture, giving a spurious relationship in the data presented here. I controlled for income in hopes that it would overlap with a wide range of other economic variables that rational choice theorists might posit, and I attempted to demonstrate that elites were not somehow manipulating the situation. Moreover, the data was gathered during the transition period, so many of the democratic stability variables were not present. However, despite all these variables that are controlled for, I cannot ensure that another variable has not been overlooked that may explain the relationship that is apparent in the evidence presented here, but there is probably never a case when ALL the variables can be controlled for. Consequently, I think it is fair to conclude that the data presented and controls presented here strongly supports the claim I have made throughout the paper: culture has a role in explaining bottom-up democratization.

In addition, rational choice theory was only tested against culture in a simple cross-tab. Although it looked like culture played a much larger role than rational choice theory in the cross-tab, it is hard to tell from this simple analysis which factor had a larger impact on democratization. A great deal could be added to this study if more sophisticated statistical techniques were used, like a regression, but there are problems with this. Indeed, regressions have been used to demonstrate the explanatory power of rational choice over culture theory (Whitefield and Evans 1999), but for the two reasons below, culture has never fared well. For one, grid/group analysis is a bi-dimensional theory, and if we separate these to give one grid and one group score, we are losing the interaction between these variables. However, when we aggregate them, we only have four nominal categories, so we could only use a series of dummy
variables to demonstrate culture effect. Second, rational choice theory often gives vague, ambiguous, or conditional predictions, and they often will overlap with culture theory's predictions. As stated by Green and Shapiro, "...constructions of rational choice theory that predict X and not-X creates vexing problems for those seeking to compare the performance of rational choice models against competing theories. The predictions of one rational choice model will invariably overlap with those derived from another kind of theory" (Green and Shapiro 1994: 37). Therefore, one step for further research would be to use more sophisticated statistical techniques for testing culture that helps determine how large or small its role is in explaining democratization, or any political behavior.

Moreover, the generalizability of the claims made here is quite limited. At the very least, it is limited to Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, East Germany, and Russia. However, since all of the examples I have given are from East Germany and Poland, some may believe these hypotheses are only generalizable to these two countries. As many post-communist scholars have pointed out, there is no universal approach to explain the transition to democracy in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, and I am not trying to come up with one here. The argument here is simply that mass culture did play a role, at the very least in East Germany and Poland, and it needs to be at least considered in all countries to adequately be able to explain, and maybe someday predict, democratization.

Finally, there are some, like Ian Shapiro, that will make the claim I focus too much attention on "the framework rather than on what is to be studied" (Shapiro 1998: 41). This may be true, but I do not change the theory and make post hoc theorizations to accommodate for anomalies in the data. I simply picked a problem that I did not believe had been adequately explained by rational choice theorists and demonstrated how culture theory could add to our
understanding of this phenomenon. This is a completely valid approach to doing political science research, especially at the theory building stage.

Although the four criticisms that are pointed out above are important and need to be improved on by future research, they do not detract from point of this study. The point here was to demonstrate culture's role in explaining political phenomenon, and disprove the objections made by Barry, and we can conclude that culture can indeed be used in as an independent variable and, given the proper methodology and the correct theory of culture, it can help us understand what causes political phenomena. There is much further research that can be done on this topic. As suggested above, one major step would be to use more sophisticated statistical techniques in culture research. This will allow researchers to better demonstrate causality and test many competing theories to come up with the best theory for explaining various phenomena. Second, research could be done on a larger number of countries throughout the world. This would allow for greater generalizability of the approach used here. Finally, and maybe most importantly, political culture needs to start being studied over time. This will allow for greater causal claims and possibly predictions about when democratization, or just general regime transition, will occur. Through this research, culture will hopefully be considered, once again, as a valid method in political research, and this will give political scientists everywhere one more tool to use to help us explain political phenomena throughout the world.
Appendix 1: Grid/Group Measures

Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between.

v127. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for

Group Score
+10 +9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1

v129. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life

Group Score
+0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9

v130. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
People can only get rich at the expense of others

Group Score
+9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 +0

v66. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
None at all A Great Deal

Grid Score

1 Variable numbers are from the 1995-1997 coded World Values Survey available on the ICPSR database, see Inglehart 2000. For a detailed discussion of the validity of the indicators please see “Measuring Culture and Cultural Change” by James Melton in Illinois Wesleyan’s undergraduate research journal Res Publica.
Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstance do it.

v118. Sign a Petition have done might do would never do
v119. Join in boycotts have done might do would never do
v120. Attending a lawful demonstration have done might do would never do
v121. Joining Unofficial Strikes have done might do would never do
v122. Occupying building or structures have done might do would never do

**Group Score**
For answers of “have done,” “a” adds +1, “b” adds +2, “c” adds +3, “d” adds +4, and “e” adds +5. For answers of “might do,” “a”-“e” all add +1

**Grid Score**
For answers of “would never do,” “a” adds +5, “b” adds +4, “c” adds +3, “d” adds +2, and “e” adds +1.

Now I want to ask you some questions about your outlook on life. Each card I show you has two contrasting statements on it. Using the scale listed, could you tell me where you place your own view? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between.

v131. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
One should be careful about making major changes

**Grid Score**
+9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 +0
You will never achieve much in life unless you act boldly

v132. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ideas that have stood the test Of time are generally best

**Group Score**
+9 +8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 +0
New Ideas are generally better than old ones
v95. If someone said that individuals should have the chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would you tend to agree or disagree?

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<th>Grid Score</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. neither/it depends</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. tend to disagree</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Possible Grid Points - 42 points
Total Possible Group Points - 51 points

World Values Survey Indicator Scores

Grid Score = Grid Score / Total Possible Grid Points

Group Score = Group Score / Total Possible Group Score
### Appendix 2

#### Table 1: Typology versus Democratic Values Favorable to Democracy in Russia, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, Controlling for Income in Deciles (1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (in deciles)</th>
<th>Democratic Values</th>
<th>Individualist</th>
<th>Egalitarian</th>
<th>Fatalist</th>
<th>Hierarchical</th>
<th>Total</th>
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Significance= 0.029  Phi= 0.379  N= 159

| 2                   |                   |               |             |          |              |       |
| -2                  | 0.00%             | 0.00%         | 1.79%       | 0.00%    | 0.59%        |
| -1                  | 21.00%            | 30.00%        | 35.71%      | 50.00%   | 27.06%       |
| 0                   | 45.00%            | 50.00%        | 53.57%      | 25.00%   | 47.65%       |
| 1                   | 32.00%            | 20.00%        | 8.93%       | 25.00%   | 23.53%       |
| 2                   | 2.00%             | 0.00%         | 0.00%       | 0.00%    | 1.18%        |

Significance= 0.176  Phi= 0.31  N= 170

| 3                   |                   |               |             |          |              |       |
| -2                  | 0.00%             | 0.00%         | 1.45%       | 0.00%    | 0.40%        |
| -1                  | 19.86%            | 26.92%        | 50.72%      | 37.50%   | 29.72%       |
| 0                   | 54.79%            | 53.85%        | 39.13%      | 62.50%   | 50.60%       |
| 1                   | 21.23%            | 19.23%        | 8.70%       | 0.00%    | 16.87%       |
| 2                   | 4.11%             | 0.00%         | 0.00%       | 0.00%    | 2.41%        |

Significance= 0.002  Phi= 0.35  N= 249

| 4                   |                   |               |             |          |              |       |
| -2                  | 1.14%             | 0.00%         | 0.00%       | 0.00%    | 0.71%        |
| -1                  | 27.84%            | 13.79%        | 53.73%      | 70.00%   | 34.04%       |
| 0                   | 52.84%            | 68.97%        | 38.81%      | 30.00%   | 50.35%       |
| 1                   | 15.34%            | 17.24%        | 7.46%       | 0.00%    | 13.12%       |
| 2                   | 2.84%             | 0.00%         | 0.00%       | 0.00%    | 1.77%        |

Significance= 0.003  Phi= 0.326  N= 282

| 5                   |                   |               |             |          |              |       |
| -2                  | 0.53%             | 0.00%         | 1.69%       | 0.00%    | 0.84%        |
| -1                  | 26.46%            | 33.33%        | 57.63%      | 7.14%    | 36.69%       |
| 0                   | 49.74%            | 44.44%        | 33.90%      | 78.57%   | 45.10%       |
| 1                   | 19.58%            | 19.44%        | 6.78%       | 14.29%   | 15.13%       |
| 2                   | 3.70%             | 2.78%         | 0.00%       | 0.00%    | 2.24%        |

Significance= 0.003  Phi= 0.357  N= 357

| 6                   |                   |               |             |          |              |       |
| -200.00%            | 0.53%             | 0.00%         | 2.22%       | 0.00%    | 0.97%        |
| -1                  | 20.11%            | 10.71%        | 53.33%      | 66.67%   | 29.35%       |
| 0                   | 57.14%            | 60.71%        | 37.78%      | 33.33%   | 51.61%       |
| 1                   | 17.99%            | 25.00%        | 6.67%       | 0.00%    | 15.16%       |
| 2                   | 4.23%             | 3.57%         | 0.00%       | 0.00%    | 2.90%        |

Significance= 0.003  Phi= 0.387  N= 310

| 7                   |                   |               |             |          |              |       |
| -2                  | 0.69%             | 0.00%         | 0.00%       | 0.00%    | 0.48%        |
| -1                  | 15.97%            | 30.77%        | 54.35%      | 42.86%   | 26.19%       |
| 0                   | 52.08%            | 46.15%        | 41.30%      | 42.86%   | 49.05%       |
| 1                   | 28.47%            | 23.08%        | 4.35%       | 14.29%   | 22.38%       |
| 2                   | 2.78%             | 0.00%         | 0.00%       | 0.00%    | 1.90%        |

Significance= 0.001  Phi= 0.396  N= 210
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Works Cited


