Can We Communicate Ultimate Reality?

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by

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Preface

I would like to express my indebtedness to the faculty of Illinois Wesleyan University for presenting to me the opportunity to write an honors paper.

The initial interest in the field of religious language stems from lectures on "The Meaning of Religious Language" which were presented by Professor Paul Hessert. These lectures were given in the Philosophy of Religion course offered in the spring of 1961.

I would also like to thank Professor John VanderWaal, chairman of the Philosophy Department at Wesleyan, for his personal guidance and encouragement during the preparation of this paper. Under his direction the Buck Memorial Library is rapidly attempting to compensate for its great deficiency in source material pertaining to this subject.

Appreciation is also due to those certain professors in various fields, who by their earnest concern for knowledge and fine scholarship as exhibited in their classroom, inspire many students to plunge into an undertaking which from the inception is beyond their grasp. The gratitude for these individuals eludes an adequate expression.
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From the moment of conception, the organism designated by the Greek term "\( \delta \varepsilon \gamma \),\( \mu \nu \)\( \mu \)\( \mu \)\( \mu \)s" is involved in a process of growing into a complex and highly developed structure. The instant the egg and sperm unite, a zygote is formed and an individual is engaged in being or existence. Every being of necessity must respond to his existence. Man's response comprises his life, and his life is what he experiences. Every man 'ought' to live in an awareness of his state of affairs - the human condition of an existing being. Indeed, from the inception of this paper, presuppositions are presented, but this should not appear unreasonable. The explicit assumption is that man's life or response to his existence concerns man's attempt to be an existentially authentic being. Man as a being engaged in existence is preoccupied with the meaning of existence, his existence.

Then man's ultimate response is to orientate himself to the cosmos. It is not adequate, according to Mircea Eliade, for man to simply say that he is in the world or "just here". That response is made only by an organism which vegetates, not an authentic being. Once again, the explicit and implicit assumption of this paper is that man, in full awareness of his state of being, necessarily seeks to orientate himself to the cosmos; this existential concern is for a directed existence, an authentic being.
As this distinct being evolves, he continually attempts to orientate himself in his existence in a meaningful manner. When anything becomes meaningful, man inevitably tries to communicate that which he understands as being the answer to authentic existence.

Simultaneously with the development of man's social relations, linguistic communication plays an increasingly important role. Language, as a means of communication, not only assists in the clarification of our own thoughts but serves as a means of communicating our ideas to others. We can therefore see that language is an integral part of social existence. Language is a priceless possession that must be employed with a conscious effort to use it properly. If our efforts to use language precisely deteriorate, our ability to communicate with meaning and clarity will greatly diminish. An essential "dialogue" will thereby be lost to the ages, and a significant part of our meaningful existence will also be sacrificed.

These thoughts introduce us immediately to the concern of this paper. We need to ask ourselves if our concepts catch hold of and convey the meanings we intend to communicate, i.e. are our linguistic apparatus rooted in the reality we seek to know, and do they communicate that reality
Ludwig Wittgenstein implies a similar, yet more emphatic consideration when he states, "In propositions there must be exactly as much distinguished (Gleich soviel zu unterscheiden) as in the state of affairs that it represents." Language cannot be discussed without involving the facts to which they refer. Semantics and ontology are the main areas to be investigated. Another preliminary consideration is that the very nature of that which is known is indicated by the approach to and solution of these problems. This contemporary concern cannot and must not be glossed over lightly by anyone who would be and think as a philosopher or theologian in the realms of scholarship.

Due to the influence and questions being raised by the proponents of philosophical movements associated with linguistic analysis, the validity of theological statements is being questioned. Someone will attempt to answer these questions, and it would be preferable if there would be a feasible response from within the discipline being attacked. In a previous paper, I have tried to explain why language is the battleground of Twentieth Century philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the cognitive implications of theological language, and within this undertaking
to recognize any change in the traditional function of philosophy.

It was a little over a half-century ago that Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) spoke his prophetic words through the character of Zarathustra. Zarathustra came down from the mountain "satiated with wisdom" and "descended into the lower world" in order that he might save mankind. Zarathustra's proclamation that God is dead is mild compared to the prophetic voices of the "doing" philosophers of today. Briefly, their Zarathustra would state that theological language is dead, traditional philosophy is dead, and philosophy is functional only as a linguistic therapy. If the philosopher can clarify the different usages of language, man will be better able to understand what claims are being made by a certain language.

The claims made through religious language are the items that confront every individual and require a response from him. In general, all religious claims to fact incorporate and proclaim an understanding in a larger dimension than the standard spatio-temporal reference. The religious claim is that there is in every man a soul that is answerable to God. This realm irresistibly confronts every authentically existing being. In addition to this most basic
consideration, there are the implicit claims to knowledge. All religious language involves an existential knowledge about life or an individual's being. Secondly, religious language entails a cognition of the cosmos as an integrated whole. Lastly, religious language claims a knowledge of the way life can be orientated to and integrated with the cosmos. An example of the first implication is St. Augustine's brief statement, "Our heart cannot find rest until it has found Thee." (The full ramifications of the existential knowledge confessed in this statement can only be realized and understood by a more thorough acquaintance with the main tenets of Christianity.) A Taoist's principle illustrates the second claim to knowledge. Tao, the cosmic energy, created the cosmos. Thereby, Tao creates "the way to go" and the physical universe is formed in a proper and distinct way or channel. The third claim is clearly expressed by Buddha's teaching of the Law of Karma. If an individual will follow the "Middle Path", he may advance to a higher existence in his next birth. Karma, the inevitable judgement of sins which determines your next existence, is a principle of justice that deals with man's relationship to the cosmos. In conclusion, religious statements proclaim the knowledge of a reality above
this material realm. This higher reality has pervading results in the existence of every human being. The fulfillment of life or the meaning of one's life comes with the establishment of this relationship of life with the cosmos. (3)

These religious claims point to and attempt to express the being of a higher reality, a reality that is absolute and ultimate. This religious concern for the ultimate involves one's total response. Karl Barth expresses the belief that this subjective search is an encounter with the objective, ultimate reality. For Barth, this is the historical Jesus of Nazareth who is the Christ. Therefore, theological language is not simply subjective, whimsical postulations, but refers to a concrete reality to which an existential being passionately responds.

At this point our discussion is progressing toward statements dealing with reality or being. For the theologian this confrontation with the problem of reality entails ontological implications. Turning our attention in an ontological direction introduces us to a perennial problem of philosophy. Traditionally the problem of reality has been handled by philosophy under the title of metaphysics. Metaphysics has been broken into three categories; ontology, epistemology,
and axiology. The term "metaphysics" was coined by the Romans to describe the type of writings that followed Aristotle's book called Physics. Thus the preposition \( \text{meta} \) ("after") was prefixed to Physics to designate any similar writings.

When Paul Tillich discusses this aspect of philosophy he believes that it is less misleading to speak of ontology than of metaphysics. Tillich suggests that we "call philosophy that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object. Reality as such, or reality as a whole, is not the whole of reality; it is the structure which makes reality a whole and therefore, a potential object of knowledge. Inquiring into the nature of reality as such means inquiring into those structures, categories, and concepts which are presupposed in the cognitive encounter with every realm of reality."[4]

It is apparent for Tillich that the character of the general structures that make experience possible involves the philosophical question. Reference is here made to Tillich because he most adequately explains that when the religious statements express a claim to knowledge, the statements are inextricably bound-up in the ontological question. Since knowing is an act that participates in being, i.e. an "ontic relation", 
the analysis of the act of knowing must refer to an interpretation of being. Understanding this issue, we can readily see the friction between Tillich's ideas and those of contemporary linguistic analysts to abandon ontology. Tillich's answer is very clear. Any answer to the relation of signs or logical operations to reality involves a statement about the "structure of being." Therefore, all statements as to cognitive claims should express their fundamental ontological assumptions. In conclusion, we should not look on ontology as a subjective stab in the dark at "the world behind the world." Theoretical statements are directly concerned with an analysis of those structures of being which we experience in our everyday, every moment involvement with reality. (5)

In order to establish the idea of an absolute structure more firmly in our minds, we need only investigate the Milesian school's search for the \( \phi \nu \sigma \iota ) \) that which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, what is natural or given. The three Ionian philosophers, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, respectively believed water, \( \alpha \nu \\varepsilon \iota \nu \nu \iota \nu \) (the boundless), and air to be the principle of all things. These philosophers initiated a tradition search for the absolute, not the relative or secondary substances.
Again in *The Republic*, Socrates, in his maieutic fashion, wasn't simply for subjective opinions concerning the meaning of "justice". Polemarchos' conventional definition or Thracymarchos' radical sophist definition of "justice" were insufficient; they weren't founded in an absolute structure.

Granted that theology is necessarily confronted with the ontological question, we need to consciously ask whether Tillich explains it clearly by saying that which confronts us ultimately must be being if we are to be confronted by and concerned with this reality. He also proposes that this being must be our ground of being or the unconditional power of being. More emphatically he states that this "being itself" expresses itself in and through the structures of being."(6) After having briefly stated Tillich's ontological viewpoint, we will gain additional understanding by a further explanation of ontological structures.

Everett W. Hall, in his article entitled "Metaphysics", suggests that the present degradation of metaphysics is a result of the prevailing emphasis on action and doing something directly and immediately. In reply, Hall states that metaphysics indirectly plays a vital share in directing progress by "shaping views
as to what nature is and how it can and ought to be controlled, by indicating the proper ends."(7) The second criticism of metaphysics is illuminated by explaining that Dewey's attempt to make thought the instrument of activity is still based upon metaphysical assumptions. The enterprise of metaphysics is also attacked because of its high degree of generality. Any assumption on the part of specialists to the effect that generality leads to unreliability and thus to a futile inquiry as to its truth, is in itself based upon metaphysical foundations.

In our thinking, actions, and communication, all people respond according to assumptions based upon their experiences. Undergirding our intention to communicate our existential situations to others, there is the very basic assumption that there is an objective, common nature to all cases of knowledge and also to all existents.(8) We thus affirm by our existence that we believe in a "common nature to existence" in the entities which we suppose to exist and that it is objective to our action and response; and most important, it is objective to even our language. Such universal constants the scholastics referred to as "transcendentals." This reference did
not imply that such existents transcended all experience, but rather it was expressing the conviction that these existents were a constant factor in each and every experience. Mircea Eliade would add that this transcendental element is the sacred as contrasted with the profane. If we can once establish this point, we can then proceed to the problem of expressing the experience of existents in meaningful language or meaningful sentence structures. Hall believes that a meaningful statement referring to universal constants "excludes symbolic expressions in their referential aspect (though not as facts)." (9) Unfortunately he does not explain why only objective language as described by the logical positivists is acceptable. (Although we are still involved with the inception of this paper, this is the very point we shall be trying to clarify.

Religious statements as symbolic statements are referring to an objective existent.)

Metaphysicians have traditionally made claims concerning the nature of knowledge and about what exists and what it is to exist. They are not primarily concerned with what part of things exist. At the same time the metaphysician can not and must not believe himself to be independent of scientific findings. In general metaphysicians must be able to modify their
stand, not their aims, and according to science, must utilize science, and generalize from scientific generalizations. It is the task of metaphysics to establish by induction from scientific propositions, propositions that do not occur explicitly in the sciences as a result of assumptions with built-in exclusiveness.

After having referred to the relationship between metaphysics and science, it is essential to clearly distinguish between the types of hypothesis with which they respectively deal. Scientific hypothesis can be verified because they state a relationship between variables. If the variables have been identified we may verify whether a predicted result actually takes place \( y = (f)x + k \). Metaphysical hypotheses refer to constants; they refer to an existent condition of being. Therefore, particular positive instances are neither conclusive nor do they posit definite verification. Yet the instances serve as illustrations by clarifying through concrete examples and stimulating imaginative insight which makes us aware of contradictory illustrations. Particular instances aid in sizing up an entire perceptual field.

Since the methodology of metaphysics must be applied to unverifiable statements, there is often the
tendency to allow "anything to go". Actually metaphysicians should try to constantly develop their methodology so as to state what would constitute approximate disverifications. In the final analysis they must exercise critical inquiry and honest insight. Though these two attitudes are the best method possible, they remain highly unreliable. The metaphysician must sincerely attempt to survey experience from many various standpoints.

At times there have been strong reactions to metaphysics among theologians. The two main anti-metaphysical theologians should be viewed in the light of their Kantian influence. It was Kant's epistemological dualism that lead to a metaphysical agnosticism. It is also the interweaving of Kantian dualism and agnosticism that has infiltrated all German theology since Kant. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) in his discussion of religion substituted the "feeling of absolute dependence" for theology. The "father of modern theology" would not allow the intellectual or ethical aspect of consciousness to be stressed as being more supreme than the religious consciousness. Following along in the footsteps of his precusor, Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1899) continues the reaction against metaphysical theology by saying that we know God only on the basis of value-judgments.
Religious judgments were valuational rather than existential. God is not reached by speculation, nor by "evidences" in nature, nor by any mystical experiences, nor by a rational apriori or intimate feeling. They rejected metaphysics as the manner in which to stress objectivity. (10)

But again we are drawn back to the fact that there still remains that perennial religious ideas in which the faith is expressed. This is the very reason that Paul Tillich insists that theology and philosophy ultimately are drawn to the same ontological question. We can not side-step the issue - man is confronted with being. To this truth he must respond.

Philosophy is not the concern for mere matters of fact; rather it is the "best wisdom of the lover of wisdom, with reference to ultimate value and ultimate reality." (11) Such a philosophical-theological approach underlines the fact that man with his total being responds to what he considers unconditionally important and his ultimate concern. He responds to reality as a whole.

Tillich continues in his "Introduction" to distinguish between theology and philosophy. "Philosophy deals with the structure of being in
itself; theology deals with the meaning of being for us." (12) While being driven by a passion for objective truth, the philosopher intends to pursue an investigation of being and its structures by means of a detached objectivity. In quite an opposite manner, the theologian involves himself with and commits himself to the existence which is his subject matter. Thus the first point of divergence is the cognitive attitude. Secondly, there is divergence concerning the difference in their sources. "The philosopher looks at the whole of reality to discover within it the structure of reality as a whole." He believes his cognitive ability is such that he can understand the structures of being. He likewise assumes that the logos of reality as a whole and the logos working in him are identical. In other words, the logos permeates all or is common to all. No particular or special place reveals the structure of being. The cosmos is pure reason. (13)

The theologian does not have as his source of knowledge universal logos. The specific logos that manifests itself in a particular historical event, that became flesh, is the theologian’s source of knowledge. The logos is not manifest through common rationality but through the church. The difference in content is shown when the philosopher deals with the
categories of being in relation to the material which is structured by them and when the theologian relates the same categories and concepts to the quest for the "new being". He speaks of the self-estrangement of the subject, about the spiritual center of personal life, and about community as a possible embodiment of the "New Being". (14)

Having sufficiently examined the traditional function of ontology and having discussed the traditional ontological similarities and differences between the philosopher and theologian, it is important to view the previous considerations in the light of any beneficial contemporary trends. It is my conviction that contemporary philosophy might help us in focusing-in on the essence of this paper.

Our primary concern shall be the investigation of a general statement made by R. Gregor Smith in the General Introduction to the wonderful series of books published by The Library of Philosophy and Theology. The statement is as follows:

"Many things have contributed so to change the picture of the work which theologians and philosophers have to do that it seems to be not so much a modified picture as an entirely new one. The strong blasts of positive and empirical dogmatic theology blowing down
from Switzerland upon Europe and America, the immense changes which have overtaken philosophy, especially in Britain, so that the very ways of thinking seem to have altered, and the changes which have taken place in the world in which we all live - have continued to bring about this revolution. We live in a post-liberal, post-idealist, atomic age in theology. Philosophy and theology alike are being compelled to face their traditional problems in such a radical way that the question even arises: are our traditional problems the real ones?" (15)

William F. Zuurdeeg has been as responsive to these new influences and has tried to incorporate the advantages of new movements and corresponding revolutions in his book, An Analytical Philosophy of Religion. It is Zuurdeeg's firm conviction that a break with the traditional idealistic approach to the function of philosophy is essential with the new insights brought about by the Analytic Age. According to him, the function of philosophy is to analyze languages. This function appears most realistic because "it follows a method which complies with what we can observe about people." (16) In our culture we are most aware that men speak many languages (e.g. mathematics, empirical science, moral, poetry, and various religious languages.) Therefore we must not look upon philosophy
as a rational attempt to discover the true meaning of life, the real value of things or the intrinsic nature of the universe.

This movement has been called by various terms – Logical Positivism, Logical Empiricism, Logical Analysis, and Analytical Philosophy. While each term stands for a peculiar emphasis, this movement rebels against the accusation that it is a school. They consider themselves "doing philosophy." The entire group of men can be most easily referred to under the heading, analytical philosophy. William Hordern of Garrett Theological School in a recent lecture stressed the idea that very few pursuits have come to such quick maturity. Taking a cue from August Comte's proposal that positivism is a higher evolutionary plateau that goes beyond mythology and philosophy, the philosophical analysts have emphasized the inability to make judgments, the abandonment of metaphysics (which results from language confusion), and necessity of not making value-judgements. In essence, the task of the philosopher is to make himself unnecessary. This does not involve a theory but activity. Philosophy is therapy of language. This is the honest conclusion to the question, "What is the purpose of philosophy?" The throne of philosophy has splintered into many chairs.
of science. These chairs of science have splintered into many specialized footstools. This historical revolution has caused contemporary philosophy (maybe a passing fad) to propose the preceding function. (17)

Today the word "semantics" is being referred to by many people in many different fields. In most academic circles investigation of semantics has become a preoccupation. The field of philosophy (specifically the logical positivist movement) has been its main entertainers. This trend is clearly reflected in such remarks as, "Our entire philosophy is a correction of our use of language." (18) In a similar tone Bertrand Russell has said that the function of philosophy is not to edify mankind, but to clarify meanings.

"The importance to the philosopher of the study of semantics may be realized when it is pointed out that there could be no philosophy without words, and that philosophy consists of the meanings of words." (19) William Hoerber continues with a word of warning. We must proceed with discriminative caution as we approach various linguistic developments. Even though these people are preoccupied with meaningfulness, they too are sometimes vague in their terminology. We will encounter different uses of the words 'semantics',
'language', and 'meaning'. If we are to really understand and think with these men, we must know what each is referring to when he speaks of "verification" et cetera. We must look for the assumptions and inevitable outcome of their proposals. "The apprehending and study of semantical distinctions, relations and principles is preparation of the ground upon which a scientific foundation of philosophy may be built more easily, and more securely. It is a primary part of a scientific method in philosophy."(20)

"He is a boy;" and "It is raining outside;" and "My disposition for doing what was right prevented me from robbing the bank", are all basic statements representing quite different types of grammatical structures. The first one is meaningful and is necessarily true by the established definition of its words. The second statement may be meaningful. Its meaningfulness depends upon verification, which we find to be possible. The third statement leads us into some difficulty. How are we to verify this feeling? If we cannot verify it, should we continue discussing it? It is evident that we have come up against a a typical semantical problem. Can we retain this meaningless statement and use our language justly? This is the context of our topic. Those philosophers who
deal exclusively with linguistic problems that a more detailed analysis of our linguistic systems will lead to answers having factual validity and being able to be verified. Thereby, it is the greatest hope that the emotional pitfalls of the ordinary uncritical use of linguistics may be overcome. We cannot stand by and allow language to lose its cognitive claims.

Rudolf Carnap wrote a fine introduction to semantics. His purpose in writing the book is, in addition to a purely formal analysis of language, that we are in dire need of "an analysis of the signifying function of language, in other words, a theory of meaning and interpretation." Another very important consideration which Carnap is willing to express, and most others will not spell out in their writings, is that this development of semantics will ultimately construct a theory of truth and a theory of logical deduction. We must always keep in mind these purposes and their far-reaching implications.

Semiotic is the theory of signs and language. This theory is divided into three areas, these areas stress different types of relationships. Pragmatics (or interpretics) is the term referring to the relationship between words and user. Syntax is the relationship between words and other words. Semantics is the relation-
-ship between the words and objects they designate. Semantics is our main field of interest in this section.

R. Carnap also subdivides the Semantical division of Semiotics. Descriptive semantics is a title given to "the description and analysis of the semantical features, either" of some particular historically given language, either of all historically given languages in general. "(22) Then descriptive semantics is primarily the description of facts or is in general an empirical science. A semantical system is the result of building a set of semantical rules. "The construction and analysis of semantical systems is called pure semantics."(23) Thus, in contradistinction to the former, pure semantics is analytical and does not pertain to factual content.

In Chapter B, Carnap introduces us to a few more essential terms. In the above discussion we recognized that a semantical system involves a designated set of rules. It is evident that by designating a certain set of rules by which our language must abide, we inaugurate a semantical system that establishes a truth-condition for every sentence employing descriptive semantics. Carnap says that the rules are a sufficient and necessary condition for the truth of an object. In other words, a system of language is made understandable by the rules, because to understand the assertion
by the sentence is to know under what conditions it would be true. This is the necessary ground work in understanding some of the main statements referred to by other books on the subject. Thus Carnap has adequately expressed that rules determine the meaning or sense of a sentence.

Another significant point made by Carnap is that truth and falsity are designated by this term. The truth-condition previously discussed is a preliminary step toward the truth-value of a sentence.

Carnap sums up his brief introduction by stating, "a semantical system may be constructed in this way: first a classification of the signs is given, then the rules of formation are laid down, then rules of designation, and finally rules of truth."(24) The logical outcome is a prescription for truth and such a prescription culminates in a "Correspondence" theory of truth. Thus we should realize that a great deal is at stake.

A few words in the way of summation are probably necessary at this point. Bertrand Russell, when discussing Ludwig Wittgenstein says that he views the development of semantical systems much as we would a chess game. If we are to play the game, there are certain rules which we must observe and
only certain moves that we are able to make.

"Wittgenstein (Tractatus. 4.024, 4.46) has emphasized the point of view that the truth-conditions of a sentence constitute its meaning, and that understanding consists in knowing these conditions."

It would be almost impossible and a great shortcoming of this paper, not to sight some of the sources, schools, and men who have made outstanding contributions to linguistic movement. Logical positivism has been the leading proponent of many linguistic doctrines. In general, this movement is opposed to the religious philosophy of Protestant New-Orthodoxy. "Its aim is to get away from metaphysical value judgments and to purify knowledge from all axiological and religious elements." The sources of logical positivism are rooted deeply in philosophy and science. A study of British empiricism of the Eighteenth Century is a fine introduction to their beliefs. Following the positivistic influence of Comte they state that the sum total of knowledge is provided by science. They inherited the empiricist idea (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) that only assertions about empirical facts admit of verification. Jumping ahead in our discussion, but relevant to this point, is Hume's belief that the impossibility of metaphysics is due to the inability
of verifying its problems.

The Vienna Circle founded by Moritz Schlick is probably the outstanding group in the historical preoccupation with linguistics. Mach preceded Schlick and made one outstanding contribution to the school. His procedure used in defining terms employed in mechanics was that meaning is in the method. When the domineering and ruthless Nazi regime came into being, the Vienna group broke up. Schlick, its founder, was stabbed by one of his students. Carnap went to the University of Chicago and continued teaching and writing. Waissmann went to teach at Oxford. Neurath, who died in England in 1945, was to become the first editor of the Monographs which were published just before the outbreak of the war and which later became the basis of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences. Later we see the entrance of the mathematicians, Whitehead and Russell, and the pragmatists, Peirce, James, and Dewey. This transplantation of logical empiricism was greatly aided by Alfred Jules Ayer's book, *Language, Truth and Logic*, published in 1936. (Reference to this book will be made later.)

It is interesting to note that R. Carnap in his *Introduction to Semantics* states that the systematic development of semantics stems from the Warsaw school.
of logicians. This group's contributions have been in the fields of contemporary logic and logical foundations of mathematics. Kraft's book, *The Vienna Circle*, is the only other book that draws specific attention to this group. S. Lesniewski's lectures dealt with semantical concepts, e.g. concept of truth and the semantical antinomes. T. Kotarbinski made a detailed analysis of certain semantical and related pragmatical concepts. Alfred Tarski who was the main influence behind Carnap's book laid the foundation of a systematic construction on the basis of the preceding analysis. Because the works of the Polish school were not translated until after 1936, they have not been given the credit they deserve.

Another great influence upon the philosophy of analysis in England has been the Cambridge School. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is undoubtedly the paramount figure in this school and possibly the entire historical development of semantics. Due to the existence of the Nazi regime, Ludwig went to Cambridge where he was appointed professor in 1939 as a result of G. E. Moore's retirement. The *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) was the only book published during his lifetime. In 1958 his "Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical
Investigations" I, The Blue and Brown Books was published. Ludwig dictated the "Blue Book" to his class at Cambridge during the 1933-34 term and had a few copies stenciled. The "Brown Book" was presented in the same manner during 1934-35 at which time he had only two students. That year he had only three copies made. These two one-year lecture notes were circulated bound in a blue wrapper and brown wrapper respectively, and thereby they acquired their names.

In the early portions of the "Blue Book" Wittgenstein believes that the puzzles we try to solve arise from an attitude toward language. "The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying to apply this law consistently comes up against . . . . paradoxical results."(27) Before this discussion he does not see metaphysics connected with language, but rather an attempt to ask and answer questions in a scientific manner.

In his first publication (Tractatus) he developed the view that all truths of logic are tautologies. Tautologies are simply analytical statements. Their contradictory is a self-contradiction. They are necessarily true. In the following years, his interest changed from logic to logical analysis.

Earlier we referred to Ludwig when speaking of
his concept of "language games" with their rules and restrictions. Later he rejected what had been said in his first book concerning statements being divided into ultimate constituents - logical atomism. One of his major statements was that the meaning of a word is acquired through and in its use. According to him, we must learn the 'grammar' or 'logic' of a word. "The raising of metaphysical problems would then be the result of a defective grasp of the grammar of words. For once the rules are properly understood, there survives no temptation to ask such questions. Linguistic therapy has cured us from the desire." (28)

With an understanding of the problems, the basic terms, main sources of influence, and prominent proponents, we are required to center our attention on the preoccupation with meaning. It is quite evident that all linguistic developments should be investigated with the recognition that it did not come about in a vacuum, and a conscious effort should be made to recognize the influences of the logical, mathematical, and scientific developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In any semantical analysis it is necessary to presuppose the stipulated relation between the sign and the signified. Specific meaning is given to a sign
when we precisely designate what the above relation
is to be. If any stipulation is to be made, both
the sign and the signified must be identifiable. If
we use the word "tree" we must be able to indicate
what the word is and indicate what the signified
object (tree) is. This process is usually carried on
by definition, but definitions don't proceed on ad
infinitum. We, sooner or later, arrive at primitive
concepts (undefinable words) where we simply point
to the immediately present.

We thus see the necessity of verification if only
by pointing. This brings us to the belief that the
meaning of the sign is in its verification. For the
statement "It is raining outside." to have any mean-
ing we will in the process of analysis discover the
Language, Truth, and Logic does not think a relevant
experience is sufficient for verification and neither
are observational statements. He carries the necessity
of verification to the extreme of requiring an ex-
perimental statement. He is willing to say that state-
ments according to some semantical systems are meaning-
ful which are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable.
For him the only real meaning and meaningful statement
in the sense of true or false is the literal meaning as
distinguished from the factual meaning or empirical hypothesis. Unless a statement meets this meaning of the 'verification of meaning', it would not be capable of being understood in a scientific hypothesis or common-sense statements.

Kraft, as he views the semantical developments of the Vienna school, doesn't believe their idea of verification necessitates actual verification. They are speaking more of a 'verification in principle'. This possibility of verification can be either by logical
Meaningless statements are empty in regards to being scientifically verifiable, but are in no way non-sensical. Even though such statements are not non-sensical, he discusses them very little. Our only conclusion is that they are of little significance.

He points out that we must be careful if we say that only assertions about empirical facts admit of verification. In essence, only statements we prove through experience are meaningful because they alone, can be verified. Therefore, mathematical and logical statements are meaningless, even if they are statements concerning the logic of science.

In summarizing the verificational analysis, Fredrick Ferré says that we should set rules for
language if we are to use it as an instrument for a communication of fact. But he says, and we should remember, that we will get out of a language what we put into it. Within the dichotomy of analytic statements of truth-conditions (no experience necessary) and fact-asserting synthetic statements (which are not meaningful because they are extra-linguistic and must be tested against some form of relevant truth e.g. sense experience), all logically important meaningfulness is included.

For a fuller understanding of the topic let us further investigate the meaning of a relevant truth. Our sense-experience verification is not conclusive. The corollary to this statement is that verification is greater or lesser probable but not necessary. It stands to reason that if we can through verification prove the positive denial of the negative we also have a meaningful statement. Thus verification can also be arrived at by falsifiability. (29)

If we attempt to verify anything beyond analytic or synthetic statements, we are once again in danger. At this level truth-conditions are not met and any statements are devoid of literal significance. If they are stated, they are parasitical because they fail to abide by the rules. These statements operate
on an "emotive capital" because they do not allow for
translation into statements about possible experience.

Ferré presents an excellent summary in three
basic statements. a) Philosophy is not empirically
uninformative. Wittgenstein says, "Philosophy is not
a natural science." The sphere for philosophy is
"logical meaningfulness." He became convinced that
philosophy should rid itself of a priori notions re-
garding an ideal language and of the relation of
language to fact and concern itself only with language
as such, within its actual use. b.) Linguistic
significance is the primary subject matter of
philosophy. Analysis is essential because grammati-
cally perfect sentences may conceal logical unmeaning.
c.) The function of philosophy is to engage in analysis
of meaningful language.

According to Ayer, all philosophers that have been
considered to be great have simply been misunderstood
analysts. For example, Socrates was most interested
in establishing the meaning (e.g., identifying specific-
ally what we mean) of terms. In the Republic,
Socrates wants men to ask themselves what he really means
by the word "justice." Do we really know the meaning
of terms? If we don't stipulate a meaning of what
value are they? There are no per se philosophical
problems. Philosophy is a method of making statements clear, it is involved with solving puzzles, not revealing truth. (30)

It is important that we recognize the ramifications of such proposals and the blow that is given to metaphysics. The movement of logical positivism seems to be one more of the many movements which developed within the realm of philosophy; and when this offshoot became independent, it took away a portion of its mother. The question remains, "Will the mother which has given birth to many offspring be resolved through the independent division of her branches?"

Wittgenstein has said that metaphysics so long as they exist have a defective grasp of the 'grammar' of words. Ayer says that metaphysics cannot reveal to us knowledge of a transcendent reality. We can only verify that which the senses can experience and not the super-experience.

M. Schlick wrote an essay entitled "Turning Point in Philosophy". (Die Wendi Der Philosophie" opened the first number of Volume I of Erkenntniss (1930-31).) In his anti-metaphysical essay, principle assumptions are set forth. "The clue to their nature is to be found in the fact that every cognition is an expression or representation. That is, it expresses a fact which is
cognized in it." "So all knowledge is such only by virtue of its form. It is through its form that it represents the fact known." The signs not becoming the determiner of reality and any ideas concerning epistemology are thrown to the wind. "The form itself cannot be represented." (31) "Everything is knowable which can be expressed . . . There are consequently no questions which are in principle insoluble." Meaningless sequence of words are such because "they transgress the profound inner rules" of logical syntax discovered by new analysis." (32) (The inner quotes are my own. It seems this is purely emotional language.)

Schlick continues by saying there can be no metaphysics "not because we aren't capable of the task but because there is no task. Then it will no longer be necessary to speak of "philosophical problems" for one will speak philosophically concerning all problems." (33)

Ferré has a very interesting chapter dealing with the elimination of theological metaphysics. The almost impossible problem to be solved is for the theological language to maintain a factual content and at the same time have a supernatural reference. The radical division in language between the observable and unobservable is not permissible.
To say that God is necessary is to say something logically impossible; a synthetical term such as God united with an analytical term is logically incompatible. It is similar to speaking of a round square or a beginning not preceded by something. This theological misuse of language is emotive. Since these statements are unfalsifiable, they are nonsense. (Recall that a previous man said that a meaningless statement is not non-sensical. And according to what Schlick said above, this idea is nonsense and thus doesn't exist.)

A revelant parable told originally by Professor John Wisdom explains how two men came to a group of flowers in the jungle. One man said there was a gardener, and the other disagreed. After no gardener showed up in a few days, and they had built an electric fence around the area and no screams were heard, and no blood hounds tracked anyone down, the original believer said the gardener was invisible. The other friend replied asking how the elusive gardener differs from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all. (34)

In passing it is worth noting that we should not give which is essential. An example of his restatement is that instead of saying "God exists", we should say
"some people have had and all may have experiences called 'meeting God'." (35)

There are four main ideas that we may obtain from R. Carnap's essay "The Elimination of Metaphysics...."

Any psychological association of some image or feeling with a word is not a sufficient or valid way of acquiring meaning. There is no criteria for an application and nothing is asserted. Simply putting these emotional words in new context does not help in becoming meaningful. Secondly, Carnap believes the mythological use of 'God' is meaningful but the metaphysical use is meaningless because it transcends experience. The theological use of the word oscillates between the former two and its disadvantage is that it is judged by the empirical science. Thirdly, under the topic the "Meaninglessness of All Metaphysics", he deals with the faults centering around the verb "to be." The first fault is the ambiguity between its use as a copula prefixed to a predicate and its use as designating existence. The second fault lies in the meaning of its use as "existence". (36) Since Kant we have known that "existence" is not a property (God is). It can only be applied to a predicate (e.g. Descartes' "cogito ergo sum"). First, we cannot say that "I exist". An existential statement does not have the form "a
exists" but rather "there exists a." The second fault is the transition from "I think" to "I exist". Not "I am E" to "I am" but rather "I am B" to "B exists". (G. E. Moore is supposed to have written an influential essay dealing with the faults of the verb "to be").

Up to this time there have only been slight indications of personal disagreement or rather obvious inadequacies of certain ideas. At present we must appraise and evaluate some essential doctrines.

Almost all men that have been mentioned as proponents of "the method of verification provides the meaning" (the most general way of expressing the over-all trend) say that the function of philosophy is not the representation of facts. As Carnap says, metaphysical speculation merely expresses a volitional attitude toward life. He believes the context of metaphysical speculation is not theoretical and therefore does not describe the state of affairs.

Personally, this seems to be one of the major shortcomings. An attitude, which I believe metaphysics to be, may well be non-theoretical in the sense that this language does not refer to plain, unadulterated objective facts. BUT we cannot go a step further (which their assumption seems to do) and deny that these life-feelings don't indicate and point to a
reality as factual (possible a better term would be "quasi-factual") as any other and aren't meaningful to our existence. A 'reality' as prescribed by their assumptions definitely short changes reality. They only deal with a segment of reality which they "feel" confident to handle. According to Ferré, any victory that narrows down what is fact is too cheap to be convincing. Susanne K. Langer would also agree that they have arbitrarily created their own "little grammar bound island."

When anyone sets up arbitrary rules by which we arrive at meaning, they are setting up a priori conditions for truth and exclude anything else. They seem to be saying if you cannot play our rules then you cannot play. This is an escape from some real issues and a denial of what could possibly be reality. The movement starts out in an attempt to clarify language and discard unverifiable language games and winds up creating their own isolated game in a vacuum. Men determines the meaning of sign-combinations. Meaning becomes relative to a certain language composed of a semantical system. Wittgenstein himself recognized some of these things when he said "My statements are meaningless" and nothing is easier than to expose and question as a meaningless pseudo-problem. (37)
The verification principle is misunderstood if it is used as a criterion for judging the meaningfulness of all language. The principle itself should be asserting a fact, but when the principle is used to test itself we find it devoid of meaning because there is no sense experience for the task. For on their very premises the statements must be judged meaningless. Ferre also shows its narrowness in dealing with theological language and paradoxes which may both be "philosophically useful or cognitively illuminating." In essence it becomes a criterion of empiricity, not of meaningfulness. (38)

In summation, the using of the verification principle has possibly saved metaphysics and theological discourse from becoming non-cognitive through lack of a technical use of language. 'It is primarily valuable as an antidote, but poisonous as an exclusive diet.' As a principle it surely fails to appreciate the wide variety of linguistic uses. Carried to its logical extreme it distorts our use of language rather than clarifies. After thinking through this section we should realize that there is a necessity for metaphysics and an urgent need to be concerned with semantics. Language is the only means of communicating factual experiences. We cannot abandon language or
get away with misusing it. It is necessary for living a full life. We must make a conscious effort to do language justice. An investigation of meaningfulness must always be at the fore-front of philosophical investigations.

Thus far we have tried to explain the ontological question as presented by traditional philosophy and have sought an understanding of the contemporary fad in philosophy to analyze the language which attempts to communicate this reality. In the final section we will be primarily concerned with a functional analysis of religious language. This approach seems to be only natural after realizing the built-in shortcomings in the premises of the earlier analytical philosophers and the insight into our problem given through Wittgenstein's proposal that the only remaining approach is to concern ourselves with the actual use of language, not an ideal language and its relation to fact.

Probably the best transitional idea is that espoused by Willem Zuurdeeg as he draws attention to the differentiating factors between mere propositional statements and statements made by a person. (38) To ask the meaning of propositions is only relevant to mathematics and science. To ask the meaning of what a person states is relevant to religious language. The latter idea reveals that
the language situation involves a human situation. As Zuurdeeg continues in his book, this emphasis exposes us to the man-who-speaks. Man speaks with convictions. In fact, man is his convictions. Emphasizing his idea with more vehemence, Zuurdeeg calls the language of mathematics and science "artificial" language. I take this to mean, it is artificial because it does not take man into consideration. We cannot perform a logical analysis of a person. Simultaneously and interwoven with the language situation is a human situation. A definite shortcoming of any analysis is the omission of this significant fact.

Often in the historical development of philosophy and theology we encounter attempts to explain the epistemological basis of faith. But it seems evident that such ideas concerning the dynamics of faith are only convincing for those who already have made theistic commitments. An example of this would be the voluntarist's belief that faith creates the fact. According to voluntarist, man cannot wait for a proof concerning his faith. It is similar to an understanding that a girl's love depends upon the boy's love that is offered simultaneously. Another manner in which his idea may be expressed is that we cannot wait to plant a seed until we have proof that a plant will grow from
the seed. It appears as though the relationship between the seed and the flower is conscientiously known, even if this knowledge is the result of accidental findings, before a person ultimately commits himself to the act of planting. It is as if theism were already true. Likewise any attempt to base faith on the moral order of the universe (e.g. Butler's Conscience, Kant's Moral Law, or Ross' Duty) seems to be convincing only for those who already profess theistic inclinations. Again there seems to be no logical inference from the illative sense (i.e. "to divine the significance of a large field of evidence", or "appreciating the drift of miscellaneous mass of evidence")(40) to the knowledge that God exists. These attitudes seem to be the result and not the cause.

John Hick's development of the nature of faith provides certain insights for our present point of concern. His basic thesis deals with the manner of cognition by which the religious man gains an awareness of God. Another of his main endeavors is to see how religious cognition is related to other cognitions. In the inception he states that there is an epistemological pattern employed for all knowing. He stresses the fact that the theistic belief will be peculiar, but this is only natural when we consider that through it cognition of a unique object is known. The word
"significance" instead of "form" or "meaning" is the key word. The latter words have been used in so many various philosophies that too much time would be required to clarify their meaning and draw out the distinctions necessary for the continuation of the presentation.

The basic characteristic of human experience is the taking on of "significance". It is this fundamental and all persuasive characteristic that permits the conscious experiencing of outer reality; the possession of significance is that which enables us to inhabit and come to terms with our environment.

Significance makes an essential reference to action. "Consciousness of a particular kind of environmental significance involves a judgment, implicit or explicit, as to the appropriateness of a particular kind, or range of kinds, of action in relation to that environment."(41) To refer to anything as having objective significance is to reveal its relational aspect since the physical structure functions in relation to human interests. In a Kantian fashion, John Hick says that the correlative mental activity by which the various significances are apprehended involves our interpretation. In addition this interpretative action takes place in relation to types of existence or orders of significance, those
being natural, human, and divine. After having mentioned objective-sigificance Hick says that it is characteristic for man to live also in a dimension of personality and responsibility. This human significance necessarily follows the realization of the objective significance. To establish the significance of one, it is necessary to recognize and deal with the other; the moral only follows after recognizing the natural significance.

"Has this epistemological paradigm -- of one order of significance super-imposed upon and mediated through another -- any further implications? . . . As ethical significance interpenetrates natural significance, so religious significance interpenetrates both ethical and natural. The divine is the highest and ultimate order of significance, mediating neither of the others and yet being mediated through both of them."(42)

This "interpretative leap" comes only after one focuses upon experience as a whole. It involves a recognition of situational-sigificance. It is not a reasoned conclusion or an unreasoned hunch. "It is, putatively, an apprehension of the divine presence within the believer's human experience. It is not an inference to a general truth, but a "divine-human encounter", a mediated meeting with the living God."(43)

While this is essentially an epistemological paradigm,
it carries over or is incorporated in and through a way of living. This is the essence of a total being involved with total existence. And after having come to live in terms of this interpretation, we neither require nor can we possibly conceive of a validation process for this cognitive claim. (A discussion of the inability to test these claims, the possibility of their mere psychological existence as opposed to existential existence will be covered later.)

Another unique point is brought to our attention by Hick:

"There is in cognition of every kind an unresolved mystery. The knower-known relationship is in the last analysis sui generis: the mystery of cognition persists at the end of every inquiry - though the persistence does not prevent us from cognizing. (44)

For a moment let us continue discussing the element of mystery and view its role in contemporary science and philosophy. Certain suppositions of the contemporary trends in science and philosophy are that we must demand clarity in our thinking and that all thinking is problem solving. Accordingly mystery originates from a lack of knowledge which science will attempt to overcome and secondly from unclear thinking which
philosophy will eliminate. Contemporary disciplines have as their common goal the elimination of mystery. (45)

Professor Hessert points out that a riddle constitutes a pseudo-problem or involves a confusion of terms. A puzzle contains the elements for a solution and merely requires being put in the correct order. A problem is a situation to which the answer is not given; but with proper plans being established, we may arrive at an answer. He emphasizes that a mystery is still distinct from the three preceding situations. A mystery is unique in that the more you go into it, the more mystery is encountered. Also the more mystery we experience the greater respect we have for its profundity. In addition, the mystery sheds light on other situations, rather than itself. (46)

The sin quo non of mystery is the attitude of wonder. For the Greeks who looked at nature as an eternal principle underlying the sensible world and at science as an intellectual contemplation of the divine object, mystery was never dispelled but always more fully revealed. In modern science, wonder is transferred to man, and he compels nature to answer his questions. Also mathematical language contain no degrees of depth or profundity for modern
If we accept Euclidean geometry as our geometrical yardstick and all explanation within the scheme, all more complex or wider application follow necessarily. Diemetrically opposed to modern science is the concept of revealed truth which offers multiple levels of depth. The former involves systems of knowledge that are eternal truths, as opposed to the claims of revealed truth that are eternally true. The basic attitudes have changed from contemplation of the self-revealing of nature to human mastery through experimentation.

The mystery referred to by the Holy Bible was not the different elements of man but the difference in man as a whole and God, not what is rational and empirical but what is within man's power and what can be revealed only by God. Mystery is therefore an integral part of religion and religious language. It is very possible that contemporary emphases have made us blind to an integral part of what we are attempting to investigate. We need to seriously consider the fact that maybe we have lost a perspective of existence, that is most basic to our cognition of the real depth dimension of reality—the reality that presents us as a total being who needs to be orientated to the objective cosmos. Undoubtedly such a perspective gives us a keener insight into the
transcendental reality referred to by religious language.

Frederick Ferré in *Language, Logic and God* presents a brief analysis of the various functional uses of religious language. His supposition is that a functional analysis is directed toward understanding the genuine use of religious language instead of being directed specifically at the manner in which it is misused. In the chapter entitled "Familiar Functions of Theological Discourse", a discussion is presented that deals with four different functions of theological languages. According to Ferré the existential language functions as a means of recognizing that all men have certain features in common. To merely drop the "existential situation" referred to with this simple statement and then state that the "central factor" of this situation is the fact that every individual is "one-who-must-die" is certainly a misleading summary. Certainly existential language seems to refer to understandings that are quite common; but its significant function, as a quest, not an seems to be the personal experience that is encountered in the midst of the quest. It is the possibility of authenticity originating from the existential tension. This reality is the significant reference; and it is through the experience of this existential situation
that man encounters a serious and honest quest for the meaning of his existence. It is not the mere objective fact that I must die, but rather the new dimension of personal life that unfolds for the first time through such an experience. Ferre's additional reference to claims concerning "after life" seems to reveal still further his lack of understanding concerning this function of theological language. In his summary he is correct in saying that this language does not need to be theistic. But it seems that this language evolves from a more preliminary situation that can lead to a more thorough understanding of the function of religious language. This is its main attribute, and this is what Ferre is unable to recognize.

A second familiar function of theological discourse concerns ethical commitment. Professor Braithwarte believes the essential function is the statement of moral assertions. Biblical stories are the best example of ethical assertions. These stories are rooted in an agapeistic concern for the individual's relationship to the world and other individuals. Commitment to the agapeistic interpretation requires putting the essential meaning conveyed through these stories into action and secondly responding with one's emotions, feeling, et cetera.
A. C. Ewing emphasizes that for emotions to respond over a long period of time requires an objective reality. As pointed out before in discussing the essential role of mystery, Ewing does not view commitment to ethical standards as an intellectual conversion. Instead, ethics involves commitment of the whole being to an objective reality. Here attempts to show that the unique function of theological languages is founded in something more basic. The ethical function to which Ewing refers rises out of something more basic. The unique expression from which behavior arises is a
"belief-content". Again, these explanations as to the function of theological statements are significant, but their superficiality does not bring us closer to any concrete reality. They aren't one of the unique or most revealing functions.

R. M. Hare says that religious statements really function as a means of expressing quasi-factual beliefs. The word "quasi" (κωστι) used in this context means "as if, in a sense or degree", or 'seemingly' factual. As an example of that to which he is referring, Hare sights the conversion of Paul while on the road to Damascus. Paul did not decide to stop persecuting the Jews simply because he thought he ought not act in this manner. Paul's behavior changed as result of understanding a
matter of fact during his encounter with Jesus the Christ. His behavior was a natural by-product that sprouted from an experiential encounter with quasi-fact. Hare's discussion of function seems to be more informative because he stresses the fact that this type of language refers to a unique and distinctive reality—what we believe is primary to our outlook upon life.

R. M. Hare makes a corollary statement dealing with the relevance of attitude. He believes that attitudes shape our interpretation of facts. Attitudes may be in disagreement, but facts may not. It seems evident that life is organized around attitudes and that "ordinary" facts are the result of active discrimination on our part. "Faith does not supply what is missing in knowledge. It helps us to obtain knowledge, not as a method, but as an attitude in which learning is made possible."(47) This quotation from Professor Hessert's book states explicitly the vital necessity and role played by attitude. But the necessary point to grasp is that attitude and method are not synonymous in this case. Attitude is not the way to truth but is rather an understanding that is the context in which we learn.

But the question arises whether attitude is necessarily logically prior to any facts. If this were so, as Hare states, man's outlook would never change.
It seems that the attitude would be innate or acquired possibly through teaching or at least before any facts affected the attitude. The facts must grasp you, not you grasp them. Hare views the attitude as making the facts and transcending the facts. Hessert is pointing out that the attitude is not the method. Hare puts faith in Kantian terms when he says that it is an ultimate category of thought and what we recognize as fact is relative to the ultimate category. Ultimate categories imply method of knowing fact, fact relative to category. This way no fact can be disproven. But as Hessert points out, fact is connected with knowledge and knowledge can expose false faith. Therefore, Hare has recognized the necessity of attitude but has incorrectly associated it with the method of acquiring fact. Again the functional analysis has brought to our attention some shortcomings of different views, but also it has exposed new insights.

John Wisdom, who was referred to in section two of this paper, sees the function of theological language as something more than attitudinal. As was pointed out before, the existence of the gardener in his illustration, could not be verified. Although we cannot verify our beliefs, as also the two men in the illustration could not, we can continue our discussion by "directing our attention" to the patterns in the "facts". Pointing
up features in the facts is the method by which the men continued their talk. Therefore, Wisdom believes theological language functions only as an attention-directing device. While this undoubtedly may be a function of theological language, this cannot be the most unique function. It seems very inadequate in the light of the enormous cognitive claim that is at stake. It does not do justice to the claim being made. While this function may have real purpose, and will be referred to later as a part of a larger discussion dealing with Ian Ramsey, we must still attempt to analyze some significant functions that are more fundamental.

Willem Zuurdeeg is quite interested in bringing the analytical approach into a correct perspective by showing that language must necessarily take the human situation into account. As stated earlier, the human situation is intrinsically included in the language situation. With this understanding in mind, we should not view religious language as indicative language. It is much more correct to refer to it as convictional language that is deeply rooted in the personality. Convictional language is also that which involves all of reality and not merely scientific facts. In addition Zuurdeeg points out another important consideration by distinguishing between the language of systematic
theology and convictional language. The language of systematic theology as opposed to convictional language is something we manipulate, not something that grasps us.

In all honesty, Zuurdeeg concludes by saying that convictional language expresses that which is real for a certain individual. He rebels against metaphysics as all analysts do; and therefore, he rejects any trans-subjective or transcendental objectivity which this language attempts to express. He fails to go beyond the situation which is real for them. In true existential fashion (Zuurdeeg includes existentialism because it most adequately emphasizes the analysis of the human situation which in turn is an integral part of the language situation) he sees reality as relative to humans. For this reason language must also be relative. This rules out metaphysics or any reference to fundamental realities. To merely state that something is real for them reveals a function but this function doesn't include a claim to a reality that is ultimate and to which all men must respond with their whole being. This type of language seems to function in an exclusive manner. It draws attention to man, not to the community and an objective cosmos which are the claims of religious language.

Alasdair Mac Intyre draws attention to the function
of myth. By myth men expresses his view of real being. The essential reality which we cannot justify but to which the myths refer requires our commitment to an authority. Theism does not rest upon firm epistemological foundations. The most significant point for the theist "is commitment to belief in these myths as more than useful or inspiring stories." (48) What makes one religion differ from another is the authoritative criteria accepted by and for this self-commitment. This ultimate criteria is the only means of justifying one's commitment. Mac Intyre emphasizes that because it is an ultimate criterion it is not possible according to the very definition to be justified; it is its own criterion. In brief, religion lacks any means of justification.

Although there is a history of apologetics which is integral to the history of theistic thought, this does not seem to refute Mac Intyre's proposal that it is not valid. Just because there is a definite tradition of historical apologetics that has attempted to justify itself before objective criteria of reason and evidence does not mean Mac Intyre is wrong. Apologetics may come up with some significant ramifications full of many insights but this can not be the main or unique function of theological language. It is not the most basic method of pointing out the essential element of
commitment. Apologetics most often assumes commitment.
(In addition we might question Ferre's idea that we
must convert our language, not instead of argument,
but for the sake of meaningful argument. Meaningful
argument seems to imply a possible justification
through reason and evidence. This is precisely what
Mac Intyre is trying to show is impossible.)

Ian T. Ramsey in *Religious Language* draws our
attention to the importance of the logical oddness of
theological language. The main thesis of his book is
that the services performed by an analysis directed from
the perspective of logical empiricism shall be very
beneficial to philosophy and theology. The empirical
placing of theological phrases will not only be the
grounds of a new cooperation, but a new venture altogether.
His two main questions are, "What is a religious
situation?" and "What kind of empirical anchorage have
theological words?"

Ramsey believes the foundation of the religious
situation is discernment. Discernment involves a break-
through. He illustrates this state of affairs by dis-
tinguishing between types of knowing. When we know
facts about a person (wissen) we have what Bertrand
Russell termed "knowledge of description." In addition
to this type of knowing, there is the knowing that
involves personal association and trust (kennen). Through this association, and knowing this person through your being known by him in the same sense, there is a sudden disclosure. The individual that you previously knew only through the channel of facts becomes a 'person'. Ramsey refers to this disclosure as a "breaking of the ice". This disclosure does not add any facts to the many facts already known. The fundamental difference comes through the "encounter which brings no new facts but rather a 'person' into focus." This personal encounter is not psychological in so far as they would reduce religion to what would be called a subjective experience.

"Let us emphasize, without any possibility of misunderstanding, that all these situations, all these characteristically different situations, when they occur, have an objective reference and are, as all situations, subject-object in structure. When situations "come alive", or the "ice breaks", there is objective depth in these situations along with and alongside any subjective changes."(49)

In addition to an odd discernment, there is a response of total commitment which is the second part of a religious situation. When we try illustrating the different types of commitment such as mathematical
that all of our examples refer not to what religious commitment actually is but only what it is like. It is only what logically corresponds to religious language. For example, we know a man who is "wrapped up" in sailing. His commitment to sailing causes his everyday language to be colored by it. This commitment carries over into all he says and does. When committing ourselves to a lover, we organize the whole of our life around another being. It causes a personal revolution. This is where personal commitment goes beyond the mathematical options which involve no heart searching.

"So we see religious commitment as a total commitment to the whole universe; something in relation to which argument has only a very odd function, its purpose being to tell such a tale as evokes the insight, the 'discernment' from which the commitment follows as a response."(50)

In addition, our religious commitment is bound up in key words whose logic resembles the logic of words used in describing personal and mathematical commitment. It has "key-words suited to the whole job of living- apex words."(51) While it may resemble other logical
uses of linguistics, it is objective language that has been given very special qualifications. It is objective language that reveals "logical impropriety". We qualify religious language to stress that its reference is in part beyond the language in which it is clothed. "The same is true about "God"; and the central problem of theology is how we use, how to qualify, observational language so as to be suitable currency for what in part exceeds it - the situations in which theology is founded."(52) Then the function of theological language is to evoke discernment and commitment through the use of objective words that exhibit logical peculiarities but refer to a religious situation with objective reality. It is a currency for discernment.

One of the many examples of logical impropriety is the topographical oddness. This involves inverting commas, hyphens, or capital letters to otherwise straightforward words. Examples of this would be 'authentic' or 'being-in-a-situation'. Another oddness is gained by using words "technically" in a sense that it is never defined at one point but is used with frequency so that it is defined in its use or it gains "meaning in use". An example of this would be the word "existential".(53)

Ian Crombie in Faith and Logic stresses the idea
that theological language functions as an establishment of a "reference range". Thus it functions "by eliminating all improper objects of reference (like finite things or empirical events) from theistic discussions and by suggesting the realms of non-theological discourse (ethical, historical, cosmological, and so on) to which theological speech is somehow relevant." (54) We then see that the logical "oddness" of theological speech functions in a semantical fashion. This language does take on significance because of its reference. Parables become more significant and through them we find the real meaning of words in a real theological context. In the context of the parable they have their appropriate "reference range" and most adequately function as theological language. Crombie believes that all language about God must be some way used in a parabolic setting. But the parable is not that with which we stop. For the Christian the parable points to reality beyond itself. The truth to which the parables witness does not correspond literally to that which is referred to in the parable. It is the trust of the Christian that as a reliable parable we are not misled as to its real significance and actual reality. Crombie goes a step beyond Mac Intyre's logic of sheer witness. He does not simply say that this is a reliable parable or image
because the believer is impelled to believe it.

Instead Crombie concludes by developing the idea that through our constant attempt to use images, light is cast by the images and provides us with a better understanding of the reality to which the image refers. The idea that "logical images are capable of illuminating one's understanding of the world," gives a new and vital significance to theological language. The idea that "illumination" is as significant as "impulsion" provides a new justification and makes a further investigation of images or analogies relevant.

The main purpose of this section has been directed toward a functional analysis of theological language. Unfortunately the analysis has brought to our attention many different functions the language may serve but has still not disclosed any conclusive discernment of a reality to which this language is referring. Though the language may serve various functions we still do not know if the language experiential reality that claims a response of our entire personality.

Susanne Langer, in her book, Philosophy in a New Key, attempts to make an honest analysis of the types, qualities, or different levels of linguistic communications. Her main emphasis is the demarcation made between
discursive and presentational language.

According to Professor Langer, language is related to reality by means of the "law of projection". To some people only discursive language, that which is language put in peculiar order, can be spoken. There is expression in a different sense which refers to feelings, emotion, and desires. This language does not represent, but expresses. This "genuine type of semantics" goes beyond and fills in the gaps of discursive language which is not the only articulate form of symbolism. Her main assumption is "wherever symbol operates, there is meaning." It is important to notice that "presentational semantics" (Does "semantics" here mean the same thing it does for the logical positivists?) is not conceived through language; but after having been experienced, it is preserved in an attitude and gains expression through interplay with other aspects of experience. The most highly developed form of connotational semantics is music.

But there still remains a certain vagueness concerning the ability of language to communicate the religious reality. When employing language to communicate a reality, we most always sense a direct awareness or participation in the reality. But with religious language, as we analyze it, we feel once
removed from the reality; and therefore, a vague or hazy communication is sensed by almost every one. Then we begin to question whether the language is actually communicating any reality at all. If there is a reality, its meaning and significance seem to have transcended the analysis. The primary question seems to be, "How can we communicate through language a transcendental subject?"

John A. Hutchinson in his article, "The Religious Use of Language" expresses the thought that religion condensed to its very essence involves symbols for the ultimate meaning of human existence. This reality which is then communicated in a symbolic manner is independent of the mind, but the mind can only find expression and fulfillment in the symbols. Hutchinson states that religious statements are analogical and metaphorical. Analogy is the only means of communicating the reality of the transcendental object. As Professor Paul Hessert pointed out i.e., an analogy is an identity of relation and not of essence. The bravery of a boy is not that of a man, but there may be a relation between their bravery. Religious language is poetical or imaginative. Such religious images are differentiated from concepts by their immediacy. After explaining this point in more
detail, he defines a religious experience as being hit by such images and responding to them. His third and fourth point are that this language must express ultimate meaning, that which is independent of and gives meaning to all other concerns, and that it is referring to a unique object that can be indicated but not defined. It is a holy language. In summary, he believes that religious language has an emotive meaning that is taken existentially.

Now that we have been exposed to the area of symbolism, let us pursue the interest further. "In man's search for what it means to be and to stay human, he returns perennially to symbols for the expression of ultimate meaning."

This statement is made in the Editor's Preface to the September 1955 issue of The Christian Scholar. And it is more that an ample introduction to Paul Tillich's thoughts is his article, "Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God".

Tillich begins by recognizing that the logical positivists have helped make us aware that we have no clearing house for communication. He also assumes and explicitly states that levels of reality exist and these levels are different. Each level demands a different language and approach. Tillich approaches
and interprets religious language as being essentially symbolic.

A sign indicates the existence of something beyond itself. It is one aspect of a larger whole (e.g. smoke is one aspect of the fire), and our real concern is with the "pointed to" reality. A symbol is also employed to represent some reality although it is not a proxy for that reality. Both the sign and the symbol point to something beyond themselves but signs do not participate in the meaning and power of that to which it is referring as symbols do.

"Every symbol opens up a level of reality for which non-symbolic speaking is inadequate." (58) The symbol is then a representation that opens up a level of reality otherwise hidden and unable to be grasped in any other manner. For Tillich, the opening-up process involves the opening up of reality in deeper levels and the opening-up of the inner man in special levels. It opens up reality and the soul. Thus the symbol brings us to a new dimension of life. A sign such as the stop light is invented and can be replaced by a different light, but a symbol has a special function. Each symbol serves for one specific function - it cannot be replaced. Symbols are the result of a situation; they are born out of a group that
acknowledges in a word, a flag or any specific symbol a part of their being. When the inner situation or conviction dies, the symbol dies. A symbol is born and dies but is not invented. The question he seems to beg is, "By what criterion will we judge between symbols if they represent an ultimate reality"? If the symbol dies it is because the situation dies. Are there any abiding or ultimate symbols and can the religious situation die?

Religious symbols open up "the depth dimension of reality itself, the dimension of reality which is the ground of every other dimension and every other depth, and which therefore, is not one level beside the others but is the fundamental level, the level below all other levels, the level of being itself, or the ultimate power of being." (59) These symbols open the experience of the dimension of this depth in the human soul. Symbols are born and die according to the changed relationship with the ultimate ground of being - God. The Ground of Being transcends any symbol. If a symbol should be taken as unconditional it is demonic.

There are two fundamental levels in all religious symbols (i.e. the transcendent level and the immanent level). The most basic symbol on the transcendent level would be the Ground of Being - God. But can we
say that his is only the unconditional ground of being? The awareness of the reality is not symbolic, but in our relationship we must symbolize — and the relationship is experienced only as we encounter him with the wholeness of our being which is a person, a being. That element which is infinite and unconditional, yet transcendental, and that which is adequate to knowing him through a person relationship are the two essential elements that always must be foremost in our transcendental symbols. The attributes and the acts of God are also included under transcendental symbols. The second level, the immanent level, involves the level of the divine in time and space. Under this section Tillich discusses the incarnation, sacraments, and sign-symbols.

Tillich concludes his article with his ideas concerning the truth of religious symbols. Symbols are independent of any empirical criticism. A symbol is alive as long as the situation out of which it was born still has significance. "Their truth is their adequacy to the religious situation in which they are created, and their inadequacy to another situation is their un-truth."(60) Again his conclusion leads to relativism unless he intended his reference to "situation" to imply ultimate situation. Even if this is what he intended, it would seem to be reasoning circulus in probando. The absolute
statement concerning the truth is that no symbol is ultimate. No symbol can take the place of the ultimate without becoming demonic. No matter what the symbol might be, it is conditional and must deny the idolatrous tendency within itself. The criterion for any Christian symbol is its clarity in representing or being a concept, but not the thing in itself.

I am sure that we would agree with Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich that God can never be an object of the mind. In my estimation most of our language is constructed as a result of objects we experience being able to become objects of the mind and thereby becoming conceptualized. It is conceivable that analogical language which does not refer to the essence of two objects but rather a relation that exists between the objects might be the only way of overcoming this barrier of communication through religious language. It seems that most communication involves conceptual language and not a perceptual language. We are able to form a concept of a tree; and because other humans have experienced a tree and it is possible to have a tree as an object of the mind, we are able to linguistically communicate in a dialogue the reality of the tree. Such things as love and attitude seem to be excluded from the categories of those things which are or can be the object of our
mind. Therefore, unless it is possible through analogy, they seem to also be excluded from the possibility of being communicated by language as we know it today. Even if we are able to use anological language to communicate a reality between those who have already experienced the reality, the question still remains, "How are we to communicate this reality by anological language or communicate it in any manner to those who have not experienced such an encounter?"

Geddes mac Gregor in his article "The Nature of Religious Utterance" brings to the surface the idea that the failure of theological communications is not necessarily failure in the use of language (assuming language is capable of expressing all realities). It is more often a symptom of confused standpoints. By the word "standpoint" he means the presuppositions and types of questions to which they give rise and the outlook on things which result. Professor H. A. Hodges in his book _Language, Standpoints, and Attitudes_ believes that each standpoint has a language; and when the languages are confused, it is merely a symptom of confused standpoints. He foresees that philosophy will become a standpoint analysis, not a linguistic analysis. Such a philosophy will require an understanding of the standpoint it considers, a certain
sense of a dramatic study, a dialectical approach, a normative structure so as to allow a judgment between standpoints and will provide an existential judgment. But again I feel that we must point out that an existential choice must be made. The question still remains, "How does one make the choice?" It seems we make a choice by being grasped or confronted by a reality. And the Christian problem involves the ability to communicate the reality to others. The central problem with which we started still remains - "Can we use language to communicate ultimate reality?" Some people would reply that all the Christian can do is trust that their words will be a witness to the reality and thereby give the reality an opportunity to reveal itself. Or some will agree with Mac Gregor that theological statements only have meaning as they are put in liturgical form or some imperative form.

In this paper a study has been made of traditional ontology, contemporary philosophy, types of verifications, and types of analyses. It has involved a preoccupation with semantics and religious reality. No matter what ideas might have seemed to be the answer at one time, we cannot escape the conclusion that the intended semantic reference of theological discourse is to an ontological reality. This has been and seems to be the
main conviction of Christians.

In way of conclusion, let us think for a moment about the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:1-7:29) or the Lord's Prayer (Matt. 6:9-15). In either one of these statements Jesus was using language to communicate ultimate reality. And Christians today repeat and pray them in order that the reality might be communicated to the men of this generation. Let us take both of these statements and view them in the light of this entire paper. We might conclude that these statements have an ontological reference. Undoubtedly those who have never experienced such a reality would attempt a verification of the referents. Others would analyze the various functions or attempt to find logical coherence in the statements. Some would say that these statements serve as an emotive or ethical function. Others would say they serve a responsive, or imperative function or would make analytical games out of these serious endeavors to communicate reality. Still others would be driven back to a standpoint-analysis which appears to offer a better solution than any other isolated method.

In all fairness I think we would admit that these statements of Jesus and other religious statements do provide a basis of communication for Christians today. But keeping in mind that the good news of gospel is
for those who have not experienced such a reality (the lost sheep), we need to question whether language was Jesus' most effective way of communicating this reality.

Most basically we need to ask whether it was the language that opened up new levels of reality for those who heard Jesus speak or whether it was possibly communicated more effectively in some other manner. According to the gospels, Jesus' most effective communication was his authority, and his authority was what he started and increased. In other words, Jesus' real communication was by what he did, not his language.

In conclusion, two main ideas have evolved through this paper. Different types of reality are opened up through different types of language - the various functions of theological language as we have found them. The other idea is that language is inadequate and certainly not the most effective manner of communicating ultimate reality. What a man is and does is more able to communicate the ultimate reality of the human situation.

Today, we are in search of a more intellectual understanding and communication of the ultimate reality. The reason for introducing the gospel in the concluding thoughts was because the Christian who
makes religious statements, whether he be theologian, minister, or an everyday man, must justify his communication according to his one model—Jesus the Christ. This is the one criterion of his ontology and its manner of communication.

The problem is still with us and I am certain always will be in future generation. "Can we communicate ultimate reality?" Is it possible that a new understanding of what language is, how it functions, and what it is capable of communicating will allow mankind to communicate ultimate reality? Or is language inadequate and we must seek a more effective manner of communicating ultimate reality? Or might real communication of ultimate reality only become a reality after both alternatives are simultaneously developed to their utmost? It seems plausible that the real solution to our problem rests with a better understanding and proper use of language and a more thorough investigation of non-linguistic means of communication! Only the energetic and vitally concerned will provide contemporary theology and philosophy with guiding insights.
FOOTNOTES

1. The Editor's Preface, The Christian Scholar
   Vol. XXXVIII No. 3 September, 1955 pp. 171-172

2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
   4,04

3. Notes taken from a lecture presented by Paul Hessert
   in Philosophy of Religion


5. Ibid. pp. 18-20

6. Ibid. p. 21

7. E.W. Hall, "Metaphysics", Living Schools of Philosophy
   edited by D.D. Jones p. 131

8. Ibid. p. 145

9. Ibid. p. 152

10. D.C. Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics", Living
    Schools of Philosophy, edited by D.D. Jones
    pp. 181-189

11. Ibid. p. 181


13. Ibid. p. 23


15. "General Introduction" as printed in New Essays
    in Philosophical Theology, edited by
    Flew and Macintyre

16. Willem Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy of
    Religion, p. 13

17. Notes taken from a lecture by William Hordern in
    the Meaning and Purpose of Theological Language.

18. Willem Zuurdeeg, op. cit. p. 18 (Within his sentence,
    Zuurdeeg quotes Lichenberger.)

19. William Hoerber, A Scientific Foundation of Philosophy
    p. 3
21. Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Semantics, p.3
22. Ibid. p.12
24. Ibid. p.28
26. Federick Mayer, A History of Modern Philosophy, p.574
27. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Book, p.27
29. Frederick Ferre, Language, Logic, and God, pp. 8-18
30. A.F. Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, p.23
31. A.F. Ayer, Logical Positivism, p.56
32. Ibid. p.59
33. Idem.
34. Frederick Ferre, op. cit., p.32
35. Ibid., p.39 (Within this passage, Ferre is quoting from Cox.)
36. A.F. Ayer, Logical Positivism, pp.73-74
37. Victor Kraft, The Vienna Circle, p.39
38. Frederick Ferre, op. cit.; p.54
40. John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, p.95
41. Ibid. p.113
42. Ibid. p.127

44. *Ibid.* p.132

45. Michael B. Foster, *Mystery and Philosophy*. This paragraph is a summary of Chapter I.

46. Notes taken from a lecture presented by Paul Hessert in Philosophy of Religion.

47. Paul Hessert, *Introduction to Christianity*, p.29

48. Frederick Ferre, *op. cit.*, p.141


51. *Idem.*

52. *Ibid.* p.38


54. Frederick Ferre. *op. cit.*, p.143

55. Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, p.81


57. The Editor’s Preface to *The Christian Scholar* September, 1955, p.178


60. *Ibid.* p.196

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