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## Of Minorities, Markets and Mongols: Re-imagining the Relationship Between Ethnicity and Rationality in Russian Center/Periphery Conflict

Brett A. Strand '07  
*Illinois Wesleyan University*

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Re-imagining the Relationship Between Ethnicity & Rationality  
in Russian Center/Periphery Conflict

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*What causes regions of the Russian Federation to opt for conflict with the central authority? Why do some regions legitimate their conflict with Moscow in overtly ethnic tones, while others do not? In attempting to answer these questions, this research responds to the need for a reconfigured understanding of federalism and ethnicity in modern society; more specifically, it answers several lingering questions from previous investigations of **primordial** and **rational choice theories**.*

*This research concludes that the likelihood of future conflict with Moscow can, in fact, be broken down systematically and predicted. In support of its arguments, the study (1) suggests a two-pronged method of regional analysis that captures primordial and rational explanations of center/periphery conflict, (2) demonstrates the accuracy of a model that simulates this analysis on the macro-level, and (3) tests the suggested theory on the micro-level through an in-depth study of the critical case of Tatarstan. In the end, this investigation finds that **the regions of Russia's ethnic federation will pursue their set preference for autonomy whenever certain variables— ethnic or otherwise— lower the risks associated with center/periphery conflict.***

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◆Ethnicity, Rationality, & the Russian State◆



At first glance, recent history seems to support the claim that ethnicity still defines Russian politics. Wars are still fought over culture and alliances are seemingly made along ethnic lines, and so it seems logical to ascribe center/periphery conflicts to the natural, inexorable expression of identities. Therefore, many scholars have emphasized ethnicity's role in Russian federal relations by asserting that the trend towards conflict is based in ancient Russian identities. This study contends that such explanations are insufficient when taken alone. Still, it cannot be denied that ethnicity and identity continue to matter in modern Russia—the question is: why and under what conditions does ethnicity matter? Why do regional leaders play the “ethnic card” in relations with Moscow?

### A Brief Ethnic History of the Russian State

For over a millennium, Russian rulers promoted the political strength of the state over ethnic concerns. In doing so, they created a state that differs sharply from most other of the West. Modern states most often organized around a specific ethnic identity; Russia, in contrast, gathered hundreds of different ethnic groups under a single authority. In order to complete this task, the Russian government repeatedly adjusted its policy towards minority ethnicities. Leaders occasionally redefined and manipulated the concept of ethnicity in order to meet the goals of the state. The long-term effects of these actions continue to be felt.

For the majority of the second millennium, Russia existed as an imperial state. Its borders expanded and contracted quite frequently; it was constantly overtaking and abandoning regional ethnic groups. In order to preserve this ever-changing body, identity was defined as a function of the state rather than of regional culture. Ethnic groups residing within the borders of imperial Russia were asked—or, more often, forced—to assume a common language and religion as:

the state created a territorial empire spanning a huge landmass and populated by a diverse array of European and Asian peoples, who differed profoundly among themselves in religion, way of life, and relationship to Russian authority (Remington).

In this complicated situation, the suppression of ethnicity existed alongside the manipulation of identity. Ethnic groups were asked to identify themselves as citizens of the Russian Empire and nothing more.

In 1917, the Russian Revolution and the advent of Soviet rule led to a sea change in relations between ethnic groups and the state. Whereas imperial governments had promoted a purely Russian identity over all others, the Soviet Empire was prevented from doing so, due to the simple fact that it was comprised of multiple national republics. Therefore, the Soviet government chose to actively employ its ethnic diversity as a tool for controlling its citizenry. During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, entire communities were invented for political purposes, cultural groups were granted superficial autonomy, and ethnicities were



erased from the record books. This effect is most clearly crystallized in the experiences of the 21 ethnic republics, as is demonstrated in Figure 1.1. In the most tragic cases, attempts were made to exterminate entire populations, as with the Ukrainians during the *Holodomor*.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet period thereby inflamed and confused ethnic identity, causing inhabitants of the Russian state to view central authority as an outside force, to which they were always beholden but frequently disloyal.

As the Russian Communist state collapsed at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, ethnic identity once again emerged as an urgent issue. For most ethnic groups, the past millennium had been an elongated cultural trial. The process of constant ethnic manipulation had created an environment in which self-identity was confusing at best and dangerous at worst. Post-Soviet leaders addressed this landscape by designing a federal state<sup>2</sup> consisting of 88 units, each belonging to one of several categories of autonomy and composition (see Table 1.1). Of the total 88 federal units, 31 exist as ethnic regions with a specific titular nationality.

Russian Federalism can be confusing to those who wish to engage in business and political relationships: one cannot merely consider a commitment to Russia but to Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Komi or Chechnya as well. The region of Kalmykia provides an example. Since its first national elections in 1993, the region has been under the rule of President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov. Mr. Ilyumzhinov has compiled a list of actions that range from the irresponsible to the bizarre: he has abolished the parliament, altered the constitution, threatened to turn the region into an independent tax haven, and single-handedly orchestrated the construction of Chess City (a 50-million dollar recreation complex on the outskirts of the capital city). President Ilyumzhinov's behavior, coupled with Moscow's inability and apparent unwillingness to interfere with his actions, clearly demonstrate that the quality of leadership varies dramatically across the regional patchwork.

A second and more pressing concern is the humanitarian cost that regional conflict may extol. Statistics regarding the conflict in Chechnya alone are staggering: 500,000 civilian refugees, symptoms of physical or emotional distress among 86% of the population, 25,000 troop deaths, and perhaps 250,000 total casualties. Sadly, modern Russia plays witness to similar violent conflicts with unacceptable frequency—massacres at a school in Beslen and an opera house in Moscow are perfect examples. Often, Russia manages these situations without international scrutiny. By understanding the sources of federal conflict—and the role of ethnicity in such conflicts—it may be possible to prevent the worst excesses of regional conflict.

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<sup>1</sup> A deliberate, Soviet-created famine that nearly wiped out the USSR's Ukrainian population in 1932 and 1933.

<sup>2</sup> A map of the modern Russian Federation is presented in Appendix A.




Figure 1.1

<b><u>Categories of Federal Units</u></b> <i>(from most to least autonomous)</i>		
Type	Ethnically Based?	Number
Republic	Yes	21
Oblast	No	48
Krai	No	7
Autonomous Oblast	Yes	1
Autonomous Okrug	Yes	9
Federal City	No	2

Table I.1



## Primordialism versus Rational Choice

Researchers and pundits often argue that ethnic conflicts stem primarily from endemic qualities held by distinct cultural groups. Lists of the relevant dimensions of ethnicity typically include salient cultural aspects such as appearance, religion, language, custom, and history.<sup>3</sup> **Primordial theory** relies on the notion that these cultural identifiers determine the nature of the relationship between actors.

Primordialists assume a level of permanence when referring to ethnicity; they often assert that, “congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on... have ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness *in and of themselves* [Emphasis added]” (Geertz, 42) and that ethnic identity will *inevitably* influence government and politics. Such an influence will occur when an ethnic group recognizes or believes that it is somehow different than the dominant national ethnicity and seeks to manage the effects of its “otherness”.

In keeping with this theory, primordialists have argued that Russia’s status as a multiethnic, multinational state continues to determine its political momentum in the most basic of ways (Bahry 2005; Coakley 1992; Drobezheva 2005; Ellingsen 2000; Gibson 2001; Hale 2004; and Hughes 2002). Primordial scholars point to the collapse of the multi-ethnic Soviet Union, noting that ethnic groups began to identify themselves publicly during the *perestroika* period and that “‘repressed’ nationalisms inevitably reemerged the moment that Gorbachav removed the coercive controls formerly imposed” (Hanson 4). Researchers have asked whether the Russian Federation might face similar centripetal tendencies. In their view, ethnicity is fundamental to human social identity and essentially trumps other sources of identity in political mobilization and organization. Scholars of the primordial school discount the importance of factors, such as economic development and natural resources, when considering regional conflict; rather, they posit that Russia’s federal system, because it is organized around ethnicity, is vulnerable to fragmentation and devolution along ethnic lines. The highly diverse statuses of the 21 ethnic groups to whom a republic has been granted is demonstrated in Figure 1.2. In other words, it may not be sufficient to offer ethnic regions a modicum of sovereignty. They will always seek to maximize their own autonomy at the expense of rational authority.

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<sup>3</sup> “Primordial Ties”, Geertz.




Figure 1.2



Some scholars, however, point out that ethnic nationalism does not always lead to conflict and indeed regions (as actors) will enter into conflict with the center only when the rewards of such an endeavor outweigh the costs. All parties are assumed to approach the table in an attempt to benefit and that, furthermore, they do so only after having completed an analysis of their own position. Such an analysis will, presumably, lead to their acceptance of a rational strategy in terms of costs and benefits. Hence, a **theory of rationality**, here, has two meanings:

First, it means *consistency of choice*: If I prefer A over B and B over C, then I must prefer A over C. The second meaning is identical with self-interest. Action is rational if it is *aimed at realizing self-interest*. If costs of an action outweigh benefits, self-interest will not be served; hence a cost-benefit calculus accompanies analysis based on self-interest [Emphasis added]. (Varshney 86-87)


Witnesses to political bargaining can therefore expect to observe behavior patterns that “conjoin means [*mobilizable resources*] to ends [*preferences*] most efficiently from the standpoint of the actor.”<sup>4</sup> We may assume that, *ceteris paribus*, regional actors see greater autonomy from central administration as being in their self-interest. Rogowski first discussed the implications of this dynamic in his seminal work in the area of nationalism and rational choice theory.<sup>5</sup> He and others have asserted that regions always prefer greater control over their own regional resources and decisions.

Rationalists also assume that the analysis performed by regions involves a review of their **resource endowments** (economic and political capital). Useful endowments includes such measures as international economic influence, natural resource potential and geographic importance. The large difference in the economic activity of Russia’s ethnically-based republics is demonstrated in Figure 1.3. In cases in which this capital is present, leaders will likely realize that their economic power allows them to realistically challenge central authority. Such regions will decide that they have enough bargaining chips to win a given argument; therefore, they will act confidently and aggressively towards the center. Past research has already shown that this system of preference pursuit based on costs and benefits is explicitly evident in nationalist and ethnic behavior (Rogowski 1985; Bates 1974).

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<sup>4</sup> Rogowski 30.

<sup>5</sup> See “Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support”, 1974.



◆ A Statistical Test of Primordial &  
Rational Choice Theories <sup>6</sup> ◆

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<sup>6</sup> This investigation originally appeared in an earlier paper (“Ancient Bonds, Contemporary Powers”; Strand, 2006).



The Study of Ethnic Federalism and the Russian State. Previous scholarship regarding ethnic federations can be divided into two subtly different areas of emphasis. The first vein includes those studies that primarily address minorities (Saideman 1997; Wright, Jr. 1991; Brancati 2006; Hale, 2004). The second includes research that is more focused on federations (Coakley 1992; Ellingsen 2000). Both of these schools rely heavily on the groundbreaking research of William Riker<sup>7</sup> and have built upon both his and other studies in order to analyze the complex relationship between governance and ethnicity.

A large number of area studies have been conducted regarding Russia and its behavior as an ethnic federation. Russia's unique post-Communist situation has offered scholars a chance to analyze the behavior of ethnic groups, both in the current Federation (Bahry et al. 2005; Zassorin 2000) and in conjunction with its Soviet history (Hanson 1998; Tishkov 1999). These studies have confirmed the more general conclusions of ethnic research by showing that ethnicity still matters in modern Russia.

The emergence of the Russian Federation has also provided scholars with an opportunity to observe and critique the way in which a developing federal state matures and behaves (Gibson 2001; Herd 1999; Lynn et al. 1997). Specifically, many studies have analyzed the negotiation of Russia's unique regional constitutions (Filippov et al. 1998; Stoner-Weiss 1999; Chebankova 2005). Researchers have also documented national development in order to compare the nature of Russia's federation with that of its communist predecessor (Alexseev 2001; Drobizheva 2005; Hale 2000). Lastly, there exists a group of scholars who have chosen to focus their research squarely on Russian regions. Their studies assess the region's role and behavior as part of the larger federal unit (Treisman 1997; Dowley 1998; Bahry 2005). This collection of research clearly demonstrates that federal regions are independent actors for whom unique economic and political situations lead to diverse actions.

Researchers have therefore established a number of clear notions regarding the Russian Federation. The following conclusions can be seen as the first four pieces of the puzzle that was confronted:

1. Cultural identity still matters in modern Russia.
2. Ethno-federalism often breeds ethnic conflict.
3. Modern economic and political factors vary among Russia's federal units.
4. Two theories attempt to explain to federal conflict: *primordialism* and *rational choice theory*.

The fourth and final conclusion was most pertinent to the research. Indeed, it was by testing these two schools against one another that the study hoped to establish a more reliable method of analyzing center/periphery conflict in modern Russia.

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<sup>7</sup> Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, 1964.



## Testing Conflict among Russian Regions: Methods & Models

Selecting the Most Appropriate Cases. The first issue confronted was case selection. The study recognized that, in order to accurately test the hypotheses, cases had to be (1) autonomous, (2) ethnically based, and (3) similar and numerous enough to ensure reliable results. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation is composed of 88 highly diverse subjects; therefore, it was logistically impossible to collect the necessary data for all cases. It was also apparent that many of the federal member states do not possess the resources or even the authority required to behave aggressively towards the center. Therefore, the study selected the 21 autonomous republics of the Russian Federation as its case set.<sup>8</sup> These 21 cases boasted a high level of autonomy, an ethnic basis, and the amount of available data necessary to conduct the intended research. In addition, the study gained the increased reliability that stems from investigating an entire universe of cases (all 21 autonomous regions).

The Research Design Model. Operationalization of the suggested concepts required extensive intuitive reasoning. In order to accurately capture the complexity of the referenced ideas, indices were constructed as a proxy for each of the main independent variables (primordialism and rational choice theory) and the dependent variable (regional aggression). The research model presented in Figure 1.4 was utilized in order to test the main hypothesis, which was that rational choice theory will be more strongly associated with regional aggression than will primordialism and will, therefore, more accurately predict regional stability.

The Testing Schedule. The study's use of a tiered measurement system—one that utilized both individual indicators and additive indices—allowed for a sequence of increasingly precise tests. First, in the Pre-test Phase, the study constructed an accurate measure of the dependent variable. Phase One included a preliminary analysis of the six individual indicators. Lastly, in Phase Two, the study used the results of the preliminary investigations to construct its main indices and test the main hypothesis. Therefore, the schedule of tests was:

### Pre-test Phase

#### 1. Operationalization and Measurement of the Dependent Variable

### Phase One

2. Bivariate Analysis of the Individual Indicators
3. Eta<sup>9</sup> ( $\eta$ ) Analysis of the Individual Indicators

### Phase Two

4. Construction of the Main Indices
5. Bivariate Analysis of the Indices
6. Linear Regression Analysis of the Indices

<sup>8</sup> A full list of the cases can be found in Appendix B.

<sup>9</sup> Eta is a test of association commonly used when the dependent variable is interval in nature and the independent variable is categorical.  $\eta^2$  can be used as a proxy for  $r^2$ .




Figure 1.4  
Primordialism *versus* Rational Choice Theory



### Pre-Test Phase: Measuring Aggressive Behavior

The operationalization and measurement of aggression posed two puzzles. The first was, of course, which indicators would provide an accurate measure of regional aggression; for instance, the study had to ensure that it was measuring aggressive behavior *towards* the center and not *from* it. The second puzzle was how best to choose variables so that all forms of aggression were accurately accounted for.

The study confronted the first puzzle by reviewing past research that utilized federal and regional aggression as a variable. A review of the existing literature suggested five reliable means of operationalization:

Timing of region's declaration of sovereignty (SOVER).<sup>10</sup> This indicator measured the political aggression shown by the region during the transitory phase of the development of the Russian state, and used rankings created by Triesman\*.

Index of Constitutional Aggression (CONST). This indicator represented a measure of the amount of aggression encapsulated in the bilateral constitution negotiated by the region and the federal authority. It was constructed through a content analysis, which included a review of a study that was completed by Stoner-Weiss in 1999.

Instances of Protest, War and Rebellion (WAR). This value was utilized to take account of any instances of actual physical violence that occurred in the regions and used data collected by the Minorities At Risk project since 1991.

Aggression in Elite Activity (ELITE). In order to measure the level of aggression shown by regional elites towards Moscow, the study relied upon the extensive content analysis completed by Dowley\*, who then translated her findings into the scale that was directly borrowed.

Instances of Assertion of Legal and Resource Rights (LEG.ASN/RES.ASN). Again using data collected by Daniel Triesman for his 1997 study, a dummy variable was created for each type of assertion, with a score of 0 denoting no assertion and 1 indicating at least one instance of assertion.

A second puzzle that required close attention was how the research could best measure each of the preceding indicators in appropriate proportion. For example, when considering a region's overall aggressive activity, an instance of armed aggression towards federal authority clearly had to carry greater weight than an assertion of resource rights. The study therefore utilized an index that included each indicator along with an assigned weight, which was represented as a cofactor. The Aggregate Center/Periphery Aggression Index<sup>11</sup> (ACPAI), whose scores are depicted in Figure 1.5, is

$$(5*WAR) + (4*ELITE) + (3*CONST) + (3*SOVER) + (1*LEG.ASN) + (1*RES.ASN).$$

<sup>10</sup> Explanations of this and all other data manipulations can be found in Appendix C.

\* For specific figures and scales, see Appendix D.

<sup>11</sup> The resulting scores of the Aggregate Center/Periphery Aggression Index comprise an evenly spread spectrum that ranges 13.32 to 67.32.




Figure 1.5



## Phase One: Assessing the Individual Hypotheses and Indicators

Operationalizing the Primordial School. The study derived the following set of auxiliary hypotheses from primordial theory:

*H<sub>1.1</sub> = Titular nationalities that have been historically autonomous will show more aggression in regional relations with the center.*

*H<sub>1.2</sub> = Those titular nationalities that do not share the Russian Orthodox religion will be more likely to show aggression in center-periphery relations.*

*H<sub>1.3</sub> = Those titular nationalities that reside in a region in which they constitute a majority will show more aggression in relations with the center.*

Each of these hypotheses captured an essential aspect of the theory that was outlined in previous primordial literature. The first hypothesis assessed a key aspect of the historical experience of each ethnicity; the second took account of ethnic religion (which, it was believed, corresponds closely with other cultural identifiers); and the third measured each ethnicity's demographic status in their region and, thereby, the potential impact of their activity as an ethnic group.

Indicators that corresponded with each primordial hypothesis were then identified. The choice of such a system required that each indicator move in the same direction; that is, a higher score had to indicate a higher degree of primordial differentiation from the center. It is also worth noting that primordial theory, due to its strictly ethnic nature, could not be accurately tested through an assessment of the actual regions. Therefore, the study's 'primordial' variables *indirectly* measured the Russian regions by measuring each region's titular nationality. The following indicators were selected for their intuitive connection to the hypotheses and their frequent inclusion in the literature:

Majority or Minority Status (MIN.MAJ). This indicator was a dummy variable that denotes whether or not the titular nationality for which the region was created exists as a regional majority or a minority. Those ethnicities with majority status received a score of 0 and those with minority status received a score of 1. This classification was based upon data collected from the Statesman's Yearbook.

Religious Status (REL). Data was collected regarding the faith to which each region's titular nationality generally ascribes. This information was found using the Minorities at Risk data set and was given as a dummy variable, with 0 signifying adherence to the Russian Orthodox faith and a score of 1 denoting ascription to any other religion.

Historical Autonomy (AUT). In order to gauge the historical perspective of each titular nationality, each region was assigned a dummy variable that signified its historical status as an autonomous state. Research was performed on each region's titular nationality and, subsequently, each region was assigned a score of either 0 or 1, with 1 signifying that an ethnicity enjoyed autonomy within an independent state at any point in history.



Measuring Rational Choice Theory. The auxiliary hypotheses that this study derived from rational choice theory were:

*H<sub>2.1</sub> = Regions with central capitals that have a larger population and a more urbanized society will be more aggressive in center-periphery relations.*

*H<sub>2.2</sub> = Regions that contain oil production or transport facilities will be more aggressive in center-periphery relations.*

*H<sub>2.3</sub> = Regions whose economies are more engaged as foreign and domestic traders will show more aggression in their relations with central authority.*

Each of these statements corresponded with an essential component of regional resource endowments. The first measured the development of each region, by the assumption that large urban centers suggest internal growth; the second hypothesis took account of oil production and transportation, which plays a critical role in the larger Russian economy; and the third assessed each region's status in the domestic and international economy. The following indicators were utilized to measure the suggested concepts:

Population of the Regional Capital (CAPPOP). As a measure of the region's urbanization and development, the population of each capital city was found. These figures were then used to construct a 5-point scale, with higher values representing a larger size.

Economic Interaction (ECON.INT). In order to assess each region as an economic actor, data provided by the Bank of Russia was utilized. This study gathered the figures for each region in four categories: A) federal rubles borrowed by private enterprises, B) federal rubles borrowed by public enterprises, C) total foreign sales per month and D) total foreign purchases per month.

Oil Resources (OIL). Information regarding the location of key oil production sites and various oil transportation structures was collected from the Environmental Information Agency. Regions were then assigned a score of 0 if no oil production or transportation takes place within the region, 1 if the region is home to some form of oil transportation structure, and 2 if the region contains oil production sites.

Tests of the Six Indicators. The first procedure, a test of bivariate correlation, measured association between the dependent variable and each of the six individual indicators. The results, which can be found in Table 1.2, were most useful when grouped according to the theory from which they were derived. This division into primordial and rational choice indicators later allowed for the construction of the main indices.

When considering the primordial variables, it was clear that the most strongly correlated indicator was an ethnic group's majority or minority status. Indeed, none of the other primordial variables showed a significant correlation with regional aggression. Therefore, the possession of a non-majority language or religion did not appear to have a significant influence on the amount of aggression with which a region behaves. In sum, *the strongest primordial determinant of regional aggression was whether or not the titular nationality resides in a region in which its members constitute a majority.*

Bivariate Correlations		
<i>Primordial Indicators</i>	<i>Pearson's R</i>	<i>Significance</i>
Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic Minority or Majority	.469*	.016
Titular Nationality's Sharing of the Russian Orthodox Faith	.289	.102
Historical Autonomous Status	.334	.069
<i>Rational Choice Indicators</i>		
Population of Capital City	.470*	.016
Presence of Oil or Oil Pipeline	.319	.080
Economic Interaction	.454*	.019
*— Significance at the .05 level.		

Table 1.2



The results of bivariate tests involving the rational choice indicators offered further opportunities for analysis. It was clear, though not surprising, that *regional aggression was most strongly correlated with economic interaction and the volume of the capital population*. Since these indicators take direct account of a region's economic development, the findings agreed with the main hypothesis. It is equally noteworthy, however, that there appeared to be a surprisingly weak relationship between regional aggression and involvement in the oil industry.

The study next conducted an auxiliary test of the indicators using an eta measurement. In the research, the eta tests were performed in order to simply reinforce the results of the bivariate analysis. All eta values mirrored the findings of the primary tests; thus, the scores appeared to increase the validity of previous results.<sup>12</sup>

Analysis of Phase One. It should first be noted that all relationships moved in the directions predicted by the hypotheses, and that three of the six hypotheses received significant support from the results (see Table 1.3).

Second, majority status appeared to be the only primordial variable that correlated with regional aggression at a significant level. This is interesting in that majority status was also the primordial indicator that most readily fit with the arguments presented by rational choice theory. Indeed, the study argued only that majority or minority status does not *independently* lead to conflict; it remains quite possible that population demographics exert a strong influence and make the mobilization of ethnicity a more realistic option by reducing the costs and increasing the benefits of conflict.

Third, the weak correlation shown between oil production and regional aggression required attention. This finding posed a dilemma for those who would argue that oil is a frequent cause of conflict between the center and periphery. Of course, the results could have been due to the fact that the possession of oil leads to interference from central authority (to which regions are unable to respond). It had to be remembered that the study only measures regional aggression towards the center; therefore, it could not account for such conflict even if it did exist. Whether or not this was the case, it was worth noting that regions that were active in the production and transport of oil were no more likely to act aggressively towards central authority than those that were not.

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<sup>12</sup> Results of the eta test can be found in Appendix E.

Summary of Auxiliary Hypotheses				
	H <sub>n</sub>	Indicator	Correct Direction?	Significant?*
Primordial Indicators	H <sub>1.1</sub>	Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic Minority or Majority	Yes	Yes
	H <sub>1.2</sub>	Titular Nationality's Sharing of the Russian Orthodox Faith	Yes	No
	H <sub>1.3</sub>	Historical Autonomous Status	Yes	No
Rational Choice Indicators	H <sub>2.1</sub>	Population of Capital City	Yes	Yes
	H <sub>2.2</sub>	Presence of Oil or Oil Pipeline	Yes	No
	H <sub>2.3</sub>	Economic Interaction	Yes	Yes
*— At the .05 level.				

Table 1.3



Phase Two: Testing the Rival Schools

Constructing the Indices. The Aggregate Primordial Indicator Index<sup>13</sup> (APII) was constructed in accordance with the following two lessons, taken from the preliminary tests: (1) status as an ethnic minority or majority appeared to be the most influential and, therefore, the most important of the three indicators and (2) while both religion and historical autonomy had weak correlations with aggression, religion's correspondence with other cultural identifiers (language, culture, custom) required that it be more heavily considered. When scaled in accordance with these lessons and combined into a single index, the measures accurately portrayed the identity of each titular nationality. The APII was represented as

$$(6 * REL) + (6 * MIN.MAJ) + (3 * AUT)$$

The Aggregate Rational Choice Indicator Index<sup>14</sup> (ARCII) was constructed based upon the following observations: (1) oil did not have a very strong influence on the rational behavior of each region and (2) both the population of the capital city and the level of economic interaction had significant and strong correlation with regional aggression. In order to account for the apparent variance in influence among these indicators, the study chose to structure the ARCII in the following manner:

$$(3 * CAP.POP) + (3 * ECON.INT) + (OIL)$$

Testing the Indices. The initial test of the indices utilized simple bivariate correlation (see Table 1.4). The results showed that both of the indices possessed a significantly strong level of association with the dependent variable. Moreover, the findings supported the research's main hypothesis: *when operationalized, rational behavior theory is more strongly associated with regional aggression than is primordial theory, though by a relatively small margin.*

The study next conducted a more rigorous, head-to-head test of the indices using the linear regression method. This procedure allowed for a comparison of each index's influence when controlling for its counter-argument; therefore, if consistent with the results of previous tests, these findings would greatly increase this study's confidence in its findings. The results of the OLS test are presented in Table 1.5.

An initial consideration is that a single model that includes both independent variables accounted for roughly half of the variance in the dependent variable ( $R^2 = .503$ ); this association was also highly significant (nearly at the .001 level). These findings supported the assumption that primordial and rational behavior indicators each play a large role in determining regional aggression.

<sup>13</sup> The APII shows a mean of 7.429, a standard deviation of 5.8187, and a Cronbach's alpha of .580.

<sup>14</sup> The ARCII possesses a mean of 18.167, a standard deviation of 7.1438, and a Cronbach's alpha of .652

Bivariate Correlations		
Indices	Pearson's R	Sig.
Rational Choice Indicator Index	.524**	.004
Primordial Indicator Index	.486*	.016
*— Significance at the .05 level. **— Significance at the .001 level		

Table 1.4

Linear Regression Model Summary	
R	.709
R Square	.503
Significance	.002

Linear Regression Results		
	Beta Weights	Sig.
Rational Choice Indicator Index	.517**	.006
Primordial Indicator Index	.478**	.010
**— Significance at the .001 level		

Table 1.5



The most valuable results of any linear regression test are the beta weights. Through these values, the OLS procedure allowed for a direct comparison of each index's effect *when controlling for its rival theory*; therefore, the results were critical to the study. One of the strengths of beta weights as a tool of measurement is that these values do not require much analysis; quite simply, the Rational Choice Index showed a larger beta weight than the Primordial Index. However, the difference between the two indices' influences was decidedly non-conclusive. Therefore, these values demonstrated that *while rational choice theory is more strongly correlated with aggressive behavior, primordialism's basic arguments regarding ethnicity's continuing relevance cannot be discounted*. In addition, these results were significantly correlated with the dependent variable and, therefore, allowed for a high level of confidence.

Conclusions of the Research. The investigation's main hypothesis was most succinctly and directly verified through a linear regression analysis, which clearly showed that the Aggregate Rational Choice Indicator Index did indeed have a stronger correlation with the Center/Periphery Aggression Index. Two useful conclusions can be made based upon the findings. The first conclusion is that in order to accurately predict regional stability in the Russian Federation, actors should assess the given region's "bargaining chips". The second and more generalizable conclusion is that cultural differences are not the strongest determinants of conflict in Russian center/periphery relations. In other words, the study disputed Geertz's assertion that ethnic characteristics "have ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves" when considering federal relations in modern Russia (42).

The research achieved its goal of showing that regional conflict in the Russian Federation is most strongly governed by the rules of bargaining theory—however, its results are not overwhelming and its conclusions suggest several new questions. Critically, the study found that *roughly 50% of the variance in the observed regional behavior remained unaccounted for*; moreover, while the argument for strictly primordial dynamics was indeed weakened, *the results suggested that the influence of ethnicity cannot be ignored*.

These considerations demonstrate a remaining puzzle regarding the behavior of ethnic regions in the context of rational choice theory. The negation of ethnicity as the cause of conflict *per se* necessitates that cultural identity be somehow synthesized with the new model—clearly, to discount the continuing influence of ethnic principals in Russian politics would be folly. While the research was able to conceive of a model for regional rational behavior, one of its most critical mechanisms (which is explicitly recognized in Figure 1.6) remains undefined. Therefore, an intriguing series of questions remains: when does ethnic mobilization become a part of a regional strategy for obtaining greater autonomy? How does ethnicity become a "bargaining chip"? Why is conflict vis-a-vis Moscow an option for some regions and not for others?






Figure 1.6  
Combining the Insights of  
Primordial and Rational Choice Theories

◆ A New Concept of Ethnicity in ◆  
Russian Center/Periphery Relations

By disputing primordialism and a model of federal relations that emphasizes pure ethnicity, previous research has taken the first steps in creating a more useful model of center/periphery relations in modern Russia. Still, researchers must face the puzzle of why some regions legitimate their rational claims in explicitly primordial terms while others do not. A bit of deductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that a synthesis of primordialism and rational choice theory offers a very promising opportunity to solve this puzzle. A previous study<sup>15</sup> took the first step in explaining the link between primordialism and rational choice theory by hypothesizing that “[ethnic] stratification has no direct effect on an ethnic group’s propensity to engage in collective action, but that its influence is mediated by the establishment of ethnic organizations or quasi-groups” (431). According to this hypothesis, it is probable that primordial variables, when mobilized as “bargaining chips”, have a significant influence on regional behavior. Hechter sums up the potential of such a synthesis by stating that it “offers the prospect of arriving at predictive statements, rather than at the post hoc descriptions [of ethnic behavior] for which sociologists have had to settle too frequently in the past” (91).

Which Aspects of Ethnicity Make Conflict Likely? Research must first identify those ethnic qualities that increase the likelihood for conflict in center/periphery relations. In order to do so, this study performed a review of the relevant literature (Makarychev 2000; Duchacek 1988; Giuliano 2000; Hale 2000; Beissinger 2002; Cruz 2000; Wendt 1999). It then developed the following list of the characteristics that lend themselves to ethnically aggressive behavior center/periphery relations. Based upon the tenets of rationalist theory, it follows that these regional characteristics— which will be referred to as “**cultural equipment**”<sup>16</sup> — will become part of a *strategy of overtly ethnic rhetoric* in center/periphery conflict. Cultural equipment can be disaggregated into at least five characteristics, the presence of which will help determine whether ethnic regions mobilize along ethnic lines:

1. *A history of ethnic independence.*

Previous research and analysis suggests that ethnic groups for whom independence was once a reality are far more likely to act engage in conflict with central authority (Wendt 1999; Cruz 2000; Hale 2000). This is not to say that these regions will explicitly attempt to regain their former independence; rather, they will be more likely to assert themselves in any number of ways. This factor implies that ethnic and regional history continues to impact contemporary identity in a very real way<sup>17</sup>; indeed, “whether in war or peace, a collectivity expresses and defends its identity by declaring, ‘We are as we are

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<sup>15</sup> “A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action”, Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum.

<sup>16</sup> This term is taken from Beissinger, 2002.

<sup>17</sup> It should be noted, however, that this study is considering factual history as distinctly different than myth; indeed, the invention of an ethnic saga will have a wholly different impact than history as it truly occurred (see characteristic #4).



because the world has made us this way”<sup>18</sup>. A history of autonomy allows regional leaders to cite their past as both a source of ethnic unity and a precedent for future independence.

2. *An ethnic majority in the region.*

Initially, the connection between a larger ethnic population and rational behavior may seem obvious; it could be considered a truism that a larger ethnic group will be more likely to act with confidence. This study argues, however, that not only will larger ethnic groups act confidently—they will also be more likely to explicitly assert their rights as a region. Linear regressions performed by Beissinger (2002) statistically support this fact; indeed, Beissinger finds that population size is the most reliable predictor of separatist behavior.

3. *The support of foreign nations or organizations.*

It is widely agreed that the “globalized” society in which we now live has created a radically new international dynamic. Investigations of this modern political system have been extremely important, particularly for scholars concerned with the increasingly global impact of regional politics (Duchacek 1988; Makarychev 2000). A compelling body of research suggests that actions taken by international organizations profoundly affect ethno-federal conflicts (and vice versa). Elazar crystalizes this new interaction by stating that

at one time, the sharp separation of boundaries between foreign affairs as the responsibility of the domestic general government and domestic affairs as the primary responsibility of the constituent governments was a given in federal systems. This is no longer the case. (xx)

It stands to reason that the support of actors who lie outside of a given region’s federal system will increase that region’s propensity for ethnically based conflict with the center. This support could come from any number of sources: foreign governments, religious organizations, international organizations, and even terrorist groups; in the same way, support may come in several different forms, including money, rhetoric, and military supplies. In short, there is significant evidence to suggest that international support for an ethnic territory’s autonomy increases the likelihood that the given region will assert its will in ethnic terms.

4. *Regional control over a “myth of peoplehood”.*

This research has consistently referred to the plasticity and malleability of ethnicity. This fourth component of regional identity directly addresses that fact. In the politics of ethno-federal conflict, historical traditions are an enigma; more specifically, ethnic history is both fluid enough to be redefined by regional leaders and concrete enough to hold weight as a bargaining chip. Previous studies have thoroughly discussed this unique quality, most often in terms of individual preference and elite behavior

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<sup>18</sup> Cruz.



(Gibson 1981; Giulano 2000; Hale 2000; Beissinger 2002). In arguing for the impact of cultural traditions on rational behavior, Wendt posits that “cultural phenomena are just as objective, just as constraining, just as real as power and interest... the point is that the real world consists of a lot more than material forces *as such*”. The argument here is that if ethnic leaders are able to re-imagine, manipulate, or even invent a cultural history that somehow validates their engaging in center/periphery conflict, they are far more likely to bring their ethnicity to the bargaining table.

5. *Ethnic figureheads through which regional leaders can motivate the electorate.*

The availability of cultural symbols to motivate the electorate is closely related to the utilization of ethnic history (see #4, above). In both cases, regions that have a ready storehouse of cultural capital are better able to organize and mobilize claims for autonomy. This final component of cultural equipment, however, speaks more directly to the use of *specific aspects* of culture when attempting to take power from the center. Scholars have suggested that cultural aspects such as language, heraldry, geography, and even popular culture might be utilized in this way (Giulano 2000; Hale 2000; Cruz 2000; Gibson 1981). Based upon these studies, this research posits that the availability of salient cultural aspects will be correlated with conflict in center/periphery relations. Giuliano summarizes the argument by stating that

symbolic issues are subject to the negotiation, manipulation, and coalition building of normal politics. The evidence presented here... recommends a reconceptualization of existing theories by focusing on the dynamic interaction between and among issues, voters, and politicians. (299, 313)

By using the manifestations of culture as either a political motivator or a uniting symbol, regional leaders will utilize their ethnicity in conflicts with central authority.

### Re-imagining Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation

It has been established that most regional behavior can be explained according to a given region's resource endowments. This first category of variables— referred to here as “resource endowment”— will always be mobilized as the basis of a region's attempt to gain autonomy . This research has identified a second category of variables<sup>19</sup> that it has termed “cultural equipment”. The primary components of each

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<sup>19</sup> The analysis presented above is by no means an exhaustive list; indeed, this discussion includes only those ethnic characteristics that are strongly supported in previous research. Scholars have suggested a number of other possible correlates of ethnic rhetoric in regional aggression. For example, researchers have asserted the critical role played by non-related political events during system-wide periods of “thickened identity” that bring tides of ethnic conflict (Beissinger 1999). However, while these theories are both interesting and valid, this research has foregone including them for several reasons. First, these characteristics are only tangentially related to the actual identity of ethnic populations. Second, this study finds that these factors have yet to receive sufficiently conclusive support in research models.



group of variables are summarized in Table 1.6. Previous investigations have analyzed the mobilization of many of these variables; however, they have done so without grouping them into these two categories (Hale 2000; Beissinger 2002; Rabushka 1972). Rather, they have constructed various models to illustrate “the ways in which political entrepreneurs structure partisan debate and competition in order to achieve their goals”.<sup>20</sup> This investigation is the first to conceptualize the dual mobilization of two groups of variables in center/periphery conflict.

Preferences and the Dependent Variable. This study draws upon Rogowski’s work in making two key assumptions: 1) that ethnically-based regions are best viewed as rational actors and 2) that a preference for increased autonomy is the most basic motivation for actors in center/periphery relations. As “power-maximizers”, both the central authority and the peripheral regions always prefer to have complete authority and control. However, a basic tenet of federalist theory is that *power is a limited resource* which must be divided between actors and that it therefore must be taken from one actor in order to be granted to another. This reality, which is so fundamental to the theory of federal systems, is the main source of conflict in center/periphery relations. Conflict arises in federal relations when one of the actors attempts to gain a portion of the limited power.

Remembering the two assumptions taken from Rogowski’s research, logic allows us to conclude that *in situations where either resource endowments or cultural equipment, or both, make the attempt to gain autonomy a rational strategy, it will be pursued*. In essence, three rules form the underlying theory of this research’s dependent variable: 1) conflict with the center (the only means of gaining autonomy) is always the hope of the power-maximizers, 2) regions, as rational actors, wait for the costs of such conflict to become sufficiently low before opting for it, and 3) these costs are lowered (and the probability of conflict is increased) through the availability of regional resources. The question is: in what situations does cultural equipment sufficiently lower the costs or raise the benefits of conflict with Moscow?

Categorizing Regions, Identities, and Behaviors. Figure 1.7 provides a simple method by which to categorize the resource positions of Russian regions. Each region can be placed in one of the four quadrants according to its unique characteristics. Thus, each of the four quadrants corresponds to both a type of region and a pattern of behavior.

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<sup>20</sup> “Distinctive Features of Politics in a Plural Society: A Paradigm”, Rabushka and Shepsle.

Variables That Influence Center/Periphery Conflict			
Cultural Equipment		Resource Endowments	
Characteristic	Specific Connection (i.e., leads to conflict when...)	Characteristic	Specific Connection (i.e., leads to conflict when...)
History	Ethnic history sets a precedent for autonomy.	Urban Population	Urban society is correlated with development of regional infrastructure.
Population Size	Ethnic group makes up a majority of the regional population.	Oil Production	The petroleum industry depends upon the region for stability.
Foreign Interaction	International actors support assertive behavior by a region.	Economic Interaction	Trade provides protection against economic sanctions.
Control over 'Myth'	Regional leaders are able to manipulate and create ethnic allegiance.	Geographic Significance	Regional location is of strategic importance to the center.
Cultural Aspects	Regional leaders are able to connect cultural aspects to assertive arguments.		

Table 1.6




Figure 1.7



Placement along the X axis is decided after an assessment of the resources endowed to a given region. The Y axis measures the second category of characteristics identified by this study— those primordial and ethnic characteristics that will serve as cultural equipment. Thus, using these two measures as guides, any region can be easily placed within the four-cell table. As an example, after completing an assessment of these two categories for Region A, a point representing its resource position on the diagram can be accurately identified. After selecting this point and recognizing the quadrant in which it lies, Region A's potential conflict with central authority can be predicted.

Predicted Patterns of Rational Behavior. This research predicts that regions in **Quadrant I (Low-Low)**, finding themselves with little or no economic might and an insufficient amount of ethnic potential, will not engage in center/periphery conflict.

The behavior of regions in **Quadrant II (High-Low)** most precisely corresponds to that which has been discussed in previous research. These regions, possessing a sufficient amount of concrete resources, will behave according to the patterns suggested by basic rational choice theory; that is, they will assert themselves based upon the “classical” bargaining chips that they possess. These regions, however, will *not* legitimate their economic arguments in overtly ethnic terms, having recognized that they do not possess a sufficient amount of cultural equipment.

Regions in **Quadrant III (Low-High)**, who find themselves with a sufficient amount of cultural equipment but no economic or political clout, will attempt to wrest authority from the center using only their ethnic equipment. These regions may engage in center/periphery conflict *even though they possess insufficient concrete resources*. Their identity as an ethnic region is reason enough for them to assert themselves if they believe nationhood, their very survival as an ethnicity, is at risk. Famously, in this way, cases like Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia, and North-Ossetia have pursued autonomy through ethno-federal relations even though they appear to have no “rational” reason to do so. The key argument here is that ethnic identity, once it reaches a certain degree of utility, becomes potent enough to supersede a deficit in concrete resources. In other words, *for regions that lie in Quadrant III, cultural equipment will be reason enough to engage in center/periphery conflict.*

Regions in **Quadrant IV (High-High)**, possess both the cultural equipment and the resource endowments that ought to produce conflicts with the center over decision-making autonomy and resource control.

Predicted Methods of Action. A second topic that this study will consider is the way in which these regional positions will be translated into action. Markusen (1987), suggests three categories of separatist strategy: policy shift claims, power shift claims, and separatist demands. **Policy shift claims** include those aggressive behaviors that do not at all contradict the established federal structure; actions in



this category include fiscal and monetary demands, requests for revenue sharing, and the enacting of tariffs or other trade barriers. These types of actions will most likely be taken by regions in Quadrant II (and, to a lesser degree, Quadrant IV). The second type of action, a **power shift claim**, is slightly more conflictual. While still abiding by the rules of the system in which they exist, regions will often demand greater autonomy or devolution in taking this type of action. These actions will be taken most often by the regions of Quadrant IV (and perhaps Quadrant II); these regions will have sufficient resources to demand more autonomy but will see no value in departing from the federal system. The third and final type of regional action is the most urgent and extreme— overtly **separatist demands**. Seeing no hope in the system that they currently inhabit, regions will look towards secession or other militant nationalist strategies. This type of action will only be observed in Quadrant III, where regional leaders are able to mobilize their populations on the basis of ethno-national claims but desperately lack resources to pass those claims through normal political channels.

A Summary. According to the suggested system of categorization, which is summarized in Table 1.7, (1) regions may still engage in center/periphery conflict for ethnic reasons, even in a system based upon rational preferences and (2) in some cases, regions engage in conflict with the center using solely their cultural characteristics. Neither of these two statements betrays any tenet of rational choice theory— rather, they each strengthen the theory by allowing for the reintroduction of ethnicity into a purely rational system of modern ethno-federal conflict.

### Uniting Theory with Reality

Placing the Regions in the Four Cells. This research will test the proposed framework by first categorizing all of the federal regions. In order to approximate the resource endowments of all 88 regions, this study will use the **average monthly federal funds borrowed**. This indicator measures economic activity, based upon the assumption that entities, both public and private, will need to borrow funds in order to grow. The values that it provides will show how much regions have tended to borrow; it is assumed that these values will be highly correlated with economic growth. Cultural equipment will be measured in terms of the **proportion of each region that claims to be ethnic Russian**. The quantification of each region's Russian population (rather than of its ethnic minority) offers two attractive qualities: 1) it bypasses the problem of regional types (ethnically-based republic, region, autonomous region, etc.) by using the same measurement in all cases, regardless of nomenclature, and 2) it manages to approximate the potential for ethnic autonomy by way of pure numbers, and thereby avoids the troubles associated with quantifying hundreds of different

The Four Quadrants			
Quadrant	Regional Identity	Predicted Behavior Pattern	Predicted Method of Action
I	Low A Low B	Insufficient resources and, therefore, no conflict.	None
II	High A Low B	Conflict based upon purely contemporary principals.	Policy Shift Claims
III	Low A High B	Conflict based upon purely ethnic principals.	Separatist Demands
IV	High A High B	Conflict based upon the ethnization of economic arguments.	Power Shift Claims

Table 1.7



ethnic communities.

While uni-dimensional measurements cannot fully gauge regional dynamics, this simple schema is sufficient to place the Russian regions in a way that strongly supports the plausibility of the framework. The results of the data analysis are presented in two forms below: graphically, as items on the four-celled diagram (Figure 1.8) and numerically, as a subdivided list of each region and its corresponding values (Table 1.8). Several observations are worth noting:

1. The majority of cases lack both the cultural equipment and resource endowments to effectively challenge Moscow. This trend explains why most Russian regions (all of which remain “power-maximizers”) have not engaged in center/periphery conflict and why the Russian Federation does not face the same centripetal pressure as its predecessor.
2. Very few regions are located in Quadrant IV, but all of these regions have demonstrated political aggression towards central authority and, consequently, have obtained extremely high levels of autonomy.<sup>21</sup> This supports the assertion that very few will find the risks of conflict so minimal as to attempt to gain autonomy Moscow, but that the opportunity to do so will always be taken.
3. A small number of aggressive (and highly autonomous) regions can be identified in Quadrant II. Most of their autonomy, however, has been gained through the relatively non-inflammatory method of policy shift claims. Few, if any, of these regions have entered into heated conflict with the center. This supports the hypothesis that regions without sufficient levels of cultural equipment will not mobilize ethnicity and so will not inspire the passionate and often extreme behavior that accompanies ethnically-based movements.
4. There are a number of Russian regions whose violent conflict with the center has been so pronounced as to be widely covered by the international press (Daghestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya, in particular). All of these so-called ‘separatist’ regions can be found in Quadrant III. This supports this research’s claim that it is possible for regions to engage in center/periphery conflict (of a highly explosive nature) in the absence of resource endowments.

When considered as a whole, the diagram therefore lends strong support to the suggestion that a rational pursuit of preferences can be observed in all cases. Only those regions who are either 1) at the highest extremes of one measure or 2) placed relatively highly on both scales, will act on their preferences and pursue autonomy through center/periphery conflict. What makes this statement possible, again, is the definition of rationality taken by this research— that rational behavior does not imply logical actions but, rather, a realistic analysis of the costs and benefits of an action.

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<sup>21</sup> For information regarding the center/periphery conflict in which these regions have engaged, see Alexseev 2001; Dowley 1998; Hale 2000; Stoner-Weiss 1999; Treisman 1997.




Figure 1.8



Region	Russian Population	Rubles Borrowed	Region	Russian Population	Rubles Borrowed
Quadrant IV			Quadrant I, continued		
Republic of Sakha Yakutia	41.15%	1,607,158.00 R	Novgorod Region	93.92%	110,171.00 R
Republic of Tatarstan	39.49%	7,068,851.00 R	Ivanovo Region	93.69%	222,350.00 R
Republic of Bashkortostan	36.32%	1,940,050.00 R	Kaluga Region	93.47%	213,460.00 R
Krasnodar Territory	3.68%	1,271,114.00 R	Smolenski Region	93.38%	268,092.00 R
Quadrant III			Belgorod Region	92.88%	370,403.00 R
Novosibirsk Region	93.01%	978,239.00 R	Tver Region	92.49%	335,384.00 R
Republic of Mari-El	47.46%	79,888.00 R	Amur Region	92.04%	182,471.00 R
Karachai- Cherkess Republic	33.65%	67,782.00 R	Altai Territory	91.97%	392,882.00 R
Republic of Kalmykia	33.55%	316,545.00 R	Kemerovo Region	91.92%	392,062.00 R
Chuvash Republic	26.53%	133,232.00 R	Kurgan Region	91.47%	97,228.00 R
Kabardino-Balkar Republic	25.14%	137,992.00 R	Tomsk Region	90.84%	431,618.00 R
Republic of North-Ossetia-Alania	23.19%	333,865.00 R	Kirov Region	90.82%	160,487.00 R
Republic of Tuva	20.11%	65,838.00 R	Jewish Autonomous Region	89.93%	33,237.00 R
Republic of Daghestan	4.69%	832,869.00 R	Primorski Territory	89.89%	1,182,587.00 R
Republic of Chechnya	3.70%	717,184.00 R	Irkutsk Region	89.88%	719,113.00 R
Republic of Ingushetia	1.19%	22,257.00 R	Khabarovsk Territory	89.82%	1,246,145.00 R
Quadrant II			Chita Region	89.80%	192,676.00 R
Nizhni Novogorod Region	94.96%	1,313,388.00 R	Leningrad Region	89.58%	431,188.00 R
Moscow Region	91.00%	3,302,775.00 R	Volgograd Region	88.89%	297,564.00 R
Rostov Region	89.35%	1,299,124.00 R	Penza Region	86.35%	334,226.00 R
Sverdlovsk Region	89.23%	2,372,924.00 R	Saratov Region	85.94%	608,947.00 R
Krasnoyarski Region	88.95%	1,473,692.00 R	Murmansk Region	85.25%	374,138.00 R
City of Moscow	84.83%	118,832,274.00 R	Perm Region	85.18%	303,456.00 R
St. Petersburg	84.73%	14,769,446.00 R	Sakhalin Region	84.28%	478,517.00 R
Samara Region	83.60%	1,618,801.00 R	Omsk Region	83.47%	610,169.00 R
Chelyabinsk Region	82.31%	1,952,680.00 R	Kaliningrad Region	82.37%	513,627.00 R
Tyumen Region	71.57%	8,310,007.00 R	Stavropol Territory	81.60%	388,929.00 R
Quadrant I			Kamchatka Region	80.85%	316,495.00 R
Vologda Region	96.56%	270,372.00 R	Republic of Khakassia	80.28%	64,607.00 R
Tambov Region	96.47%	110,668.00 R	Magadan Region	80.18%	255,561.00 R
Bryansk Region	96.34%	122,292.00 R	Republic of Karelia	76.64%	114,211.00 R
Kursk Region	95.87%	270,264.00 R	Orenburg Region	73.94%	225,679.00 R
Lipetsk Region	95.83%	161,311.00 R	Ulyanovsk Region	72.65%	201,081.00 R
Kostroma Region	95.58%	54,556.00 R	Astrakhan Region	69.69%	151,127.00 R
Orel Region	95.32%	117,453.00 R	Republic of Buryatia	67.82%	326,181.00 R
Tula Region	95.21%	405,671.00 R	Adigei Republic	64.48%	55,838.00 R
Yaroslavl Region	95.15%	311,095.00 R	Republic of Mordovia	60.84%	528,166.00 R
Vladimir Region	94.74%	144,666.00 R	Udmurt Republic	60.12%	432,271.00 R
Ryazan Region	94.59%	261,348.00 R	Komi Republic	59.59%	303,764.00 R
Pskov Region	94.25%	79,912.00 R	Republic of Altai	57.41%	19,377.00 R
Arkhangelski Region	94.19%	273,564.00 R	Chukot Autonomous Region	51.87%	175,941.00 R
Voronezh Region	94.14%	484,566.00 R			

Table I.8

That this research has been able to logically categorize and arrange the Russian regions supports its claims. Moreover, the accuracy that the model possesses in predicting the actions taken by regions and levels of regional autonomy suggests that a highly rational system underlies even the most seemingly chaotic political situations. The logic of the system is made clear in Table 1.9 (which shows the way in which the proposed schema predicts reality) and Figure 1.9 (which portrays the distribution of the cases in the schema that this study has suggested).

As a final test of the model, Tatarstan will be examined as a critical case. The region of Tatarstan sits squarely in the high-high category of the model, thanks to the strong ethnic heritage of the region's titular nationality and the thorough development of its economy. If center/periphery conflict is going to occur anywhere, it will occur in Tatarstan. Furthermore, by looking carefully at a single case, this study will be able to explore multiple dimensions of cultural equipment and resource endowment in a way that was impossible when examining the entire Federation.



Regions in The Four Quadrants				
Quadrant	Regional Identity	Predicted Behavior Pattern	Predicted Method of Action	Regions that Fall Into Quadrant
I	Low A Low B	Insufficient resources and, therefore, no conflict.	None	Tula Region, Jewish Autonomous Region, Omsk Region
II	High A Low B	Conflict based upon purely contemporary principals.	Policy Shift Claims	Moscow Region, Sverdlovsk Region, City of St. Petersburg
III	Low A High B	Conflict based upon purely ethnic principals.	Separatist Demands	Republics of Daghestan, Ingushetia, & Chechnya
IV	High A High B	Conflict based upon the ethnicization of economic arguments.	Power Shift Claims	Republics of Sahka-Yakutia, Bashkortostan, & Tatarstan

Table 1.9




Figure 1.9

◆ The Critical Case of Tatarstan ◆



*“Even if your mouth is full of blood, do not spit in public”*

—Tatar proverb

**Tatar History.** The narrative of the Tatar people is one of the most compelling and, at times, surprising that history offers. The Tatars, as an ethnic group, have existed as an active component of the Russian state for over a millennium. Scholars believe that a specifically “Tatar” ethnic group had emerged among the Muslim inhabitants of the Volga region by the beginning of the second millennium.<sup>22</sup> However, this ethnicity was essentially ransacked by the Golden Horde as the invading Mongols overran the Volga region and adopted the Tatar name. Russian anger towards their Oriental invaders morphed into a more general resentment of the Tatar name and culture. Consequently, when Ivan the Terrible officially conquered the Tatar capital in 1552, the effect of this resentment began to be felt. Walker sums up the immediate and long-term results of the Russian’s misplaced racism in writing that as

Russia’s imperial reach extended across Siberia... Moscow’s colonial policies alternated between harsh campaigns of religious conversion and cultural assimilation on the one hand, and relative tolerance toward non-Russian, non-Orthodox peoples on the other. The Muslim peoples of the Volga-Urals region (the ethonym “Tatar” was used equivocally by Russians prior to the twentieth century, sometimes designating Muslims, sometimes Turkic-speaking peoples, and sometimes all “Orientals,” and it was not accepted by the Volga Muslims themselves until late in the nineteenth century) reacted with episodic rebellions. (5)

The sometimes counterintuitive effects of this imperial history are that 1) the ethnic Tatar people inherited a name that conferred an undeserved negative reputation, 2) Tatars remained outsiders to most Russians even as they continued to exist as a natively Russian ethnic group, and 3) as the Russian empire collapsed, the Tatar people saw an opportunity for independence *from* Russia rather than *as a part* of it. This on-going struggle for independence would dominate the next 100 years of Tatar history.

Throughout the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Tatar people struggled for the autonomy that they believed they had earned. The Russian Revolution and the subsequent years of upheaval provided the opportunity for a resurgence in ethnic assertiveness among all Russian minorities. Tatars, sensing that the time had finally come for them to be treated as equal members of the Russian state, therefore began a campaign for independence. In May 1920, Tatar concerns were addressed but not satisfied when Tatarstan was named an Autonomous Republic of the Russian Socialist Federal Republic <sup>23</sup>—a status with which they were not satisfied. Ravil has recognized three subsequent stages of Tatar history and behavior<sup>24</sup> that occurred from the beginning of Soviet rule through the collapse of the USSR:

1. The first stage lasted for over half a century, as Tatars pursued a higher status as a

<sup>22</sup> Walker.

<sup>23</sup> Maps of Tatarstan are presented in Appendix G. The Republic can also be found on the map provided in Appendix A.

<sup>24</sup> These stages were not “officially” defined programs; rather, they are the author’s method of clarifying recent Tatar history.



Union Republic of the Russian Federation.

2. The second stage occurred during *perestroika* (1985 through late 1990). It was in this period that Tatarstan, along with all members of the former Soviet Union, was required to make countless official (and unofficial) decisions regarding its future identity. During this time, Tatarstan established its identity as a “multiethnic, multicultural society based on territorial rather than ethnic sovereignty”.
3. The third stage began in early 1991 and is currently on-going. This post-Soviet, “modern” era of Tatar history is the focus of much of the rest of this case study.

Tatarstan in Post-Soviet Russia. The remarkable facts of recent Tatarstani<sup>25</sup> history have inspired a great many investigations and studies. The way in which the republic has developed its economy and rebuilt its government in the wake of the USSR has led many to suggest that the “model of Tatarstan” begs documentation (Walker 1996; Graney 2001; Teague 1994; McAuley 1997; Dowley 1998). Others have gone a step further in asserting that the model’s success warrants imitation by other federal regions, namely Chechnya (McCann 2004; Robertson, 2001; Lieven 1998; Sharafutdinova 2000); several have even erroneously cited Tatar behavior as an indicator of Russia’s imminent demise (McAuley 1997; Hale 1998). This large body of scholarship speaks to the “specialness” of Tatarstan in the post-Soviet. By systematically analyzing the region’s political standing and leadership, identifying its cultural equipment, and recognizing its resource endowments, this research intends to show the compelling way in which recent Tatarstani history adheres to the suggested model.

Tatarstani Politics Since 1990. What is true of most Russian regions is true of Tatarstan as well—any discussion of politics is dominated (and often overshadowed) by leadership figures. Unfortunately, Russian leaders’ notoriety is most often due to corruption and incompetence. This, however, is where Tatarstan differs from most Russian cases — its president has grown famous for his stable, effective, and progressive leadership. Mintimer Shaimiev, who has served as leader and President of the Republic of Tatarstan without break since the *perestroika* period, has been the impetus for the region’s development and the symbol of its success.<sup>26</sup>

In the past two decades, the government of Tatarstan, under the guidance of Shaimiev, has established a high level of legitimacy among its citizens and its political contemporaries. This trust has been nurtured through a clever and calculated strategy in which leaders continually positioned themselves

<sup>25</sup> In order to maintain a distinction between the Tatar ethnic group and the Republic of Tatarstan, the term “Tatarstani” will be used to refer to regional matters and “Tatar” will continue to be used when referring to the ethnic group.

<sup>26</sup> Shaimiev is often presented in contrast to the far less successful President of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudaev. See Teague, 1994.



in such a way as to negate the arguments of their more radical (or conservative) counterparts.<sup>27</sup> More specifically, by promoting a sense of nationalism based upon borders rather than identities, leaders have united the hopes and desires of *all* ethnicities for which Tatarstan is home. The president himself crystallized Tatarstan's multinational character in saying:

By virtue of its geopolitical location, Tatarstan and its capital, Kazan, have played the role of a connecting link between East and West. They have been a meeting place of different civilizations, cultures, and confessions. Having lived together for many centuries, people have worked out their own form of multinational intercourse that has facilitated, and still facilitates, the mutual enrichment of languages and cultures and deep traditions of understanding and cooperation. (Walker 19)

Inspiring statements such as this have resulted in a high level of domestic support for the government of Tatarstan. This broad and deep legitimacy has translated into political capital for Tatarstani leaders, which they have used to establish a highly autonomous relationship with Moscow.

Tatarstan today enjoys a uniquely powerful status among Russian regions. The Republic's "considerable leverage in its relations with Moscow"<sup>28</sup> was first evidenced during the Federation's formative period, as the republic was able to 1) establish a regional constitution over a year before the larger Federation was able to ratify its own, 2) negotiate a number of topical agreements that solidified Tatarstani control over Tatar affairs, and 3) negotiate the first bilateral, power-sharing treaty between the Russian Federation and one of its units.<sup>29</sup> In this way, the region has "gained control over much of the power and authority generally attributed to sovereign states, including legislative and judicial authority, budget and tax authority, defense and foreign policy-making authority, and the capacity for nation-building" (Graney 33). Tatarstan's autonomy is demonstrated by its many agreements with the larger Federation, which are catalogued in Table 1.10. Through the actions of its leadership, Tatarstan has bucked the trend of Russian regional ineptitude and has thus established itself as a leader (and a rogue) among the units of the Russian Federation.

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<sup>27</sup> Radical groups such as the Iffitak Party have been present in Tatarstan for over 20 years. For a more in-depth review of their identity and actions, see Ravil, Chapter 5 (1997).

<sup>28</sup> Sharafutdinova 16.

<sup>29</sup> The texts of several of the most important legal documents regarding Tatarstani politics are included in Appendix H.

<b><u>Agreements Involving the Russian Federation &amp; the Republic of Tatarstan</u></b>	
<b>Name/Topic of Agreement</b>	<b>Date of Signing</b>
Declaration of Sovereignty by the Republic of Tatarstan	30 August 1990
Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan	6 November 1992
Constitution of the Russian Federation	23 December 1993
Bilateral Treaty between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation	15 February 1994
<b>Topical Agreements</b>	
<i>On Economic Cooperation</i>	22 January 1992
<i>On the Production and Transportation of Oil and Petrochemicals</i>	5 June 1993
<i>On Property</i>	22 June 1993
<i>On Customs</i>	22 June 1993
<i>On Environmental Cooperation</i>	Unknown
<i>On Higher Education</i>	Unknown
<i>On Banking, Credit, and Foreign Exchange</i>	February 1994
<i>On Foreign Trade</i>	February 1994
<i>On the Budget</i>	February 1994
<i>On the Defense Industries</i>	February 1994
<i>On Law Enforcement</i>	February 1994
<i>On Military Organizations</i>	February 1994

Table I.10



Tatarstan's Cultural Equipment. Tatarstan's placement in the lower portion of the model reflects the substantial level of cultural equipment that it has at its disposal. In truth, the 4-cell model reflects only the low number of Russian citizens that live in Tatarstan—however, an analysis of Tatarstan's cultural equipment should demonstrate the accuracy of this measurement:

1. *A history of ethnic independence.*

As was previously stated, the Tatars have existed as an ethnic group for more than a millennium. Over the course of its existence, the level of autonomy granted to the Tatar nation has been in constant flux. They first experienced independence before the Mongol invasion, and again briefly in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century. Even when the opportunity for modern autonomy presented itself during the Soviet era, Tatars were frustrated in their bid for independence. Ravil captures the the cruel irony of the Soviet situation in sarcastically writing that that the Tatar nation was

officially degraded to a so-called *feudal* nation, making, with the beneficent help of the Big Brother, a giant leap from the abyss of its medieval darkness and ignorance to the shining heights of Socialism. (Ravil 92-93)

Thanks to this storied history, Tatarstan possesses a sense of autonomy that is so ancient and vivid that modern leaders cannot help but reference it. In sum, the Shaimiev government has been able to cite the past as both a source of ethnic unity and a precedent for future independence.

2. *An ethnic majority in the region.*

In the modern era, the Tatar's have always constituted a plurality—albeit a small one—in the regional population of Tatarstan (this dynamic is clearly shown in Figure 1.10). Equally important is that the demographics have “remained surprisingly stable throughout the whole period” and have therefore solidified the Tatar nation's dominance of its own region. Also, there exist a large number of Tatars in diaspora, as the borders of the 1918 Soviet Tatar Republic “were drawn arbitrarily, and 75% of the Tatarstani population were left outside their nominal republic” (Teague 21). Therefore, not only do Tatars possess the necessary plurality within their own region, but they also enjoy substantial support in the Federation as a whole.

3. *The support of foreign nations or organizations.*

Tatarstan enjoys the support of numerous foreign entities, thanks to both historical ties and cultural connections. The Muslim identity of the Tatar nation links it with many political units, both inside and outside of the Russian Federation. In addition, the sheer length of its history suggests that it would find commonality with a great many foreign entities; this pattern is demonstrated in a September 1992 newspaper article, titled “Tatar Delegation in Vilnius Proposes Treaty with Lithuania Involving Tatar Oil”, and which reads,




Figure I.10



When the problem of Tatar diaspora in Lithuania arose, [Lithuanian leaders] immediately recalled the Battle of Gruenfelde [or Tannenberg], in which Tatars and Lithuanians fought together [in 1410—a victory of Poles and Lithuanians over the Teutonic Knights], after which [they] expressed understanding for... the Republic of Tatarstan. ('Tatarstan Flexes' 4)

The region has nurtured its foreign relations by taking 16 missions abroad, signing more than 50 international agreements, and participating in several international forums and conferences.<sup>30</sup> Tatarstan has utilized its connections to such a large extent that “it has become possible to discern the outlines of a distinct Tatarstani foreign policy, or what might better be termed ‘external relations’” and has therefore earned substantial support from its foreign partners (Slocum 58).

#### 4. *Regional control over a “myth of peoplehood”.*

Tatar history has been analyzed in previous sections, and its impressive scope has thus been demonstrated. However, even beyond the pure facts of the Tatar narrative, there exists a palpable sense of unity and momentum among the people of Tatarstan. President Shaimiev captures this feeling in writing that “It is probably difficult to find another nation, whose history would be so entangled as that of the Tatars. Even in Russia itself, where the Tatars constitute the second largest nation, little is known about their rich 1000-year old history” (Shaimiev 1997). Indeed, there is a vaguely mythic quality to Tatar history, which includes the infamous Genghis Khan and the grandeur of the Russian empire, and which still remains an enigma to many observers. The power of the past is not lost on Tatarstani leaders, however—Ravil states that “‘ancient and splendid Islamic civilization’ of this country plays an immensely important role” in the political behavior of its leadership (45).

#### 5. *Ethnic figureheads through which regional leaders can motivate the electorate.*

Cultural symbols representing the Tatar nation exist in abundance. Of the possible ethnic figureheads suggested by this study (language, heraldry, geography, and popular culture), Tatar culture encompasses them all. In recent regional leaders have been able to resurrect and utilize these symbols as,

The Tatar alphabet has been modernized (i.e., latinized), all children in Tatarstan now study the Tatar language... government functionaries are encouraged to know both Tatar and Russian... the republic has revised the school curriculum to include a great focus on Tatarstani history and culture... the new state flag and symbols reflect an identification with the Tatar people, [and] the government has spent a large sum to rebuild Tatarstan's mosques. (Graney 35-36)

So potent was the desire for Tatar culture that scholars have argued that some of the “burning issues underlying [Tatarstan's] dreams [were] the sad state of national education and the plight of the Tatar language” (Ravil 91). What is critical to understanding this dynamic is the way in which the suppression of Tatar language and symbols during the Soviet period has had the reverse effect of *strengthening* the uniting power of these ideals.

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<sup>30</sup> Sharafutdinova 618.



Tatarstan's Resource Endowment. As with cultural equipment, Tatarstan's placement on the model suggests a high level of resource endowment (so high, in fact, that the scale of the model does not allow for the placement of Tatarstan's true location). Keeping this measurement in mind, the following review of Tatarstan's concrete resources reflects three key characteristics of the relevant information: 1) that economic data is very flexible in the short term and must therefore be viewed over time, 2) that unlike cultural equipment, the components of resource endowment are best illustrated through figures and quantities, and 3) that no real list of the definite components of resource endowments can be identified, as each region's economic position is infinitely unique and idiosyncratic.

Therefore, to begin with, some key aspects of Tatarstan's formidable resources (at two points in time) are outlined in Figure 1.11 and Table 1.12. First, Figure 1.11 presents a few of the many pieces of information that led Kondrashov to state that "the republic [was] not just an important pillar of the Russian and Soviet economy, but also its net donor"(94). In Table 1.12, the present strength (and diversity) of the Tatarstani economy is demonstrated, validating the Republic's own claim that "Tatarstan is one of the most economically developed republics of the Russian Federation... [boasting] wealthy natural resources, powerful and diversified industry, high intellectual potential and qualified labor".<sup>31</sup> When viewed in tandem, what these two diagrams make clear is that Tatarstan did not just *begin* the post-Soviet period in a strong position—indeed, in years since, it has used its resources as a tool for improving its economy even further. This process of steadily increasing economic power shows that "Tatarstan's strategic location and economic strength [rendered] it virtually indispensable to Moscow" (Teague 21) and that, furthermore, Tatarstani leaders view "the attainment of economic autonomy, and a degree of self-sufficiency, as the ultimate goal of sovereignty" (Slocum 59).

Realizing the futility of gathering data on all aspects of a region's economy, the investigation already identified three quantifiable regional characteristics that play a critical role in resource endowment, and for which indicators were readily available. In order to analyze Tatarstan's economy, this research simply will duplicate its earlier methods—therefore, Tatarstan's status with regards to each are listed below:

1. *Urban/Capital City Population:* The overall population of Tatarstan is highly urbanized, with some 70% residing in urban environments by 1989 (see Figure 1.12). There is also an ethnic component to this measurement, however, as it is shown that ethnic Russians have been consistently more urbanized over time. This is a logical observation, in that most Russians entered Tatarstan as immigrants and would have been more likely to settle in its major cities.

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<sup>31</sup> Economy: The Republic of Tatarstan  
([http://www.tatar.ru/index.php?DNSID=e3c3f09f902783d686f0cbb3cd1f41c1&node\\_id=792](http://www.tatar.ru/index.php?DNSID=e3c3f09f902783d686f0cbb3cd1f41c1&node_id=792))



**Economic Profile of Tatarstan -1991**  
**Among the Largest Regions of the Russian Federation\***

<b><u>Population</u></b>			<b><u>Industrial Output</u></b>		
Region	Population, '000s	% of the Total	Region	Output, Rb Billions	% of the Total
1. City of Moscow	9 003	6.06	1. City of Moscow	77.0	6.14
2. Moscow Oblast	6 718	4.52	2. Moscow Oblast	61.0	4.86
3. City of St. Petersburg	5 035	3.39	3. Sverdlovsk Oblast	51.5	4.11
4. Sverdlovsk Oblast	4 785	3.22	4. Tumen Oblast	42.7	3.41
5. Krasnador Krai	4 738	3.19	5. City of St. Petersburg	41.3	3.29
6. Rostov Oblast	4 348	2.93	6. Chelyabinsk Oblast	35.4	2.82
7. Republic of Bashkortostan	3 984	2.68	7. Nizhni Novgorod Oblast	34.7	2.77
8. Nizhni Novgorod Oblast	3 775	2.54	8. <i>Republic of Tatarstan</i>	<i>31.7</i>	<i>2.53</i>
9. Chelyabinsk Oblast	3 715	2.50	9. Republic of Bashkortostan	31.0	2.47
10. <i>Republic of Tatarstan</i>	<i>3 679</i>	<i>2.48</i>	10. Samara Oblast	30.7	2.45
<b>Russian Federation</b>	<b>148 543</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>Russian Federation</b>	<b>1 254.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>

<b><u>Agricultural Output</u></b>			<b><u>Annual Investment in Fixed Assets</u></b>		
Region	Output, Rb Billions	% of the Total	Region	Investments, Rb Billions	% of the Total
1. Krasnador Krai	12.8	4.92	1. Tumen Oblast	22.2	10.60
2. Rostov Oblast	9.0	3.46	2. City of Moscow	8.6	4.08
3. Moscow Oblast	8.6	3.31	3. Moscow oblast	6.6	3.12
4. Republic of Bashkortostan	7.9	3.04	4. <i>Republic of Tatarstan</i>	<i>5.9</i>	<i>2.79</i>
5. Stavropol Krai	7.7	2.96	5. Sverdlovsk Oblast	5.7	2.73
6. Altai Krai	7.2	2.77	6. Krasnoyarsk	5.6	2.69
7. <i>Republic of Tatarstan</i>	<i>7.0</i>	<i>2.69</i>	7. Republic of Bashkortostan	5.4	2.56
8. Saratov Oblast	6.3	2.42	8. Krasnador Krai	5.0	2.36
9. Volgograd Oblast	6.2	2.38	9. Kemerovo Oblast	5.0	2.34
10. Orenburg Oblast	6.0	2.31	10. Chelyabinsk Oblast	4.7	2.22
<b>Russian Federation</b>	<b>260.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>Russian Federation</b>	<b>148 543</b>	<b>100.00</b>

\* Each list presents the 10 largest regions  
in the stated category.

Source: Kondrashov, *Nationalist & Sovereignty in Tatarstan*

Figure I.II

Economic Profile of Tatarstan- 2005	
Component of Resource Endowment	Key Figures
Resources of Strategic Importance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Defense Industries</li><li>• Oil and Gas Pipelines</li><li>• Plane and Helicopter Production</li></ul>
Natural Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Crude Oil Reserves—30 million tons per year (6.7% of Russian total)</li><li>• Brown and Black Coal</li><li>• Carbonate Rocks, Gypsum, and Other Minerals</li><li>• Numerous Lakes and Rivers, and Underground Mineralized Water</li></ul>
Major Sectors of the Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Gross Regional Product—510 million rubles (7% over 2004)</li><li>• Aggregate Agriculture Output—68.1 billion rubles (one of three leading regions of the Russian Federation)</li><li>• Per Capita Investment in Fixed Capital—36 000 rubles</li><li>• Real Cash Income—18.4% over 2004</li><li>• Index of Industrial Production—4.6% over 2004</li></ul>
Domestic Economic Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Major Imports: Non-ferrous Metals, Gasoline, Chemicals, Coal, Textile, Timber, Transportation Needs, Consumer Goods</li><li>• Major Exports: Crude Oil, Diesel Fuel, Products of Organic Synthesis,</li><li>• Domestic Sales Volume—\$1,414 million, USD</li><li>• Domestic Purchase Amount—\$793.4 million, USD</li></ul>
Foreign Economic Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Volume of Services in Foreign Economic Activity—\$122.4 million, USD</li><li>• Foreign Investments in Tatarstan—\$683,829.4 thousand, USD</li><li>• Largest Foreign Trade Partners: Germany, Poland, Finland, and Lithuania</li></ul>
Geographic Location	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Lies at the confluence of the Volga and Kama Rivers</li><li>• Land is mainly forest and forest-plain</li><li>• Climate is moderate-continental, with 170 days of vegetation growth per year</li><li>• Substantial amounts of black-earth soil</li></ul>
Sources: Official Website of the Republic of Tatarstan; Sharafutdinova, 2000	

Table I.II




Figure I.12



federal “leaders had a significant interest in controlling petroleum exports... since Tatarstan had been a major oil producer since the 1940s” (Sharafutdinova 17). Table I.II confirms Tatarstan’s large role in the production of Russian oil—even more critical to the oil regime, however, is the contribution that the Republic makes through pipelines and other forms of oil transport. It is for this reason that Walker suggests that one way for Tatarstani leaders to gain leverage over the center is “by cutting off the flow of oil and gas through the republic’s vital pipeline system” (Walker 35). In sum, Tatarstan’s dynamic participation in the production of Russia’s critical oil regime makes it an indispensable ally for Moscow.

2. *Foreign Economic Activity*: Tatarstan’s extensive foreign interaction has been discussed in previous sections as a political phenomenon; that Tatarstani international activity is mainly economic in nature is equally important. Indeed, Slocum states that

Tatarstan’s external economic relations have been facilitated by a number of bilateral agreements on trade and economic cooperation that... normally would be viewed simply as trade agreements rather than diplomatic accords. However, in the context of the former Soviet Union, these agreements serve crucial political functions [and]... can be viewed as attempts to renew and reinforce Soviet-era economic arrangements. (64-65)

Clearly, Tatarstan has established and nurtured its foreign economic ties. Moreover, it has often done so with the explicit goal of political and international support

Thus, the three components of resource endowment that were previously measured on the macro-scale (urbanization, oil production, and foreign economy) appear to exist in abundance in the region of Tatarstan.

A final note must be made regarding the residual effect of Soviet-style business on the modern Tatarstani government. In his well-researched article, Globalization and Post-socialist Development: The Tatarstan Variety of Capitalism, McCann (2004) explains that “the [Tatarstani] system is capitalist, but not as we know it” and that, in many ways, Tatarstani capitalism remains innately beholden to its Soviet-era mechanisms (359). It is commonly acknowledged that socialism continues to retard Russian business and Tatarstan is no exception to this rule; what the article compellingly portrays, however, is the way in which *Soviet business practices also serve as a resource for Tatarstan*. In the many qualitative interviews that the study conducted, it is obvious that the socialist mindset continues to exist and, crucially, that it remains the most effective way of conducting Russian business. This mindset is evident in the following direct quotes, taken from McCann’s interviews with assorted Tatarstani businessmen:

The government has a stake in retaining its interests in the strategic branches of the economy... It is a fact a fact of life here that if you have family relations in the government your business is more likely to be successful. (354)

Political interference is still a major problem... The state is used to getting its own way [and]... it is basically a process of state fostering of individual companies. (356)



[Tatarstani] businessmen don't want to work in Western ways. The laws are not international... the mentality is totally different. It's a different system, totally. Capitalism doesn't do the same thing in Russia. (358)

The system of bribes is working in a stable fashion. (357)

Taken on their own, this series of opinions would certainly suggest problems for Tatarstan's economy. These description, however, predict a completely different effect when considered in light of the following quote, from a prominent analyst of the Russian Presidency:

If anyone says that Russia's establishment is corrupt, I can say yes, yes, for sure. It is possible to consider the system corrupt. However, the question is, does it have a bearing on my business? If you know what to pay, to whom, it is not a risk, simply another form of expenditure. (358)

According to McCann, Tatarstani businessmen *do* know who to pay and how much they ask, and it is for this reasons that the economy of Tatarstan remains so successful. In other words, *one of the largest components of Tatarstan's resource endowment may very well be the region's continuing endorsement of "Soviet-style capitalism"*.

The preceding analysis shows the accuracy with which the model captures Tatarstan's storied history and its modern identity. This, however, is only half of the suggested theory—indeed, it must be remembered that this study has made arguments regarding both regional identities *and* regional behaviors. Therefore, having established that the Republic of Tatarstan possesses the “certain variables” that ought to lower the risks of center/periphery conflict, this investigation will assess if Tatar leaders have truly taken advantage of their lowered risk and pursued their preference for autonomy.

Tatarstan's Broad Strategy of Ethnic Mobilization. In the years directly following the collapse of the USSR, Tatarstani leaders seized a unique opportunity and gained control over their future. By combining the leverage provided by their resource endowments with the passion aroused by their cultural equipment, Tatarstani leaders successfully linked their arguments for economic, political, and ethnic independence. Two broad processes can be recognized in their pursuit of autonomy: 1) an *internal process*, characterized by political outmaneuvering of nationalist critics and the establishment of a special “Tatarstani” brand of nationalism and 2) an *external process*, in which the republic entered into conflict with the center over political autonomy and economic control. These two phases of Tatarstan's post-Soviet bid for autonomy are linked by the strategy adopted by Mintimer Shaimiev and his government—understanding the situation presented to them, leaders have continually formed their arguments in order to elicit cooperation (and concession) from their opponents. Indeed, Ravil sums up the president's legacy by stating that

One can easily distinguish the cornerstone of his state philosophy: the basis of statehood is the people, not just the industrial infrastructure or natural resources. All along the long and difficult path of Tatarstan's revival as a state, Mintimer Shaimiev is presenting an example of how state objectives can be achieved not through sacrificing the people, but, quite the opposite, through deep



compassion for the multiethnic people of his country... the president [has] managed to turn his country's national patriotism from a potentially lethal weapon into a mighty creative tool for shaping the future. (110-111)

The following discussion will validate these arguments first by defining the two broad phases of Tatarstan's post-Soviet political actions using the words of its leaders, which are presented in Table 1.12. It will then support its theories more acutely by showing the way in which the Tatarstani strategy strongly informed the Republic's actions during the "sovereignty" referendum of 1992.

Redefining Tatarstani Nationalism. On the domestic level, the words of Tatarstani leaders reveal a strategy that combines the force of nationalist rhetoric with the inclusiveness of more contemporary definitions of "nation". A few key observations can be made:

1. Tatarstan's leaders introduced a new definition of nationalism, which included all citizens of Tatarstan without sacrificing the ideals of the ancient Tatar ethnicity. By sifting Tatarstan's long-term narrative (which leads straight to autonomy, they argued) while emphasizing the need for inclusion in the nation's modern form, Tatarstani leaders successfully united their people.
2. At first, radical nationalist forces flourished in Tatarstan, as "nationalism... seemed to be able not only to explain the roots of the people's troubles, but also promise a better ethnic future for them" (Ravil 88). It was the government's sheer silence in the face of these critics, however, that allowed them to dominate their xenophobic arguments. Rather than cooperating and compromising with their radical contemporaries (which would have jeopardized their objectives by allowing Moscow to accuse Tatarstan of harboring ill-will), Tatarsani leaders simply positioned their arguments in such a way as to steal nationalism's supporters while betraying its more radical demands. Presidential advisor R. Khakimov crystallizes this strategy by stating that

[The government] immediately formulated the concept of balancing ethnic and religious interests, saying that, in fact, we were building a polyethnic and polycultural society. Such a structure of the inner relations in the republic allowed us to feel confident in our negotiations with the federal center... Internal stability helped us to conduct negotiations with the center much more successfully.

3. Leader's comments regarding their economy make one thing abundantly clear: that *economic development was of the utmost importance* to them and that they believed that Tatarstan required economic independence in order to grow. Furthermore, their words suggest that economic growth was critical not only to Tatarstan as a republic, but to the Tatars as a people as well.



<b><u>The Political Philosophy of the Leadership of Tatarstan</u></b> <b>A Collection of Quotes from 1991 to 2007</b>	
<b>On Tatarstan's Pursuit of Autonomy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "There is no doubt that Tatarstan's policy is aimed at changing the republic's status with respect to the Russian Federation. But those who say that Tatarstan wants to secede from Russia and, moreover, is wrecking the federation are wrong."—VL</li> <li>• "Why was Tatarstan more vocal than the other autonomous republics during this process? Because the problem of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as huge republics was always there."—MS</li> <li>• "We followed a civilized democratic path and did not seek armed confrontation. We sought only to meet the demands of the people."—MS</li> <li>• "We immediately formulated the concept of balancing ethnic and religious interests, saying that, in fact, we were building a polyethnic and polycultural society. Such a structure of the inner relations in the republic allowed us to feel confident in our negotiations with the federal center... Internal stability helped us to conduct negotiations with the center much more successfully."—RK</li> </ul>
<b>On the Nature of Tatarstani Nationalism</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "The Tatar people have always lived with the dream of restoring their statehood."—RK</li> <li>• "When the Tatar Republic was formed by decree in 1920, it possessed many rights that were later taken away, unfortunately. That is why the question of guaranteeing our rights is coming up today."—RK</li> <li>• "The international community had always spoken of human rights and of the rights of peoples to self-determination. These ideas fell on ripe soil... This process was waiting for its historical moment."—MS</li> <li>• "The Tatar declaration of sovereignty was written in the name of the people of Tatarstan, and we do not divide this people into ethnic groups."—MS</li> <li>• "On the first day that we proclaimed statehood, we declared that our sovereignty was not ethnic in nature... The Republic's multiethnic population has always looked forward to the future with optimism, because it appraises friendship and likes to work."—MS</li> </ul>
<b>On Center/Periphery Conflict</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "We will not allow an even tougher center than before to form. Russia must not talk to the peoples in the language of a state of emergency or in the language of a court."—MS</li> <li>• "I consider the primary cause of conflicts in the USSR to be neither ethnic nor national problems, but the lack of rights of Union and autonomous republics when they were subsumed under a tightly centralized system."—MS</li> <li>• "The confrontation with Russian state authorities after the collapse of the USSR was based on a total misunderstanding. We never asserted in any official decision that Tatarstan wanted full independence... But at the time, it came off like a bomb."—MS</li> <li>• "No matter how difficult, all conflicts should be addressed through negotiations. The main thing, in my view, for regulating and preventing conflicts in such a complex country as Russia in the long term is not to allow tension to accumulate."—MS</li> </ul>

Table 1.12.a



<b><u>The Political Philosophy of the Leadership of Tatarstan</u></b> <b>A Collection of Quotes from 1991 to 2007</b>	
<b>On the Russian Federation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• “If we do not understand in our heart that Russia is no chance accumulation of territories and tribes but a living, historical, organism not subject to arbitrary dismemberment, then we are not worthy of our great common past... Shortsighted politicians who satisfy their ambitions by courting cheap popularity and play the “nationalities question” card will inevitably become the victims of their bloody game.” —AR</li><li>• “If we are going to create a federation under conditions of a civilized society, we have to do it from the bottom up.” —MS</li><li>• “Like it or not, we need a new nationalities policy for Russia. A conception of a nationalities policy has been by the President but it is mostly to quiet the society and the republics... we have to do what is best for all nations. We have to help when Russia is having a difficult time. We must peacefully resolve these problems with respect for each nation.” —MS</li></ul>
<b>On the Economy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• “I agree... that we must not lose the leadership of the economic system. But the question is: how should we manage it? Why is the economy of Tatarstan in better shape than that of other regions?... It is because we retained control over the economy. We are moving towards the market, but not in a hurry, carefully analyzing each each. We don’t command the enterprises but we control them through economic levers.” —RS</li><li>• “Tatarstan, because of its specific features, is integrated into not only the Russia but also into that of the whole former Union. Therefore, it is natural for the republic to seek to be a full-fledged player in the market and to have ties with its partners without intermediaries.” —MG</li><li>• “We have realized that attracting foreign investment without first setting up appropriate market institutions, without acquiring the necessary skills for working with securities and without changing our attitude to export of oil, we will be an impossible task.” —MS</li></ul>
<b><u>Quoted Authorities</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Marat Galejev, <i>Vice-Chairman of the State Committee on Economics</i> (MG)</li><li>• Rafail Khakimov, <i>Adviser to the President</i> (RK)</li><li>• Vasily Likhachov, <i>Vice-President</i> (VL)</li><li>• Aleksandr Rutskoi, <i>Vice-President</i> (AR)</li><li>• Sabirov, <i>Prime Minister</i> (RS)</li><li>• Mintimer Shaimiev, <i>President</i> (MS)</li></ul>	
<i>Sources: Ravil, 1998; Shaimiev, 1998; “Tatarstan Flexes”, 1992; “Tatarstan Referendum”, 1992; Walker, 1996; McAuley, 1997.</i>	

Table I.12.b

Thus, Tatarstan's leadership took the first step in pursuing their autonomy by ensuring the utility of their cultural equipment and promoting the importance of resource endowments to their future.

Political Gamesmanship with the Center. In their early relations with Moscow, Tatarstan's leaders pursued a strategy of constant give-and-take. The comments contained in Table 1.12 reveal a virtual labyrinth of opinions and arguments. For each instance of somewhat aggressive rhetoric ("We will not allow an even tougher center than before to form..."), there exists an equally benevolent statement of Tatarstan's good intentions ("If we do not understand in our heart that Russia is no chance accumulation of territories and tribes but a living, historical, organism not subject to arbitrary dismemberment, then we are not worthy of our great common past..."). Moreover, it is possible to recognize several instances in which regional leaders (Shaimiev, in particular) made inflammatory statements and, at a later date, explained how those statements were simply misunderstood.

The end effect of this process of political jousting was that Tatarstani leaders were able to progressively erode the center's control as their ethnically-tinged arguments for independence, coupled with their ever-growing economic prominence, wore away at Moscow's resolve. In this process, one can certainly recognize the presence of Markusen's strategy of policy-shifts. Indeed, Tatarstani leaders were constantly mindful to pursue their autonomy by way of formal and legitimate avenues. Ravil takes analysis a step further by defining the four principles of Tatarstani political strategy:

1. *Stability* ("The federalization process should not impair the already existing political stability".)
2. *Voluntary Association* ("The abstention from force as an instrument of federalization and the reliance on the... voluntary redistribution of powers in upgrading the status of subjects [is] fundamentally important".)
3. *Graduality* ("New federative formations must be created not by destroying but by upgrading the old ones".)
4. *Resilience* ("Historical, ethnic, religious, and cultural aspects of certain subjects... beget specific federal territories... it is important to reckon with specific features of these subjects and deliver to them more rights and powers than to others").<sup>32</sup>

These principles capture the Tatarstani method of forceful yet non-inflammatory action. By accepting the established system and merely insisting upon new power-structures *within* that system, Tatarstan was able to bypass the more damaging consequences of other regional strategies (i.e., power-shift claims and separatist demands).

Perhaps the most ingenious and effective instance of a policy-shift claim by Tatarstani leaders

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<sup>32</sup> Ravil 133.



resulted from the referendum on sovereignty that the republic chose to hold in early 1992. Shaimiev recalls that he chose to hold the referendum “in accord with the declaration of Tatarstan’s sovereignty which had been announced earlier... Only a referendum—the most democratic form of public expression—could communicate the wishes of the people...and only a referendum could create peace in the republic” (Ravil 124). Realizing the critical importance of remaining legitimate in the eyes of Moscow, the President demonstrated cleverness and foresight in managing the potentially disastrous situation.

Political Strategy in the Referendum of 1992. Tatarstani leaders confronted the domestic situation by wording the referendum in a highly-specific way, recognizing that they had to unite the desires of the Tatarstan’s many ethnic groups (such a strategy would, it was thought, appease Moscow as well). The text of the referendum read: “*Do you agree that Tatarstan is a sovereign state and a subject of international law that is building relations with Russia and other republics and states on the basis of equal treaties?*” (Walker 16). By writing the question in this way, Tatarstani leaders distanced itself from Tatarstan’s radical nationalist opposition. Shaimiev made clear that he was not seeking independence in the name of the Tatar people and “the nationalist opposition perceived this as a betrayal of their ideals... This was the crossroads, where the paths of the Tatarstan elected leadership [sic] and of nationalist opposition parted company” (Ravil 95-96). Though the final goal remained Tatarstani autonomy, the way in which Shaimiev’s government framed its statement of sovereignty effectively removed any sort of ethnic threat that it might have posed.

However, in spite of this genteel approach, Tatarstan’s leadership was forced to confront its consequences on the federal level as well. Yeltsin took issue with the statement, reneging on his invitation for Tatarstan to “take all the sovereignty you can swallow” and the assurance that “if you [Tatars] want to govern yourselves completely, go ahead” (Walker 12). Consequently, the federal leader reminded Tatarstan of the potential repercussions and he “bluntly asserted that he would ‘not allow Tatarstan to leave the Russian Federation’... [making] clear his belief that, despite Shaimiev’s assurances, the main goal of Tatarstan’s leadership was full independence” (Walker 18). Therefore, when it was revealed that a majority of the region’s population (Tatar and ethnic Russian alike) had defied Yeltsin and supported state sovereignty, crisis seemed imminent. The leader of Tatarstan’s main nationalist movement “hastened to announce that the results of the referendum indicate a desire on the part of the majority of Tatarstan’s population for the republic’s full independence from Russia” (“Tatarstan Referendum” 7). However, taking the lead for his nation, Shaimiev quickly announced that “the republic’s goal was not secession—rather, it was a bilateral treaty with Moscow”; by making such a statement publicly, Shaimiev prevented the federal center from taking any sort of recursive action against



Tatarstan. Yeltsin, forced to make a volte-face and back down from his threats by Shaimiev's disarming rhetoric, "made clear that he too preferred compromise" (Walker 19). That compromise, and the bilateral treaty to which it eventually lead, would not have been possible had Tatarstan's leadership not acted in such a politically intelligent way. The tack taken by leaders in this case clearly demonstrates Tatarstan's innovative and well-managed strategy of federal relations, in which political arguments are constantly adjusted so as to remain effective and non-inflammatory.

In the end, Tatarstan's actions regarding its 1992 referendum provide real anecdotal support for the conclusions of this research by showing that *it was Tatarstan's resources (its economic and political importance in the shadow of the Soviet Empire) and its ethnicity (the mobilization of its re-imagined concept of nationalism) that allowed it to pursue autonomy through center/periphery conflict*. As a critical case, Tatarstan therefore aligns with each of the major tenets of this study's theories: possessing substantial amounts of resource endowment and cultural equipment, the region faces smaller risks and greater rewards from center/periphery conflict than most other regions in the post-Soviet era. Therefore, it's leaders have opted for an intelligent and calculated strategy of political conflict with the center that has allowed them to successfully pursue their preference for autonomy.



## Conclusions: A Rational Means, but to What End?

This study argues that each Russian region should primarily be viewed as a rational actor with a set preference for autonomy; it also outlines two categories of variables that define how each region will manage this preference. By suggesting that *primordial variables inform a strategy based upon rational choice*, the study explains center/periphery relations in a way that will satisfy proponents of each of the rival theories of ethno-federal relations. In short, it has demonstrated a way to tie ethnic variables to a rational theory of ethnic conflict in an empirically viable way.

What, then, can be said of the future of the Russian Federation? Based upon the arguments made by this investigation, one could expect that the pursuit of regional autonomy, and the subsequent center/periphery conflict, are unavoidable dynamics of federal behavior. Therefore, the pertinent question for Russian scholars and politician may not be how to *prevent* conflict, but rather how to *manage* the conflict that will inevitably occur. Perhaps by applying this study's framework, future scholars will be able to suggest new strategies for Moscow, strategies that would seem to point to socio-economic development of the regions, so ethnic mobilization will not lead to separatism. In remarks made before the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in 1998, President Mintimer Shaimiev outlined his beliefs regarding the future of center/periphery relations in the Russian Federation:

What worries me? This is a transitional period, and the center can live with asymmetrical federalism and treaty-based relations. I do not consider myself a naive person, and I think that when the political and economic situation stabilizes, this question will arise in full force and we will move toward a symmetrical federalism. Voices will arise calling for democratic but uniform federalism. We have to be ready for this; it is a reality of life. Only politics that takes reality into consideration is real politics....

We all now understand that building a democratic society is extremely difficult. It is easy to call for it, but building and leading is a lot harder. But the choice has been made, and it is a historic one. This choice draws us toward civilization. We politicians have to be responsible, and understand from history what Russia consists of, and with this sense of reality peacefully strive to defend the rights of each nation. Only in this way can we build a democratic Russian Federation... ('Conflict Prevention' 73-74)

Shaimiev's comments reflect the immense challenge that Russia must confront in coming years and the mature understanding of ethno-federalism that must define its strategy.

It is critical that the suggested theory appears to accurately predict not only *when* conflict will occur, but also *how* that conflict will be conducted. With this in mind, the most valuable inquiry for future researchers may be an investigation of those cases that fall into Quadrant III of this study's model (i.e., those regions for whom cultural capital is very high and resource endowments are very low). These regions are the sort of extreme cases in which cultural extinction is a definite possibility and for whom violent conflict would appear to be a rational option. Future research should assess how these regions



mobilize their cultural capital in order to pursue their autonomy. Remembering that their behavior will always occur in a system which is based upon rational choice, what can we expect that these regions will engage in the type of separatist behaviors that this model suggests? Violent conflict grounded in external and international support, perhaps? Inter-regional movements, in which ethnic leaders unite their nations and defy Moscow while ignoring the system of modern governments and borders? While such an investigation is beyond the scope of the current project, it would certainly be a fruitful next step for scholars interested in Russia's system of federal relations.

Another possibility for future research is the possible application of this study's model (Figure 1.7 on page 29) to other federal structures. The model appears to accurately capture the dynamics of the Russian Federation and, perhaps, its system of categorization and regional placement could be extrapolated to other states, or even the international political system. Such an investigation would certainly test the generalizability of this research's arguments and could provide for a more thorough understanding of political behavior on many levels.

What is clear is that ethnicity in modern Russia cannot be ignored or dismissed. This fact does not predict doom for Russia, nor does it suggest that the Russian Federation is an inherently flawed political body. As this study has demonstrated, the vast majority of Russian regions simply do not have the means to pursue autonomy through center/periphery conflict. Indeed, there is a system of rational behavior at work in Russia and, therefore, the modern Russian state does not face the same centripetal forces as the Soviet Union. Rationality surely dictates the system of Russian federal behavior, and yet *the survival of ethnicity has become a rational concern*. Thus, separatism remains a possibility in those regions where a strong cultural identity exists alongside the type of economic and social crises that might threaten ethnic survival.

Inarguably, in a system in which cultural boundaries are often reinforced by regional borders, ethnic issues will always matter. The future of the Russian state will likely be determined by how well its leaders are able to balance the dual demands of ethnicity and governance. Indeed, Russia's greatest hope may very well lie in the echoes of her past, as ethnic bonds provide the meaning for a rational, effective, and truly fair form of federal government.



## ◆Appendices◆

Appendix A- Administrative Divisions of the Russian Federation



Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Russian-regions.png>

Appendix B- Full List of Cases

- |                        |                          |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Republic of Adygea  | 12. Mari El              |
| 2. Altai Republic      | 13. Mordovia             |
| 3. Bashkortostan       | 14. Sakha (Yakutia)      |
| 4. Buryatia            | 15. North Ossetia-Alania |
| 5. Daghestan           | 16. Tatarstan            |
| 6. Ingushetia          | 17. Tuva                 |
| 7. Kabardino-Balkaria  | 18. Udmurtia             |
| 8. Kalmykia            | 19. Khakassia            |
| 9. Karachay-Cherkessia | 20. Chechnya             |
| 10. Karelia            | 21. Chuvashia            |
| 11. Komi               |                          |



## Appendix C– Explanation of Indicator Manipulations

### Index of Constitutional Aggression

The index was created by assigning 1 point for a region having demanded inclusion in the first round of treaty negotiations and 1 additional point for each instance of discrepancy between federal and regional law enshrined in the constitution.

### Instances of Protest, War and Rebellion

This project assigned each region a score between 0 and 3. A score of 0 signified no instances of protest, war, or rebellion; a score of 1 signified at least one instance of protest/rebellion; a score of 2 signified at least one instance of war; and a score of 3 signified instances of both protest/rebellion and war.

### Timing of Region's Declaration of Sovereignty

Treisman's rankings assign each region a number based upon the quickness with which they declared their sovereignty. The rankings, which are on a scale of 0-11, were recoded into a 0-5 scale by dividing each score by 2, and rounding up when necessary.

### Economic Interaction


In order to accurately gauge the trend of these figures, this study averaged the figures for January 2000 and December 2005 in each category. After transferring each of the four figures onto a 5-point scale, this research chose to combine all resulting scores in order to construct a comprehensive index of economic activity. The resulting scores were again used to construct a 5-point scale, with higher values denoting a higher volume of economic interaction.

Appendix D- Borrowed Data Sources

Regional Elite Behavior- Dowley, 1998.

Region	Score	N	Region	Score	N
Adygea	3.62	8	Karelia	3.56	25
Altai	3.33	6	Khakassia	3.64	11
Bashkortostan	4.00	46	Komi	3.44	16
Buryatia	3.50	15	Mari El	3.86	7
Chechnya	4.62	62	Mordovia	3.20	15
Chuvashia	3.62	13	North Ossetia-Alania	3.12	34
Daghestan	2.84	19	Sakha-Yakutia	3.68	41
Ingushetia	3.50	30	Tatarstan	4.33	43
Kabardino-Balkaria	3.05	21	Tuva	3.80	15
Kalmykia	3.29	17	Udmurtia	3.43	14
Karachay-Cherkessia	3.00	11			

Timing of Regional Sovereignty- Triesman, 1997.





Appendix E— Results of the Eta Test

Eta Values		
Primordial Indicators	Eta	Significance
Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic Minority or Majority	0.522*	.016
Titular Nationality’s Sharing of the Russian Orthodox Faith	.323	.102
Historical Autonomous Status	..288	.069
Rational Choice Indicators		
Population of Capital City, 2002	.548	.016
Presence of Oil or Oil Pipeline	.400	.080
Combined Monthly Economic Interaction	.641	.019
*— Significance at the .05 level.		

Appendix F— Interaction among Bargaining Variables

The study performed a brief, cursory analysis of the interaction between the three bargaining indicators. Three models were created, with each model including one of three possible pairings of bargaining indicators. The study then tested each two-indicator combination for correlation with the dependent variable ( $R^2$ ) through the OLS method. In this way, the research was able to assess which indicator pairings, if any, exert an exceedingly large influence on regional aggression. The results were :

Indicator Pairing	R <sup>2</sup>	Significance
Oil & Economic Interaction	.275	.024
Oil & Capital Population	.264	.055
Economic Interaction & Capital Population	.250	.075

Clearly, none of the indicator pairings exerted a substantially greater influence on regional aggression than any other. Therefore, a region that possesses oil and a high-level of economic interaction was found to be no more likely to engage in conflict than will a region that possesses oil and a large capital-city population. The basic investigation did not suggest that there is *no* particular combination of “bargaining chips” that exert an exceedingly large influence on regional aggression; it merely demonstrated that, *among these three variables*, there was no substantially influential combination. In order to investigate the issue further, researchers should perform similar analyses using larger pools of variables and more theoretically coherent models.



Appendix G—Political & Geographic Maps of the Republic of Tatarstan.<sup>33</sup>



<sup>33</sup> Official Website of the Republic of Tatarstan; National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan.



## Appendix H—Selected Legal Documents of the Republic of Tatarstan<sup>34</sup>

### Declaration of State Sovereignty, 30 August 1991.

#### DECLARATION on the state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan

The Supreme Soviet of Tatar Autonomous Soviet Social Republic,

- realizing the historical responsibility for the fortunes of multinational peoples;
  - expressing respect to sovereign rights of all peoples, inhabiting the Russian Federation and the USSR;
  - realizing the incapability of the status of Autonomous Republic, and the interests of future political, economic, social and spiritual development of the multinational peoples;
  - ensuring the inherent rights of Tatars, of the whole population of the Republic to self-determination;
  - aiming at the creation of legal democratic state,
1. PROCLAIMS Tatar state sovereignty and reforms the Autonomous Republic into the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic (Tatar SSR) - The Republic of Tatarstan.
  2. The land, its natural resources and other resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR shall be the exclusive property of Tatar people.
  3. Irrespective of nationality, social origin, belief, political convictions and other differences, Tatar SSR shall guarantee all citizens of the Republic equal rights and freedoms. Russian and Tatar shall be state languages and shall be equal in Tatar SSR, the maintenance and development of languages of other nationalities shall be ensured.
  4. The official state name in the Constitution, in other legal acts and in state activity shall be "Tatar Soviet Social Republic" ("Tatar SSR" or "The Republic of Tatarstan"). Republic's Supreme body of power shall be named "The Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR" and its enacting acts shall be named: acts of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR.
  5. The present declaration shall be the basis for Tatar Constitution, for Tatar legislation, for participation of Tatar SSR in drafting and signing the Union Treaty, for agreements with the Russian Federation and other republics. It also shall be the basis for the presentation of the most important questions of state formation of Tatar SSR, its relations with the USSR, with the Russian Federation and other republics for the consideration of its people. The Constitution and the acts of Tatar SSR shall be supreme on the territory of Tatar SSR.
  6. Before the adoption of new Constitution of Tatar SSR, other laws and regulations of Tatar SSR, acting laws of Tatar SSR, of the Russian Federation and the USSR remain valid on the territory of Tatar SSR, unless they contradict the Declaration on the state sovereignty of the Tatar SSR.
- The present Declaration shall come into force from the date of its adoption.

M. Shaimiev,  
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tatar Soviet Social Republic  
*Kazan, August 30, 1990*

### Resolution Regarding the Referendum on State Sovereignty, 21 February 1992.

Taking into account the fact that the determination of state status of the Republic of Tatarstan is the most important question of state activity, concerning the interest of each citizen, and ensuring the constitutional principle of the execution of state power by people directly by means of referendum, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatarstan Republic RESOLVES:

1. To submit the question on state status of the Republic of Tatarstan at a referendum.
2. To conduct the referendum on March 21, 1992.
3. To include in the ballot paper the following formulation of the question submitted at the referendum and the variants of voters' answers: "Do You agree, that the Republic of Tatarstan is the sovereign state, the subject of international law, forming its relations with the Russian Federation, other republics and states on the basis of equal agreements?" "Yes" or "No".
4. To establish an order according to which during the referendum, which shall be conducted on March 21. Central election Committee on the Deputy elections shall fulfill duties of Central referendum's Committee on the basis of article 19 of the Tatarstan's Law "On the referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan"; in the regions - the corresponding regional and urban election Committees on the Deputies' elections shall fulfill duties of the regions' and urban referendum's Committee.
5. To establish an order according to which those who have no permanent place of residence on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan shall not take part in the referendum.

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<sup>34</sup> All texts published by Kazan State University.



6. To oblige the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, local Soviets of People's Deputies to ensure the guarantees of citizens' free will on the referendum's question in strict accordance with the Law "On the referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan". To exclude the possibility of any pressure on citizens, preventing them from realization of their right to take part at the referendum.
7. To invite representatives from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), representatives from Russia's Republics and international organizations who wish to take part in the control process as observants.
8. To oblige Regional and urban Soviets of People's Deputies to ensure the organization of polling places and the referendum's Committees not later than on February 25.
9. To oblige the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan to settle the questions, concerning the material and financial maintenance on conducting referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan, the questions of transport and communication service according to needs of Central election Committee of the Republic of Tatarstan by the time before March 1.
10. To recommend social amalgamations, mass media, their editorial boards to ensure a comprehensive and objective interpretation of the essence of referendum's question, the method of voting in easily understood form for wide sections of population.
11. Voting results shall be determined all over the Republic of Tatarstan in general.
12. According to article 1 of Republic's Law "On the referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan", the answer at the referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan shall be final, shall be valid on the whole territory of the Tatarstan Republic and shall be revoked or changed only by means of a new referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan.

F. Mukhametshin,  
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan  
*Kazan, February 21, 1992*

### Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan (extract), 6 November 1992.

Article 1. The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a sovereign democratic state, expressing the will and interests of the whole multinational people of the republic.

The sovereignty and powers of the state shall come out from the people.

The state sovereignty shall be an inalienable qualitative status of the Republic of Tatarstan.

Article 4. Tatar and Russian shall be equally official languages in the Republic of Tatarstan.

Article 5. The state bodies in the Republic of Tatarstan shall take guidance from the principles of legal state, i.e. from the supremacy and strict observation of laws, division of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

Article 8. The Republic of Tatarstan shall reject violence and war as the means of setting disputes among the states and nations. The territory of The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a zone, free of mass destination weapons.

The propaganda of war shall be prohibited in The Republic of Tatarstan.

Article 9. The earth, mineral wealth, water, forest and other natural resources, the animal and vegetable kingdom, means of state budget, assets of national banks, cultural and historical values of the peoples of Tatarstan and other estate ensuring the economic independence of the republic, the preservation of material and spiritual culture, shall be the property of the whole people.

Article 11. The economic activities in The Republic of Tatarstan shall be based on private, state-owned, municipal (communal) and public property.

Land plots and other subjects, objects and projects, used in any sphere of activities not prohibited by the law, may be the private property.

The property of other states, international organizations, foreign juridical persons and aliens, stateless persons as well as the joint property of private citizens, juridical persons and the state shall be allowed in The Republic of Tatarstan.

Article 19. The Republic of Tatarstan shall have its own citizenship. Reasons, procedures of acquiring and renouncing the citizenship of The Republic of Tatarstan shall be established by the Law on the Citizenship of The Republic of Tatarstan.

Citizens of The Republic of Tatarstan shall be admitted to the citizenship of the Russian Federation - Russia.

Citizens of The Republic of Tatarstan may acquire the citizenship of other states under conditions determined by treaties and agreements between The Republic of Tatarstan and other states. Citizens of The Republic of Tatarstan may keep dual citizenship or renounce it.

Each person shall have the right to choose the citizenship and the right to change it. Deprivation of citizenship or of the right to change the citizenship shall be prohibited.



Article 59. The Republic of Tatarstan shall independently determine its state and legal status, making decisions concerning political, economic, socio-cultural development. The laws of The Republic of Tatarstan shall enjoy supremacy all over its territory, unless they contradict international obligations of The Republic of Tatarstan.

Article 61. The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a sovereign state, a subject of international law, associated to the Russian Federation - Russia - on the base of the Treaty on Mutual Delegation of Powers and Subjects under Jurisdiction.

Article 62. The Republic of Tatarstan shall establish relations with other countries, adhere international treaties, exchange diplomatic, consular, commercial and other missions, participate in international organizations, taking guidance from the principles of international law.

Generally recognized principles and norms of the international law shall prior to the laws of The Republic of Tatarstan.

*Adopted on November 6, 1992*

### Bilateral Treaty between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, 15 February 1994.

#### T R E A T Y

between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan

"On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan"

The plenipotentiaries of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan: empowered by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan; based on the universally recognized right of all nationalities to self-determination and the principals of equality, voluntariness and free will;

having the aim to guarantee the preservation of territorial integrity and the common economic interest;

wishing to promote the preservation and development of historical and national customs, cultures, languages;

being concerned about ensuring civil peace, international accord and national security;

acknowledging the priority of basic human rights and freedoms regardless of nationality, religion, location of habitation and other differences;

taking into account that the Republic of Tatarstan, as a State, is united with the Russian Federation according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Treaty "On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan", and participates in international and foreign economic relations, have agreed to the following:

#### Article I

Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present Treaty.

#### Article II

The Republic of Tatarstan has its own Constitution and Legislation.

The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall execute the authority of state power and shall:

- 1) guarantee the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms;
- 2) form the republic budget, define and impose the republic taxes;
- 3) decide issues concerning jurisprudence and notary public;
- 4) implement the legal regulation of administrative, family and housing relationships, as well as relations in the area of environmental protection and use of nature;
- 5) grant amnesty to individuals, convicted by the courts of the Republic of Tatarstan;
- 6) decide issues of possession, use and disposal of land, mineral wealth, water, timber and other resources, as well as state enterprises, organizations, other movable and immovable state property, located on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan, which is the exclusive property of Tatarstan's people except for units of federal property. Delimitation of the state property shall be governed by a separate Agreement;
- 7) establish the system of state governmental bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, their organizational structure and activity;
- 8) decide issues of the republic citizenship;



- 9) establish the order for alternative civil service on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan for citizens who have the right to substitute their service in the armed forces according to federal law;
- 10) establish and maintain relations, conclude treaties and agreements with the republics, territories, regions, autonomous districts and regions, with the cities of Moscow and St.-Petersburg of the Russian Federation, which shall not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, the present Treaty and other agreements between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan;
- 11) participate in international affairs, shall establish relations with foreign states and conclude treaties, which shall not contradict the Constitution and international obligations of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present Treaty, shall participate in the activity of corresponding international organizations;
- 12) create a National Bank pursuant to a separate Agreement;
- 13) independently conduct foreign economic activity. The delimitation of authorities in the field of foreign economic activity shall be settled by a special Agreement;
- 14) decide on the order established by a separate Agreement, questions of conversion for enterprises, which are in the possession of the Republic of Tatarstan;
- 15) establish state awards and honorary titles of the Republic of Tatarstan.

### Article III

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan jointly are authorized to:

- 1) guarantee the civil rights and freedoms of persons and citizens, the rights of national minorities;
- 2) protect sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- 3) organize mobilization of the national economy, direction of the design and production of armament and military equipment on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; questions concerning the sale of armament, ammunition, military equipment and other military property, as well as conversion of the defense industry. The form and share of the Parties' participation shall be governed by a separate Agreement;
- 4) settle the common and contradictory questions of citizenship;
- 5) coordinate the international and foreign economic relationship;
- 6) coordinate pricing policy;
- 7) create funds for regional development;
- 8) pursue monetary policy;
- 9) manage the items of property of the Russian Federation or the Republic of Tatarstan, which may be transferred to common management according to interest based on voluntary and mutual consent. The forms and the order for common management of specific items shall be governed by a separate Agreement;
- 10) coordinate activity on questions of geodesy, meteorology and calendar system;
- 11) create joint funds for the purpose of financing common programs, elimination of the consequences of disasters and catastrophes on the basis of mutual agreements;
- 12) coordinate the management of common power system as well as highway, railway, pipe, air and tubing, water transport, communications and information systems;
- 13) ensure an unobstructed and duty-free regime for movement of transportation of vehicles, cargoes and production by air, sea, river, railway, motor road and also through pipe transport;
- 14) estimate the quality of environment conditions according to international standards and promote the measures for its stabilization and restoration; secure the ecology, coordinate the action concerning use of land, water and other natural resources; prevent ecological disasters and settle questions on specially protected natural territories;
- 15) implement common policy in the social sphere: population employment patterns, migration processes, social protection, including social welfare;
- 16) coordinate activity on issues of health, family protection, maternity, paternity, childhood, education, science, culture, physical culture and sport; preparation of national specialists for schools, educational institutions, establishments of culture, mass media and other institutions and organizations; shall provide pre-school organizations and educational institutions with native language literature; shall coordinate scientific research in the field of history, national cultures and their languages;
- 17) deal with problems of personnel for justice and police enforcement;
- 18) settle litigation, arbitration and notary public question;
- 19) coordinate the activity of police enforcement agencies, the cooperation of security services, creation and use of programs to combat crime;
- 20) establish common principals for organization of state bodies and local self-government;
- 21) establish administrative, administrative-legal, labor, family, housing, land, water, timber legislation, legislation on mineral wealth, on protection of the surrounding environment;
- 22) address the questions of common use of land, mineral wealth, water and other natural resources;
- 23) execute other authority established by mutual agreement.



#### Article IV

Within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its State Bodies are found:

- 1) the adoption and alteration of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, as well as control of their observance; the implementation of the federal system and the territory of the Russian Federation;
- 2) regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; questions of citizenship in the Russian Federation; regulation and protection of rights of national minorities;
- 3) establishment of a system of federal legislative, executive and judicial power and the order of their organization and activity; formation of federal bodies of state authority;
- 4) the federal state property and its management;
- 5) establishment of the basis of federal policy and federal programs in the fields of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation;
- 6) establishment of the legal basis for a common market; finance, currency, credit, customs regulation, money supply, principals of general price policy; federal economic agencies, including federal banks;
- 7) the federal budget, federal taxes and duties, federal funds for regional development;
- 8) the federal power system, nuclear energy, fissionable materials; federal transport, communication pathways, information and communication systems, space activity;
- 9) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international agreements of the Russian Federation; questions of war and peace;
- 10) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation;
- 11) defense and security; the defense industry; the determination of the order of sale and purchase of armament, ammunition, military equipment and other military property; production of poisonous substance, drugs and the order of their use;
- 12) the determination of the status and defense of the state frontier, territorial waters, air space, the exclusive economic area and continental shelf of the Russian Federation;
- 13) the judicial system; the procurator's Office; penal legislation, criminal procedure and penal-executive legislation; amnesty and clemency; civil, civil procedure and arbitration-procedural legislation;
- 14) federal conflict law;
- 15) the meteorological service, standards, standard metres, metric system of measures, time calculation, geodesy, cartography, names of geographical places; formal statistics and book-keeping;
- 16) state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;
- 17) federal state service.

#### Article V

Judicial documents, issued by state bodies, institutions and officials of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan within the limits of authority of these state bodies, institutions and officials, shall be valid.

#### Article VI

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation as well as the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have no rights to issue any legal acts on issues, which do not relate to their area of responsibility.

The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan as well as the Federal State Bodies shall have the right to protest against the acts of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan where they infringe upon the present Treaty.

Disputes on the execution of authority in the sphere of common competence of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be settled in accordance with the procedure agreed to between the Parties.

#### Article VII

For the purpose of execution of the present Treaty the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have the right to conclude additional agreements, create joint structures and commissions on an equal footing.

#### Article VIII

The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have plenipotentiary representatives in the cities of Moscow and Kazan.

#### Article IX

No unilateral cancellation, alteration or amendment of the present Treaty or its provisions shall become valid.

The Treaty shall become effective 7 days after its signing and shall be published for public dissemination.

The present Treaty is concluded on February 15, 1994 in the city of Moscow in two copies, each in Russian and Tatar, both texts having equal judicial force.

On behalf of the  
Russian Federation:

President of the  
Russian Federation  
B. Yeltsin

Prime Minister of the  
Russian Federation  
V. Chernomyrdin

On behalf of the  
Republic of Tatarstan:

President of the  
Republic of Tatarstan  
M. Shaimiev

Prime Minister of the  
Republic of Tatarstan  
M. Sabirov

*Moscow, February 15, 1994*



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