



1968

Radical Moral Theology: Existentialists and Analysts Negate Christendom

Steven Hughes '68
Illinois Wesleyan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/religion_honproj



Part of the [Religion Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Hughes '68, Steven, "Radical Moral Theology: Existentialists and Analysts Negate Christendom" (1968). *Honors Projects*. 16.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/religion_honproj/16

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.

©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

Radical Moral Theology:
Existentialists and Analysts
Negate Christendom

by

Steven Hughes
//

ARCHIVES

BJ
1251
H8

Submitted for Honors Work
In the Department of Religion
Illinois Wesleyan University
Bloomington, Illinois
1968

Illinois Wesleyan Univ. Libraries
Bloomington, Ill. 61701

Accepted by the Department of Religion of
Illinois Wesleyan University in fulfillment of the
requirement for departmental honors.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "James E. Whitcomb". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Project Adviser

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
PART ONE: A REJECTION OF BARTH, SCHLEIERMACHER, COX, BULTMANN, TILlich, AND H. RICHARD NIEBUHR.....	5
PART TWO: A CONSIDERATION OF VAN BUREN AND ALTIZER.....	22
PART THREE: AN AFFIRMATION OF THE DEATH OF GOD IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEW HUMANITY.....	49
CONCLUSION.....	53
END NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	54

INTRODUCTION

What difference does it make? Once again in the springtime a few seniors restlessly sit behind typewriters with sweaty keys. In particular some of us are writing a paper that may complete an Honors project. If these Honors papers are accepted, they are placed upon a musty shelf in the Buck Library Archives. Suppose we "negate" this situation. To understand what this negation might mean we must first look closely at our supposition. Does this mean that we are trying to prove that Departmental Honors Programs are merely a "booby" prize for being smart? Hopefully this strange, confused statement is not what is meant. Perhaps the writer of this paper could explain. Yes, I believe he can. The supposition was meant to merely be a starting place from which to spring what Thomas Altizer termed a "private myth." For any myth to be private it must necessarily be one that is neither generally known nor easily available to anyone. This means that someone has created from his imagination a new vision "that reflects and unveils a new form of the cosmos and history," according to Mr. Altizer. However, this is somewhat more than we can claim for the narrow negation suggested above.

Perhaps the most fruitful procedure at this point would be to try to unravel the unclear use of words in the above paragraph. First some clarification of the situation would be helpful. If some senior sits restlessly in the springtime, one would normally expect

that these words were being used to show that these particular seniors would rather be doing something else. Next some clarification of the negated supposition must be spelled out. We know that the word negation is not used in the sense of making fun of the Honors project, since "'booby' prize for being smart" is judged an inadequate explanation of negation. We also know that the writer had some intentional and existential meaning in mind from the reference to the writer and the confusing conversation the writer is having with himself. Furthermore, the writer clarifies himself by making an extensional and analytic statement about his intentional and existential idea or image. This statement informs us that Thomas Altizer uses negation in some connection with "private myth." However, the writer cautions us that he is talking in a narrower sense.

With this clarification of the first paragraph, perhaps we can now push through to a reasonable description of the negation of the situation in question. But we find that this is impossible until we have some further expression of intent by the writer. At present we might pursue the sentence "What difference does it make?" This is a rather common phrase especially among seniors in the springtime, so that we might say that nothing particularly helpful can be gained from an investigation of this phrase. At least, we could say that any further conclusions concerning the term negation at this time would be merely speculation.

Hopefully, the foregoing discussion gives some specific hints about the meaning of the title of this paper and about a direction for the development of the meaning of the title. The following is designed to clarify these hints and outline the organization of this

paper. Moral Theology is not an often used term, nor is it meant to be a technical term. Rather one can easily guess its meaning. "Moral" ordinarily refers to the correctness, rightness, or appropriateness of an action, person, institution, document, etc. In this case "moral" modifies the word "theology" which would establish some connection between saying of something that it is moral and viewing the world as if it were created, ruled, judged, etc. by God. In the introductory example there was at least some hint of the type of moral situations with which this paper will be concerned, namely the "ought" of our daily activities. If the hint "private myth" is associated with theology, one can understand that some new vision of our existential situation is under consideration. Further, that this new vision is radical in the sense that it is neither generally known nor easily available and hence destined to be a shock to the status quo. Accepting this view of radical, implicitly necessitates dealing in some way with someone who is trying to communicate an existential vision. Here existential simply reaffirms the definition of radical given above as it relies upon the privacy of the vision for its meaning. Hopefully, this clears up the phrase radical existentialists.

Two other terms not yet explicitly mentioned occur in the title--Analysts and Christendom. Analysts should be easily understood, for it is meant in the ordinary way. In addition, the word "analysts" should have been clear if the system of discussion on page two was at all successful. However, we must once again consider the meaning of the word radical.. Actually the distinction is easily described. Being a middle-class, Midwestern, white, Protestant type, the writer considers

all linguistic analysts and ordinary language philosophers who concern themselves at all with religion to be radical. This radicalism is most evident when one considers the implications of the analysts' view that everything that exists, exists in space, time and cause. Finally, the word Christendom, the one word in the title which is meant in a rather technical sense, means all those claiming any official or unofficial connection, concern, belief, etc. similar to the public organization and dogma of the various Christian churches.

For some years now the split in philosophy has been between the linguistic analysts and the existentialists. Now it seems that a similar split is emerging at the far left of theological dialogue. However, this writer shall try to show that there is an organic connection between these two groups of theologians, especially when they consider morality. In part these two groups are intertwined to the point of interdependence in the example given at the beginning of this paper. The goal of this paper is to develop the vague hint of this relationship given in the example in the following ways: (1) by briefly describing the men and ideas that the analysts and existentialists at the radical left consider influential, (2) by giving some reasons for rejecting the influential men and ideas considered in (1), (3) by outlining the basic tenants held by the analysts and the existentialists, (4) by comparing and contrasting these positions, and (5) by evaluating the relevance of these positions.

PART ONE

This first part is by no means designed to be a comprehensive history of theology in the last two centuries. In fact it may be viewed as a description of a few influential ideas that have been rejected and/or refuted by certain radical existentialists and analysts. These ideas have been selected in part from Altizer's categorization of the famous theologians of the last century. For Altizer,³ Barth is the ecumenical and neo-Reformation leader in theology.¹ However, Altizer sees this as a political job that is not directly related to theology. If one can in any way accept Barth as the incarnation of the Establishment, then perhaps describing Harvey Cox as "pop Barth" follows naturally. Cox is then the one who has given a new language to the neo-orthodox tradition.² Many questions arise about the terms Altizer applies to his categorization of Barth and Cox. However, ~~an argument with~~ Altizer about terms is unnecessary, if, by analyzing the ideas Altizer associates with Barth and Cox, one can begin to understand more clearly just what is negated in the "private myth" Altizer is expressing. Thus, I shall, on the one hand, try to outline a few of the ideas Altizer associates with major theologians and briefly discuss their possible influence upon Altizer and radical theology. Certainly this is a rather questionable technique to choose. However, even though one may dispute not only the accuracy with which the ideas are formulated but also their

influence upon Altizer and radical theology, I maintain that these ideas do point toward a radical theology and have certainly been departures for some theologians from Barth, Cox, Bultmann, Heidegger, Tillich, etc.

On the other hand, this is not a paper only about Altizer. Thus, Schleiermacher and H. Richard Niebuhr will be discussed in this section to simply explain what type of liberalism is dead, or rather negated. These men were chosen as the representatives of liberalism, in what I term Moral Theology, because of their place in the history of theology and their great influence in the 1950's.

Finally this section will be concluded with a few comments about Alfred Jules Ayer's logical positivism and G.E. Moore's ethics as a means of introducing the radical analytic camp. Thus, this part will cover points (1) and (2) listed on page four.

In a real sense, one can understand Schleiermacher as a thesis which Barth negated in an antithesis of "crisis theology or" dialectical theology". If this is true then a probing of this relationship should give rise to some sort of synthesis. First, however, it is necessary to understand in what sense Barth negated Schleiermacher.

We are apprehensive of the righteousness of God because we feel much too small and too human for anything different and new to begin in us and among us. This is our despair.

... apart from the righteousness of God there is nothing to reflect upon, to reform, or to aim at; ... that the primary matter is a very decided Yes and No to a whole new world of life.

And because we are so proud and so despairing we build a tower at Babel.

The crisis Barth is talking about becomes even clearer when he says

... to whom (God) in our pride and despair we have erected the tower of Babel; to the great personal or impersonal, mystical, philosophical or naive Background and Patron Saint of our human righteousness, morality, state, civilization, or religion... Is God righteous?.. It is our calamity,... this god, to whom we have built the tower of Babel, is not God. He is an idol. He is dead.

Perhaps these words of Schleiermacher will set the stage for a comparative discussion of the thesis and antithesis involved:

From what we have now said it is already clear how we must judge the assertion that piety is a state in which Knowing, Feeling, and Doing are combined.

The piety which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a modification of Feeling, or immediate self-consciousness.

... the self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.

For those who rejoice in an original idea of the Supreme Being derived from some other quarter, but who have no experience of piety, will not tolerate the statement that the expression of that feeling posits the action of the very same thing which is expressed in their original idea. They assert that God is a mere fiction, an idol... And those... base their position on the contention that the representation of God ... destroys itself. Meanwhile, religious men know that it is only in speech that they cannot avoid anthropomorphic: in their immediate consciousness they keep the object separate from its mode of representation...

In order to compare and contrast these statements, it is helpful first to think of Richard R. Niebuhr's description of the two men.

"Schleiermacher is the prototype of the theologian who takes

seriously the Enlightenment and especially its discovery of religion as an historical, human phenomenon, and The Christian Faith is his classic effort to reconcile the empirical, descriptive, approach to Christianity as a human religion with the Christian faith in Jesus of Nazareth as the redeemer of mankind. "... the Karl Barth⁵ protested against the liberal captivity of Protestantism and attempted to emancipate their generation from the influence of Schleiermacher, because his position so little accorded with the revelation-oriented theology of those later times and its premise of the infinite, qualitative difference between eternity and time." 9

Although Altizer does not even think that Barth is doing theology, his negation of god would certainly also negate Schleiermacher's bold assertion that the expression of a feeling posits an action that has the same essence as the original idea but not the same words, and at the same time gives rise to the possibility of a new vision or private myth. Thus it would seem that in some sense Barth clears the way for Altizer. Nevertheless, implicit in Barth's conclusion is the premise that men feel small and empty apart from God. Then the crisis of man arises. Will man live with the righteousness of God? or Will man try it on his own? Barth says yes to the first question and Schleiermacher says yes to the second question. But Barth claims he is saying yes and no "to a whole new world of life." This further extension of the dialectic is exploited by Altizer, but Barth's decision to accept what Altizer claims is a neo-Reformation interpretation of the Bible is rejected. Barth is consistent, for if we in no sense can build one of Schleiermacher's idols, neither can we build upon the

Biblical myth nor create a new myth--revelation is our only possibility.

If Schleiermacher had maintained that the words in the idea, the words connected with the feeling, the words expressed in the action, all have the same essence, then he would have been a great input into the analytic tradition. At most, it is hard to understand what the essence of God represented in piety is like for Schleiermacher. The intertwining of knowledge, feeling, and action is certainly realized by Hare when he does moral philosophy, just as being caught up in some feeling is realized by Van Buren when he talks about the Easter Event. Therefore, in one sense Schleiermacher is still influencing analytic thought just as Barth is still influencing existential thought. In another sense, both Van Buren when he almost equates faith and understanding and Hare when he almost equates imperatives and moral language seem to spell out the essence to the extent that they too almost claim that no essence in the sense Schleiermacher uses the word exists. They would both probably ask what it could possibly mean for an action and a feeling to have some representation in common other than the words used to describe and express these feelings and actions, and the words used to evaluate this description and expression. Hare's and Van Buren's positions will be spelled out in Part Two. At the present, it is only important to realize in what ways Barth and Schleiermacher are accepted and in what ways they are not accepted.

Perhaps Altizer's disregard for the contribution of Harvey Cox is very obvious if we have understood the parts of Schleiermacher

and Barth that have been rejected above. However, if this is true then we are assuming that Altizer would reject Schleiermacher for the same reason that Van Buren and Hare would reject him. Suppose, until Altizer's position is spelled out later, that this is true. Thus, Cox may in fact be accepting the neo-orthodox interpretation of the Bible and be saying that our actions and feelings somehow reflect the essence of God if we live in dependence upon God and can experience piety as Schleiermacher defined it. Cox can deceive us, unless we are careful, by seeming to say something very radical, that is, denying neo-orthodoxy and some vague essence.

First, Cox interpretes the creation as the disenchantment of nature, ~~that is, nature, man, and God are all separate~~. But this is also true in the three story view of the universe. Cox hasn't departed from orthodoxy yet. Second, Cox claims that the Exodus was the desacralization of politics.

Political leaders in the West have by and large accepted the fact that they can make only provisional and limited demands on their citizens... Our political consciences have all been secularized.¹⁰

Seemingly, Cox has now affirmed the secular world as the organizing authority for our lives. This means that man is in some way responsible for the way life is here on earth. Once again Cox has said nothing to deny the neo-orthodoxy that Altizer associates with Barth, for Barth claimed that it was the crisis of man that he is responsible but not righteous. Thus, even though we are responsible and the sacred does not permeate either nature or politics, somehow God has an essence that we need or that we have and don't realize?

... Paul Tillich once called this age, marked as it is by the disappearance of securely grounded values, the land of broken symbols... Like nature and politics they are no longer the direct expression of the Divine Will. ¹¹

The Bible does not deny the reality of the gods and their values; it merely relativizes them. ¹²
It accepts them as human projections...

If one accepts that nature, politics, and values are relative and that we are in a new period of history (Cox quotes Van Peursen), the period of functional thinking, then what is the place of God. It would seem that man is responsible for and controls everything, and that nothing is ultimate except in the sense of some type of logical or functional rules. For example, we do have certain rules by which we play certain games, by which machines can be said to operate correctly or incorrectly, by which we can know what another person means when he uses language correctly, etc. But on the other hand, all empirical situations are described simply by the function or use involved in that situation. Well then what is the place of God?

God is merely a name, the name is everything. The name points and locates something in history. Since language grows out of a sociocultural milieu then the name God is also a sociological problem. ¹³

...we must alter the social context in which "speaking of God occurs" and refuse to play out our cultural roles, ¹⁴ which trivialize whatever the speaker says.

Cox claims some kind of a partnership between God and man. Man is the chosen one for the partnership and man needs God. But what kind of a partnership is this if we must refuse to play

out our cultural roles because it trivializes speaking of God. Are we responsible or aren't we? Perhaps then what we have to do is live life God's way and not with our idols and relative values. But this is to negate these idols and clearly Cox doesn't want to do that. Rather he wants to say that the Bible authorizes the relativism of our values, nature, and politics, but at the same time that God is very meaningful because of this very sociocultural situation. Well, then how is it that we play alongside God and confront him in our functional thinking. Apparently, we are stuck with Schleiermacher's essence if we are to give any sort of clear explanation at all. The confrontation must be one that we realize through feelings when we say the word God. But this does not mean that God equals our actions or the word, but rather this represents the way God works in a partnership with man.

Thus we see that Cox still accepts the neo-orthodox view disguised in new language and still accepts some feeling about God, or maybe in some strange sense the revelation of God, which arises as the essence in our activity. The only reason Cox seems radical is that he does not spell out his case as clearly as Barth and Schleiermacher, and he uses non-technical language.

Altizer lodges some of his most fierce criticism against Tillich and Bultmann. A review of these arguments should point toward the arena in which Altizer's own ideas begin to develop. For Altizer the problem with Bultmann and Tillich begins when "Bultmann will not demythologize the Kerygma and Tillich's method of correlation demands a preservation of the form of traditional

Christian symbols. Altizer agonizingly yearns for a contemporary view of "Existenz" that takes into account what Altizer terms post-Christian history. In order to accomplish this task both the "outer now" of objective "Historie" and the "inner now" of subjective "Geschichte" must be negated, claims Altizer. For example, "the theological method of the mature Tillich, particularly as contained in the second volume of his Systematic Theology, is grounded in the traditional Christian principle that Christ is the "answer" to the "Angst" (fear) of the human condition. Once granted that "Existenz" in our time is swallowed up in a radically immanent mode of being, then the Christ who is an "answer" to our condition must be a wholly immanent Word that is fully detached from the Jesus of history."¹⁵ However, at the last second both Tillich and Bultmann stick in the transcendent Word that is the ground of our being, the Unconditioned, the Word of faith, or some other phrase for the historic forms of the Christian faith. Altizer maintains that this transcendent and immanent Word is simply a contradiction. Both Tillich and Bultmann have denied the dialectical position of either radical transcendence or radical immanence. Instead Tillich and Bultmann end with the involved contradiction of partial transcendence and partial immanence.

Altizer maintains, specifically concerning Bultmann's method and theology, that he is doing much the same sort of thing that Tillich is doing, translating eschatological symbols into categories referring only to human existence. Unlike Tillich, Bultmann's concern is to construct a biblical rather than an ontological theology. Nevertheless, Bultmann sacrifices the historical Jesus to an "existential" Word.

Before considering the writings of Tillich and Bultmann themselves, one must realize some of the premises upon which Altizer has lodged his attack. To a greater extent than either Tillich or Bultmann, Altizer experiences existence as one thing. This simply means that one assumes a great deal when he says that the dialectical method of viewing the world is the only correct view. But what else can be the case? Whenever one thinks of a conflict, he tries to envision the end of the conflict, or a method by which to end the conflict. There is a conflict in Vietnam, a conflict in the ghettos, a conflict in my fraternity house. The conflict in Vietnam may be ended by radical military aggression. The conflict in the ghettos may be resolved by revolution. The conflict in the fraternity may be resolved by vicious slander, dangerous and harmful pranks, or by a handshake. Certainly, the dialectic method necessarily recognizes that whenever contradictory forces are set loose, they must be resolved. For Altizer the Death of God resolved the conflicts in the Christian era. Now it is absurd to not move toward an immanence that rejects any metaphysical outer and inner history concepts or objective and subjective existence concepts. Obviously, Altizer means God is Dead and that we must find a new myth within which to live. Implicitly, Altizer seems to suggest that this myth will lead to a new concept of God. The connection between radical existentialism and radical analytic thought should be rather clear now. Both accept the same view of existence-- God is Dead, metaphysics is dead, experience is simply what we experience.

But Tillich and Bultmann have both tried to move toward an immanent view of Christianity. They stopped short because they believed that God lives and that there is more than what we experience. Altizer has accepted the existential viewpoint, but not the duality of immanence and transcendence.

Macquarrie maintains in his discussion of Bultmann that "man can understand the being of God as somehow analogous to his own." ¹⁶

The Bible thinks of God as personal and historical. This concept is utterly different from the concepts of God which have been current in Greek and western philosophy. ... The difference between such concepts of God and the Biblical concept may be expressed by saying that the former understand his being under the categories of substantiality, the latter understands his being under the categories of existentiality. ¹⁷

Bultmann claims he means several things when he speaks of God.

I deny the worldly connection as a whole when I speak of God. I deny the worldly connection of events when I speak of myself, my personal existence is no more visible and capable of proof than is God as acting. ¹⁸

God is working here and there, but His action is hidden, for it is not directly identical with the visible event. ¹⁹

This is the paradox of faith, that faith "nevertheless" understands as God's action here and now an event which is completely intelligible in the natural or historical connection of events. This "nevertheless" (Tillich's in spite of) is inseparable from faith. ²⁰

Macquarrie finally spells out the decision for us.

Thus man must choose between God and the world--this is to say, between being his true self in a life of obedience to his ²¹Creator, and losing himself in serving the creaturely.

... the biblical writers communicate a different kind of knowledge-- the knowledge of individual human existence before God, which defies the kind of classification and generalization ²²which are appropriate only to the objects of nature.

The difference between Bultmann's position and Altizer's contention should be evident. The only point of confusion may be that both Bultmann and Altizer are existentialists. But this is only an apparent confusion. Altizer commends Bultmann for his existential demythologizing, but not as a method by which to negate the historical Jesus or our experience. Certainly the biblical writers were talking about a kind of knowledge different than the categorizing of chairs, but not different from our experience of existence. God's action is hidden because it doesn't exist. There is a strange confusion in saying that I don't know my own existence, in the way I know that the chair exists and thereby trying to say that I know God exists. Consider the sentence I cause my finger to move the typewriter key. Bultmann must claim that I cause my finger to move is different than my finger causing the typewriter key to move. For Bultmann the difference must be that I am somehow free from the natural laws of cause and effect and space and time. Unlike my self, my finger must cause the typewriter key to move if I cause my finger to move. But when I think of myself, I think of the image I see in the mirror, the dreams, ideas, etc that I have, the feelings and emotions that I experience, the forces that cause me to make some action. What am I like if I am not wholly within space, time and cause, but rather partially within nature and partially outside of nature? This it seems to me is what Altizer is saying when he criticizes Bultmann for denying the dialectic and trying to maintain a partial immanence and partial transcendence. Ultimately Bultmann denies

what Altizer claims existence is and asks for man to choose between God and the world- -a choice not even open to Altizer. However, the evidence seems to be in favor of Altizer's claim since Bultmann's position is full of contradictions and vague analogies and descriptions. Nevertheless, this discussion is not a complete refutation of Bultmann, rather it points toward a radical approach to theology.

Tillich gives a somewhat different account of the world and God which is much more convincing and radically immanent.

Man has a world, namely, a structured whole of innumerable parts, a cosmos, as the Greeks called it, because of its structured character which makes it accessible to man through acts of creative receiving and transforming. ²³

Man can transcend his environment in any direction, in imagination, thought and action. Man has world through every part of his environment. His encounter with any of the objects surrounding him is always an encounter with the universe manifest in a particular object. ²⁴

Such an encounter presupposes freedom from the particular, and the ability to see the universal within the particular. The manifestation of this freedom is language. Language lives in universals. ²⁵

The moral imperative is the demand to become actually what one is essentially and therefore potentially. ²⁶

The "Will of God" for us is precisely our essential being with all its potentialities, ²⁷our created nature declared as "very good" by God...

Tillich uses the word "world" in a very strange way, as if the world is something different than everything in our environment.

Ryle maintains that such uses of words are category mistakes.

For example to take a tour of the campus with Lee Short, one would probably see the science building, the administration building, the

student center, the drama school, etc. If after the tour, the student said he enjoyed seeing all of those building but asked to see the University, this would be a category mistake. When Tillich talks about the world as something different than all the parts of our environment he makes a category mistake.²⁸ In a similar way it is confusing to talk about the universe manifest in a particular unless one means he can get a feeling that the plant is growing by looking at the plant. Or one can notice certain laws of nature by looking at a tree. Or ones imagination calls up many images when one looks at a tree or touches or thinks about a tree. Perhaps one even conceives of what a perfect tree might be like from all the trees he has seen. Certainly, to understand the word tree one has in some way become familiar with properties that are common to many trees, but that is not to say that those properties exist independent of the trees they refer to. In a similar sense words have no meaning unless they are used in some way and have a certain reference. To say that the moral imperative is the demand to become actually what one is essentially and therefore potentially is to make the same mistake again. Thus the "Will of God" can mean little more than proficiency or efficiency in performance. Van Buren will suggest that the moral imperative might be getting caught up in some feeling and experience that guides a persons life. But Tillich does not want to equate his "Will of God" with the impetus for some drive or demand to improve. Although Altizer may not have used this method of refutation, he maintains that partial transcendence and partial immanence as Tillich has outlined is not the answer.

One additional comparison of Altizer's view of negation and H. Richard Niebuhr's attempted synthesis of Existentialism maybe helpful to point out the dialectical view Altizer has in mind.

Niebuhr tries to include all of the various explanations of Christ and Culture into one organic form since it is impossible to state adequately by means of concepts and propositions a principle which presents itself in the form of a person.²⁹ For Niebuhr all of the virtues of Christ were the same whether a moralist, a metaphysician, or a historian gave a description of them.

The virtue of Christ which religious liberalism has magnified beyond all others is love.³⁰

... by eschatological interpretations that see him as the man of hope, and by existentialism that describes him as radically obedient. ... orthodox Protestantism ... the virtue of faith, and by monasticism... his great humility.³¹

...so in existentialism He becomes the mere counterpart of moral decision.³²

Our decisions as Christians in the midst of cultural history are existential as well as relative decisions. ... We must decide, we must proceed from history and speculation to action; in deciding we must act on the basis of what is true for us in individual responsibility; we must grasp what is true for us with the passion of faith; in our decision we need to go beyond what is intelligible and yet hold fast to it.³³

But there always has been a choice prior to our own.³⁴

Though we speak of it as if it were possibility we choose, it seems clear when we attend to it that even more than life and reason it is a power and a value for which we have been chosen.³⁵

Here, then, are two strands of faith, loyalty, and trust. ... Faith exists only in a community of selves in the presence of a transcendent cause.³⁶

Now that it has been called forth in us through him we see that it was always there, that without it we should

never have lived at all, that faithfulness
is the moral reason in all things.⁵⁷

At first glance it would seem that Niebuhr has in fact included all of the elements that correspond to the virtues of Christ and set them in an existential context of culture. However, several problems arise with the description of the way in which we make moral decisions. Being caught by some power or force besides our own reason and being guided by that myth or vision as we experience it even to the point of saying that one has faith that his decisions that are made during some sort of ecstatic, emotional, mystical, etc, state are valid is different than the presence of a transcendent cause. Although we need not be able to identify the exact physiological changes between the cause and the effect of some experience, we should be able to identify the cause as some thing or some idea or some sort of situation in our experience. Niebuhr, just like Tillich and Bultmann has suggested that something outside our experience has chosen us who are free and responsible. It seems that we are free and responsible only in the sense that if we live in faith, love, obedience, etc. to God then we automatically choose, by what we call free thought, the right way to act. Obviously Altizer would not accept this partial transcendence and partial immanence, especially in the sense that we are so controlled by an external force. There are many forces within our culture that compel us and control us, but to contradict my experience by claiming that some outside force compels my reasoning and chooses me seems mere speculation.

As a brief introduction to the next part of this paper which includes an explanation of radical analytic thought, I shall mention Ayer's emotive moral theory and Moore's indefinible, non-material good.

The importance of both theories rests upon the reaction against them. Ayer maintained that all moral language is used only to evoke emotion or express a matter of taste. This is to say that some moral arguments are really disguised moral arguments which actually refer to some standard such as the Constitution or to some authority such as the church. All other arguments are merely ones of taste.³⁸ If a person's taste is too abnormal he may need psychological treatment. The recording of these tastes is merely a matter for sociological research. The flaw in Ayer's argument is not realizing that under his description even much of the Constitution becomes a matter of taste. In addition, as Hare pointed out most moral statements are similar to imperative statements in that they entreat someone to do something and are a unified combination of a descriptive statement and a command in that a command is meaningless unless it refers to something. Realizing that moral utterances had a particular logical use of commanding, compelling, motivating, etc was a result of Moore's conclusion that good is some sort of entity that is indefinible, and non-material.³⁹ Hare realized that one should not ask what good meant but rather the purpose for which it was being used and in what sense and to what the word referred. Thus, to say "You ought to do so and so" is more than a matter of taste and is not some indefinible, non-material entity. A complete explanation of Hare's position will be given in Part Two.

PART TWO

In this part, I shall try to spell out the sorts of considerations being discussed in radical theology. Although Altizer is probably the most prominent theologian in the field, there are many other radical theologians with just as many different points of view. Using Altizer as a guideline I shall discuss the various philosophers, theologians, poets, playwrights, novelists, psychologists, economists, mystics, etc. that Altizer has found valuable in formulating a radical theology. As outlined in Part One, the linguistic analysis philosopher and the radical existentialist find themselves meeting in the common affirmation of the death of God. Many of the problems with the language of neo-orthodoxy were spelled out in the discussions in Part One. To develop this, I shall also discuss Van Buren's position so as to clarify other linguistic problems and outline the world view within which both Altizer and Van Buren are attempting to celebrate a new secular vision of existence.

A few ideas presented in Part One were affirmed by Altizer. Barth in a way clears the way for Altizer by eliminating any conceptualizing of God. In Schleiermacher the element of intertwining knowledge, feeling, and action into the representation of religion as immersed in the secular becomes an equation of faith and understanding in Van Buren. Cox seems to be of little help. Tillich and Bultmann are both helpful in that they both reject literal objectifiable theism and move toward an existential immanence. Niebuhr is no more helpful than Cox.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer began the contemporary radical movement when

he "described his situation as a Christian in a world 'come of age' in which men no longer believe in a transcendent realm where their longings will be fulfilled. Wishing not to retreat from this new world, Bonhoeffer began what he called a 'nonreligious interpretation' of biblical concepts."⁴⁰ "His question still lies before us: How can the Christian who is himself a secular man understand his faith in a secular way?"⁴¹ Pondering these thoughts the radical theology of Van Buren emerges in the method of linguistic analysis.

In a similar way Altizer believes "that a strong case can be made that the most decisive theological influence on the younger generation of Protestants today is Dietrich Bonhoeffer."⁴² Bonhoeffer's words are the only ones "written in the recent past that can help us understand the new era into which we are moving."⁴³ "What is this new era? It is the world of the new forms of technology, of mass media, of great danger and great experiment."⁴⁴

In Bonhoeffer's own words

God is teaching us that we must live as men who can get along very well without him. The God who is with us is the God who forsakes us. ...Before God and with him we live without God. God allows himself to be edged out of the world and onto the cross. God is weak and powerless in the world, and that is exactly the way, the only way, in which he can be with us and help us. (Letter of July 16, 1944)

It is much easier to understand why both Van Buren and Altizer were profoundly struck by Bonhoeffer when one considers what they rejected in Barth, Cox, Schleiermacher, Bultmann, Tillich, and Niebuhr. But now we must probe Bonhoeffer's influence to understand what the consequences of living within this influence had upon Van Buren and Altizer as they began formulating their vision of Christianity.

Van Buren's emphasis upon Bonhoeffer clearly lies in the words "understand," "secular," and "faith." As he develops his position, he begins to formulate some sort of ethical system, not totally unlike Bonhoeffer's ethics. For Bonhoeffer, ethics began with man's "fall." This is to say that man began trying to make his own decisions about good and evil. As a consequence man experienced shame, in the face of his nakedness and separation from God. This disunion spread from the God--man relation to the man-self relation. Conscience is the sign of self disunity. However, if we live in conscience, then we are on the first step to a re-uniting with God.

In the above description of Bonhoeffer's ethics, it is easy to guess Van Buren's departure from Bonhoeffer. Both men contemplate living without God. Both men emphasize understanding, secularity, and faith. Both men will point to ethics as the means of communicating the Christian message. However, since the method of linguistic analysis obviously implies that somehow our entire relation with the world is dependent upon and indeed permeated by our language, therefore our faith is somehow very closely bound to, if not identical to, understanding for Van Buren. This simply means that Van Buren accepts some of the following statements:

There are a variety of "language games," activities with their appropriate languages, and a modified verification principle is now used to ask what sort of things would count for an assertion and what sort of things would count against it.⁴⁵

The meaning of a word is not some invisible presence behind the word, some "ghost in the machine."⁴⁶

The problems of philosophy are not empirical problems, they are solved,⁴⁷ rather, by looking into the workings of our language.

Hare has invented the word blik for a fundamental attitude..... the ~~one~~ sees them (statements of faith) as expressions of a "blik", and orientation, a commitment to see the world in a certain way, and a way of life following inevitably upon this orientation.⁴⁸

I have argued further that we can use general terms, for example predicates (the chair is red), without conceding them to be names of abstract entities.⁴⁹

"You are going to shut the door (phrastic), yes(neustic)." (Hare's account of the sentence 'You ought to shut the door.')

⁵⁰

Without a close inspection of the above quotations, it is very evident that Bonhoeffer has in mind a nonverbal sort of mystical ethics that is based upon innocence guided by the Will of God. Throughout he has placed emphasis upon unity before the "fall" and shame after the fall, upon conscience as our guide rather than linguistic analysis, upon some implicit quest or search for a re-uniting with God. These make it clear that Bonhoeffer was not interested in "language games", in eliminating the essence behind the words, in the workings of our language, in a blik, in eliminating a concept of names as abstract entities, or in the imperative and descriptive parts of moral language. Rather Bonhoeffer wanted to affirm that we must immerse ourselves in living by delivering ourselves to Jesus Christ and thus to a reunion with God. Obviously the words "living" "delivering" "Jesus Christ" "reunion" and "God" are still used in the old neo-orthodox sense which Van Buren claims is meaningless by the affirmations listed above.

To clarify Van Buren's position some explanation of the quotations listed above must be outlined. Certainly Van Buren conceived of Jesus as some historical figure with whom a person can still be committed to and thus see the world in a certain way. This involves being caught up in something like the "spirit" of a baseball team, the "spirit" of Americanism, the "spirit" of Civil Rights, or the "spirit" of Christ. On the other hand this word spirit does not refer to any abstract entity, just as the university does not refer to something besides going to classes, raising money, constructing buildings, memorizing vocabulary words for a German test, etc. At the same time we do not have to point to some thing for the word spirit to mean something. Instead we must realize that there are a variety of "language games." We may say that we saw a spirit meaning that we hallucinated, had certain feelings, etc. Unlike a chair that we can empirically analyze, the above sense of spirit has a logical meaning of exhibiting. This is to say that we exhibit our hallucination or feeling by our actions as we "have" the sensation of seeing a spirit. Someone else knows we have had this experience because we exhibited it. However, for us to describe our experience leads us to suppose that some sort of an entity other than our sensations existed, just as such a method led Moore to suggest that "yellow" and "good" are non-material entities. But neither "yellow" nor "good" have any meaning separate from the purpose or logical use of these words. The only entity involved is the object or activity that is involved in the statement. For Hare this meant that every moral statement has two elements- -one which

adequately identifies the object or activity being referred to and in what sense that object or activity is meant, and secondly one which makes clear the logical purpose for uttering a sentence. The logical purpose is very clear when we say "I see a chair" for we are merely describing. However, when we say "Shut the door!" we obviously are commanding. And when we say "You ought to shut the door," Hare claims that we are making a special kind of imperative statement, the two elements of which can be clearly shown by the sentence "You are going to shut the door, yes."

Many philosophical problems arise with Hare's claim that the two elements of a moral statement can be somehow clearly distinguished and that all moral statements are forms of imperative statements. In addition neither Hare nor Van Buren are very clear about how it is that we select the best possible "blik". Is the Christ "blik" readily available? explainable? stronger? Do we simply accept the "blik" that is most generally accepted? But if we are products of a particular "blik" system, then how do we evaluate other "blik"s?

Perhaps most important at this point is to realize that Altizer follows Bonhoeffer much more closely in that he wants to depend upon mystical categories to deal with the death of God. In fact Altizer would answer Van Buren's dilemma by stating the question "What distinguishes this Christian from his non-Christian comrade?" and answering that the answer lies in study of the statement "Man is challenged to participate in the sufferings of God at the hands of a godless world."

Whether or not Altizer's answer is helpful depends upon the success with which he can establish a new myth within which the answer makes sense. At first it seems to be just another meaningless and contradictory metaphor. If God is dead what are his sufferings like? How is it that God suffers but is permanently absent from this world? In the rest of this section I shall try to make some sense of Altizer's position.

We must begin building the myth that Altizer has envisioned by first understanding what it means to negate Christendom. For Altizer Christendom is not only the church and the dogma accumulated throughout the history of the church, but Christendom is also the extension of the myth formalized by the church members and those who dogmatize the beliefs of these members into all of the institutions which organize our life. Thus, Christendom represents a dogmatic presentation of history, a formalized report of our existence presented for us in ritual, and a faith that we must live within unless we want to live in the chaos of emptiness.

Christendom is everything that Christianity has become in history.⁵⁴

Although Altizer does not spell out his argument except in very vague existential phrases quoted from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, etc., the following seems to me to be a fair restatement of his argument.

Since the formulation of the church, Christendom has been the negation of Christ. This means for Altizer that Christ was trying to start a new way of life by negating the past forms of society.

Jesus's proclamation of the Kingdom of God makes incarnate a transcendent Wholly Other, a Wholly Other that radically reverses the believer's existence in both the being and the values of the Old Aeon of history, and makes possible even now a participation in the New Aeon of grace.

...in the concept of "church" it (Christendom) has pronounced holy precisely what the "bringer of good tidings" felt to be beneath and behind himself- -one would look in vain for a greater example of word-historical irony.⁵²

Certainly this is a different but not contradictory explanation of the way in which Christ came to fulfill the covenant. To speak dialectically, necessitates, claims Altizer, that one first bring to an end the ways in which one lives. This means ending all of the social conventions and ending the myth within which we have our faith. This demythologizing parallels the negation of transcendence, the death of God, as the Word became totally Flesh in Jesus Christ. Since Christ made the Word totally immanent, the Kingdom of God was now possible. However, for this new way of life to emerge the parallel event of negating the old society became necessary. Instead the church fathers tried to maintain the old myth, and the old society in a doctrine of a new faith in Christ. These men simply did not understand that to free thought the form that the thought takes must be ended. Thus, we negate objectivity and become some type of mystic. It is only within this mystical structure of total subjectivity that faith can be ~~attached to~~ a new myth and finally expressed in a new society. In short, "existence in faith is existence by virtue of the absurd."

Finally subjectivity must be negated so that the dialectic can in fact become the New Aeon of grace.

Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel of being. Everything dies, every-blossoms again, eternally runs the year of being. ... In every Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the sphere There. The center is everywhere. Bent is the path of eternity.

Quote from Nietzsche

So likewise the "existential" truth of Eternal Recurrence shatters the power of the old order of history, transforming transcendence into immanence, and thereby making eternity incarnate in every Now. Eternal Recurrence is the dialectical antithesis of the Christian God. The creature becomes the Creator when the Center is everywhere. Hence Zarathustra, the proclaimer of Eternal Recurrence, is the first "immoralist" and his proclamation is a product of the "second innocence" of atheism.

Altizer's interpretation of Nietzsche

Christianity is a dysangel because it retreated into the very "history" which Jesus transcended and transformed, the transformation of the blessedness of Jesus' proclamation into the Negsaying of resentment (non dialectical negation).

Altizer believes that he has explained the uniqueness of Christianity within our existence. First, he includes the proclamation of the Incarnation since he ultimately establishes a dialectical unity of the sacred and the profane. Secondly, he includes a world-reversing form of ethics as formulated by Marx, Freud, Kafka, and Nietzsche. Thirdly, he firmly establishes the fact that Christianity is the only one of the world religions to have evolved or initiated a radically profane form of Existenz.

To evaluate this conclusion, we must re-consider certain problematic parts of the discussion of Altizer presented thus far. There are at least four points involved in Altizer's claim of dialectical unity

that are still unclear.

First, the word sufferings, in the quote from Bonhoeffer that Altizer gives in reply to the problem that Hare and Van Buren could not resolve, is still unclear. Just how does saying "Man is challenged to participate in the sufferings of God at the hands of a godless world" help us identify the Christ-blik as the right blik in a crowd of thousands of blik's? In addition how does Altizer's answer help us distinguish between the Christian and the non-Christian? Part of the answer is clearer now for we now have some conception of what our crisis is supposed to be like and what some of the characteristics of living in a godless world must lead toward. However, just how we identify the "believer" as he participates in the sufferings of God and just how this participation sets the Christian apart from the rest of the men in the world and yet is the sign of a complete immersion in Existenz is still rather vague. Therefore, I shall discuss some of Kierkegaard's discourses as a means of clarifying Altizer's claim.

Second, the criteria of accomplishment that Altizer set for himself was the vision of a new myth within which man can view his existence. So far, we have only given a basic description of the dialectical method Altizer uses to create his new myth. A brief consideration of Altizer's remolding of Blake should clarify this point.

Third, Altizer outlined the dialectical method in terms of negation. This point becomes puzzling when one tries to consider what it might be like to negate his own history. To be sure there is some sense in which we negate our past conception of existence

when we get married, after being a bachelor for twenty years or when we decide to become a socialist after living as a capitalist for many years. However, this is not to say that we are not a product of our past nor that from time to time we may not have to search our past to understand ourselves in the present. Since Altizer has referred to Marx and to psychoanalysis in connection with his view of history, perhaps their ideas can clarify Altizer's position.

Fourth, Altizer has maintained that his dialectical negation involves first negating objectivity and second negating subjectivity. There are at least three problems that arise with this concept. First, how can we so completely split existence into an objective element and a subjective element? We usually speak of objectivity as if it included only matters of fact. On the other hand we usually speak of subjectivity as if it included only some persons taste, opinion, feeling, etc about some matter of fact. But if we negate matters of fact then what are we being subjective about? Perhaps Teilhard de Chardin's terms "Passivity and Activity" can clarify the sort of distinction Altizer is trying to make. This subjective-objective problem points to the second difficulty with point four, mysticism. Altizer interprets mysticism as the pure thought remaining after thought is separated from all society, that is, "the initial movement of thought must be the negation of society." But what does it mean to think about something that is in no way shaped by the space and time we live in? What kind of existence can Altizer mean? A survey of Altizer's discussion of

study of Eastern religion, and a brief outline of some Zen movements may help to spell out this concept of mysticism. Finally, point four raises the question of what "existence in faith by virtue of the absurd" might mean. Usually we think of having faith in some idea, some feeling, some person, etc., but not in something that is unreasonable and ridiculous. Here such writers as Kafka, Sartre, Grass, Ferlinghetti, and Genet can be helpful.

Altizer's second claim that the dialectical system has produced a world-reversing form of ethics can be described to some extent by a discussion of Nietzsche's Ethics.

An analysis of Altizer's third claim that he firmly establishes the fact that Christianity is the only one of the world religions to have initiated a radically profane form of Existenz will be discussed in Part Three.

Returning now to the first problem listed above, we can begin fitting the pieces of the myth together. Kierkegaard makes it a very simple matter to identify the Christ-blik and the Christian.

...there is a perpetual joy contained in the thought that the affliction is the way. The sufferer immediately knows definitely what the task is; he can immediately begin on it with all his might; no doubt can come sneaking between the way and the affliction, for they are eternally inseparable; and therefore it is eternally certain that this way must lead to something for here no affliction can obstruct the way, which is always passable, as the affliction is never superhuman.⁵⁷

The task comes from within. The task is expected to be difficult so we waste no time pondering or doubting the task. The way we ought to live is often the same road or pathway for the Christian and the non-

Christian, but how the road is traveled is very different. The Christian does not hesitate to accept and work through the narrowest parts of the road. Thus, the affliction becomes a joy to the Christian because he does not struggle in doubt or search for rationalizations. Usually, a Christian does not choose the way because of the afflictions, but the afflictions verify that he is on the right way. If our challenge is to move down the way of suffering as Kierkegaard has described how we should travel, then perhaps we can even learn to celebrate the godless world. Certainly, this method of verification is open to error, but as a general guideline that points toward a radical myth within which to live, the idea is certainly helpful.

Within the context of the affliction is the way, we can now try to describe the role of the myth in the radical Christian vision. At very least Kierkegaard suggests that our existence is somehow very closely connected with our refusal to live in doubt and anguish about the satanic forces in the world. This for Altizer becomes a rejection of the Church structure that only "resents" (see quote page 30) the satanic forces and therefore directs our society toward deeper anguish. Finally, this means a negation of the doubt about suffering and complete immersion into the satanic forces of suffering. At this point Altizer begins building the yes-saying of apocalypse which dialectically corresponds to the no-saying about history.

According to Altizer, William Blake's private myth spells out the consequences of no-saying in the apocalyptic vision of radical yes-saying. I shall outline Altizer's concept of no-saying⁵⁸ in the first four points below and yes-saying⁵⁹ in the last three.

(1) Blake discovered the final loss of paradise, that is, innocence had been wholly swallowed up by experience.

An eschatological end can only follow a primordial beginning, but that beginning is not creation, it is fall. ... a continual and present process, a process that has become identical with the very actuality of experience.⁶⁰

Blake passionately resisted this transformation (Eastern religions tend to dissociate the sacred name from the actualities of concrete experience) of experience into innocence.⁶¹

Therefore, the way of Oriental mysticism is a way backwards to the primordial beginning. ... Eschatological faith is the expression of immediate participation in the "Kingdom of God" (the Godhead in an active process of negating the fallen form of history, so as to lead forward to an ultimate and final Eschaton).⁶²

(2) Blake further formulates a vision of the negation of history and experience.

Faith is vision... but vision can neither arise nor be consummated apart from the transformation of the totality of experience.

For the early Blake, the passionate rebel, God is the primary product and agent of repression. ... he is associated with the iron laws of the present creation, the repressive laws of morality, and the tyranny of governments and history.⁶³

(3) Blake thinks of a fallen time and space as the paradoxical presence of eternity. In this way living in suffering and affliction is living in negation of the fallen form of existence and in the presence of eternity.

(4) However, this new "Kingdom of God" existence is an experience that can only be found in the "fallen world

of generation." Thus, the "Kingdom" is the essence of regeneration. Suppose, that the body of Christ is symbolically connected with the sort of existence represented by the metaphor of the "fallen world of generation." This would mean that the sexual energy of generation is at once the source of life and a process of redemption.

The lamb of God sports in the gardens of sexual delight because these gardens are palaces of self-annihilation and mutual forgiveness.

The ecstasy of liberation that is the gift of sex reverses the repressed energy of a fallen body, and resurrects the dead who are enslaved to an alien law and an inhuman Creator.⁶⁴

Thinking of this myth within the context of history and "Kingdom", the entire vision begins to take shape. Man must follow Jesus, the lamb of God, into the ecstasy that emerges when the barriers restraining our free expression of delighting in the world are broken. This means that certainly we live in the fallen world of generation, the body of Christ. But somehow this body is "sick" because it is always repressing the ways in which the energy it has is trying to release itself. Unless this energy is released the body can not grow and develop. All of this simply means that the repressive controls that we associate with Christian dogma and ultimately with "an inhuman Creator" are in fact the "repressed product of Satan's mills." In this way the transcendent God is Satan who prevents our "fallen world of generation" from becoming the process of regeneration. Therefore, we must will the death of God so that in the passion of Jesus the regenerated "Kingdom" is fulfilled. For each man this means that he can live the way of affliction only if he can totally

release his energy that is bound in the conventions of society. This sort of negation means that there is an immediate epiphany in the passion of sex and that the female can be either a perverted destructive force or a redemptive force. Whether or not this image can be effective will be considered later, but certainly the passion of sex does in some sense negate all other historical factors if it is released. However, a Dionysian dance within the context of doing one's task on the "way of affliction" is further explained as Blake describes his vision of God and Jesus more precisely.

(5) Blake outlines his vision of the total kenotic movement of God or the Godhead, a vision which leads to the redemption of a cosmic humanity.

This vision arises in the context of a new and apocalyptic understanding of the "Mystery" of the Godhead. When Blake sees Satan within the dark Selfhood of Milton's shadow, he sees a "Human Wonder of God" reaching from heaven to earth, a "Human Form" revealing the monstrous Churches of a perverse innocence and the dark Gods of Hell. ... this is consummated in Jesus' triumphantly breaking through the central zones of death and Hell and opening eternity in time and space.⁶⁵

In this image, Blake seems to equate the Christian God of transcendence and the barriers of restraint (Church, Selfhood) as one and the same thing. However, Jesus comes into the "fallen world of generation" to regenerate life by breaking through Hell (the existence we must negate) and becoming fully incarnate in a new existence (the Kingdom of God, way of affliction, new humanity). Thus, whereas before God was a redemptive Satan in that he was trying to break the "resentment"(nondialectical activity) of the Church, now Jesus is equated with Satan as the one unveiling the

redemptive goal of the fallen world of experience.

(6) Altizer further explains what the atheistic view of God as Satan means as follows:

Blake committed the blasphemy of blasphemies by identifying the biblical God as Satan. Not only did Blake leave numerous personal statements to this effect, but in his supreme pictorial creation, his illustrations for the Book of Job, he depicted God as Satan on the magnificent eleventh plate, and did so in fulfillment of his own vision, in this work, that redemption can take place only after the transcendent and numinous God has been recognized as Satan or Selfhood.⁶⁶

Thus when Jesus breaks through Hell, he is breaking through Satan who made himself a God, who destroyed the "Human Form Divine," and who represents Chaos "but there" somewhere. Jesus is Satan in the sense that his total incarnation makes this world his body of satanic restrictions, i.e., the restrictive law of repression issued by God-Satan. At the same time Jesus is the regeneration and release of redemptive energy.

(7) Blake's Christocentric emphasis can be characterized further by a discussion of the way in which he created a Christian vision "of the full identity of Jesus with the individual human being (the minute particular)."

Jesus continually reverses his "maternal humanity" and his dehumanized and falsely spiritualized body by becoming incarnate in a satanic body of holiness.

His very existence in a generated body challenges Satan's repression and initiates the process of reversing the fallen energy of the body. This movement of reversing the world of experience is the process of regeneration and it occurs only in the full actuality of the body.⁶⁷

In this way the transcendent God has moved into man. Jesus dies to reverse the satanic God. Now each Christian can repeat Jesus' passion and thereby through "Self-annihilation" negate the present existence and discover a new joyous humanity born by means of the death of God. As each man lives the way of affliction, God incarnate in the alien others of Hell and Satan eternally dies. In another sense the satanic body of Christ has been cleansed and regenerated for a new humanity. Since the Church represents the past history of Jesus, the Church cannot lead to this new humanity. Only as the old law of repression is abolished can a new existence begin.

It is very difficult to know how to evaluate a private myth. Perhaps by considering the third and fourth points of Altizer's claim of dialectical unity of the sacred and the profane we can better understand the description given in points one and two. The theory of history considered in point three and the concept of negation and synthesis considered in point four should either affirm the concreteness of Blake's private myth or discount the myth as mere speculation. Certainly, the myth is consistent with the rest of Altizer's theology, and therefore, if we find that Altizer's theory of history and concept of negation are sound, we must affirm Altizer's theology and hence Blake's myth. However, this would be an affirmation of only one of Altizer's claims. We will still need to consider Altizer's ethics and the practical consequences of his theology upon our Existenz.

Freud and Marx, for different reasons, both seem to affirm Altizer's approach to history.

Marx: the whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labor, and the emergence of nature for man; he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation of his own origins. 68

For Marx the history of man is the history of man's evolution from being controlled by nature to controlling nature. For Marx certain ideas and conceptions follow from the way in which we organize our entire society. Clearly, if we are the creators, then we are free to abolish by revolution the present social, economic, and political structure. So even if we are influenced by nature and society, we are not in a direct causal relationship with these forces. Therefore, as far as Marx is concerned negation as Altizer explains it is very possible.

Freud: sees primitive man as one who gives full satisfaction to all his instincts. As civilization grows, man transforms his sexual energy into psychic energy. But this frustrates his original libidinous impulses. ... historical development... is also a development which implies increasing discontent and increasing possibilities for neurosis. 69

The desire for property and the desire for sexual satisfaction seem to be the two conflicting theories of motivation. 70

Freud understands the conflict within man to be mostly between the Id, representing instincts and pleasure drives, and the Ego, representing one's personality and contact with the responsibilities of reality. Sometimes, however the super-ego, the conscience based upon the norms of the father in most cases, may jar the balance between the Id and Ego and the person becomes neurotic. If the person can not control the forces within and without, he may revert to some childhood

experience when he felt safe. For Freud, organized religion, by teaching people to believe in an illusion of safety, sanctified bad human institutions throughout history and prevented these people from facing reality. Here again this idea closely corresponds with the Altizer-Blake myth in several ways. First the Church acts as a repression of creative energy, namely the sex drive. Second the Church through its "resentment"(non-dialectical action) sanctifies bad institutions. Third the Church therefore becomes satanic. Fourth the Church has also corrupted society by maintaining an illusionary God of transcendence which is really Satan. Fifth the message of Christianity is really for one to fully face reality on the "way of affliction" and regenerate Existenz.

Another striking parallel between Altizer and Freud is the concept of transference. Just as Altizer claimed that God continually dies so that each of us can regenerate our lives by repeating Jesus' passion and negating our present existence, so in a similar way Freud talks about transference. For Freud it is possible to negate parts of our past history by repeating some experience differently with the psychoanalysis taking on the characteristics of the satan-like(as Altizer uses the term) person originally involved in the experience. Thus for both men some satanic force is negated by the repetition of some experience (death of God or personal experience in childhood) that frees our passions thereby allowing us to more fully face reality and discover a new joyous humanity.

Finally, we must briefly consider the three-fold problem of negation. First the problem of considering pure subjectivity. After considering Blake's myth, Altizer's position can be stated more clearly. Clearly, Altizer does not mean that we are to negate living in the world and try rather to become one with some primordial existence. Rather Altizer is negating the way he used to live, which he equates with objectivity, for the passion of a new way to live, namely the way of affliction. So when Altizer maintains that we should negate the objectivity because faith is pure subjectivity he means what Blake said faith is: Faith is vision ...but vision can neither arise nor be consummated apart from the transformation of the totality of experience. Thus when Altizer rejects one objectivity, he accepts another to which he subjects himself. However, this objectivity is merely the freeing of his passions and the development of power within the satanic body of Jesus. In this state of being subject to afflictions, the person is taking part in the transformation of the totality of experience--the cleansing of the body of Christ. As Chardin says

The scale of that which he has unveiled
and unleashed brings him into subjection.

He, the lesser, must receive rather than give.

... the exaltation of one's self melts into
the zeal to die into another.⁷¹

Thus, one becomes passive and not bothered by the affliction of the struggle, but rather completely subjected to that which he has released.

In this way one is in a sense negating objectivity, and living within complete subjectivity wherein he embraces the new myth and emerges into a joyous new humanity. However, we must not forget that the vision arises in the context of transformation and struggle.

The second part of the negation problem is the question of the subject matter of mysticism. This problem is not very troublesome when we realize that Christian mysticism looks forward not backward and is always in the context of the transformation of existence and the way of affliction. The subject matter would then simply be Blake's myth. But we need to clarify this mystical activity somewhat.

Finally, it is now clear that an eschatological faith- -as opposed to a messianic faith- -cannot look upon history as the arena of the "acts" of God; for eschatological faith, God is the God of the End, and His "action" must bring history to an end.⁷²

Thus we must remember the first part of the myth; "the Godhead in an active process of negating the fallen form of history, so as to lead forward to an ultimate and final Eschaton." (see page 35). Thus, we are not concerned with individual acts but always with a time of transformation. Just as for Kierkegaard we are not concerned with doubts, rationalizations, or suffering, we just follow our task within the structure of the myth.

... the entertainment of the idea of God distracts the Christian from the actual presence of God... Therefore the time has come to bring an end to the idea of God.⁷³

This brings us to an understanding that for faith and self-giving

compassion to exist, a self-consciousness and a consciousness of history must die. This is what is meant by not knowing this world as our world or "world", that is, not being conscious of the events and our self as we once were. Certainly, this emphasizes the here and now as the only time of importance and nearly merges Dionysus and Jesus. That is, there is very little if any difference between faith and contemporaneity, between our world the Kingdom of God.⁷⁴

The third part of the problem of negation is the question of what it means to say that one exists in faith by virtue of the absurd. From the above discussion we can understand that faith depends upon the subjectivity of Christian mysticism. To understand just why Altizer may have chosen the word "absurd" we can look at the ideas of some writers of the absurd. Gunter Grass writes about Short and Wide (Koljaiczek) who works at a brick quarry, who is running from two Tall and Narrow's, who is sheltered under the many skirts of the narrator's grandmother, who has intercourse with grandmother, who... The narrator is all the time in a mental hospital.⁷⁵ Ferlinghetti writes in his Routines the skit "Non-Objection!" A bath tub with a dead nude model is center stage. Two real painters are on either side in baby carriages. One at a time they get up, cry, look in a mirror, and paint either black or white faces. Both move faster and faster until both die flailing the back wall. Two hooded figures pile the two dead painters into a coffin. The End.⁷⁶ Franz Kafka writes about the Investigation of a Dog. An old dog explores many areas of

life corresponding to human life. Strangely, the dog find he no longer understands much of what life is all about because science has permeated every field of study. Alas, even music is scientific. But the dog hopes for a new science of freedom. The End.⁷⁷

Jean Genet wrote Our Lady of the Flowers. Of special interest are the introductory remarks by Jean-Paul Sartre.

It (the book) appears at first to have only one subject, Fatality: the characters are puppets of destiny. But we soon discover that this pitiless Providence is really the counterpart of a sovereign- -indeed divine- -freedom, that of the author. With fiendish application it leads human creatures to downfall and death. And yet, in its strange language it presents this downfall as a triumph.⁷⁸

There is only one subject: the pollutions of a prisoner in the darkness of his cell; only one hero: the masturbator; only one place: his "evil -smelling hole, beneath the coarse wool of the covers."⁷⁹

... Genet writes in a state of dreams, and in order to consolidate his dreams, dreams that he writes, then writes that he dreams, and the act of writing wakes him up.⁸⁰

There are several common characteristics in each of these authors. Each one has hints of creation and death. Each one is about someone caught in a blik or a myth. Each one looks at life very subjectively, that is his consciousness is turned inward. Each one identifies with some myth of security. Each one is in a dream world within the world, that is each one is in some way at odds with what most people call reality. And finally, like Altizer's subjectivity each one is in the context of transformation and struggle, sexual expression, and an equation

of reality and myth.

The four points discussed above seem to establish the fact that Altizer does indeed establish a theological system including a new mythic vision that dialectically unify the sacred and the profane. However, this is not to say that this vision can be formulated as an "ought" that we can evaluate as either good or bad. Nor does this say that Altizer has established a vision that will solve our social, economic, and political problems. Depending upon one's point of view either Altizer's vision or "ought" and "relevant" may seem important. For Altizer the vision almost automatically directed one's life in the right way and necessarily reformulated society. But this merely points out, as William Hamilton does, that Van Buren and Altizer split between ethics and mysticism. However, in several places Altizer mentions the word immorality and the need to end the restrictions of Christian morality. To be sure the sexual vision within Blake's myth is highly immoral and suggests some Nietzschean up-side-down morality. Therefore, in the following, I shall give a brief discussion of Nietzschean ethics.

For Nietzsche the "common essence of all moral codes is self-overcoming." This is done by "self-criticism--man's critical reflection on his own intentions and actions--the core of morality." The principle by which to judge one's intentions and actions is the one basic form of the will, the will to power. The process of the control is sublimation. The main drive that is sublimated into the will to power is the sex drive. There are three manifestations

of the will to power- -intellect, reason, and spirit- -to which all of our passions are reducible. Therefore, man is trying to overcome his chaotic impulses so as to organize them and integrate them into a harmony that gives him power over himself and nature. This is meant to be a dialectical monism in that Dionysian passion and Apollinian wisdom are synthesized into one power. Thus much in the same way that one becomes subjective and still exists in the context of transformation, reason ultimately as spirit is in the context of passion. Similarly, the sexual energy and drive must be released and sublimated for regeneration and freedom within the overall myth within which one lives. Certainly, this view of ethics fits into Altizer's system.

Throughout the discussion of ethics the exact source of the willing of the "right" power, the criteria by which to judge this power, and even the "rightness" of the principle of power is somewhat troublesome. Maintaining a sort of intuitional knowledge of right by searching one's intents and actions is troublesome but the assertion that somehow reason and passion ultimately form a monism from which we intuitively know the way in which to build power is even more troublesome. This metaphysical monism seems unnecessary. Why can't one intuitively know what is right by searching one's intents and action in much the same way that we intuitively know how to use language by searching our intents and actions? In this case no metaphysical monism is even necessary. Similarly, it seems that Altizer is so convincing that the experiencing God or Jesus is not even necessary. Even in Kierkegaard it

would seem possible to realize one's task without any intuitive knowledge from some utterly Subject sort of thing. This misunderstanding of intuition seems to pervade the entire vision. To know something intuitively is merely to realize that we are human beings, and that there are certain rules which apply to the way we live. Many of these intuitions are merely the realization of certain drives that we have and certain needs that we have. Sometimes we confuse images, self-ish wants, prejudices, etc. with intuitions. But in any case to claim that something exists outside of our experience that we can experience intuitively seems contradictory.

All of this is simply to say that even though Altizer successfully establishes a dialectical unity of the sacred and the profane starting with the present Christian myth, this does not help if the word God is meaningless. But even if the monism or "eternally God dying myth" is meaningless, much of Altizer's vision is still very meaningful and helpful for our Existenz. This idea will be considered in Part Three.

PART THREE

In this last part I shall try to show that many aspects of Altizer's dialectical method and many specific parts of his vision can be a very helpful and meaningful way for us to begin to understand our contemporary society. In this way Altizer's myth is reality.

Radical Moral Theology and the Computer, Technology, Cybrenetics.

With the increase of technology, the sort of subjectivity that Altizer maintains becomes more and more a reality. Either a person has a job that is so routine that he is barely conscious of what he is doing, or a person organizes, creates, thinks, etc. In this way one no longer identifies with the work situation but is set free to create new models, new values, and new emphasis upon living for the moment. From the Marx-Altizer history interpretation, one begins to understand that man can change things by negating history. Certainly, the computer makes change race faster. The computer and technology will ultimately give us more time to be immersed in the world by affirming our passions and releasing them in the concreteness of a moment. Our new values will certainly be freer because much of the agony of working long hours, much of the need for tight self-control can be transformed into the sort of free control of Dionysus-Apollo. With the building of higher mathematical relations within which we must live as allies with computers, our imagination of the absurd should be released.

According to the dog who did Kafka's investigations, this scientific vision points toward a need to radically express a new inner and outer freedom. In this way the Yippies are not surprise, nor is the increase of social interest among students. Thus, cybrenetics releases man to be radically subjective and creative.

Radical Moral Theology and Chemical and Neurophysiological Psychology

Altizer seems to accept Ryles' claim that there is no "ghostly machine" in the body called the mind when he talks about subjectivity in the context of a transformation of experience. Ultimately, the distinction merges into a new way of life within a new myth. One basic feature of this new way is that man is autonomously in charge of the new way. In the vision Christ ended transcendence by breaking through the old satanic laws of repression and setting man free to live a new humanity radically in the world. Certainly, if man begins erasing some of man's history, giving him a new freedom from past repressions, and emphasizing the possibilities of the moment, then certainly man will have become subjected to living within the vision Altizer sets forth. Chemical and Neurophysiological Psychology can provide the means for this process. Perhaps psychologists would rather claim to have eliminated certain behavior patterns, increased the activity of certain parts of the brain, and suggested new directions for the person. Nevertheless, the result of negating history and regenerating one by losing his energy and redirecting it is clearly broadly parallel in both cases.

Radical Moral Theology and Big Business in the Urban Crisis

Because of the new methods of cybernetics and psychology, Altizer's vision can be generally applied to business. If we decide about how to redirect our sexual energies toward power, then our willing is shaped by an examination of our intents and actions. If business decides how to direct its power building by (1) allowing a combination of passion and reason and (2) examining its intentions and actions, then clearly business must negate some of its history and accept the way of affliction. This simply means that the big companies of the United States can find a tremendous new power in the long range by developing the inner-city. Some is being done now, but this image should help in one critical psychological point which leads to a new vision of freedom from doubt, reversal of resentment, and drive for a new humanity: we must negate our past rationalizations, our past prejudices, our past satanic restrictions and open-up business possibilities regardless of race, religion, education, etc. The way to do this is simply eliminate our outdated suppression of people by negating the satanic restrictions placed upon them.

Radical Moral Theology and China, Vietnam, and Politics

Much the same direction can be given in world politics. A new trust can be formulated by negating the mistakes of past leaders, worrying less about who is ahead and which ideology is best, and begin to do our task of building a new humanity. Thus by not being so self-conscious nor so concerned with the

past, then we can begin to work together for the future. This also means the way of affliction, that is, task over personal interest in exploiting an economy. It implies building a new power that is both Dionysian and Apollinian, and not one of exploitation. By negating a "fallen world" we can begin a revolutionarily new way to live by ending the old satanic, restrictive, and corruptive forms that were a part of the Christian God.

Radical Moral Theology and the New Left

The New Left has been caught by the "blik" of freedom, compassion, brotherhood, new humanity, and an end to the present moral system, economic and social and political system. The emphasis upon the moment, the radical loss of consciousness of wanting to exploit, the "minute particularism" and concern for the humanity of everyman, certainly, through passion, has negated and annihilated Selfhood. The Death of God and thus the death of Satan and Hell by the radical immanence in Jesus, gives us a real direction toward the joy of a new humanity.

CONCLUSION

In no way has this paper proven that Altizer's way is the answer, rather perhaps a direction to consider. To a great extent Altizer has simply rediscovered Freud, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. On the other hand he has given a sort of meaningful unity to the concept of a Dead God. For this writer Altizer actually negated a past society with certain conventions and restrictions and pointed toward a new society. This new society is sacred only in the particular concept of subjectivity that was discussed. Yet, Altizer seems to want to claim as does Chardin that there is a sense, not an idea, of God within this subjectivity. In addition, Altizer hints that he conceives of the Body of Christ as a real mythic entity which eternally breaks through Satan - Hell - God so that God is eternally dying. As a metaphor and a meaningful guideline this is helpful, but to claim some sort of existence for this seems to deny the radical immanence of Altizer's dialectic.

So it would seem that Altizer in the final analysis wants somehow to affirm the mystical existence of God, but to proclaim the eternal death of the idea of God. Somehow this is rather added on and unnecessary. The dialectic is complete without the real existence of God. What difference does it make?

END NOTES

¹Thomas J.J. Altizer, Radical Theology and the Death of God, p. 4

²Ibid., p.5

³Karl Barth, The Word of God and The Word of Man, p.17

⁴Ibid., p. 22

⁵Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, Vol. 1, p. 11

⁶Ibid., p.5

⁷Ibid., p. 12

⁸Ibid., p. 25-26

⁹Ibid., p. ix

¹⁰Harvey Cox, The Secular City, p. 24

¹¹Ibid., p. 29

¹²Ibid., p. 31

¹³Ibid., p.211

¹⁴Ibid., p. 217

¹⁵Altizer, Radical Theology, p.11

¹⁶John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 20

¹⁷Ibid., p. 21

¹⁸Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 65

¹⁹Ibid., p.64

- ²⁰Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 65
- ²¹Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 22
- ²²Ibid., p. 17
- ²³Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 19
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 20
- ²⁵Ibid.
- ²⁶Ibid.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. 24
- ²⁸Morris Weitz, 20th -Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition,
a selection from Gilbert Ryle's argument against Descartes' Myth, p. 302
- ²⁹H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, p. 14
- ³⁰Ibid., p. 15
- ³¹Ibid., p. 19
- ³²Ibid., p. 24
- ³³Ibid., p. 243
- ³⁴Ibid., p. 250
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 251
- ³⁶Ibid., p. 253
- ³⁷Ibid., p. 255
- ³⁸Alfred Jules Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, p. 201
- ³⁹Weitz, 20th-Century Philosophy: p. 68-70

- ⁴⁰Paul M. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 1
- ⁴¹Ibid., p. 2
- ⁴²Altizer, Radical Theology, p. 113
- ⁴³Ibid., p. 114
- ⁴⁴Ibid.
- ⁴⁵Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 15
- ⁴⁶Ibid., 16
- ⁴⁷Ibid., 17
- ⁴⁸Ibid., 86
- ⁴⁹Willard Van Orman Quine, from a logical point of view, p. 12
- ⁵⁰R.M. Hare, Language of Morals, p. 18
- ⁵¹Altizer, Radical Theology, p. 13
- ⁵²Ibid., p. 99
- ⁵³Ibid., p. 98
- ⁵⁴Ibid., p. 99
- ⁵⁵Ibid., p. 100
- ⁵⁶Ibid., p. 111
- ⁵⁷Soren Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses, p. 228
- ⁵⁸Altizer, Radical Theology, p. 184
- ⁵⁹Ibid., p. 188
- ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 174

- ⁶¹Altizer, Radical Theology, p. 179
- ⁶²Ibid., p. 186
- ⁶³Ibid., p. 175
- ⁶⁴Ibid., p. 180
- ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 178
- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 177
- ⁶⁷Ibid., p. 181
- ⁶⁸Erich Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 33
- ⁶⁹Ibid., p. 36
- ⁷⁰Ibid., p. 40
- ⁷¹Teilhard de Chardin, The Divine Milieu, p. 74
- ⁷²Martin Marty, new theology no. 1, from article written by Altizer, p.159
- ⁷³Ibid., p. 162
- ⁷⁴Ibid., p. 165-167
- ⁷⁵Gunther Grass, The Tin Drum, p. 9-18
- ⁷⁶Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Routines, p.26-28
- ⁷⁷Franz Kafka, Selected Short Stories, from story "Investigation of a Dog,"
p. 202-255
- ⁷⁸Genet, Our Lady of the Flowers, from the introduction by Sartre, p. 9
- ⁷⁹Ibid., p. 11
- ⁸⁰Ibid., p. 13

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Altizer, Thomas J.J., Radical Theology and The Death of God, Bobbs Merrill, New York, New York, 1966
- Anderson, Alan Ross, Minds and Machines, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964
- Ayer, Alfred Jules, Language Truth and Logic, Dover, New York, 1944
- Barth, Karl, The Word of God and The Word of Man, Harper and Row, New York, 1957
- Bultmann, Rudolf, Jesus Christ And Mythology, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958
- Chappell, V.C., Ordinary Language, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964
- Chardin, Teilhard de, The Divine Milieu, Harper and Row, New York, 1957
- Cox, Harvey, The Secular City, Macmillan, New York, 1965
- Ferlinghetti, Lawrence, Routines, New Directions, 1964
- Fromm, Erich, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, Pocket Books, New York, 1962
- _____, Psychoanalysis and Religion, Yale University, New Haven, 1950
- Genet, Jean, Our Lady of the Flowers, Modern Library, New York, 1963
- Grass, Gunter, The Tin Drum, Fawcett, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1967
- Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals, Oxford University, New York, 1964
- _____, Freedom and Reason, Oxford University, New York, 1965
- Kafka, Franz, Selected Short Stories of Franz Kafka, Modern Library, New York, 1936
- Kaufmann, Walter, Nietzsche, World Publishing, Cleveland, 1956
- Kerner, George, The Revolution in Ethical Theory, Oxford University, New York, 1966
- Kierkegaard, Soren, Edifying Discourses, Harper and Row, New York, 1958

- Macquarrie, John, An Existentialist Theology, Harper and Row, New York, 1965
- Marty, Martin E., new theology no. 1, Macmillan, New York, 1964
- Niebuhr, H. Richard, Christ and Culture, Harper and Row, New York, 1951
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1957
- Quine, Willard Van Orman, from a logical point of view, Harper and Row, New York, 1953
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich, The Christian Faith, Vol. 1, Harper and Row, 1963
- Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1950
- Tillich, Paul, Morality and Beyond, Harper and Row, New York, 1966
- Van Buren, Paul M., The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, Macmillan, New York, 1963
- Weitz, Morris, 20th-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition, Collier-Macmillan, Toronto, Ontario, 1966
- Williams, Oscar, Immortal Poems of the English Language, Washington Square Press, New York, 1952

PERIODICALS

- Allen, Joseph, "Business and the Urban Crisis," Business Week, February 10, 1968, C1-C16.
- Bloy, Myron, "Technology and Theology," University Christian Movement Dialogue Focuser on Technology, to be published April 1, 1968 by Bobbs Merrill, New York, pages 55-65
- "Christian-Marxist Dialogue," Federation News, No.3, 1967, pages 9-20.
- Michael, Donald N., "Cybernation: The Silent Conquest," A Report to the Center for the Study of Emocratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, 1962

- Nelson, Bruce, "The Christian Resistance," The Bowditch Review, Berkeley, California, fall 1967, pages 74-76.
- Political Concerns Committee of the University Christian Movement, "Minimum Political Stance," U.C.M. General Committee, June 1967, New York
- Spiegel, Mike, "Success and Failures of the National Council," New Left Notes, Volume 3, Number 1, January 8, 1968
- Swomley, John M., "myths about communist china," motive, May, 1960
- Terrill, Ross, "China and Vietnam," The New Republic, Harrison-Blaine of New Jersey, 1966
- Thomas, Edwin, "Selected Sociobehavioral Techniques and Principles: An Approach to Interpersonal Helping," Social Work, Vol.13, No. 1, January 1968