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## The Ubermensch-Artist of Friedrich Nietzsche and Thomas Mann

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THE <sup>10</sup>ÜBERMENSCH - ARTIST  
OF  
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE  
AND  
THOMAS MANN

By  
Dale Whitney  
||

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Accepted by the Department of English of  
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requirement for departmental honors.

  
Project Adviser

  
Chairman, Department of English

PREFACE (Not to be read by those who lack frivolity)

At this late hour (4:00 AM) when my honors project lies completed, I find myself left with a certain hollowness, a consuming desire to reread Genealogy of Morals, a tremendous admiration for Erich Heller, a painful wish to begin the Joseph novels (which, I confess with shame, I haven't read), an insatiable thirst for deeper study of Freudian psychology, a long repressed urge to dive back into Schopenhauer, with whom I've recently become acquainted, and an enormous throbbing "writer's callous" on my right middle finger. In other words, although my project lies strewn around me here after a final burst of Dionysian fervor, it's behind me already. The following pages are really one stage in its growth, frozen into being on paper. The reader will probably suggest that it should have continued maturing, and I agree. With no false modesty, I acknowledge fully my vast ignorance of Nietzsche and Mann, of whose works I've barely touched the surface. Something like this is a new thing: it's Idea and Experience constantly compounding and deepening itself as the writer develops it and himself. I found myself rereading whole volumes with frustrating slowness when I knew I should be covering new material, or taking long, meditative walks to hash out some irrelevant point that took up a single sentence. Scholarship has a strange inertia that drives one



deeper and deeper into it if he's not careful. I console myself by announcing that I've made nearly every possible mistake there is in preparing this paper, and I've learned from the mistakes. In fact, a new urge to put myself through this torture again is already being born because another overpowering Idea has captivated me and demands investigation.

What fascinates me as a student-philosopher-writer about just such an enterprise is its creative as well as constructive aspects. Here I must point out (at the risk of sounding Nietzschean) the Dionysian and Apollonian parts of something even as mundane as a college honors project. The very idea that I could invent my own chapter titles and subjects was heady, and its responsibility a challenge.

My naïvete is probably amusing. I express it primarily because after this year my composition will find oblivion in the school Archives and I, in future years, as a toughened, sophisticated veteran of papers, theses, and expositions, will look back in superior amusement at my effusions now. But at this moment I can't express my satisfaction enough at handling this project. Its ideas found form in countless (and comical) outlines and intricate diagrams that were adopted, found lacking, and discarded in almost a year of researching. It was research highlighted by sudden bursts of insight and enthusiasm and long, gray periods of lethargic fact-finding and infuriating back-tracking.

My thanks are many: to Mr. Meyers, my advisor, for his suggestions, inspiration, and long, patient efforts to direct

my hubric aspirations; to Dr. Pearson, for granting me the privilege to attempt such a project; to Professor Vander Waal for agreeing to review the work; to Mr. McDonald for his suggestions and criticism (mostly criticism) that spurred me my long-suffering mother, who acted as a study hall supervisor during vacations; to all my friends, and especially my roommates, who bore the brunt of my erratic study hours, preoccupation, and extended soliloquies on Nietzsche and Mann.

This paper, full of its few virtues and many has been one step in my seeking for knowledge, but the process constantly moves forward. I have an almost uncontrollable urge to turn my back on this completed effort, but that would be a denial of its significance. Nietzsche talks about running up stairs toward knowledge, and I suppose I can regard it as one step. But I'm already a level or two beyond it, and I hesitate even to turn its pages now. While a part of me, the project was a real contribution to my self-realization as person and student. But with it as a springboard I'm taking unladylike leaps toward new learning experiences, both enjoyable and tedious. Mostly enj

## INTRODUCTION

There is at once a thin line and an enormous gulf between the artist-philosopher and the philosopher-artist. Where one spreads out his ideas in a dazzling and often bewildering array, the other builds a framework with them and constructs the fictional experience of a latent philosophy. Where Nietzsche exultantly screams an aphorism, Mann constructs a novel.

Thomas Mann lived in the shadow of a philosopher who affected the German consciousness in ways that were both realized and unrealizable. The questions and nagging truths that he revealed were realities that Mann wrestled with as a German and as an artist throughout his life.

After presenting a very short biography of Nietzsche and a few general comments, I will first outline the major tenets of Nietzsche's philosophy, then present an exposition of his concept of the Artist. This will be followed by a study of Mann's essay on Nietzsche, It is important to include this essay here both as a necessary transition and as a presentation of the perspective through which Mann saw Nietzsche's life. It does not necessarily reflect his attitude toward all of Nietzsche's philosophy. Indeed, Nietzsche's ideas had so saturated German culture and Mann himself that he was probably barely conscious of the fact that he was working with Nietzschean concepts in a great deal of his writing. The ensuing pages will then delineate

my understanding of Mann's transference of Nietzschean philosophy into his concept of the Artist.

For this reason I have begun my paper with an overview of Nietzschean philosophy. It is precisely this total impact of his outlook upon Mann's age that I want to convey in carrying Nietzsche over into Mann's writings. It is often the vast implications of Nietzsche's thought that Mann handles in his fiction. He attempts just such a rendering of philosophy into art in transferring Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea into his novel Buddenbrooks. Unfortunately, the rest of his work does not present so discernable a transition. I make this clear because I detest philosophical "lint-picking." Tying together interesting tidbits about Nietzsche's and Mann's personal likes and dislikes is not one of my goals.

The profundity of what Nietzsche's philosophy implies for living made me babble as Hans Castorp did in the face of intellectual excitement. Fortunately, Mann didn't babble -- he wrote. And because he grasped the profundity, the enigmas and the implications of his precursor's thought, he was able to build artistic frameworks to present them or to seek their resolution. This is the Mann I seek: the philosopher-artist, who not only saw Nietzsche's implications and resolutions. Once he had experienced them as realities, he asserts at one point in The Magic Mountain, he could rise above them as an artist.

Mann's works specifically covered in this paper include:

Novels:

The Magic Mountain

Dr. Faustus

The Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man

Stories:

Death in Venice

Tonio Kröger

Tristan

Fiorenza

Little Herr Friedemann

Essays:

Nietzsche's Philosophy in Light of Contemporary Events

Essay on Schopenhauer

Freud and the Future

## BIOGRAPHY AND INFLUENCES

Attracted by my style and talk  
 You'd follow, in my footsteps walk?  
 Follow yourself unswervingly  
 So -- careful -- shall you follow me.<sup>1</sup>

Friedrich Nietzsche was born in 1844 at Röcken, a small village in the Prussian province of Saxony. While the boy was still very young, his father died and he was left to be raised with his sister Elizabeth by their mother. As a child, Friedrich was very deeply religious and well-mannered:

The tight little Lutheran home gave Nietzsche many lasting traits, including a contempt for common humanity, admiration for discipline, a habit of hero-worship, and a haughty, anachronistic sense of honor.<sup>2</sup>

He studied philology at Bonn and Leipzig and finally received a fine position at Basel. After a dazzling friendship with the giant composer Wagner, Nietzsche broke with the man, and in pursuit of his health he travelled over much of Europe. In the meantime, he put out essays and books that gained him much notoriety and little praise. Nevertheless, Nietzsche considered himself "great and wicked" and continued to write until he became hopelessly insane in 1889. Living in peaceful oblivion and nursed by his sister, he died in 1900.

Tracing the influences upon Nietzsche would be the subject for another honors project; as an enthusiastic and brilliant scholar, he read deeply and widely. Although he "outgrew" Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, they exerted obvious and powerful effects upon him, and although he later

vehemently denounced Darwin, the naturalist deeply affected his "scientific" and evolutionary trends of thought. Lesser but noteworthy English and American influences were Carlyle, Emerson, Shakespeare, and Keats. The German giants Goethe and Wagner helped mold the young man artistically. What he did with these influences can be glimpsed in the following pages. His impact on Germany and later philosophy is still debatable, but the appearance of his philosophy is indisputably a European event. Even Will Durant, who is not particularly partisan to Nietzschean philosophy, admits:

He spoke with bitterness, but with invaluable sincerity; and his thought went through the clouds and cobwebs of the modern mind like cleansing lightning and a rushing wind. The air of European philosophy is clearer and fresher now because Nietzsche wrote.<sup>3</sup>

This appearance is an event that modern man is still trying to deny to deny, justify, or explain.

CHAPTER NOTES #1

<sup>1</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, (New York, 1960),  
p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>Eric Bentley, A Century of Hero-Worship, (Boston, 1957),  
p. 86.

<sup>3</sup>Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, (New York, 1926), p.483.



## APOLLO AND DIONYSUS

The Birth of Tragedy, which sets forth Nietzsche's famous concept of the Apollonian and Dionysian influences upon artistic creation, has been the subject of debate for years. There are reliable scholars who claim that Nietzsche "preferred" the Apollonian element, and equally reputable men who declare just as firmly that Nietzsche affirmed and reaffirmed his preference for the Dionysian throughout his life.

For Nietzsche, Apollo's influence in Greek tragedy manifested itself in "appearance":

In fact, we might say of Apollo, that in him the unshaken faith in this principium and the calm repose of the man wrapped therein receive their sublimest expression; and we might consider Apollo himself as the glorious divine image of the principium individuationis, whose gestures and expression tell us of all the joy and wisdom of "appearance" together with its beauty.<sup>1</sup>

Rising out of the primitive "dream" art of ancient Greece, the Apollonian artist expressed "his own state, i.e., his oneness with the primal nature of the universe. . .revealed to him in a symbolical dream-picture."<sup>2</sup> This characteristic of art gives us the harmony of our art, its restraint and intrinsic balance. Most manifest in the discipline artist, Nietzsche says that Apollo, as an ethical god, requires self-knowledge and self-control. For the Greeks, his influence taught them to reiterate "know thyself" and "nothing in excess." Thus, Apollo becomes an inherent and necessary constituent of artistic expression.

Nietzsche speaks relatively little of this Apollonian

aspect in The Birth of Tragedy, while he rises to lyrical heights describing the Dionysian. This approach could cause misunderstanding, but it is not hard to fathom. It is much easier and much more likely for one to wax poetic over passion, which Dionysus represents, than over discipline, which Apollo symbolizes. One is limited in the amount of exulting he can do over self-control without losing fervor. Discipline is necessary, just as girdles, forks, and waste-baskets are necessary, but we aren't liable to belabor the point. I stress this inequality because The Birth of Tragedy leaves one with a dazzling impression of Dionysian frenzy and a vague, wispy remembrance of a few Apollonian restraints. For this reason, many jump to the conclusion that according to Nietzsche Dionysian elements in art are the best and most desirable.

Out of the dithyrambic verse of barbarian festivals Dionysian verse arose. "The Dionysian musician is," says Nietzsche, "without any images, himself pure primordial pain and its primordial reechoing."<sup>4</sup> This attitude is at once strangely joyful and sorrowful. It stresses the utter savage joy in knowing both pain and well-being. There is no gray Weltschmerz for Nietzsche: the Dionysian man exults in the pinnacles of his happiness and the chasms of his despair. He is the wine-filled, frenetic dancer of the ancient festivals, who relinquishes all of his individual identity to become a part of the sweeping stream of instinctive power and joy that runs through all of life. But it is an

enigmatic power because this instinct is both frenetic and "lethargic," according to Nietzsche, because the Dionysian spirit is encased in a world of individual and social limitations:

For we must realize that in the ecstasy of the Dionysian state, with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence, there is contained a lethargic element, in which are submerged all past personal experiences.<sup>5</sup>

He compares the Dionysian man with Hamlet, who has perceived "the nature of things"; but time, Nietzsche continues, is "out of joint" and he cannot act; it is as if he is asleep, lethargic. Art must become the saviour for the disoriented spirit because it is the only means by which the Dionysian expresses the primordial power he has glimpsed. In Greek art, Nietzsche says, this insight expressed itself through the satyric chorus.

Now then do these Apollonian and Dionysian elements combine to present us with finished art? In Greek tragedy, says Nietzsche, the Apollonian "dream-state" in the actions of various characters in an imaginary setting combines with the searing reality of the lyrical chorus. There is a sense that one aspect cannot exist without the other:

When he thought of these deities, the Greek artist in particular had an obscure feeling of mutual dependency: and it is precisely in the Prometheus of Aeschylus that this feeling is symbolized.<sup>6</sup>

Nietzsche uses Prometheus as the supreme example of Dionysian suffering in search of Apollonian justice. We respond to Prometheus because we recognize his fellow-suffering, but

Apollonian ideals have brought about his suffering. When Apollo and Dionysus were united in Greek tragedy, the world saw its height of creative artistry.

Unfortunately, however, Euripides brought about the initial perversion of this union in a kind of pseudo-Apollonism that was in reality "esthetic Socratism." Turning the cold light degraded the instinctive and natural parts of the creations and exalted logical presentations. Thereafter, Greek art degenerated in impact and artistic value.

This division into two elements of art results in mass confusion for students of Nietzsche. Notable among these is Crane Brinton, who declares:

The Dionysian is A Good Thing: it is God's and Nature's primal strength, the unending turbulent lust and longing in men which drives them to conquest, to drunkenness, to mystic ecstasy, to love-deaths. The Apollonian is A Bad Thing -- though not unattractive in its proper place: it is man's attempt to stop this unending struggle, to find peace, harmony, balance, to restrain the brute in himself.<sup>7</sup>

Walter Kaufmann, a well-known Nietzschean scholar, disagrees:

In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche did not extol one at the expense of the other; but if he favors one of the two gods, it is Apollo.<sup>8</sup>

Mencken further declares that Nietzsche "divided all mankind into two classes."<sup>9</sup> To be sure, Nietzsche later incorporated Dionysian "immorality" into his *Urbemensch*, but at the time he wrote The Birth of Tragedy, he was not interested in exalting one god above another. His introduction to The Birth

of Tragedy states this from the outset:

These two distinct tendencies run parallel to each other, for the most part openly at variance, and they continually incite each other to new and more powerful births, which perpetuate an antagonism, only superficially reconciled by the common term "Art"; till at last, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will, they appear coupled with each other, and through this coupling eventually generate the art-product, equally Dionysian and Apollonian, of Attic tragedy.<sup>9</sup>

In every artist, then, struggle these dialectic tendencies of Dionysus and Apolle. Their synthesis is art: natural truth presented in a harmonic framework.

CHAPTER NOTES #2

- <sup>1</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, (New York, 1954), p. 954.
- <sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 957.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 966.
- <sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 971.
- <sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 984.
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 997.
- <sup>7</sup>Crane Brinton, Nietzsche, (New York, 1965), p. 39.
- <sup>8</sup>Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, (New York, 1964), p. 108.
- <sup>9</sup>Henry L. Mencken, The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, (Boston, 1913), p. 72.
- <sup>10</sup>Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, p. 951.

## THE WILL TO POWER

The frenzied Dionysian reveler, who exhibits the primordial, universal forces of pain and joy, stirred Nietzsche's imagination and curiosity. This instinctive life-love grew from his understanding of Schopenhauer's Will to Live, the overpowering desire for survival in all living things, but it encompassed much more. As Nietzsche's philosophy grew and matured, his concept of the Will to Power became increasingly complex and central to his way of thinking.

Over each people there hangs a tablet of values. Behold, it is the tablet of self-mastery; behold, it is the voice of its will to power.<sup>1</sup>

This statement of Zarathustra's undergirds the entire movement of Nietzsche's philosophy and of his concept of man, for there is an upward movement that ever strives beyond itself and toward a goal. In order to provide a grasp of this tenet, we must consider as many aspects of it as possible.

The Will to Power, is not, first of all, dependent upon external forces or obstacles, but derives from an inner source.<sup>2</sup> It is an enormous, welling surge of inner power that manifests itself, strangely, in love. However, the love Nietzsche speaks of is not the altruistic self-giving of the Christian, but the savage lust for life that stirs our primordial roots. Thus, life represents more than mere existence or struggle for survival; it is the intense recognition of every pleasure and pain impinging upon the consciousness, with a consuming joy because of its very realization. It is the triumph of the

man who has suffered and who is willing to suffer again because this recognition has reaffirmed his deep awareness of Life. The Will to Power, then, indicates more than a survival of the fittest. There is almost a willed upward evolution implied, generated through a lust for the life force within us. The tightrope walker bravely moving across a rope over an abyss in Zarathustra would be a positive indication that Nietzsche spoke of a conscious effort on the part of the individual to control his Will to Power.

Thus we arrive at a cornerstone of this part of his philosophy: self-overcoming. Zarathustra described the process metaphorically in terms of the famous camel, lion, and child. We are first, he says, the camel: we accept unquestioningly the burdens which our society has placed upon us -- its laws, morality, and responsibilities. Then we become lions -- no-sayers -- and hurl off the bonds. We must say "no" to all doctrines and ethical systems that have heretofore bound us. After this complete rejection, we are capable of becoming children -- yea-sayers -- who are selfish, amoral, and innocently and wickedly happy.<sup>3</sup>

The actual process involved in this self-mastery is another subject for endless debate. Kaufmann has attempted to categorize Nietzsche's Will to Power as sublimated instinctive drives that are conquered through reason.<sup>4</sup> Reason, or rationalism, as Kaufmann also calls it, is a poor choice of words, if only because of its manifold connotations. Nietzsche's



anti-intellectualism would rebel at such a neo-classical interpretation of his all-important idea of self-mastery.

Thomas Hanna attributes this misunderstanding to an oversimplification of the Apollonian and Dionysian forces, because Apollo does not equal Reason and Dionysus, Instinct. The savage forces which bring about growth must be controlled by an overall effort of human will. Zarathustra defines self-mastery:

Whoever cannot obey himself receives commands. . . . Even when it commands itself, it must atone for its command. It must become judge and avenger and sacrifice to its own law.<sup>6</sup>

"Obey" is often translated "command." There is more implied here than reason:

"Freedom of the Will" -- that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order -- who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his own will that overcame them.<sup>7</sup>

There is then implied a self-willed directing and controlling of upward forces. As Kaufmann insists, the intellect too is an important aspect of this concept, because the forces which push us recklessly forward also demand the incisive and ruthless control of the mind in striving after the truth and shattering stultified dogma.

The self-mastery of the individual is a continuous process which changes as the individual and his environment change; it thus takes on a creative aspect, which we shall cover

more thoroughly in our discussion of Nietzsche's artist. The process must, however, go beyond the single entity who generates it: the constant self-overcoming becomes a self-assertiveness and extends beyond the individual.

"Will to Power," Morgan says, "means will to risk power in order to get more power and spend it."<sup>8</sup> In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche states simply, "The 'non-free will' is mythology: in real life it is only a question of strong and weak wills."<sup>9</sup> He constantly makes Zarathustra tell his listeners to "become Hard." One must harden himself to pity and empathetic responses toward those we disregard in striving upward, as Perry in The Present Conflict of Ideals explains:

Nietzsche teaches. . . that the strong man will not be governed by the feelings of others, but by his own will to mastery. He will be hard in the sense that he will assert himself without scruple.<sup>10</sup>

When we go beyond the individual in discussion of any philosophy, we become entangled in ethical considerations that govern man's relationships with man. On this account Nietzsche has received the greatest censure. If Zarathustra had remained in his mountain cave quietly overcoming himself, we probably would never have struggled with the doctrine of the *Urbarmensch* or even have heard of Nietzsche. But the man driven by his self-mastered forces comes down from the mountaintop and hurls invective at the "herds" in the marketplace. He is above them, beyond them. He lives outside their tight ethical and religious framewords. He is amoral, immoral, and joyfully wicked.

### CHAPTER NOTES #3

<sup>1</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. by Marianne Cowan, (Chicago, 1957), p. 56.

<sup>2</sup>Ralph Barton Perry, The Present Conflict of Ideals, (New York, 1922), p. 160.

<sup>3</sup>Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. 21-23.

<sup>4</sup>Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, chapter 8.

<sup>5</sup>Thomas Hanna, The Lyrical Existentialists, (New York, 1962), pp. 167-170.

<sup>6</sup>Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 115.

<sup>7</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, (New York, 1954), p. 400.

<sup>8</sup>George Allen Morgan, Jr., What Nietzsche Means, (Cambridge, 1941), p. 64.

<sup>9</sup>Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 404.

<sup>10</sup>Perry, The Present Conflict..., p. 163.

## MORALITY AND THE ÜBERMENSCH

When I came among men, I found them sitting on an old conceit; they conceded that they had known for a long time what was good and what was evil for the human race. . . I disturbed their sleepiness when I taught that no one yet knows what is good and what is evil except the creator.

And the creator is he who creates a goal for man, and an aim and a future for the earth. Good and evil do not exist until the creator creates them.<sup>1</sup>

The man who has overcome himself, Zarathustra, informs the men of the world that there is no longer a moral absolute. No wonder they are disturbed! With admirable deliberation, Nietzsche explores the psychological reasons for morality in his Genealogy of Morals and concludes that an ethical or religious absolute is necessary for the weakened will which needs moral dependence in order to function. He also covers this concept in depth in Beyond Good and Evil and Joyful Wisdom:

He who feels himself dishonoured at the thought of being the instrument of a prince, or of a party or sect, or even of wealthy power. . . but wishes just to be this instrument, or must be so before himself and before the public -- such a person has need of pathetic principles which can at all times be appealed to: -- principles of an unconditional ought, to which a person can subject himself without shame, and can show himself subjected.<sup>2</sup>

This idea of subjection to a standard must be understood in light of Nietzsche's view of the Will to Power and its result in the Ü bermensch. The Will to Power lets nothing stand in its way: it grows, overcomes, and strives upward. Any conceptual boundaries or frameworks are nonexistent and cannot impede its forward movement. Thus, those systems which have impeded mankind's development for abstract purposes are

useless and even deplorable:

Nietzsche came to the conclusion that this universal tendency to submit to moral codes -- this unreasonable, emotional faith in the invariable truth of moral regulations -- was a curse to the human race and the chief cause of its degeneration, inefficiency and unhappiness.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to loathing the doctrines of Christianity, a topic dealt with in a later section, Nietzsche despised its hold over men. Morality, or values, to Nietzsche are dynamic and ever-changing -- within each epoch, each man, and each moment. For Christianity to clamp down the behavior of a single historical time, place, and circumstance upon a mankind that has spread in place and time beyond that historical moment is to Nietzsche deplorable. Once more, this ethical system has decayed into a negation of life, and thus directly opposed the Will to Power. In one of his most moving attacks against Christianity, Nietzsche accuses that religion of the destruction of European culture:

The hatred of the "world," the condemnation of emotion, the fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond, invented to slander this world all the more, at bottom a longing for Nothingness, for the end, for rest, for the "Sabbath of Sabbaths" -- all this, together with the unconditional insistence of Christianity on the recognition only of moral values, has always appeared to me as the most dangerous and ominous of all possible forms of a "will to perish"; at the very least, as a symptom of a most fatal disease, of the profoundest weariness, faint-heartedness, exhaustion, anemia -- for judged by morality (especially Christian, that is, absolute morality) life must constantly and inevitably be the loser, because life is something essentially unmoral, -- indeed, bowed down under the weight of contempt and the everlasting no, life must finally be felt as unworthy of desire, as in itself unworthy.<sup>4</sup>

In combating this slave-morality, Nietzsche, as Morgan points out,<sup>5</sup> does not make the mistake of superimposing his own standard upon mankind. Man, he asserts, must utilize both Good and Evil to their fullest capacities. This puts man beyond the entities of Good and Evil, then, as values in themselves.<sup>6</sup> At this point Nietzsche presents the necessity for "experimentation" in the deepest sense. The superior man must constantly test himself and his surroundings in order to determine that which brings him closest to self-fulfillment at each moment, and this fulfillment is his only ultimate value:

He should. . . judge a given action solely by its effect upon his own welfare; his own desire or will to live; and that of his children after him. All notions of sin and virtue should be banished from his mind. He should weigh everything in the scales of individual expediency.<sup>7</sup>

~ Perhaps in this quotation Mencken uses the word "expediency" too loosely. Nietzsche's philosophy was not a glorified utilitarianism or a mere gratification of small pleasures. Self-fulfillment of the Will to Power within an individual is the actualization of all conditions that move the Will upward and outward. This actualization is Nietzsche's primary departure from Schopenhauer. Rather than negating or disseminating the Will into aesthetic tranquility, Nietzsche channels it, through a self-conscious unmorality, into a dynamic and self-substantiating force. Morgan calls this "an Apollonian culmination of a Dionysian world,"<sup>8</sup> because it indicates a disciplining of uncontrolled forces. We thus come to understand

more fully Nietzsche's attitude toward Christianity.

Nietzsche's attack on Christianity is probably the greatest cause of his notoriety, and his cry that "God is dead!" has echoed down the years to scandalize modern ears as much as it did when he first uttered it. He prophetically foretold an age when Christian symbols would lack relevance for contemporary man: "to have lost God means madness; and when mankind will discover that it has lost God, universal madness will break out."<sup>9</sup> Kaufmann further emphasizes Nietzsche's anguish over the loss of God:

He felt the agony, the suffering, and the misery of a godless world so intensely, at a time when others were yet blind to its tremendous consequence, that he was able to experience in advance, as it were, the fate of a coming generation.<sup>10</sup>

It would be a mistake, however, to consider Nietzsche's declaration a cry of sorrow. Like much of his philosophy, these words commingle joy and despair. God is dead, he exults, and long live man! The reason for exultation becomes clear when one understands Nietzsche's conception of Christianity as a "faulty perspective" and "weakness." It is an evil, which "has waged deadly war against this higher type of man. . . . Christianity has sided with all that is weak and base."<sup>11</sup>

Nietzsche is not against God per se, but against what the Christian God has made of his worshipers:

Just as the Darwinian finds that civilization interferes with natural selection, so Nietzsche finds that Christianity tends to excuse incompetence, lower standards, and negate aspiration.<sup>12</sup>

Christ, then, becomes the epitome of this disastrous

plague that has overcome humanity. Strangely enough, however, Nietzsche treats him ambiguously. Jesus was for the German philosopher "the first and last Christian," who should have died for himself alone, consumed by his own suffering. Instead, early Christians, especially Paul, claimed he died for mankind, and thus vitiated the real man. He became the symbol of selfless suffering, and finally that self-effacement turned into the goal of the Christian. For Nietzsche this suffering for the sake of a nonexistent entity is the greatest sin a man can commit, for it means the disavowing of everything that makes an individual uniquely human and alive.

We must remember that Nietzsche glorified suffering -- not suffering for suffering's sake, but for the sake of one's humanity. The gray self-denial of the Christian represents a "herd morality" that is weak and vile. True suffering occurs when man, in his "pride and wickedness" hurls himself recklessly into living a life bent on achieving personal power. The Christian psychology, on the other hand, forces man to look outward so much that he fails to confront himself:

The pathos which develops out of this condition calls itself faith: closing one's eyes to oneself once and for all, lest one suffer the sight of incurable falsehood.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, Christianity is wholly unrealistic and false -- a delusion for which millions are sacrificing themselves. Loving one's neighbor is the greatest falsehood, propounded, according to Zarathustra, because it is a perversion of



an unrealized self-love:

You cannot endure yourselves and do not love yourselves enough; that is why you want to seduce your neighbor to love you and gild yourself with his mistake.<sup>14</sup>

Love your neighbor, he says further, but love yourself first; then you can approach your neighbor with integrity. There is almost a pathological desire in the Christian, he indicates, to mortify himself -- sacrificing "all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit; it is at the same time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation."<sup>15</sup> Because, under the guise of reformation, Luther perpetuated this lie, he is despicable. Nietzsche considers his efforts a woman's "hysterical scream" and "the victory of mediocrity, philistinism, and a mob psychology that is the end of all true spiritual grandeur."<sup>16</sup> And lastly, in the Christian's longing for afterlife, Nietzsche saw the final demoralization of the human spirit, since for the sake of later reward, man sacrifices and renounces the last shred of his humanity.

With the acknowledgement of Nietzschean unmorality, we enter upon one of the greatest ambiguities or problems of Nietzschean philosophy, one which philosophers and artists have grappled with since his works became known; for we are left with the "Übermensch -- the mountaintop man. After an examination of this concept, a closer look at the problems it creates will give us the key to Nietzsche's equivocal position in philosophical history.

What is the nature of the "Übermensch? Writers on Nietzsche

define him variously as the master-class, the superman, the leader, the dictator, the artist-philosopher, the tyrant, the aristocrat, or the philosopher. This variety of interpretations stems from Nietzsche's own vagueness on the subject. According to the philosopher, the Übermensch is the man who has overcome himself -- hence, the Übermensch. He controls and channels his will with a joyful (and wicked) wisdom. He is the Antichrist. He is Dionysus. He is Zarathustra. He is related vaguely to the "blond beast" that once overran Europe. The literal-minded student of Nietzsche achieves a headache if he investigates volumes to discover an exact description. One can only determine some characteristics of Nietzsche's Übermensch and draw his own conclusions. Zarathustra gives us some help:

That you have contempt, you superior men, makes me hope. For those who have great contempt have great reverence. . .

You creators, you superior men! One can be pregnant only with one's own child. . .

Whoever sees the abyss -- but with an eagle's eyes, whoever grasps the abyss -- but with an eagle's talons: he has courage. . .

Be of good cheer: what does it matter! How much is still possible! Learn to laugh at yourselves as it is necessary to laugh.<sup>17</sup>

In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche lists some of Europe's forerunners of the Übermensch as Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, and Schopenhauer. If we are to take his censure of Napoleon for his corruption seriously

in The Genealogy of Morals, we have only artists and philosophers left among our Übermensch-precursors. And yet, when Nietzsche criticizes the artist (with Wagner in mind) as a "deceiver," we wonder if he considers the artist to be man's final goal.

Nietzsche continually speaks of the need for creativity on the part of the Übermensch; creativity in meeting new situations in order to survive, and creativity in the act of overcoming one's weaknesses. The Übermensch is constantly "making himself new," as well as suffering and growing because of that suffering:

Well-being, as you understand it -- is certainly not a goal; it seems to us an end; a condition which at once renders man ludicrous and contemptible -- and makes his destruction desirable! The discipline of suffering, of great suffering -- know ye not that it is only this discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto?<sup>18</sup>

This comment rings a familiar note, for it brings us back to the very origins of Nietzsche's philosophy and The Birth of Tragedy. We have the Dionysian man. He is a matured Dionysian entity -- one who has combined the Apollonian and Dionysian elements of his personality into a new man -- the Übermensch -- who channels the primordial forces within him into new heights of self-realization:

. . .How is it that on the contrary he finds reasons for being himself the everlasting Yea to all things, "the tremendous and unlimited saying of Yea and Amen"? . . . "Into every abyss do I bear the benediction of my yea to Life". . . But this again is the very essence of Dionysus.<sup>19</sup>

It is somehow fitting that Nietzsche ends his last book, Ecce Homo, with emphasis on the same god, Dionysus, with which he had begun writing many years before. As Kaufmann points out, Nietzsche's concept of Dionysus matured gradually into the combination of Dionysian drive and Apollonian restraint; the artist. Does this mean that Nietzsche's Übermensch is the Artist? Nietzsche strongly hints at the artistic qualities of his Übermensch, but never tells us outright that he is one. He would probably say that each Übermensch has his own set of characteristics; these artistic touches only show Nietzsche's personal preferences. Another alternative would be that Nietzsche envisioned a social aristocracy of "self-overcome" men. But although he spoke about the necessity for a "herd" in order for the Übermenschen to exist, ~~we have little reason to~~ for the Übermenschen to exist, we have little reason to believe that Nietzsche's goal. True, the Übermenschen would use and exploit the "slaves" when necessary, simply because the masses are incapable of living in an unmoral, undirected society and need maneuvering. But the aristocracy he presented is more cultural, intellectual, and artistic than political, and Georges Chatterton-Hill explains:

The superior race, which is strong, which incarnates the unchecked Will of Power, which loves beauty and symmetry, which is in every respect a race alike of conquerors and of artists -- of conquerors and artists, understood not in the narrow sense of the words, but conquerors and artists in every domain, whether physical, moral, or aesthetic -- this superior race will have a moral code reflecting its character, a moral code in which all the virtues of the Will of Power will celebrate their saturnalia. . . .20

The chief characteristic of the Übermensch is his isolation. He is not a part of the society which spawned him. In overcoming himself, he has overcome the need for the society from which he grew. In Four Prophets of our Destiny Hubben envisions this:

The truly valuable beings are artists, philosophers, and perhaps also the saints. . . The future man is needed, the superman, whom society will not yet recognize and to whom it will attach the stigma of loneliness.<sup>21</sup>

At this point the serious student of Nietzsche, if he has lasted this long, begins to feel misgivings. It is acceptable to be superior to everyone and be set apart because of it. It is acceptable and even desirable to overcome oneself and feel the joy of this mastery. It is even acceptable to feel the depths of suffering and peer into the Abyss.

But alone? To be ever and always above and apart, never appreciated, never accepted, never loved? It is an idea that is hard to bear philosophically and psychologically. We modern children of Freud see this as the height of maladjustment and thus thoroughly unacceptable, because we have learned to view man as both a social and existential creature. Perhaps this very impossibility for sheer isolation has forced many to turn away from the lyrical philosopher for more "sane" approaches to life, because we find that Nietzsche may have been just as unrealistic in his "isolation" resolution as Schopenhauer was in his "Nirvana."

William Barrett characterizes this problem well in

comparing Nietzsche's *Übermensch* to Goethe's Faust. Both Faust and the *Übermensch* are dissatisfied and unsatisfiable in their respective developments. Both have learned how to utilize their "devils" to their advantage. Eventually, however, Faust resolves his problem by learning to involve himself in meaningful activity and find a certain satiability; but the *Übermensch* does not recognize the lack or basic vacuum that exists at the root of his insatiability. "Is the Superman to be the extraordinary man," Barrett asks, "or the complete and whole man?"<sup>22</sup> In other words, is a lack of basic security a condition to <sup>be</sup>sought after and cultivated or overcome through compromise?

We are stepping outside of Nietzsche's philosophical framework if we begin to question the advisability of his *Übermensch* in light of the rest of his theories. But if we regard the philosopher as one of Freud's psychological predecessors (as Mann does) and as one of the fathers of existentialism, we can begin to see the implications of the *Übermensch* for succeeding generations. If the *Übermensch* is not psychologically possible and this impossibility brings about the despair of an entire age of philosophers and artists, then its enigma is indeed a matter for consideration. Its very ambiguous nature bore into the souls of an entire nation and raised itself to the prime concern of artists and philosophers of the twentieth century. Barrett pictures Nietzsche as Zarathustra running up the mountain before Reality with

insane laughter forever trailing behind. Whether or not this is an accurate picture of the man or his philosophy is debatable. What is more certain is the problem of the <sup>Ü</sup>bermensch Nietzsche brought forth: is the <sup>Ü</sup>bermensch -- the genius, the artist-philosopher, the self-overcome-man -- always destined to be apart from society? Does he suffer because he is apart? Nietzsche's only resolution -- an unsatisfying one -- could be Eternal Recurrence.

#### CHAPTER NOTES #4

- <sup>1</sup>Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 202.
- <sup>2</sup>Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, p. 41.
- <sup>3</sup>Mencken, Nietzsche, p. 77.
- <sup>4</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, (New York, 1954), p. 942.
- <sup>5</sup>Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 186.
- <sup>6</sup>Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 384.
- <sup>7</sup>Mencken, Nietzsche, p. 93.
- <sup>8</sup>Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, p. 205.
- <sup>9</sup>Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 81-82.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 82.
- <sup>11</sup>Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, from The Portable Nietzsche, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, (New York, 1954), p. 571.
- <sup>12</sup>Perry, The Present Conflict..., p. 160.
- <sup>13</sup>Nietzsche, Antichrist, p. 575.
- <sup>14</sup>Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 58.
- <sup>15</sup>Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 432. of Nietzsche, (London, 1912).
- <sup>16</sup>William Hubben, Four Prophets of Our Destiny, (New York, 1952), p. 104.
- <sup>17</sup>Nietzsche, Zarathustra, pp. 297-303.
- <sup>18</sup>Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 530.
- <sup>19</sup>Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 902.
- <sup>20</sup>Chatterton-Hill, Nietzsche, p. 255.
- <sup>21</sup>Hubben, Four Prophets, p. 95.
- <sup>22</sup>William Barrett, Irrational Man, (New York, 1962), p. 192.



## ETERNAL RECURRENCE

Nietzsche's philosophy of Eternal Recurrence is at once his ultimate attack against Christianity and his supreme proof of the desirability of the *Übermensch*. It is simply the concept which describes the eternal waves of re-existence that all mankind, all nature, and all things undergo. We will, says Nietzsche, live every moment of this life again exactly as before, an infinite number of times here on earth and among all of our fellow human beings. One can almost hear him saying: "If you Christians can languish away this life for the sake of an Afterlife, my super-people will live this life over and over again just to prove their love for it." It is the ideal antithesis of what he considered one of Christianity's most debilitating doctrines. Kurt Reinhardt characterizes the other aspect of this tenet:

The ambivalence of the philosophy of Nihilism is finally resolved and Nihilism itself conquered and overcome in the vision and the doctrine of "eternal recurrence." . . . In more concrete terms: the doctrine of the "superman" of the future presupposes the doctrine of the "Eternal Return"; for only the man who has conquered, overcome, and transcended himself, has become seasoned enough in his "joyful wisdom" to desire the eternal return of all being and of all things.<sup>1</sup>

Kaufmann sees this aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy as totally inseparable from that of the *Übermensch*. It is only the *Übermensch* that is willing to live the sad-joyful life for all eternity.

I support this aspect of his philosophy with reservations, since many readings of the tenet seem to reveal

primarily a desire for some type of immortality on Nietzsche's part, rather than a hard-bitten acceptance of the present.

His "Drunken Song" seems to indicate this:

Oh man! Take heed --  
 What does deep midnight say?  
 I slept, I slept --  
 I have awakened from deepest sleep.  
 The world is deep  
 And deeper than the day had thought.  
 Deep is its sorrow  
 Joy -- deeper still than heart's own pain.  
 Grief speaks: Depart!  
 Yet all joy wills Eternity,  
 Wills deep, deep Eternity.

Zarathustra's "everlasting flow," nevertheless, is Nietzsche's justification for the Übermensch and is his greatest test of courage. If he can bear this life repeatedly, he is truly the Übermensch and awaits each recurrence with joy.

## CHAPTER NOTES #5

<sup>1</sup>Kurt F. Reinhardt, Introduction to Joyful Wisdom, (New York, 1960),  
p. 10.

## THE ARTIST

If Nietzsche had characterized the Artist at any point in his career, there would be no difficulty in outlining his characteristics. But once again he has left us with fragmentary pictures and vivid impressions of his concepts of art and the artist, and the student must attempt to piece together a coherent whole. We know that the artist could be an Übermensch; he is part Dionysus and part Apollo; he is a deceiver; he is Wagner, Goethe, and Sophocles.

We know from The Birth of Tragedy that the artist embodies the qualities of both Apollo and Dionysus:

I shall keep my eyes fixed on the two artistic deities of the Greeks, Apollo and Dionysus, and recognize in them the living and conspicuous representatives of two worlds of art differing in their intrinsic essence and in their highest aims. I see Apollo as the transfiguring genius of the principium individuationis through which alone the redemption in appearance is truly to be obtained; while by the mystical triumphant cry of Dionysus the spell of individuation is broken, and the way lies open to the Mothers of Being, to the innermost heart of things.<sup>1</sup>

In other words, the particular Apollonian framework of the art presents Dionysian Truth in its purest form. If we keep in mind Nietzsche's Übermensch, we can understand this in relation to the artist himself. Through Apollonian control, he channels his Dionysian tendencies into creativity, self-overcoming, and art. Nietzsche describes the artist absorbing "this entire world of phenomena, in order to anticipate beyond it, and through its destruction, the highest artistic primal joy, in the bosom of the Primal Unity."<sup>2</sup>

In other words, the artist writes from his own experience, from his own joy and deepest suffering. This Dionysian aspect of the artist requires the Apollonian -- the artist creates out of psychological need in a self-governed framework of art. He is an anguished Creator, and thus a God,

who, in creating worlds, frees himself from the anguish of fullness and overfullness, from the suffering of the contradictions concentrated within him.<sup>3</sup>

The anguish and the pain he feels is a result in part of glimpsing his primordial potentiality. He is a man, but he is governed and moved by forces and drives from all of nature. He desires to live and yet to die, to laugh and yet to be sorrowful, to conquer and yet to submit. This concept coincides with Nietzsche's belief in the essential immorality of the natural man. The recognition of this lack of natural restraints is, of course, a chaotic realization. Man can reach the highest pinnacles and the deepest depths. His freedom to move in all directions, morally and psychologically, is a staggering thing. Hence, the "lethargy" Nietzsche talks about. Like Hamlet, the artist is mesmerized by the possibilities open to him. Through Apollonian control, he can channel the forces within him beyond himself, and once objectified, they serve as stepping-stones for further action and self-overcoming. Nietzsche senses the exceedingly dangerous aspect of this part of his insight:

Indeed, it seems as if the myth were trying to whisper into our ears the fact that wisdom, especially Dionysian wisdom, is an unnatural abomination; that whoever, through his own knowledge, plunges nature into an abyss of annihilation, must also expect to experience the dissolution of nature in himself.<sup>4</sup>

From this dissolution can come art -- it must come if the artist is to overcome himself. An intrinsic part of this "dissolute" aspect of artistic creation is health, or, more specifically, its opposite: "To an intrinsically sound nature," Nietzsche affirms in Ecce Homo, "illness may even act as a powerful stimulus to life, to an abundance of life."<sup>5</sup>

This necessity for illness was for Nietzsche more than mere opinion: it was a moving conviction. "A man must have experience through both his strength and weakness," he says in Ecce Homo, and the supreme weakness is physical incapacity. He goes on to insist that it was illness itself that brought him to some of his greatest truths, personal and universal. Greek tragedy, he adds, grew out of a profound need. "In short," Nietzsche says, "the Apollonians of the mask. . . are the inevitable consequences of a glance into the secret and terrible things of nature."<sup>6</sup> Kaufmann characterizes tragedy as Greek "comfort" for deep wounds of the spirit.<sup>7</sup>

At this point we enter upon art as another aspect of overcoming. "We are not presented with an elaborate theory of aesthetic value, but we find that the creation of beauty is envisaged as the response of a fundamentally healthy organism to the challenge of disease,"<sup>8</sup> Kaufmann asserts, as

as we recognize that art is stimulated out of disease and ill-health for Nietzsche, who struggled with the problem himself. In fact, says Kaufmann, Nietzsche is the best example of his own theory:

. . . few men have fought more heroically against illness and agony, seeking to derive insight from their suffering, utilizing their talents to the last, and making their misery a stepping stone to new and bolder visions.<sup>9</sup>

The specific art that results is another ambiguous area. Of all artistic manifestations, Nietzsche covers only Greek tragedy, Wagnerian opera, and music in general. Since we have discussed his unification of Dionysian and Apollonian qualities in Attic tragedy, an investigation of his musical insights may give additional awareness of the Art he glorified.

"What power was it that freed Prometheus from his vultures and transformed the myth into a vehicle of Dionysian wisdom?" Nietzsche asks, and answers himself: "It is the Heracleian power of music; which, having reached its highest manifestation in tragedy, can invest myths with a new and most profound significance."<sup>10</sup> This new joining of music and tragedy awakened "a longing anticipation of a metaphysical world."

Nietzsche agrees with Schopenhauer that music is the "immediate language of the will," and further gives us the symbolic image of Dionysian Truth: the tragic myth. Music gives us the reality behind phenomena. In discussing opera, he shows how the recitative creates the perfect balance of

Apollonian and Dionysian elements. The voice (the principium individuationis) brings forth music, the universal, primordial Truth. The Apollonian "veil," the drama, lifts from the Dionysian Truth and we understand it fully. From this concept Nietzsche soars into the height of his aesthetic doctrine:

Here the Dionysian, as compared with the Apollonian, exhibits itself as the eternal and original artistic force, which in general calls into existence the entire world of phenomena; in the midst of which a new transfiguring appearance becomes necessary, in order to keep alive the animated world of individuation. If we could conceive of an incarnation of dissonance -- and what else is man? -- then, that it might live, this dissonance would need a glorious illusion to cover its features with a veil of beauty. This is the true artistic function of Apollo: in whose name we include all the countless manifestations of the fair realm of illusion, which at each moment render life in general worth living and impel one to the experience of the next moment.<sup>11</sup>

This last quotation is an important one. It expresses the Apollonian ideal as more than a restraint or control, but as an enhancer and preserver as well. The dissonance -- the chaos -- that is man, the Artist, requires such a veil of control only so that he can eventually create beyond himself and out of his inner "dissonance." This is the Nietzschean Artist.



CHAPTER NOTES #6

<sup>1</sup>Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, p. 1033.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 1073.

<sup>3</sup>Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 940.

<sup>4</sup>Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, p. 995.

<sup>5</sup>Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 820.

<sup>6</sup>Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, p. 993.

<sup>7</sup>Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 110.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 111.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>10</sup>Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, p. 1002.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 1087.

MANN'S ESSAY: "NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT HISTORY"

Shortly after completing his novel Dr. Faustus in 1947, Mann was preoccupied with Nietzsche the man when he gave this lecture. In the minds of those who heard him there was undoubtedly the link of Nietzsche and Hitler and the War just past. With this situation before him Mann attempted to present Nietzsche as a person, a political force, a philosopher, and an artist.

He begins by showing the philosopher as a Hamlet figure. He describes his own reaction to the man as that of "reverence and pity," because Nietzsche was a person "called to knowledge" but not really capable of handling it.

In an attempt to discern some of the forces that shaped him, Mann presents a short biography of Nietzsche and concludes that he could have had a respectable and distinguished life. His downfall came, however, in his constant desire to "overreach" himself, "to climb to the fatal height where advance and retreat alike become impossible." The key to this merciless drive is Nietzsche's destiny, Mann asserts, which is his genius, and his genius is disease. He adds hastily that disease in itself does not produce genius: who is sick alone determines this. He then asserts that Nietzsche's contraction of syphilis can give insight into the man's development and describes a scene that Nietzsche related to a friend of an accidental and embarrassing entrance into a brothel.

Mann considers this incident a "trauma" in Nietzsche's life

and points out numerous passages in his writings that seem to reflect its effects. Because of it he contracted the syphilis which spurred him into a demonic search for self-knowledge and ultimate "insights crueler than his temperament could bear." His frenzies of creativity can be described simply as "over-stimulation" or "vanishing rationality," and Zarathustra is the outcome of just such frenzies. Greatly over-estimated by Nietzsche, this book is inferior, Mann insists, to Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals. Even the objects of his greatest condemnation, Wagner and Christ, are hated more with passion than with conviction, as Nietzsche repeatedly shows in one contradiction after another.

Nietzsche's philosophy, however, remained a coherent whole throughout his life and requires study with its consistency in mind. "What is this idea?" Mann asks--

It must be broken up into its ingredients, and its contending elements within his personality analyzed, if we are to understand it. Those elements, named as they come to mind, are: life, culture, consciousness or cognition, art, nobleness, morality, instinct. The dominant notion in this whole complex is that of culture, which is equated almost with life itself. Culture for Nietzsche is the aristocracy of life; and linked with it, as its sources and prerequisites, are art and instinct, whereas the mortal enemies and destroyers of culture and life are consciousness and cognition, science and finally morality. Morality, as the guardian of truth, attacks the very core of life, since life is essentially based upon appearance, art, deception, perspective, and illusion. Error, Nietzsche avers, is the parent of all vitality.

He goes on to show Nietzsche's agreement with Schopenhauer that life is an aesthetic phenomenon, and as such, wisdom stands higher than truth, which is a moral value. To this "tragic wisdom" Nietzsche gave the name Dionysus. The philosopher's harshest condemnation was vented upon the Socratic "theoretical man."

In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche expressed his hope that the German spirit would rise above this stultifying rationalism to a "rebirth of tragedy."

Mann then briefly analyzes "Of the Usefulness and Disadvantages of History for Life." Nietzsche loathed the study of history as a science because it tied the present down to a past that is static. Science as a positivistic study is at fault for this scientism, and should be dismissed in favor of a "suprahistorical point of view." The hero, the great man, is the real goal of all history. Mann cautions that this concept can be twisted into fascism.

Nietzsche, he says, was, above all, a psychologist. He, like Schopenhauer, saw the intellect as a tool of the instinctive will, the will which rises out of "bad impulses" and should be obeyed. Hence, the "revaluation of all values."

He compares Nietzsche's attack on morality to that of Oscar Wilde and attributes much of it to the era's anti-Victorianism. In contrast, Nietzsche advocated a drunken intoxication with all that life offers so that one may suffer just for the sake of the emotional intensity. "In overleaping himself," Mann says, "he was bloodily cutting his own flesh, practicing flagellation, moralism." He then questions Nietzsche's rage against morality and asks "whether humanity itself is not our 'outside' by which we measure our actions. Nature and life combine in man to form mind, "and mind is life's self-criticism. This humane something in us," he adds, "throws a pitiful glance at Nietzsche's 'hygienic doctrine' of life."

The two major flaws in Nietzsche's thinking, according to Mann, lie in his "willful misinterpretation of the relative power of instinct and intellect on this earth," and "the utterly false relationship into which he puts life and morality when he treats them as antagonists." Has there ever been a danger of too much intellectualism? he asks. He goes on to assert that life and morality as such cannot be separated and adds that the real division comes between ethics and aesthetics. "Not morality," Mann states, "but beauty is allied to death, as many poets have said and sung."

Because of this aestheticism, Nietzsche could extol war without really sensing the implications of what he said. Mann then shows how this abstract principle was superimposed upon a culture that saw nationalism where it should have seen aestheticism. Nietzsche, he insists, did not create fascism, but he sensed its coming and railed against it. He was, in fact, more socialistic at heart than fascist. He wanted to "permeate things with human spirit," Mann says, and this is socialism. Mann shows how he foresaw not only the need for European and international unity, but also spoke out against a mechanistic "cause and effect" universe.

What does this leave us with, then, as a philosophy? Mann answers:

In the final analysis there are only two basic attitudes, two points of view: the aesthetic and the moral. Socialism is a strictly moral world-view. Nietzsche, on the other hand, is the most uncompromisingly perfect aesthete in the history of thought. His major premise, which contains within itself his Dionysiac pessimism--namely, that life can be justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon--applies exactly to himself, to his life, his thinking, and his writing.

Because of this aestheticism, one must approach Nietzsche with certain presuppositions. Mann considers his stance a "deep irony that thwarts the understanding of the simpler reader." His diatribes were, he continues, "the self-lashing of a man who suffered profoundly from life." In studying him "literalness and straightforwardness are of no avail. Rather, cunning, irony, reserve, are requisite." Mann gives examples of Nietzsche's warning against himself and his constant comments not to take him "seriously" and adds;

All his life Nietzsche pronounced curses upon the "theoretical man," but he himself was this theoretical man par excellence. His thinking was sheer virtuosity, unpragmatic in the extreme, untinged by any sense of pedagogic responsibility, profoundly unpolitical. It was in truth without relationship to life, to that beloved life which he defended and hailed above all else.

He heralded a new age that stresses "solitude," carried on by Kierkegaard, Bergson and others. It is a trend that seeks "a concept of humanity of greater profundity than the complacently shallow view of the bourgeois age."

And yet Nietzsche's glorification of evil is also a product of a bourgeois age, an age that a war-torn world has grown beyond. Mann concludes with a comment upon Nietzsche's philosophy which had high relevance:

I cannot conceive of the supradenominational religion of which he speaks as other than allied to the humanitarian ideal, a religiously based and colored humanism which, out of depths of experience, having survived many trials, includes all knowledge of the lower and daemonic elements of man's nature in its homage to the mystery of man.

"Religion," he adds, "is reverence--reverence first of all for the riddle which man is." What we need, he continues, is a new atmosphere in which man can seek his humanity, and poets

and artists can help to establish this kind of culture. But it is not a "taught" atmosphere: "it must be experienced and suffered." Nietzsche suffered through his philosophy and was driven into a "grotesque error," and this error makes him the tragic figure we see today.

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\*All quotations in the preceding six pages have come from Clara Winston's translation of Mann's address, delivered on April 29, 1947, and recorded in the book Last Essays.

## TOWARD THE ÜBERMENSCH-ARTIST

The preference [novelists] have shown for writing in images rather than in reasoned arguments is revelatory of a certain thought that is common to them all, convinced of the uselessness of any principle of explanation and sure of the educative message of perceptible appearance.

-- Albert Camus  
The Myth of Sisyphus

This statement of Camus presents his belief that the philosopher must speak in images in order to convey his ideas most honestly. This belief is certainly worth consideration when dealing with philosophers such as Nietzsche and many subsequent thinkers and artists who have valued psychology above systematics in the propounding of their individual viewpoints.

The so-called "philosophical, novelist" conveys his philosophical message through the actions and interactions of characters who are seeking life stances in a world of psychological reality. Through fiction the writer usually documents the development of his own attitude toward life and human relationships, disguised by fictionalized characters and situations. As a result, we are likely to find philosophical traces of the minds which influenced the writer and which spoke to him in such a way that his own experience and thought brought about an existential melding of abstract thought and human development. In other words, we have difficulty in separating another man's philosophy in its "pure" form from the fiction of an artist who has grown with it, rejected



it, and/or modified it as his own experience has dictated.

With this difficulty in mind, I have purposely avoided exhuming tidbits of Nietzschean philosophy in Mann's works. Nietzsche's ideas spoke existentially to a young artist who struggled to overcome his own weaknesses and who sought honestly to maintain his integrity in the face of the aesthetic and human polarities within his own personality. In developing his self-realization as a humanistic individual and as an artist, Mann first welcomed, then rejected, and finally modified Nietzsche's philosophy into a workable stance toward his own life.

We have seen in the preceding summary some of Mann's commendations of and reservations about the philosopher's doctrines. With these opinions in mind, we will move from the philosopher-artist to the artist-philosopher and witness the impact of a dynamic philosopher and his ideas upon a sensitive artist and his writing.

Thomas Mann, born of bourgeois parentage in 1875, lived a young life rich in the advantages of culture. A poor and undisciplined student, he nevertheless read a great deal, and during his twentieth year, he became acquainted with the works of Nietzsche. In A Sketch of My Life he describes Nietzsche's influence:

I leave to the critics to investigate -- should they feel so inclined -- what sort of modification, what sort of transmutation the art and ethos of Nietzsche suffered in my case. It was, at all events, a complicated sort; it held itself scornfully aloof from the fashionable and popular doctrines of the philosopher; from the cult of the superman, the easy "renaissancism," the Caesar Borgia aesthetics, all the blood -- and beauty -- mouthings then in vogue. The youth of twenty was clear upon the relativity of this great moralist's "immoralism" . . . In a word, what I saw above all else in Nietzsche was the victor over self. . . My Nietzsche experience. . . made me finally proof against the baleful romantic attraction which can -- and today so often does -- proceed from an unhuman valuation of the relation between life and mind.<sup>1</sup>

The words "victor over self" and "relation between life and mind" are key here: they represent major themes of all of Mann's writing. He quotes Goethe's statement that "to do something one must be something," and perhaps this concept alone provides the real link between Mann and Nietzsche. The spiritual kinship was obviously there; he calls Nietzsche's writings "self-criticism" and proceeds to look into himself with the German philosopher's

words before him. The resolutions both men come to are poles apart, but their dealings with the problems of Art, the unconscious, the German spirit, illness, and isolation are shared. In his Sketch Mann claims that he made a "good citizen" of Nietzsche. The isolated Übermensch becomes the Artist; the "blond beast" becomes the blond, "natural" member of orthodox bourgeois culture; the Will to Power becomes the Unconscious, and Zarathustra's mad laughter becomes ironic humor. If we look, then, for "philosophic" traces of Nietzsche in Mann (of which there are many), we are barely touching the deeper union of the two. Nietzsche, with savage and perceptive insight, brought to light central problems of the German and of the artistic consciousness: Mann recognized their common source, and utilizing the tool of fiction, documented his own path toward their resolution.

"One must harbor chaos in order to give birth to a dancing star," is one of Nietzsche's simplest and most profound statements. Borrowing from Hegel and Schopenhauer, he acknowledged the power of unconscious and conflicting forces, but drew from their concepts new insights. Mann, too, recognized that the artist must feel the chaotic elements within his own personality before producing their synthesis in art. But early in his life, he came to the realization that there are for the artist the "moral" life and the "aesthetic" life, and although they are often concomitant, both have within them elements that are productive and destructive.

This is not an especially modern insight. Plato, recognizing the morally unstable nature of art, hoped to resolve any problems by banishing poets from his Republic. Aristotle attempted an ex-

planation of the joining of real emotion and aesthetic response in the "catharsis," and Longinus tried to differentiate aestheticism from reality by defining the uplifting of everyday action into art as the "sublime." It has taken modern man, however, to seriously question the aesthetic and moral aspects of human nature and their relationships. One of the best explanations of the ambiguous correlation of the two is given by Geoffrey L. Bickers in an analysis of King Lear:

Now suffering, the mere fact of it, as normally experienced, whether it be our own or that which we share by sympathy with others, diminishes in proportion to its severity our sense of being truly alive. If sufficiently intensified and prolonged it ends by turning life into that dull mechanical routine of utter misery which is barely distinguishable from a state of not living at all. When, therefore, this lowest dead level of existence . . . is suddenly and mysteriously so "raised aloft" as to become its topmost living peak; when, in other words, it unexpectedly evinces the power of making us feel that we are never so intensely alive as when our suffering comes nearest to destroying all sense of life, our reaction is such that we are filled with that blend of wonder and fear which we call awe, the experience itself being none other than that of the Beautiful. . . But whereas, when contemplating the sublimity of suffering, we felt that this power lay in the nature of suffering itself, and were awe-struck by the seeming paradox, we now . . . realize with a shock of surprise -- not, of course, by reflection, but intuitively -- that in so feeling, we were the victims of an illusion.<sup>2</sup>


This elevation of suffering -- reality -- into Beauty can result, Mann felt, in confusion between reality and illusion: so much so, that the individual reacts in life to an aesthetic response to reality. In other words, there is a dual nature within the imaginative individual that makes him both the actor and audience in the drama of his own life. The cathartic experience,

then, is a continuous process within the artist -- he is at once the audience, aesthetically experiencing the Beauty observed in suffering, and the character who feels the raw edges of his own pain. The aesthetic response is not only a safety factor to shield him from the pain of his experiences, but also has the potential to take him from the reality of that living. The moral question arises in maintaining one's integrity (both in the sense of "wholeness" and of "self-respect") in the face of such inner duality.

I have belabored this point because it is a motivating factor within each of Mann's characters and within the author himself. In one essay after another, Mann cries out that suffering is not beautiful, war is not noble, and death is not a lofty ideal; but in his fiction he weaves the aesthetic and the moral experience within the individual and reveals their deceptive natures -- a deceptiveness, we remember, that was his greatest criticism of Nietzsche.

An illustration of this appears in the juxtaposing of two early short stories of Mann's, "Little Herr Friedemann" and "Disillusionment." In the former, a small, deformed humpback falls in love with a beautiful woman who tantalizes and then rejects him; unable to bear his suffering, he commits suicide. In the latter, which is almost a monologue, an "extraordinary man" describes his complete inability to enjoy living. "I have no sense of actualities," he says. "Perhaps I am too soon full, perhaps I am too soon done with things. Am I acquainted in too adulterated a form with both joy and pain?"<sup>3</sup> In presenting both

of these parts of human nature, Mann, like Nietzsche, acknowledges the potentialities and polarities of the human personality. This acknowledgement is a recognition of inner "chaos" or the unconscious potential behind the "mask" with which we live. Throughout his writings, Mann reveals the entire spectrum of artistic potential. His characters are unique in themselves and display unforgettable personalities, but they are startlingly similar in some respects. All have strong "Dionysian" or "Apollonian" tendencies, or stand in a crucial position in relation to society. Their particular positions in these categories usually determine the course of their entire lives. An oversimplification of these particular tendencies in the characters covered here is represented below. It serves its co-function as a gimmick and as a quick way of discerning the shadings of artistic personality which Mann delineates through his fiction. I will use both Mann's and Nietzsche's terms for the polarities represented:



The Apollonian and Dionysian tendencies that determine the artist are important psychological factors in the development of the artist for both Nietzsche and Mann.

In "Death in Venice" Mann's artist Aschenbach exhibits the utter decay of Apollonian discipline as Dionysian forces overcome it. He is a writer whose favorite motto is to "Hold Fast" and whose whole life is characterized by relentless self-discipline. During a vacation in Venice, the elderly author is driven to distraction by his fascination for a beautiful young Polish boy; he contracts cholera, and in a private ecstasy of aesthetic drunkenness dies quietly without ever speaking to the child. The work is laden with irony, but points out with serious intensity the polarities within the personality of the creative artist:

The union of dry, conscientious officialdom and ardent, obscure impulse, produced an artist. . . And yet the pure, strong will which had laboured in darkness and succeeded in bringing this godlike work of art to the light of day -- was it not known and familiar to him, the artist?

This "pure, strong will," we remember from Nietzsche, has its "lethargic" aspect as well as the "strong" -- well-illustrated in The Magic Mountain by Hans Castorp. His restraint ebbs away in the lax atmosphere of the Berghof; he experiences "reckless sweetness" in his heart at the sight of Madame Chauchat and seems to taste its "boundless joys of shame," while his "excellent chair" becomes the location of his wild, sensual dreams. Hans' "letting go" opens into a complete moral and disciplinary relaxation: Dionysus has

overcome a not-very-resistant Apollo.

In Adrian Leverkühn Mann handles with greatest agility Nietzsche's concept of the Apollonian and Dionysian, both in the artistic personality and in the art itself. He deals with the idea of the absolute union of Apollo and Dionysus in both artist and art and their ultimate effect.

When Zeitblom and Adrian Leverkühn are young, they hear lectures by a musician, Kretschmar, who delineates some of the musical philosophy behind Beethoven's symphonies and sonatas, especially the "subjective" and "conventional" aspects:

Where greatness and death come together, he declared, there arises an objectivity tending to the conventional, which in its majesty leaves the most domineering subjectivity far behind, because therein the merely personal -- which had after all been the surmounting of a tradition already brought to its peak -- once more outgrew itself, in that it entered into the mythical, the collectively great and supernatural.<sup>5</sup>

In a discussion of this lecture, Adrian brings forth his idea that a certain "barbarism" in music is necessary in order to give life to an old musical "culture," and a later lecture by Kretschmar confirms this idea. He concludes that the "elemental" harmonic beginnings of music lie at a "mythical" creative core of all melody, and that these primordial roots can be re-invoked to produce new forms of music in epoch after epoch. He discusses the story of Biessel, an American founder of a religious sect, who used vocal and rhythmic patterns in creating religious music that acted as direct expressions of the piety he intended to express.



As Adrian grows, these ideas develop in his mind and in his art, until, in a discussion with Zeitblom he outlines his belief that the "organizational" and "subjective" aspects of art can be united. "Old or new," he says, "I will tell you what I understand by 'strict style.' I mean the complete integration of all musical dimensions, their neutrality towards each other due to complete organization."<sup>6</sup> The effect, as is soon evident, is outwardly chaotic, but inwardly as precise and harmonically perfect as the "magic square" of mathematical calculations that Adrian hangs above his desk. Here is ~~the~~ "new" Dionysus that Nietzsche spoke about: the elemental, unrestrained mythical roots of music that are so basic as to be totally ordered.

The Apollonian restraint of Adrian's outward appearance is the necessary cover for the complex intellect behind his "mask." Only at the end does the Dionysian take over completely, in Adrian's "confession" before his friends of his pact with the devil.

Interesting parallels lie in the descriptions of both Adrian and his music: they combine the concepts of utter simplicity of appearance arising out of basic conflict:

Zeitblom describes Adrian:

Of a lack of naïveté I would not speak, for in the end naïveté lies at the bottom of being, all being, even the most conscious and complicated. The conflict -- almost impossible to simplify -- between the inhibitions and the productive

Zeitblom describes Adrian's Lamentations of Dr. Faustus:

But precisely in the sense of resume there are offered musical moments of the greatest conceivable possibility of expression: not as mechanical imitation or regression, of course; no, it is like a perfectly conscious control over all

urge of inborn genius, between chastity and passion, just that is the naivete out of which such an artist lives, the soil for the difficult, characteristic growth of his work; and the unconscious effort to get for the "gift" the productive impulse, the necessary little ascendancy over the impediments of unbelief, arrogance, intellectual self-consciousness: this instinctive effort stirs and becomes decisive at the moment when the mechanical studies preliminary to the practice of an art begin to be combined with the first personal, while as yet entirely ephemeral and preparatory plastic efforts.<sup>7</sup>

the "characters" of expressiveness which have ever been precipitated in the history of music, and which here, in a sort of alchemical process of distillation, have been refined to fundamental types of emotional significance, and crystallized. . . Does it not mean the "break-through" of which we so often talked when we were considering the destiny of art, its state and hour? We spoke of it as a problem, a paradoxical possibility: the recovery, I would not say the reconstitution -- and yet for the sake of exactness I will say it -- of expressivism, of the highest, and profoundest claim of feeling to a stage of intellectuality and formal strictness, which must be arrived at in order that we may experience a reversal of this calculated coldness and its conversion into a voice expressive of the soul and a warmth and sincerity of creature confidence. Is that not the "break-through?"<sup>8</sup>

This "break-through" is the revitalization of an artist, an art, and a culture through the ultimate simplicity and wholeness of the Dionysus-become-Apollo. We thus find that for Mann the Apollonian and Dionysian polarities of the unconscious mind can be united within a powerful personality to produce a consummate art. This union is the "metaphysical miracle" that Nietzsche discussed in The Birth of Tragedy.

The recognition, then, of the untamed essence of the unconscious, or the realization that one's "spirit" is stronger than "nature" (society), becomes the basis for the "Übermensch-Artist. Mann, like Nietzsche, felt that art rises out of

a need to overcome "weakness," either in the form of physical illness or a spiritual "dislocation." Once one recognizes the hidden potentialities of his mind and spirit, in other words, he must control his will in order to keep it from its more dangerous or frightening possibilities. This type of control results in an aloofness, an apartness, that will always be necessary for the man who wishes to grasp fully the chaotic elements of his nature and hold them at arm's length.

Tonio Kröger, one of Mann's earliest spokesmen, characterizes well the reasons for his artistic nature:

The artist must be unhuman, extra-human; he must stand in a queer aloof relationship to our humanity; only so is he in a position, I ought to say only so would he be tempted, to represent it, to present it, to portray it to good effect.<sup>10</sup>

He, like Nietzsche, points to Hamlet as the tragic figure who was "called to knowledge but not born to it" -- a man, we recall, who was "out of joint" with his times. This "out of jointedness" is symbolized in Tonio Kröger by Tonio's relationship to two blond bourgeois friends, Hans and Ingeborg. Hans, Tonio's youthful idol, and Ingeborg, his earliest love, reappear symbolically when Tonio has grown up and left his home town. Once again he senses poignantly his separation from the bourgeois "blond" roots of his childhood and longs unbearably for acceptance by his two "lovers." As in his home city he is set apart and unaccepted; neither his dark looks nor his imaginative spirit will allow his quiet amalgamation into the society he yearns for. That night in bed Tonio's isolation rushes in upon him:

He thought of the dreamy adventures of the senses, nerves, and mind in which he had been involved; saw himself eaten up with intellect and introspection, ravaged and paralysed by insight, half worn out by the fevers and frosts of creation, helpless and in anguish of conscience between two extremes, flung to and fro between austerity and lust; raffine, impoverished, exhausted by frigid and artificially heightened ecstasies; erring, forsaken, martyred, and ill -- and sobbed with nostalgia and remorse.<sup>11</sup>

Tonio finally acknowledges in a letter to his Russian friend Lisabeta Ivanovna that he is indeed a "bourgeois," but a bourgeois gone astray. He is accepted neither by the "blonds" nor by the "bohemeians" and can accept neither way of life fully. He admits being secretly drawn to "the blond and blue-eyed, the fair and living, the happy, lovely, and commonplace,"<sup>12</sup> but they are, he admits, too shallow for his total love. Yet he cannot deny wholly his attraction to them. "I admire those proud, cold beings who adventure upon the paths of great and daemonic beauty and despise 'mankind,' but I do not envy them," he writes. He cannot accept austere, aesthetic aloofness either; and so the young Tonio (and young Mann) set out on a life bent to reconciling the inner "weakness" that brings about their art.

Spinell, in Mann's Tristan, is a pathetic example of the not-quite-overcomer. A resident at a sanatorium, the young German writer becomes enchanted with the wife of a German businessman. His small attempts at "self-overcoming" are efforts to curb a wayward spiritual lethargy that is never mastered. He describes "people like himself" to Frau Klöterjahn:

We are feckless creatures, and aside from a few good hours we go around weighted down, sick and sore with the knowledge of our own futility. . . A kind of decorum, a hygienic regimen, for instance, becomes a necessity for some of us. To get up early, to get up ghastly early, take a cold bath, and go out walking in a snowstorm -- that may give us a sense of self-satisfaction that lasts as much as an hour. If I were to act out my true character, I should be lying in bed late into the afternoon. My getting up early is all hypocrisy. . .<sup>13</sup>

The beautiful Frau Klöterjahn and he are united in mystic harmony as she plays music from "Tristan" on the piano, and Herr Spinell falls before her on his knees. When she becomes fatally ill and her irritated, bourgeois husband is sent for, Herr Spinell writes him a letter of rebuke for his "unconsciousness" of her refinement. "The world is full of what I call the unconscious type," he writes, "and I cannot endure it; I cannot endure all these unconscious types!"<sup>14</sup>

The ensuing scene between the businessman and Herr Spinell is painfully ludicrous. While the writer stands frozen in embarrassed silence, the irate husband refutes the insults of the letter and leaves. Later, when Spinell takes a walk and accidentally comes upon the dying woman's lusty and healthy baby, he turns -- "his gait was the hesitating gait of one who would disguise the fact that, inwardly, he is running" -- and goes back to a life of shy, sporadic attempts at lonely self-overcoming.

Three of Mann's heroes are almost true "Übermenschen" in their overcoming. Through their self-mastery, they master the

society which gave birth to them, and stand aloof from it. But since they are essentially overcoming one facet of their personalities, there is an ultimate imbalance in the results. They are Aschenbach of Death in Venice and Savonarola and Lorenzo of the Fiorenza, who finally fall short of Übermensch-status, because they are secretly wooers of the very society they stand apart from. Mann describes Aschenbach's ambition:

. . .but he had attained to honour, and honour, he used to say, is the natural goal towards which every considerable talent presses with whip and spur. Yes, one might put it that his whole career had been one conscious and overweening ascent to honour, which left in the rear all the misgivings or self-derogation which might have hampered him.<sup>16</sup>

Savonarola, a fiery ascetic, who was once renounced by the woman he ardently loved, becomes the religious leader of Renaissance Florence in Mann's play Fiorenza. The play itself is quite universally acclaimed as one of Mann's most contrived creations, but the characterization is vivid and valuable for observing the author's ideas of the leader with artistic bent. Savonarola's foil is Lorenzo De Medici, a shrivelled and dying ruler who has brought artistic richness to Florence. In himself he is ugly, but the aesthetic wealth with which he has uplifted Florence has put her at his feet. When the two leaders meet, their words reveal their real attitude toward their aloof positions:

Lorenzo:

Oh, my dreams! My power and art!  
My power and art! Florence was my  
lyre. Did it not resound? Sweetly?  
It sang of my longing. It sang of  
beauty, it sang of great desire, it  
sang it sang the great song of life.

Savonarola:

. . .I that suffered so. . . .  
Ambition says: my sufferings  
must not have been in vain.  
They must bring me fame. One  
might laugh at the docility  
of the world --<sup>18</sup>

Lorenzo wants Florence's subjection to him and Savonarola wants her to die for him, and both will woo her to this end. They, in overcoming their weaknesses, have gone beyond their society, but they look back on her and reach out as Nietzsche's *Übermensch* would never do.

Of all of Mann's artists, two would qualify as *Übermenschen* in the Nietzschean sense: Adrian Leverkühn and Felix Krull. Two such disparate heroes demand explanation as holders of this title, which Tonio Kröger may interpret. We recall his "proud, cold beings who adventure upon the paths of great and daemonic beauty and despise 'mankind.'" This type of person would be the *Übermensch* Nietzsche described in their "wicked immorality."

Adrian Leverkühn of Mann's Dr. Faustus does not "despise" mankind; he simply doesn't care about it. Germany rises and falls about him as he composes his music in utter detachment. He neither depends on society for his spiritual well-being nor intends to contribute to it for its well-being.

Adrian, discussing music with Zeitblom, characterizes his musical ideal:

The ruthless indifference of one who has risen above it towards the sheer earthly difficulties of technique is to me the most colossally entertaining thing in life.

This "ruthless indifference" could characterize Adrian's attitude toward involvement in the life about him. Except for his temporary attachments to the woman Marie and the child

Nepomuk and his traces of sentimentality in his choice of physical surroundings like those of his childhood, Adrian is detached from the world.

In ensuing sections, we will see how Adrian, as an *Übermensch*, rises with indifference beyond all boundaries, religious and moral, to a complete self-mastery. This mastery, Mann affirms, must be wholly aesthetic in order for it to be achieved. And since, as we know from his essay, beauty is allied with death for Mann, the *Übermensch*-Artist, Adrian Leverkühn, is doomed.

Felix Krull, on the other hand, is so thoroughly apart from society that he can superficially enter into it with spiritual immunity. His hilarious confidence games are merely games and the society that nurtured him in his plaything. He could have been, if Nietzsche had had the intent or humor, the philosopher's comic prototype of the *Übermensch*. We recall that Felix too, although always involved in a particular situation with other persons, affirms at the outset, ". . .for in early youth an inner voice had warned me that close association, friendship, and companionship were not to be my lot, but that I should instead be inescapably compelled to follow my strange path alone, dependent entirely upon myself, rigorously self-sufficient." And so the handsome young man skips from plot to plot and bed to bed with an aesthetic immunity that we, as participators in a comedy, find amusing and even enviable.



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Once we have established Mann's artists as self-overcomers, we begin to understand the essential unmorality of their natures. Morality for Mann, we must remember, had a profounder meaning than the mere ethical connotations of Nietzsche. Mann's morality is diametrically opposed to "aesthetics," and as such represents actuality, humanity, or, as Heller terms it, "reality." The unmoral nature of the world of the self-overcomer becomes the "day" and "night" shadings of all human experience: that which accentuates or detracts from the life-experience of the individual. The self-overcomer of Mann, recognizing his separation from society, becomes as Nietzsche's "lion" a "no-sayer" to that society's standards, or he may, as Hans does, enter upon Nietzsche's "experimentation" with values and experiences to determine which ones enhance life for him. I will explore some of these day and night shades of experience in analyses of The Magic Mountain and Dr. Faustus, novels in which he was able to develop his ideas with subtlety.

The equivocal nature of sickness appears in much of Mann's work and undoubtedly rises out of Nietzsche's claims of its "heightening" capacity in artistic creativity, as well as Mann's own experience. For Hans the first confrontation with wall-to-wall illness is a bewildering one. Sickness has made a society all its own, a society of which Hans cannot be a part until he develops suspicious symptoms himself. His excitement over the rise in his temperature is an ambiguous one, compounded of fear and anticipation. The ensuing "illness" also has equivocal effects on Mann's young hero. He

finds his sensual receptivity heightened to a dizzying sensitivity and ideas fall upon him with a new impact and significance. He "babbles" in excitement over this new physical and intellectual awareness. But another aspect of his sickness reveals itself simultaneously, and it is not without its attraction. Herr Albin, a young "incurable" speaks beneath Hans' porch shortly after his arrival, and his words reveal an underside to illness that Mann continues to weave as a leitmotiv throughout the novel until its climax much later in the "faun" vision Hans experiences while listening to his records. I will include here Hans' introduction to this "night" side -- the abrogation of responsibility -- of physical illness, followed by its culmination in Hans' music-dream, in order to show its complete inculcation into the youth's sensibilities.

But Herr Albin was inexorable. . . "I'm sick of it, fed up, I can't play the game any more -- do you blame me for that? Incurable, ladies, as I sit here before you. . . Grant me at least the freedom which is all I can get out of the situation. In school, when it was settled that someone was not to move up to the next form, he just stopped where he was, nobody asked him any more questions, he did not have to do any more work. . .<sup>19</sup>

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The young faun was joyous on his summer meadow. No "justify thyself," was here; no challenge, no priestly court-martial upon one who strayed away and was forgotten of honour. Forgetfulness held sway, a blessed hush, the innocence of those places where time is not; "slackness" with the best conscience in the world, the very apotheosis of rebuff to the Western world and that world's insensate ardour for the "deed."<sup>20</sup>

Herr Settembrini holds out against this self-indulgent tide upon which Hans lets himself drift. "Disease has nothing refined about it, nothing dignified!"<sup>21</sup> he cries out in anger, but the diverse currents of disease within Hans lift him up into new insights and drag him down into years of "letting go."

Adrian's illness, his "pact with the devil," of course directly parallels what Mann supposed Nietzsche's contraction of syphilis to be. His illness wends a slow course throughout Leverkühn's ensuing twenty-four years after the Nietzsche-Leverkühn incident in a brothel, until the composer, like the German philosopher, composes his Ecce Homo, "The Lamentations of Dr. Faustus," and lapses into complete insanity. Mann's devil (who is even more diabolically enjoyable than Dostoevsky's in The Brothers Karamozov) explains the function of Leverkühn's illness:

"Disease, indeed I mean repulsive, individual, private disease, makes a certain critical contrast to the world, to life's mean, puts a man in a mood rebellious and ironic against the bourgeois order, makes its man take refuge with the free spirit, with books, in cogitation. . . What has come about by the way of death, of sickness, at that life has many a time clutched with joy and let itself be led by it higher and further. . . What uplifts you, what increases your feeling of power and might and domination, damn it, that is the truth."<sup>22</sup>

And yet he describes with gleeful morbidity how the organs rot away, one by one, with boring predictability in the "ordinary" man, who experiences no simultaneous heightening. The reader, nevertheless, is ironically aware that however

Faustian or Nietzschean the sufferer is, his innards are also disintegrating with painful slowness -- a "night" side to the most glorious heightening of the invalid's art.

Mann applies this "disease" motif to the German culture as well. Nazism, the disease, at first stimulates and arouses the German people to new plateaus of national pride, Zeitblom says, while insidiously eating her away from the inside. Mann's brilliant sliding of time periods, one over the other, in recounting his story accentuates this theme. As Leverkühn becomes infected, rises, and finally succumbs, Zeitblom records his private reactions to the same phenomena in the society around him.

In the courses of these two novels, Mann traces the day and night sides of the religious spectrum from pole to pole. From the utter masochistic subjugation of humanity under the Christian aestheticism of Naphta in The Magic Mountain to Zeitblom's mildly mystical humanism in Dr. Faustus, Mann hammers away with conscientious curiosity at the various faces of religion and religious experience. He doesn't fail to bring into both novels ("Research" in Magic Mountain and the talks of Adrian's father in Dr. Faustus) the metaphysical instability of all of nature and natural phenomena with its possible purposiveness.

Let us recall Mann's statements about religion in his discussion of Nietzsche:

I cannot conceive of the supradenominational<sup>al</sup> religion of which he speaks as other than allied to the

humanitarian ideal, a religiously based and colored humanism which, out of depths of experience, having survived many trials, includes all knowledge of the lower and daemonic elements of man's nature in its homage to the mystery of man. . . Religion is reverence -- reverence first of all for the riddle which man is.

This attitude requires, we must remember, the unmoral sort of "experimentation" that Nietzsche demanded of the *Übermensch*. He would probably frown upon Mann's experimentation with religion, but to follow the philosopher's ideal strictly would call for such investigation. Mann's thorough methods of propounding and representing various religious views, especially in Dr. Faustus, indicate that he too is a conscientious experimenter in the finest sense.

Mann's most repeated "religious" affirmation is the instability and equivocality of existence. We must, he insists, force ourselves to recognize this:

All actuality is deadly earnest; and it is morality itself, that, one with life, forbids us to be true to the guileless unrealism of our youth.

Like Nietzsche, Mann distrusts the religion that demands human sacrifice for an abstract ideal. The humanism of a Zeitblom would probably reflect what Mann considered his own most "religious" attitude. But Adrian Leverkühn, the *Übermensch*, rises above his early religious involvement so that he, as an artist, can return and move freely within the framework that could have bound him. Perhaps Adrian's and Serenus' most "religiously" edifying lessons in their youth come from Adrian's father, when the older man gives his

talks on natural science. He points out an exquisite crystalline structure that grows just as organic substance does: Mann's way of making a moral-aesthetic division even at the natural level. From these early days and onward, Adrian is continuously confronted with the day and the night shades of his existence and environment. When he has mastered his acceptance of the instabilities and equivocalities at the root of things, he can manipulate them and create beyond himself. I am convinced that Mann considers Adrian's training and his associations with natural science, religion, and metaphysics, as well as those with music and the people around him, as religious or moral experiences, in the sense that Adrian is exposing himself to his education with the intention of grasping and understanding as many aspects of life as possible.

This scrupulous honesty in facing the equivocalities of existence, we recall, is a mandate of both Nietzsche and Mann: don't blind yourselves to reality, they say -- accept it and create through it. Mann goes a step beyond Nietzsche in this attitude by remaining completely open to a universe that may or may not contain a divine entity: Nietzsche has excluded entirely such an option.

But Adrian, the *Übermensch*, carries his experimentation beyond moral boundaries and "falls" in the eyes of his creator. Adrian's letter to Kretschmar, delineating his reasons for

turning to music, expresses his dissatisfaction with all other types of endeavor, including theology. He cannot, he admits, "respect" the areas of study he has mastered and become bored with. "I have not warmth," he says ruefully, and calls his boredom the coldest thing in the world. And yet Adrian's fascination with the religious never ceases, as he also admits in this quaint way, to his teacher:

Ye think me called to this art, and give me to understand that the 'step aside' to her were not long one. My Lutheranism agrees, for it sees in theology and music neighbouring spheres and close of kin; and besides, music has always seemed to me personally a magic marriage between theology and the so diverting mathematic. Item, she has much of the laboratory and the insistent activity of the alchemists and nigromancers of yore, which also stood in the sign of theology, but at the same time in that of emancipation and apostasy; it was apostasy, not from the feith, that was never possible, but in the feith; for apostasy is an act of feith and everything is and happens in God, most of all the falling from Him.

Adrian, the Übermensch, rises beyond religion so that he may safely use it -- "wed" it to his art. He, like Nietzsche, has grasped the "wicked wisdom" that turns even the holy into an aesthetic tool. This, Mann indicates, is the ultimate form of religious aestheticism -- morality, or human reality, is no longer a department of theology. In failing to maintain the moral-aesthetic tension of the religious element in his life, Adrian makes a pact with the devil. Excerpts from Adrian's final "confession" document this pact:

Never had I felt more strongly the advantage that music, which says nothing and everything, has over the unequivocal word; yes, the saving irresponsibility of all art, compared with the bareness and baldness of unmediated revelation. . . So did I feed

my arrogance with sugar, studying divinity at Halla Academie, yet not for the service of God but the other, and my study of divinity was secretly already the beginning of the bond and the disguised move not Biblewards, but to him, to him the great religiosus.

When we recall that Hans envisions the evolution of nature toward the human as a cancerous disease, or that Adrian's father takes pains to show that animate and inanimate matter are really united, we come to understand Mann's ultimate censure of Adrian. The "Übermensch-Artist" falls from grace because he refuses to acknowledge the unstable, human, "moral" aspect of the religion he brings to life in his music. It becomes static and aesthetically perfect. Man is a riddle, Mann says, and true religion must acknowledge this. When man and his ideals or faiths are held at arm's length and pressed into a harmonic framework, they lose their reality, their morality. Man is day and night, beauty and ugliness, moral creature and aesthetic creature. When recognition of this equivocality ceases, Mann believes, the beholder must bear the curse of his blindness.

As the reader has undoubtedly discerned, Mann's "night" side of existence is that which is death-directed, or more specifically, directed toward non-living. The Will to Live and the Will to Die are unnamed actors in all of his stories and rise to the visible surface only in such characters as Settembrini and Naphta in Magie Mountain. Settembrini and Naphta, clearly representing Life and Death forces in the life



of Hans Castorp, battle for the youth's "soul" on an intellectual plane, while he feels their subtle emotional conquests as he acts out his life in the sanatorium. And yet even these life and death figures are ironically portrayed: Settembrini will brutally massacre those who oppose him politically, and Naphta seeks death, he says, in order to achieve lasting life. Life and Death meet Hans everywhere: in music, romanticism, psychology, science, and wherever else the human mind and body interact. Hans, like Hamlet, succumbs to the "lethargy" born of the inability to act in face of equivocation. His emotional resolution to this inactivity comes in the "Snow" chapter, where the youth, who is caught in a snowstorm, has a dream-vision that awakens him to the ideal stance in the face of Life and Death. In his dream Hans sees an idyllic, simplified community where persons interact with "sweet courtesy" in the shadow of a hideous temple where he finds two old hags dismembering a child. When he awakes, Hans rambles in ecstasy:

I know all of man. . . But he who knows the body, life, knows death. . . I have dreamed of man's state, of his courteous and enlightened social state; behind which, in the temple, the horrible blood-sacrifice was consummated. Were they, those children of the sun, so sweetly courteous to each other, in silent recognition of that horror? . . . The recklessness of death is in life, it would not be life without it -- and in the centre is the position of the Homo Dei, between recklessness and reason, as his state is between mystic community and windy individualism. . . Love stands opposed to death. It is love, not reason, that is stronger than death. . . For the sake of goodness and love, man shall let death have no sovereignty over his thoughts.<sup>25</sup>

The acknowledgement of the "underside" of life, Mann says, makes that life the valuable, active force that it can be. With that recognition, man overcomes his Hamlet-like inaction and masters his own will. This recognition, as we have seen, must come in all phases of our existence -- religious, artistic, natural, etc., and be a dynamic attitude toward each new experience.

And yet, problems remain to be solved that Mann and Nietzsche both saw and for which neither could offer definitive answers.

Early in Dr. Faustus Zeitblom and Leverkühn discuss music:

"A gift of life like music," I responded, "not to say a gift of God, one ought not to explain by mocking antinomies, which only bear witness to the fullness of her nature. One must love her."

"Do you consider love the strongest emotion?" he asked.

"Do you know a stronger?"

"Yes, interest."

"By which you presumably mean a love from which the animal warmth has been withdrawn."

"Let us agree on the definition!" he laughed.

"Good night!"<sup>24</sup>

Interest: the cold neutral word that motivates the Faustian man. It is not an easy word to accept because of our romantic concepts of the "love of knowledge" and the "search after truth." The incredible equivocality of Interest's existence comes not in the life-death motif, but in the earlier, deeper one of reality versus the aesthetic. The ambiguous nature of this Interest is its ability to become Disinterest: the profound unmorality which can look like love because it accepts all things for the sake of their aesthetic presence. This

is precisely the Love that Zarathustra could exult over. Nietzsche, who rarely ever kept a friend, could "love" everyone for the sake of the aesthetic experience. Once we have entered this aesthetic reality, we can no longer speak of Life and Death forces because no morality exists here over which they can contend. When the aesthetic enters the moral life, however, life and death war over the victim of Beauty's fascination while leaving the object itself untouched. Aschenbach muses on just such a possibility:

And has not form two aspects? Is it not moral and immoral at once: moral in so far as it is the expression and result of discipline, immoral -- yes, actually hostile to morality -- in that of its very essence it is indifferent to good and evil, and deliberately concerned to make the moral world stoop beneath its proud and undivided sceptre?<sup>25</sup>

Clavdia Chauchat's effect on Hans also demonstrates the moral chaos that Beauty inflicts upon the beholder, as Hans' "letting go" drags him farther and farther from participation in his own life.

Who then is left untouched by the total unmorality of Beauty? The answer can again be found in Mann: the person whose strongest motivation is Interest, i.e. aesthetic Disinterest. Just such a person is Adrian Leverkühn of Dr. Faustus, whose perfect union of Dionysus and Apollo has made him the Übermensch. His polar opposite is Serenus Zeitblom the humanist. Thomas Mann lies somewhere between and feels the constant torture of their moral-aesthetic tension.

It is in this sense that Mann is truly a bourgeois artist.

An awareness of the connotations that the word "bourgeois" has for Mann is valuable, since it is, of course, a more profound concept than the usual socio-political meaning would indicate. In light of Nietzschean philosophy, the bourgeoisie would be neither the "herd" nor the "master-class." It would be somewhere between, with roots in the mass culture and inclinations and aspirations rising above that culture. For Mann the meaning would have deeper subtlety: the bourgeois man would stand symbolically between the strictly moral masses and the wholly aesthetic *Übermenschen*. Here too stands Thomas Mann. The fact that the day and night aspects of life do war within him and must be overcome repeatedly, that he cannot overcome the attraction for society's companionship and admiration, and that he must assert Apollonian restraint over uncontrollable and conflicting forces, identify him as the not-quite-*Übermensch*. Nietzsche himself does not qualify, although he went mad trying. The philosopher's mistake was his inability to recognize his own moral nature and its incapability of achieving complete aesthetic distance from the world and from himself. It is not easy to find any human being whose artistic life has wholly or almost wholly obliterated his moral one.

The modern artist who best succeeds at such a departure is James Joyce, whose "fingernail paring" behind his art denotes a craftsmanship that has so closely approached pure aesthetic distance that he can return (like Felix Krull) into

a fictionalized moral world and move with immunity through it. The profoundly personal happenings in his own life are objectified into an artistic framework that approaches perfection in balance and design. One is affected by his work as Zeitblom is by Leverkühn's music:

But precisely in the sense of resume there are offered musical moments of the greatest conceivable possibility of expression: not as mechanical imitation or regression, of course; no, it is like a perfectly conscious control over all the "characters" of expressiveness which have ever been precipitated in the history of music, and which here, in a sort of alchemical process of distillation, have been refined to fundamental types of emotional significance, and crystallized.<sup>26</sup>

Joyce's work is outwardly chaotic and inwardly as balanced as Leverkühn's "magic square," where all the numbers horizontally and vertically add up to thirty-two.

Mann's realization of this essential difference between the moral and the aesthetic in man is most evident in his use of ironic humor. This handling of the funny is far different from that of Nietzsche's, whose Zarathustra hurls down his exultant laughter on the heads of the herd he leaves behind in the market place. We recall Barrett's reference to Zarathustra's "retreating" in joy to his mountain cave. This laughter indicates an avoidance of inner reality precisely because it does involve a "running away." Mann repeatedly illustrates this type of "fleeing" humor in many of his characters. Zeitblom describes Leverkühn's mirth:

His love of laughter was more like an escape, a

resolution, slightly orgiastic in its nature, of life's manifold sternness; a product of extraordinary gifts, but to me never quite likable or healthy.<sup>27</sup>

In The Magic Mountain, Behrens, the controller of the sanatorium, exhibits a similar type of humor in the face of his sick residents:

"Morning, gentlemen, morning," he said. "How's everything in the big world? I've just come from an unequal duel with saw and scapel -- great thing, you know, resection of ribs. . . The chap today knew how to take the joke -- put up a good fight for a minute or so. -- Crazy thing, a human thorax that's all gone; pulpy, you know, nothing to catch hold of -- slight confusion of ideas, so to speak."<sup>28</sup>

This is a style of wit that indicates an avoidance of reality, an unwillingness to look inside oneself and face the pain and conflict there.

Mann's humor, however, can be called a confrontation of this inner reality. It is the most psychologically mature comedy because it acknowledges human dualities and weaknesses and objectifies them. The very fact that they are objectified benignly and without censure indicates that they are recognized and accepted as a part of the human personality, and their distance from ourselves evokes a smile of recognition and acknowledgement. Mann's use of this objective recognition manifests itself in his use of irony and paradox. One often feels that Mann's characters don't understand themselves, and we smile at their misconceptions. But the skill with which he has revealed the hidden, opposite sides of their character is his mastery of the ironic literature. Paradoxes in language, tone, and allusion abound in Mann. His use, for example, of The Phaedrus in Aschenbach's descent is the ultimate in paradox.

paradoxical handling of a dialogue dedicated to Beauty's "uplifting" nature.

This attitude toward polarities in character may be the door to the resolutions which Nietzsche and Mann seek philosophically, and the key is in their humor. Nietzsche sees his inner paradoxes and shouts triumphantly that he will rise on the tides of their power and overcome them. Mann sees the paradoxes and documents them. His means of "overcoming," then, is acknowledgement through art, and because our most hidden, human traits are spread before us, we smile in recognition. Who then is ultimately more brave, Nietzsche or Mann? Nietzsche runs ahead of his "lion," laughing at his ability to outrace him: Mann turns and grins him down. I must throw my vote to the intrepid grinner.

A conclusion to a paper such as this is difficult because there is no final statement I can make that will indissolubly tie Nietzsche and Mann together and state their relationship. Nietzsche represented a psychological and a philosophical breakthrough into the twentieth century. Mann took some of the fragments of this breakthrough and investigated them, turning the jagged pieces in the light and handling them with delicate curiosity. He found Nietzsche a recognizer of deep truths, but knew through his own experience that the philosopher's answers to human needs were mistaken. Perhaps their most deeply unifying conviction lay in their decision to regard the recognition of the equivocalities of existence and man's

responsibility to face them a moral affirmation rather than a spiritual failure. But Mann went a step further in using his skill as a nearly consummate artist to delineate the aesthetic and the moral aspects of living and their effects on the human personality. The perfect <sup>''</sup>Übermensch-Artist, apart and above society and dedicated wholly to his art he finally discarded as his private ideal. The "blond people" who lived in what Conrad called "saving darkness" he also laid aside. The tension between the two became an artistic as well as a personal goal. An artist who spoke out in times of national stress and who suffered with his people in their defeat also left that society; as a result, he combined aesthetic craftsmanship in its highest form with a heartfelt desire to communicate human truths to his readers. In a sense, he is a "betrayor" of Nietzsche, the aesthete, on one hand, and on the other, of the herd, the common man. But in this tenuous union of aestheticism and morality, Mann found insights into himself and, thus, into the reader, that are unsurpassed; he produced an art that ranks him as one of this century's finest writers.



CHAPTER NOTES #7

- <sup>1</sup>Thomas Mann, A Sketch of My Life, trans. by H.T. Lowe-Porter, (Paris, 1930), p. 21-23.
- <sup>2</sup>Geoffrey L. Bickersteth, The Golden World of "King Lear", (London, 1946), p. 12.
- <sup>3</sup>Thomas Mann, "Disillusionment," from Stories of Three Decades, trans. by H.T. Lowe-Porter, (New York, 1936), p. 27.
- <sup>4</sup>"Death in Venice," from Stories of Three Decades, p. 413.
- <sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 53.
- <sup>6</sup>Thomas Mann, Dr. Faustus, trans. by H.T. Lowe-Porter, (New York, 1965), p. 191.
- <sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 152.
- <sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 485.
- <sup>9</sup>Mann, Sketch, p. 22.
- <sup>10</sup>Thomas Mann, "Tonio Kroger," from Stories of Three Decades, p. 103.
- <sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 131.
- <sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 132.
- <sup>13</sup>Thomas Mann, "Tristan," from Stories of Three Decades, p. 142.
- <sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 160.
- <sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 166.
- <sup>16</sup>Mann, "Death in Venice," p. 385.
- <sup>17</sup>Mann, "Fiorenza," from Stories of Three Decades, p. 270.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 269, 270.

<sup>19</sup>Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain, trans. by H.T. Lowe-Porter,  
(New York, 1964), p. 80.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 646.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 98.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 232-242.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 495-497.

<sup>24</sup>Mann, Dr. Faustus, p. 86.

<sup>25</sup>Mann, "Death in Venice," p. 386.

<sup>26</sup>Mann, Dr. Faustus, p. 488.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

<sup>28</sup>Mann, The Magic Mountain, p. 173.

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