Honors Projects   Political Science Department

1999

Beyond Narrow Liberalism

Justin B. Taylor '99

Illinois Wesleyan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/polisci_honproj

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation

Beyond Narrow Liberalism

By
Justin B. Taylor

Research Honors
Advanced Studies in Politics
Dr. James Simeone
4-15-99

Abstract: Of growing debate among those concerned with American political culture and democratic theory is the modern conception of liberal democratic theory. This work attempts to broaden our understanding of democracy. I will argue that modern liberalism has narrowed our conception of individual liberty. This narrowed focus has produce a reliance on the use of public regulation and interest group pressure as substitutes for civic engagement. In an attempt to move past a mere critique of narrow liberalism, this essay will develop a research design and an empirical test to measure our current political culture's support for a robust democracy and its future prospects of development.

Table of Contents

Beyond Narrow Liberalism

Introduction

The year 1965 was one of milestones and victories for liberal democratic ideals. Hailed as a centerpiece of the civil rights movement, the 1965 Voting Rights Act accomplished an essential step in the evolution of democracy and justice. This procedural reform sought to ensure individual rights and liberties through the inclusion of minority voice in the political process. For those who fought and died, this national level guarantee of political voice and power was designed to ensure equality and freedom under uniform laws for all citizens. This was a great achievement which re-focused our country on the goal of a more equal and just society. However, the act neglected an equally important reason for this reform: the engendering of civic participation and meaning. Liberalism has pushed individual freedoms and equality to new understandings but has ignored the equally important role of civics in our democracy. An essential normative claim of this essay is the requirement of continuous input and oversight by "the people" in order for democracy to make the virtuous claim of self-government and the civic improvement of its citizens. Modern liberalism narrowed our understanding of democracy. It excluded the formative role of participation in the pursuit of individual rights.

Liberalism and democratic theory in general depend on the three fundamental pillars of self-government for their foundation: individual freedom, public regulation, and civic meaning. Liberalism in the last fifty years has focused on the first of those pillars, using the second as a crutch, at the expense of the third. This is not a new observation; many authors have identified the tension liberalism has produced in modern democracy

in different ways. Theodore J. Lowi's analysis of the "second republic" in American history characterized by the explosion of bureaucracy explores the far-reaching effects of a liberalism narrowed to a focus on regulative bureaucracy (Lowi, 1979). Lowi's "interest group liberalism" took the path of least resistance—it increased individual freedoms and government responsiveness through pluralistic access to regulative bureaucracy instead of engendering change in the hearts and minds of the citizenry.

As Stephan Holmes argued in his work, Passions and Constraints, traditional liberal democratic theory had a heavy dose of positive consitutionalism. Constitutions, as early liberals envisioned, not only limit government power to ensure individual freedom (negative constitutionalism). But they also establish structures that, "can ensure that the will of the people is formed through open public debate . . . [and] can enhance the intelligence and legitimacy of decisions made" (positive constitutionalism), (Holmes, 1995:8). According to Holmes, traditional liberalism both assumes and requires the engendering of participation and active individual engagement to counter regulatory power. In the end Holmes states that, "liberalism is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for some measure of democracy in any modern state" (Holmes, 1989:9). In what he suggests is a co-existence, liberalism allows for and assumes republican concepts and participation.

James Morone in his work, The Democratic Wish, identifies the "dread and yearning" of the American people (Morone, 1991). The dread of government, stems from "the perception that public power threatens civic liberty" (Morone, 1991:2). The conflicting yearnings of the American people comprise the democratic wish. Key to the democratic wish, "is an image of the people—a single, united, political entity with the

2

capacity, as John Adams put it, to 'think, feel, reason, and act'" (Morone, 1991:5). The American people have always assumed and strived for active participation according to Morone. The American ideology, as he terms it, is based on self-government, meaning active popular participation to prevent government action without the consent of the people. However, a stronger yearning, individualism, has allowed the American people to be deluded into thinking the expansion of government is their own will and is actually protecting their desire to ensure self-government. Morone's portrait of democracy's development in America ends in a disheartening conclusion.

> The state and its bureaucracy grew; however, they never won a legitimate role at the center of our society. Instead, two centuries of state building produced a string of metaphorical legitimators for public administration: a mirror of the people (as the revolutionaries fancied their assemblies), a reflection of the people's choices (Jacksonians), the computation of disinterested science (Progressives), the outcome of the pluralistic political market (some New Dealers). Each formula was an effort to rest administrative authority on an external, automatically functioning source of legitimacy. Each was a different escape from the same threat—public officials who make independent judgements, ministers who think.
> (Morone, 1991:323)

Morone argues that a republican yearning has existed throughout our history but that the yearning to be unencumbered has prevailed in shaping our democracy. I would argue that, while this may be the case to limited degrees, it simply reflects the logical balancing of republican participatory ideals and individual freedoms in earlier periods. Only in the twentieth century has this delusion that bureaucracy can be an effective substitute for participation become hegemonic.

Michael Sandel's analysis of the American public philosophy supports the above assertion. In his work, Democracy's Discontent, he defines the modern manifestation of liberalism as one that "asserts the priority of fair procedures over particular ends, the

public life it informs might be call the procedural republic" (Sandel, 1996:4). Several key points and ideas are argued from this definition. The first is that "freedom consists in the capacity of persons to choose their values and ends" (Sandel, 1996:5). Sandel terms this the priority of the right over the good. This means that our right to choose our own good trumps any controlling collective good. There is no common conception of the good life. Virtue comes in allowing citizens to choose their own ends. The second major point to be made from Sandel's definition is the implied neutrality of the state. In his procedural republic, the state does not perform any formative function. Lowi's second republic, Holmes's negative constitutionalism, and Morone's self-delusion are different conceptions of very similar arguments. The explosion of bureaucracy has insulated the people from their government and de-emphasized civic participation.

An essential flaw in Sandel and other critics of liberalism is their juxtaposition of liberalism to republicanism. Republicanism is *not* in opposition to liberalism. As some have suggested these two public philosophies combine and rely on each other to maintain self-government. Richard Dagger for example argues that, "just as a liberal society must be able to count on a sense of community and civic engagement, so the republican polity that Sandel now champions must be able to count on a commitment to liberal principles, such as tolerance, fair play, and respect for others" (Dagger, 1998:4). Democracy relies on both philosophies for development and regime support. Without both sides of the equation, democracy can be undercut. Narrow liberalism has de-emphasized, but not destroyed, republicanism. A resurgence of republicanism should not attempt to discredit a commitment to a broader liberal theory.

"Central to republican theory is the idea that liberty depends on sharing in self-government . . . sharing in self-rule involves . . . deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to the destiny of the political community" (Sandel, 1996:5). Sandel misunderstood the implications of his own definition of republicanism. This definition does not demand a communitarian model, where the common good has priority over individual rights. Nor does this definition demand republicanism be set in opposition to liberalism. As Richard Dagger points out in his critique of Sandel, "we should pause to consider whether republicanism and liberalism share enough features to make a hybrid possible—perhaps in the form of a 'more civic-minded liberalism' that might be called republican liberalism" (Dagger, 1998:26). While Dagger seeks to find a hybrid, I contend the relationship should be conceptualized more as a necessary co-existence. Republicanism and liberalism are distinct schools of democratic thought which cannot be combined into one overarching theory. Yet, in the practical application of democracy on a society, each requires the other for foundations and support. On the one hand, liberalism relies on republican virtue to create the type of citizens required for self-government. This, in turn, is the vehicle for individual freedom and liberties. On the other hand, republicanism relies on liberalism's commitment to tolerance, freedom and fairness to create a just society. Both are necessary but not sufficient for democracy's development.

Narrow liberalism does not allow for what Sandel terms "a formative politics," (the cultivation of citizens). However, traditional liberalism accepted and relied upon the republican idea of a non-neutral state. Holmes' argument for positive constitutionalism not only allows for but also requires the cultivation of citizens able to and inclined to

participate and debate. Again, Sandel confuses traditional liberalism with the narrow implementation of the twentieth century. "The republican conception of freedom, unlike the liberal conception, require a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires" (Sandel, 1996:6). Republicanism envisions a formative project. The cultivation of civic-minded individuals is essential to self-government, and therefore is essential to the protection of individual rights as well as the pursuit of the common good. Narrow liberalism's dilemma is that it has secured rights through procedural reform instead of through societal consensus. These advances in individual rights help us develop as individuals and as a society. We must engage in a formative project to change the hearts and minds of our citizenry and, this cannot be done through regulation alone. This must be done through open debate and engagement and a formative state. The challenge is to develop new ways to engender this type of citizenry without coercion under our new understandings of individual rights. It is not, as Sandel states, that "the liberal vision of freedom lacks the civic resources to sustain self-government," but that the modern implementation of narrow liberalism lacks the necessary institutional mechanisms.

As opposed to the traditional, wide-reaching ideals found in liberal thought, the liberalism that has dominated the twentieth century has produced a society and a government focused on achievement in only one area. The focus on individual, private freedom has achieved great strides for the citizens of this country, but at what cost? An essential piece of democracy is the civic ideal. Narrow liberalism has neglected the importance of civic culture and instead has relied solely on procedural regulation to maintain a government truly for the people. In the end, narrow liberalism has used

procedural mechanisms to expand individual freedom while assuming that those mechanisms they have created will keep government in check and lessen the need for civic engagement.

Self-government on autopilot is the order of the day for modern liberal theory. The reliance on regulative bureaucracy allows citizens to be concerned only with their own private, usually economic, well-being and undermine the crucial function of civic participation. The total de-emphasis of civic meaning and interdependence will not lead to a total destruction of democracy and free will. It will, however, prevent society's advance toward a more just and morally virtuous society. The normative argument thus leads to an empirical claim. The goal of this essay is to clarify the normative issues in order to shape our understanding of the tangible impact of narrow liberalism on our democracy. To fully understand this somewhat meandering line of logic, several basic assumptions and definitions must be established. What follows is a discussion on democracy, self-government, concepts of development and, in the end, a proposal for measuring civic culture values concretely in terms of democratic institutions, actions, and norms.

I. The Pillars of Self-Government

Any attempt to move beyond our current state and develop our democracy into a more just and virtuous milieu for individual growth and freedom requires an analysis of the pillars of self-government and how they affect future development. I have identified three broad categories: public regulation, civic meaning, and individual liberty. These pillars of self-government provide the foundation of democracy and its development. A

regulative body checking the government and providing the structures for participation; civic meaning and the sense of community, nation and personal relevance it creates; and private individual freedoms and autonomy comprise those fundamental pillars of self-government. Each of these pillars, in distinctive ways, adds to the development of democracy. They are also interdependent. Public regulation is an unavoidable result of government of any kind, and it is a very virtuous product when under control and in the hands of the people. Without regulative bureaucracy, a society cannot institutionalize ways to protect and engender civic meaning or individual liberty. Civic meaning, our sense of whom we are in relation to those around us, is undermined in the absence of individual liberties. Without the production of civic meaning, individual freedom loses some of its virtue and may become undermined as well.

James Morone was correct in as much as democracy necessarily creates bureaucracy as a vehicle of regulation (Morone, 1990). Self-government is still a government. Governments are administrative and bureaucratic in nature. The concern is to what purpose the bureaucracy exists. Is it there as an arm of a dictator's repressive regime? To collect a monarch's tribute? To carry out national interest group demands? Or is the purpose of bureaucracy to implement the will of the people and protect the agreed concepts of society; e.g. freedom, justice, and equality? In the case of self-government, the type of regulation created performs two essential functions: not only does it address and protect private interests, but it also acts as a public check.

Stephan Holmes identifies constitutionalism as the key regulative actor in limiting a government's power and shaping our society (Holmes, 1995). For Holmes, constitutions perform both a restrictive and facilitative function. Liberalism of the

twentieth century has embraced "the doctrine that constitutions are primarily preventative or inhibitory devices, meant to check or repress tyranny and other abuses of power" (Holmes, 1995:7). No doubt this is true and a very necessary role for constitutions and the regulative elements of democracy in general. However, the unquestioned focus merely on restriction has led to an acceptance on an ever-increasing regulative body. This body has grown far past constitutional limits and concepts. Bureaucratic agents are now given the tools of power to define societal norms, set standards, and determine governmental bounds on private life without ever receiving one vote. As a pillar of self-government, regulative bodies must not only check government power, but also perform the facilitative role of structuring institutions to promote and channel public debate into the policy making process. Unlike constitutional-level institutions, the current system is tied to interest group pluralism and therefore cannot accomplish this. The reformers of the 1960s attempted to engage the public within the framework of the current system and only produced further bureaucratic insulation from individual debate and discussion and an even greater focus on national interest groups (Harris and Milkis, 1989).

Self-government produces a higher meaning for the citizen. This more virtuous meaning is a product of self-government's requirement of participation. Virtue is increased by shifting the focus from one's own position to a focus on one's contribution to the making of a just and virtuous society. Citizens' moral virtue is increased by their awareness of and concerned for those around them. "More than a scheme for majority rule or individual liberty or equal rights, democracy had as its highest purpose the moral and civic improvement of the people" (Sandel, 1996:220). As Sandel and others argue with success, the modern liberal notion of unencumbered or bracketed selves is

unachievable and undesirable. We are partially defined by our encumbrances, and as such, it is important to realize that we must accept responsibility to engage in self-government in order to improve our personal virtue. Self-government produces higher civic virtue and individual meaning through its requirement of participation and engagement in the search for a just and virtuous society.

The third pillar of self-government is individual liberty. Each individual's freedom and autonomy stems directly from self-government's commitments and ends. Individuals are free because they engage in and have an effect on their government. By voting, debating and contributing to democracy, we free individuals to pursue "the good life" in whatever shape we envision. This pillar of self-government has been the sole focus and desire of narrow liberalism. While essential and virtuous, the production of individual freedom as defined by modern liberals has mutated our system's regulative structures and powers and has de-emphasized and undermined the production of civic meaning. A broadening of our understanding of democracy and all its essential characteristics is required.

II. The Surface Characteristics of Democracy

Democracy has been stated simply and in seemingly un-mistakable terms. Abraham Lincoln's oft quoted assertion, "government of the people, by the people, and for the people," seems to suggest what any fourth grader would tell you: democracy is simply free government, based on the sovereignty of the people, advancing the will of the people. This type of government can be easily distinguished from non-democratic forms. Clear and unmistakable characteristics define a democracy, but only describe democracy

at the surface. These surface characteristics are important and necessary to democracy's foundation, but do not guarantee a robust version of self-government capable of producing virtuous citizens. In fact, the four surface characteristics are termed such because they are only products of the first two pillars of democracy, individual freedom and public regulation. A democracy based only on two legs cannot stand. The third pillar of democracy, civic meaning, produces more subtle characteristics of democracy, which I term foundational characteristics. This distinction will shape the development of the empirical claim of the essay and lead to a research design.

Elections are the most readily measured surface characteristic of democracy. Along with other structural mechanisms, elections are designed to ensure representation, both in the legislative assembly and in policy outputs. To be a truly democratic influence on policy-makers, elections must be structured to ensure a wide definition of those who are qualified to vote. This is for democratic legitimacy and to ensure that representative government is indeed, representative. The great success of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was that it widened the electorate. But even with this seemingly clear characteristic, some distinctions and explanations must be made. Democratic theorists have debated two elements or conceptions of the role of elections. I will present these as the idealist version and the realist version of elections. Joseph Schumpeter articulates the realist position: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1997:366). Elections simply serve as a check on those in power, but only in so far as they allow "the people" to choose which set of elites will govern. According to Schumpeter, idealists ignore the essential role of

elections as tools for selection of leaders. True government by the people is unattainable and impractical. Democratic theory is moving toward this new realization. The idealists contend that free and open elections are part of the essential process of debate and discussion. Elections are not designed to give the populous direct control over policy; they are principally designed to translate the doctrine of popular sovereignty into an operating principle or institutional practice (Mayo, 1997:372). Elections are obvious and essential points in the process of self-government by which the will of "the people" is measured. For idealists (and I count my self as one), elections also point to a deeper role and value in democracy. They not only allow Schumpeter's "throwing the bums out" but also ensure that those in power listen to public debate and govern accordingly in between elections. If representatives fail in this task, they risk the same fate as those they replaced.

Another surface characteristic of democracy is a commitment to freedoms, both political and individual. Political freedom refers to the ability to freely choose a representative body. Voters must be allowed to make their own decision without coercion or intimidation. Essential to this process is the existence of formal rules such as secret ballot, freedom to run for office, freedom of press and speech, and freedom to assemble and organize for political purposes (Mayo 1997:374). The legitimate operation and inclusion of opposition parties and opinions is a measure a government's commitment to democracy. Governments such as the former Soviet Union, Communist China, and the hegemonic PRI in Mexico display all the trappings of democratic elections, but these are only cosmetic. Preordained election results and the lack of any viable opposition sweep away any claim to democracy. Fundamental to democracy's

effectiveness and stability is a commitment to the maintenance of individual freedoms. Rights of privacy, religion, basic education, and economic self-determination are just some of the rights demanded. The protection of individual rights maintains and engenders popular support for the regime and a sense of government working to protect each citizen. This understanding of rights is part of what Richard Wilson calls "compliance ideologies": those standards and norms, decided on by society, and ensured by the government, which protect and stabilize the current political structure (Wilson, 1992).

Commitment to political and social equality is also a necessary trademark of modern democracy. This distinction parallels democracy's commitment to freedoms. Political equality refers to electoral structure and outcomes. For political equality to be achieved each citizen shall have one vote, each vote shall count equally and the representatives elected shall be proportional to the number of equal votes (Mayo 1997:372). Political equality ensures legitimacy and translates popular sovereignty into structural outcomes. Social equality is measured through the policy outcomes but is achieved through wide popular consensus. This implies another problem with narrow liberalism: modern liberals measure success or progress in procedural reforms rather than societal attitudes and norms. The assumption is that government can produce mass attitudinal change through regulation. If democracy's highest purpose is the civic improvement of citizens and this is accomplished through individual participation and engagement, a theory as to how society as a whole improves is implied. A basic argument of this work is that social attitudes are altered one person at a time and not by

centralized regulation. But at this juncture, it is important to note that modern democracy must display a commitment both to political equality and to social equality.

Majoritarianism is the fourth surface characteristic. It presents an internal tension, which must also be addressed in any attempt to define democratic structure. Democracy's claim to representation is seemingly at odds with the notions of majority rule. Some argue that, if the will of the majority prevails, those in the minority are not represented in policy. As Schumpeter put it, "the will of the majority is the will of the majority and not the will of 'the people,'" (Schumpeter, 1997:368). But this does not necessarily exclude the claim of government "by the people." As MacIver, Mayo, Lindsay and others have argued, democracy is not a form of policy development; it is a system to determine *who* governs and to what ends (Cohen, 1997). Many consider majoritarian aspects of democracy beneficial and stabilizing when counter-balanced with a society wide commitment to minority rights. The very fact that the majority prevails when universal consensus cannot be achieved, which is almost always the case, only ensures democracy's survival and continued mass support of the government structure. It is important to note that this is not a carte blanche for Tocqueville's feared "tyranny of the majority." In the end this benefits all society members by maintaining egalitarian aspects and structural opportunities for minorities, while maintaining stability and long-term support.

The surface characteristics of democracy display the important products of the first and second pillars of democracy. However, they also point to their own inability to ensure and protect the third pillar of democracy, civic meaning. Elections are designed to begin the process of translating popular sovereignty into an operating principle but cannot

14

alone create a virtuous society or virtuous citizens; this requires a more personal and continuous participation. Commitments to freedom and equality are both essential products in structuring a virtuous society but cannot alone encourage the engagement of citizens in the formation of community. Much like the first three, majoritarianism provides necessary stability and regime support but does not, in itself, engage citizens in the formative project. To produce civic meaning and virtue in society, we turn to the foundational characteristics of democracy.

III. The Foundational Characteristics of Democracy

Democratic theorists have been struggling for centuries with the notions of participation and community ends, both of which are essential products of democracy and its future progress. These foundational characteristics form a symbiotic relationship with the third pillar of self-government, civic meaning. Participation and community are at once the results and causes of civic meaning. Individual level engagement presupposes consent. By debating, citizens contribute to the polity and thus consent to societal norms and structures. This process of contributing to the formation of norms is the mechanism for civic improvement. Civic meaning enables the cultivation of citizens and a commitment to broader, community-based ends. And, by turn, when a society cultivates citizens, it produces civic meaning.

For democracy to make the virtuous claim of self-government there must be continuous input and oversight by "the people." This is a very different claim than modern liberal theorists have pragmatically pushed into practice. Narrow liberalism's tunnel vision toward an expansion of individual rights and liberties has resulted in the use

of bureaucracy and interest groups organization in place of true individual participation. In other words, narrow liberalism has developed a system of incentives that encourages pursuing narrow ends via interest groups. Democracy cannot stand on interest groups and regulation alone so that, individuals may spend all of their efforts toward their own ends. In order to develop and advance to a more virtuous kind of democracy, the expansions in individual rights and procedural regulation must be matched in kind by a new conception and understanding of civic meaning and new ways to engender the formative project of cultivating citizens capable of self-government. This is a very basic fact that liberal policy of the last fifty years has unintentionally undermined.

Even activists movements of the late 1960s and 1970s, such as the environmentalists, were subject to the structural and cultural effects of narrow liberalism. The environmental movement was part of a larger movement to get citizens "plugged back into" government and policy making. However, the emphasis and tactics employed by the environmental movement display a complete adaptation to modern liberalism's pluralistic structure. Individual citizens and small community action groups were not effective. Only after a national movement funding professional lobbyists in Washington D.C. was formed did they view their work as successful. With the creation in 1970 of the Environmental Protection Agency, environmentalists gave decision-making power to bureaucrats, not elected officials or community groups. Many of these bureaucrats were actually lobbyists formerly working for citizen groups who moved over to the agency (Harris and Milkis, 1998: 225-230). They bought into narrow liberalism's reliance on regulative bureaucracy and judicial activism by a federal agency to ensure that private interests (the protection of the environment) were achieved.

The EPA, like nearly every other executive agency, became a government co-opted interest group. As long as their professional lobbyists and the EPA were on the job, environmentalists did not need to stay engaged in the debate and decision-making process. In effect, environmentalists accepted public regulation as a substitute for civic participation. According to Richard Harris and Sindey Milkis, the deregulation efforts of the Reagan administration was a direct result not only of Reagan's larger philosophical commitment to downsizing government, but also to the tactics and structure of the environmental movement now virtually controlled by an executive agency and not private citizens. "It was this involvement of public lobbyists in the courts and the bureaucracy that many in the Reagan administration found obnoxious . . . it seemed the height of hypocrisy for public lobbyists to proclaim themselves tribunes of the people and champions of participation, while fighting their greatest battles in the courts, the least democratic branch" (Harris and Milkis, 1989:226). The Reagan administration was able to cripple an executive agency achieving widely supported goals because the citizen participation needed to prevent this action was absent. The system put in place by narrow liberalism encourages this type of interest group pressure and reliance on public regulation, which in turn can endanger the effective translation of popular will into policy.

At this juncture a brief return to representation is necessary. The argument to be made for a newfound emphasis on participation begs the question of what participation is and how effectively it is translated into policy. At a most basic level, participation is simply voting. But as stated previously, this does not ensure the designed representation both in the assemblies and in the policy outputs. Some would argue that to be truly

virtuous, participation must have a direct effect on policy. Otherwise, it has been diluted in its power, and "the people" are a little less self-governed. While in a utopian setting this argument might be logically posited, it cannot be a serious consideration in the modern world.

As suggested by several authors, the Athenian model and universal assent can no longer define participation. Participation, as a foundational characteristic of democracy, now means the opportunity and ability to engage in debate. Each member of a society must undertake the absolute necessity of discussing the issues of the day. As A.D. Lindsay argued, "what matters is not that the final decision of government should be assented to by every one, but that every one should have somehow made his contribution to that decision" (Lindsay, 1997:362-3). It is the responsibility of the assembly to set the agenda and provide a calming force to the volatile winds of public opinion, but without free and open debate, assemblies can make no claim of continuous representation. In modern society, we see the unmistakable breakdown in participation (debate, discussion, and voting). Narrow liberalism has implanted a reliance on regulative bureaucracy to ensure individual rights from government encroachment. The concern is two-fold. Under a structure reliant on regulation and bureaucracy, how legitimate is the claim of self-rule? Also as Lindsay points out, debate should lead to responsive representative assemblies. Is this input occurring at all, and if it is, is the bureaucracy listening and responsive? In reality, the regulative bureaucracy and the system are not responsive to the right kind of input, which produces the formative ends of government, i.e. individual contributions to the debate shaping the collective good. On the other hand, they are perhaps too responsive to the narrow concerns of interest groups. Lindsay's pronouncement, "what

matters is not that the people should rule, but that they think they should rule; and it has

given undue emphasis to the element of consent over the element of discussion" (Lindsay

359), now seems even more ominous in the face of a democracy purposefully put on

autopilot. The pursuit of individualism has allowed society to be deluded into thinking

regulative bureaucracy and interest groups can be substituted for the individual

participation contributing to the collective good that is necessary for the growth of

virtuous citizens.

Individualism and a reliance on regulative bureaucracy alone cannot advance

democracy and help our society develop the broader, community-based ends which are in

turn required for the production of virtuous citizens. "Democracy is a kind of community

government" (Cohen, 1997:357). This simple observation has not been advanced in the

narrow liberalism of the twentieth century, yet I maintain that community is the second

foundational product of self-government. If the goal of our society is to produce full and

complete virtuous citizens, attention must be given to the notion that we cannot act as if

our lives and actions affect no one but ourselves. It is an inescapable truth that we, as

Sandel terms it, are "encumbered." This fact is a strength not a weakness. Without

interpersonal contact and responsibility we cannot become complete human beings.

Long ago John Dewey noted this fact "The keynote of democracy as a way of life

may be expressed as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in

the formation of values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from

the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human

beings as individuals," (Dewey, 1997:378). Two important elements can be found in the

above claim. First, it is absolutely essential " for the participation of every mature human

being." Working with the above description of participation, the reason for its necessity should become clear. Democracy as in all forms of government establishes and enforces community norms and standards. Without individuals engaging and participating in our government, it ceases to be our government; we cease to be self-ruled. As Dewey clearly argued, "all those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing and managing them" (Dewey, 1997: 378). "General social welfare" cannot be determined, let alone achieved, with a completely atomistic, self-interested view of the individual. If we understand "general social welfare" to be an aggregate of developing complete and virtuous citizens, we must require consent by contribution and the development of reason through debate, interaction and a widened understanding of those around us. Self-interested consumers cannot achieve individual development as long as they remain unengaged. In addition, society's commitment to freedom, equality, justice, and virtue require input from the people. Even the narrow liberal's definition of "general social welfare" cannot be achieved and protected without civic-minded individuals.

A brief discussion on ends versus means should be helpful to my point. Since Hobbes, liberals have debated whether the goal of civil society should be the development of shared ends or shared means. My contention is that shared means are necessary but not sufficient. Democracy requires civic individuals engaged in their community to develop consensus on shared means to individual development and personal definitions of success. However, in the process, we also have at least one shared end: the development of a virtuous society that allows for the growth of complete human beings. Narrow liberalism's de-emphasis on civic meaning and the formative project has put us in danger of losing the recognition of this shared end.

John Rawls discussed this process in terms of concepts and conceptions (Rawls, 1971: 9-10). The goal of our democracy is to achieve a consensus on the concept of justice. It is absolutely essential that a self-governed society actively engages in and debates that concept continuously. This is due to the fact that each individual's conception of those concepts of justice, freedom, toleration and equality changes and develops over time. Conceptions are the necessary building blocks of concepts. Let's consider the *concept* of fairness. There are many *conceptions* of fairness: the central themes are equity versus efficiency. When individuals engage and debate the *concept,* their *conception* changes. Eventually a new consensus of the concept of fairness is achieved through changing conceptions. We, as a society, have grown and moved toward our goal of more complete individuals. There are many defendable conceptions of justice our society might share, but we are in danger of forgetting that we need to share a consensus of the concept.

The challenge for our democracy is to find new and inventive ways to engender and support civic-minded citizens without coercion or trampling the advances we have made in our shared concepts of individual rights and freedoms. "Merely legal guarantees of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly are of little avail if in our daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred. These things destroy the essential condition of the democratic way," (Dewey, 1997:382). Democracy is not simply a structure established by our founding fathers that we can ignore and disengage from in the pursuit of self-interested individualistic goals. The foundation of democracy relies on the need for civic engagement and development. Without it, our development as

complete human beings and a truly just and virtuous society is hampered. "The heart and final guarantee of democracy is in the free gatherings of neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day, and in the gatherings of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to converse freely with one another," (Dewey, 1997:381-382). The challenge is to find new neighborhoods, new street corners, new ways of engaging our citizens and engendering civic virtue.

IV. Liberalism's Tension Revisited

Traditional liberalism was composed of two elements. The first is that a new conception of self-interested, rational individuals seeking their own personal ends shaped an understanding of private freedom and autonomy. But in addition, liberalism accepted and understood the need for participation and a sense of community and nation in order to achieve and protect individual liberty. Holmes recognized this and has critiqued modern liberalism as losing sight of this second element. In an attempt to find the path of least resistance for the attainment of individual liberty, liberalism has narrowed its definition of democracy and self-government. Narrow liberalism in its practical application has transformed Holmes' envisioned two-fold regulative body, one that included negative and positive constitutionalism. Narrow liberalism has redefined the role of regulation to that of a disinterested, neutral structure ensuring individual freedom and popular will without the need for costly dialogue at the community level. Narrow liberalism is very efficient but it is a short-run, shortsighted efficiency. Mills' hypothetical enlightened despot can be instituted according to liberals. But Mills' original objection is still valid (Mills, 1991:238-239). Twentieth century liberalism

assumes and hopes regulative bureaucracy can replace participation as the "self" in self-government, and that the ends of government *for* the people rather than *by* the people, will be enough to create virtuous citizens. This is a naïve and ultimately self-defeating position. Without advancement and growth in all pillars of self-government and a strengthening of all pillars of democracy, we as a society and as individuals cannot develop beyond our current understandings and virtue. Essential to the goal of individual development, is the relationship between engagement and participation, which establishes consent by contribution and requires reason that promotes individual development.

Narrow liberalism relies on a neutral state to carry out the functions previously required by civic participation. It requires a neutral state so that those in power cannot abuse power. Not only is this naïve; it is undesirable. Concepts such as toleration, freedom, and fairness are not neutral; they are moral value judgments about what is "right." A totally neutral state protecting and enforcing non-neutral values is impossible. The focus on individual liberty, as modern liberalism has defined it, de-emphasizes and reduces civic virtue. Narrow liberalism presupposes a collective agreement on concepts of justice and liberty. But if the debate over the concept of justice is robust (efficiency versus equity), our debate over liberty is stalemated and stagnated by this system.

This is not to argue that a democratic government should not act as arbiter between social groups and competing ideals. Some of democracy's surface characteristics perform this function. Elections ensure channels to government and allow competing voices to be heard. Commitments to freedom and equality provide protection and allow minority groups to compete with the majority in free and open debate. Under this structure, a majoritarian outcome ensures that a small but powerful social group, i.e.

23

elites, cannot impose their views. More to the central point, narrow liberalism has focused on government's role as arbiter in order to expand individual's ability to focus solely on their own interests.

As the case of Hungary in the late 1960s will demonstrate, this type of focus and societal atmosphere can cause great setbacks for democracy's development. In 1968, Hungarian leader Janos Kadar received Soviet approval for his "New Economic Mechanism." Kadarism, as it came to be known, was a product of the politics of liberalization. A society starting to organize and cry out for democracy was effectively bought off by economic liberalization. A society convinced of atomistic, consumerist, economic driven concepts of progress and success was bribed into abandoning any dreams of democracy in return of some measure of market reforms. Kadarism, "kept society in a diffuse and inarticulate state, in a childish dependence; it deprived people of efficient institutions of interest intermediation and participation . . . it liberalized people without giving them rights and real freedom" (Hankiss, 1990:81). Democratic reforms and development were delayed in Hungary for decades by a deluded understanding of what freedom and democracy really meant.

Narrow liberalism's focus on the individual freedom pillar of self-government has greatly affected the other two pillars. While incredibly responsive to the people as organized interest groups, our regulative bureaucracy is now massive, pervasive, intrusive and non-responsive or accountable to the people as individual contributors to our public discourse. Our regulative bureaucracy allows for and promotes contributions in the form of is routinized imposters parading massive money-making special interest groups as new ways to engage in our public discourse. As a nation, America has seen its

sense of community and civic engagement languish in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The great gains of narrow liberalism should not be undone or attacked. They are essential to our further development and represent great achievements for democracy. However, just as important is a renewed sense of civic responsibility and engagement. Our society and our government must redefine their roles and responsibilities. We must embrace our newfound individual rights and freedoms, but we must also embrace the challenge of finding new ways to produce civic meaning and engender participation if we are to develop our democracy to the next level.

V. The Nature of Development

The term development requires some definition at this point. To develop means to change, to redefine society and political culture, to broaden our understanding of humanity and ourselves. The common concepts of what is just, fair, virtuous, and morally desirable for individuals and society needs to be continually questioned. When a society has successfully redefined Rawls' conceptions, then society has moved to a new phase of development. The moment of development is not distinct. Phases do not come in neat bundles, easily identifiable or set off by profound or cataclysmic events. Development is a slow, incremental process. It is based on individual agency. Through our life experiences, personal understandings and beliefs on rights and obligations, we alter and refine our personal ideology. So too, this is the way for society. The aggregate of each individual's ability to debate, discuss and experience new ideas and people allows our society to slowly change its dominant understanding of our own political culture and thus political development occurs.

In Compliance Ideologies, Richard Wilson outlines an argument conceptualizing

political culture as ideology and on the development of democracy. A society's ideology

is the set of agreements and norms which maintain and stabilize its political environment.

Wilson terms his concept of political culture "compliance ideologies," due to this

stabilizing and maintaining effect. "A compliance ideology rests both on generalized

notions of what is morally acceptable and on regulations (customary or codified) that

translate what is acceptable into specific guides for action. The study of political culture,

as I use the term, is the study of compliance ideologies and the way they legitimize

systems of institutional control" (Wilson, 1992:24). Political culture reinforces and

legitimates the institutions which enforce a society's social contract.

Wilson centers his notion of political culture on "conceptual axes." These axes

are comprised of two components: cognitive and moral. Conceptual axes of compliance

ideologies represent the point at which two sides of individuals (and aggregately the

society's motivations and ultimately worldview) intersect. Wilson's cognitive axis

represents the rational, self-interested, economics driven model of motivation and

personal success. The moral axis represents the emotional, irrational, and often times

relational motivations of individuals. The point of intersection of these axes represents

the "compromise that is arrived at between the demands of the group and the needs of the

individuals is formulated in compliance ideologies as moral guidelines" (Wilson,

1992:82). Consonant with the approach assumed here, I will argue that over a period of

time, due to many factors rather than an earth-altering event, the conceptual axes shift

slowly and as they shift the political culture of a society shifts and development occurs.

This gradualist approach to development is directly tied to the previous discussion on

concepts and conceptions. The consensus on our dominate concepts changes incrementally individual to individual through open debate and contribution to structuring society.

Wilson identifies four phases of development. The "archaic," or pre-state, phase was dominated by kinship ties and fatalistic beliefs in warring gods. The shift to the "traditional" phase was marked by three general trends: the development of monotheism, the beginning of law, and the rise of world religions. Wilson also points to technological advances that fundamentally changed the way people communicated and lived, such as advances in agriculture, shipbuilding, advance methods of warfare, and elaboration of writing techniques. A slow shift occurred in society's compromise of individual freedoms and autonomy, as well as in their obligations and relation to the community around them. This phase was characterized by a focus on stability and strict hierarchical system. Solely the class structure and status determined an individual's rights and responsibilities. Wilson identifies a catalyst that pushed society toward the third, "modern" phase as the idea "that fairness requires like cases to be treated alike" (Wilson, 1992:70). The modern phase, which we are now in, has been dominated by property relations. The compromise was structured around the competing view of rights as property of equal individuals and rights as community property. Wilson's fourth phase, emergent, has not yet arrived. Wilson hypothesizes it will be dominated by a new evaluation of personal worth. Individuals will be measured by their ethical worth. The dominance of property and a hierarchy will wane and society will develop to a new moral high ground.

The importance of Wilson's stages here is his analysis of the modern phase and in the process of change. For Wilson, the modern phase's reliance on property as a unifying concept, a kind of common language, taints our advancement in individual freedoms and liberties and prevents our development. I concur with this view in so much as I argue society must remove economics from civics. Narrow liberalism has defined individual freedom and morality solely in economic terms. The higher goal of creating virtuous citizens has been swept aside in search of the almighty dollar. The narrow liberal assumption that all humans act rationally and rights are merely property to hold and control has created an atomistic, consumeristic society that lacks the civic culture necessary to develop beyond our current compliance ideology.

To demonstrate my point further, let's consider the shift from the traditional to the modern. The transition completed the establishment of democracy and the rule of law. It advanced our understanding of toleration, fairness, equality and rights. The change did not occur uniformly throughout the world, or even within a single country. Regions and individuals still clung to the traditional system. But the dominant concepts and agreements did indeed shift. As Wilson describes the process, "it proceeds at both the individual and ideological level, slowly, interactively, incrementally, and disjointedly" (Wilson 1992:75).

VI. Measuring Our Public Philosophy

An essential flaw in Wilson and most every other author's attempt to analyze and discuss political culture and change is the lack of reliable empirical methods of measurement. While I have advanced a normative argument it is also the goal of this work to establish a new conception of political culture and infer new ways to measure

change. This work has sought to establish a theoretical argument on the nature of our public philosophy and the necessary steps for democracy's advancement. Much of this debate has been centered around the abstraction of theories from anecdotes and contrived notions of life as we experience it. To effectively claim a theory to be anything more than this, a historical or empirical test must be administered. Amy McCready effectively argues that both Rawls and Sandel's critique of Rawls, while advancing successfully our understandings of the self and motivations, fall short of convincingly explaining the world around us for this very reason. "Without a grounding in history or some sort of empirical reality, Sandel's theory is subject to the same criticism that it launches at liberalism—that a theory abstracted from specific situations and constructed of conceptions only cannot justify itself or offer guidance to the world as it is" (McCready 1998:25). The next step is to determine that the problem as theory is really occurring through the creation of an empirical test.

Many have attempted to conceptualize and empiricize political culture. The theoretical argument presented above points to a new way to measure our political culture. Determining what is culturally necessary for the foundations of democracy and its development requires empirical measurement, analysis, and comparison over time. In many cases, this question has been posed in terms of cultural support for democracy and the measurements used, specifically voter registration and participation, have invariably been found unreliable (Laitin, 1995). I seek to establish an agenda for the creation an empirical test based on three indices as quantifications of the pillars of self-government, (a civic ties index, a directive function index, and an individual liberties index) which, when considered as a ratio, define political culture. These indices directly flow from the

theoretical arguments made above and hopefully will be more successful at measuring

democracy's political culture because these measures stem from a more precise

theoretical understanding of what democracy produces and what it is founded upon.

An important clarification must be made at this point. The theoretical debate has

generally assumed a zero sum relationship between individual freedom and civic ties. I

do not agree with this empirical conceptualization. Sandel and the liberals he critiques

fall into the trap of zero sum arguments. It is not the case that as a society increases

individual freedoms, civic meaning must decrease. Instead, my argument points to a ratio

conception implied in Wilson's understanding of conceptual axes. He viewed the

relationship as a ratio between defining the rights of individuals and defining obligations

to the community. "Contractual obligations, which stress defined limits to authority, the

intrinsic value of the individual, and the legal guarantees regarding negotiating processes,

are paired, in some ratio, with positional obligations that stress mutuality, community

need, and an organic view of society" (Wilson, 1992:89). Much as Wilson understood

the compromise of these obligations to be the definition of the current "compliance

ideology," I shall define and argue that the ratio at which we find these three indices

defines empirically, our current political culture.

The three-part ratio, which would empiricize political culture, consists of a civic

ties index as the first ramification of the ratio. The civic ties index would measure the

side of the public philosophy de-emphasized by narrow liberalism, civic meaning. This

measure would attempt to index several different measures into one comparable point.

By plugging this value into a ratio we can measure its relative strength and importance in

society. And we can also draw conclusions, one step removed, as to the effectiveness of the current institutional and regulative structures' abilities to engender civic engagement.

Possible measures in the civic ties index seek to measure non-individual interest based behavior. Tax morality, the level of citizens' timely payment of taxes, can be seen as a direct measure of their support for the regime and their commitment to any social programs funded through their tax contributions. A useful tool in developing the civic ties index would be a mass survey. A survey, while impossible to go back in time and survey from the first two of Wilson's phases, would still be very useful for measuring current attitudinal levels of support and engagement. This tool would provide researchers with an individual measure which could be aggregated to the community and provide clear evidence of community perceptions of civicness. Neighborhood action associations, sports clubs, health clubs, social clubs, community action groups, corporate community improvement initiatives could all be used to measure the amount of individual involvement in non-government, private sector forms of participation and community improvement. Measuring per capita charitable donations and hours of volunteer work would also help to measure civic engagement. New forms of community participation must also be identified, such as Internet chat groups and recycling levels. The civic ties index seeks to accurately measure new wave forms of civic engagement. Just as the challenge is to create new ways produce civic ties, our index must be able to identify these mechanisms and their effects in order to paint an accurate picture of our society's civicness.

The middle measure in the ratio is the directive function index. This index represents a photo negative of the public regulation pillar of self-government. Instead of

measuring bureaucratic power and insulation for the people, this index measures

variables more to the point of producing virtuous citizens. This means the ways in which

society and the institutional structures it creates promote and achieve debate and thus,

consent by contribution. By combining measures of both institutional mechanisms and

actual levels of direct citizen participation into a single index, a measure will be created

determining an exact level of both opportunity for and actual levels of popular directive

control over government action and policy, essentially the level of political contribution.

Including measures from each branch and level of government is essential in any

attempt to measure the true level of citizen direction and participation in their

government. Voter participation, while proven to be unreliable by itself as an indicator

of civic participation, must still be included in the directive function index. As a direct

measure of citizen engagement in self-government voting at all levels of government

cannot be ignored. Highly correlated to voting, but measuring citizens' ability and

propensity to have elements of direct democracy, would be measuring the frequency of

recalls, initiatives and referenda. The index must include whether or not these avenues of

recourse are available to citizens as well as their actual use of such mechanisms. This

variable would give a direct measure of citizens' willingness to dictate to or overrule the

legislative assemblies, elections of executives, and appointments of judges. Again this

measure requires data from all levels of government. As Putnam and others have

demonstrated, the number of free press operations and the level of newspaper

subscriptions provides an accurate measure of citizen political socialization and trigger

public debate on the issues of the day. As argued in the section on surface characteristic

of democracy, public debate is heard by those in power, and in an effective democracy,

that debate directly affects policy well beyond Schumpeter's "throwing the bums out" view of elections. Press operations and newspaper subscriptions are a measure of society's interests in and thus participation in affecting government and public policy.

From the judicial standpoint, institutions such as trial by jury and grand jury general statements provide citizens with a directive function over judicial precedence. Measuring level of exceptions from jury duty and the frequency of grand jury general statements could provide a more exact measure of directive action than a simple dichotomous measure. A measurement of bureaucratic power and responsibility should be included as a negative measure of directive action. Measuring budget levels, levels of discretionary spending, percent of federal a state budgets supporting semi-autonomous agencies, and number of persons employed by the government bureaucracy are all possible ways to measure bureaucratic power and insulation from directive action. Some form of this measure must be included to obtain an accurate picture of the true power of directive actions. For this index, a mass survey needs to address issues of efficacy and channels to government. This survey must be designed in such a way to avoid the masking effects of narrow liberalism's view of procedural regulation as the will of the people. Local governments' ability to tax citizens and develop their own spending programs would also be a possible variable to include in this index. Assuming the accuracy of the argument that local and state governments are "closer" to the people and therefore more responsive, these governments' levels of autonomy, which is directly tied to funding discretion, should provide another way in which to measure the strength of directive actions. Again, identifying new ways to communicate with and affecting policy makers is crucial to the accuracy of the index. These might include news ways of protest,

discussion, and debate or the evolution of old practices such as writing a letter to your congressman, but now the index must include e-mail levels to congressional offices. By indexing all these different aspects of directive action, it will be possible to compare this phenomenon to the other sides of the ratio in an attempt to determine the state of our political culture.

The third and final side to the ratio is the individual liberties index. As I have argued, the focus and progress achieved by narrow liberalism has mainly come in this arena. The United States has witnessed fundamental changes in the way individual liberties are protected and an expansion of those liberties to virtually all sectors of our population. A mass survey of citizens would provide an attitudinal foundation for the index. Measuring peoples' opinions of not only their own rights, but also how they view the rights of minority and marginalized sectors of our population provides an insight into institutional and cultural successes. It will also point to areas that still require efforts to overcome engrained cultural barriers to universal individual liberty protection. A simple dichotomous coding of basic rights protected under the law would include freedom of religion, speech, to a trial by jury, to petition the government, from unreasonable search and seizure, and from cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees of habeas corpus. Each of these freedoms connect to form the basic foundation of individual rights and must be included. A way to measure the ongoing process of redefining liberties and expanding the inclusion of marginalized sectors of the population would be to include civil liberties minority rights legislative initiatives per legislative session. A key to this index is the ability to measure the effectiveness and breadth of the enforcement of the laws and structures and whether this enforcement is changing attitudes. The survey

portion of the index should be able to tap into the change in attitudes or lack thereof, but I am unable to determine an accurate way to measure enforcement issues. This will be a difficult challenge for the researcher who attempts to collect the data necessary for this empirical analysis.

Narrow liberalism of the twentieth century has achieved great gains in the realm of the individual liberty index, while only modest gains in the directive function index have been achieved. Sandel would argue, and there is some evidence to support this claim, that civic ties measures have actually diminished during this period. As a result, we as a society have reverted to a less ideal form of government less capable of producing virtuous citizens. This is implying a certain doomsday atmosphere to the debate which I do not think the theory or the empirical evidence supports. Derek Bok's 1996 work, The State of the Nation, demonstrates the difficulties in measuring civicness and the mixed empirical indicators. I expect to find similar results with indicators of stagnation or at best a slight increase in measures of civic ties. This certainly does not lead to cataclysmic foretelling of the destruction of self-government. In the context of the discussion on development, this does point toward a transition period during which the ratio is attempting to find a new equilibrium. The problems Sandel and others have identified concerning the lack of growth in civic engagement and participation could be a sign that this transition is taking place. Once one side of the ratio has increased i.e. individual liberties, the other sides must find new ways to develop in the context of this development. As stated previously, the challenge is to find new ways of engendering civic engagement and the creation of new opportunities for participation in the context of our new understandings of individual liberties. Wilson's emergent phase will be

achieved when society's dominant conceptions have altered and redefined our concepts and institutions in such a way that a new equilibrium between the three indices is achieved that produces more virtuous citizens than before.

Conclusion

Narrow liberalism has triumphed in America for the last fifty years. As a society we have achieved great procedural reforms and expanded our legal definitions of citizen, intrinsic liberties, and public (government) responsibility. These great achievements have not come without an honorable but deadly battle. The civil rights workers of the 1950s and 1960s endured the hardships of an intolerant South and a complacent nation. Only after many thousands had protested and hundreds had died did we achieve procedural reforms protecting minority voting rights and civil liberties. And thirty years later, this country is still searching for an answer to our race relation problems. The simple truth is that procedure does not change a society, black or white. Procedure and institutions are tools. They are vehicles for the development of a society's public philosophy. While procedural institutions are inescapable, they do not solely define democracy.

The aim of this work was to set forth a normative argument as to the nature of our political culture, which could lead researchers to a way of measuring our culture and find ways to move beyond our current state. Stated simply, there are three pillars of democracy: individual freedom, public regulation, and civic meaning. Narrow liberalism of the last fifty years has focused on individual freedom using public regulation while neglecting civic meaning. For democracy to develop, all three pillars must change, grow

and become more adept in helping create virtuous citizens. If our aim is to produce free and complete individuals then we require a government and a society, which engage in a formative project. Civic meaning refers to an aggregate level notion of community, nation, and state. But it also has an individual level reference, the idea that we are not actors in a vacuum and that to be virtuous and complete, we have to contribute to the greater good around us. This requires civic participation and engagement. Our government and society are more virtuous when citizens use their own reasoning ability to contribute to the society and thereby grant consent. This process of using one's reasoning ability to contribute and by which a government establishes legitimacy and virtue is essential for the individual as well. To develop individually, we must engage and participate in the world around us, or we can never obtain the virtue we seek.

This is essentially a new political culture paradigm. Values are not separate from institutions and incentives, but rather are essential components of political culture. While I have not addressed this directly, it is important to note that I have assumed and implied the interdependence of these actors throughout the work. In the end, I have constructed and empirical conception of political culture. The construction is of a three-part ratio: a civic ties index, a directive function index, and a individual liberties index. The normative claims I have advanced are unsubstantiated. While anecdotes and historical context have been used by Putnam, Sandel and others to further this claim, what is lacking has been a successful empirical measure of political culture. I have set forth a possible test to be used in determining the state of society's civicness and political culture in general. While obviously untested more work along this line is essential.

The greatest design task, that I foresee concerns the transitional period and how to identify it. During a transition from one type of culture to another more than attitudes and concepts change. Much of how we measure this change is through the institutions that are created. Not knowing in advance what the emerging political culture will look like, there will be high levels of contention as research point to new types of institutions for evidence. Sandel and others like him who have correctly critiqued narrow liberalism, must continue to be aware of new ways to measure the change around us so that we do not miss it.

The equilibrium of public regulation, individual liberties and civic meaning is in a state of transition. Narrow liberalism has achieved great strides in individual liberty but the other pillars of democracy have been neglected. They are not crumbling; democracy is not in danger of collapsing. The speed of development is the point of concern. A period of transition has begun. The ratio, which defines our political culture, is searching for a new equilibrium. The challenge is to find new ways and institutions to develop civic meaning and put public regulation back in the hands of the citizens, while maintaining the gains in individual liberties. The balance to be struck is one between freedom and coercion, between the individual and community, between liberty and cultural stagnation.

Works Consulted

Barry, Brian. 1978. *Sociologists, Economists & Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bok, Derek. 1996. *The State of the Nation.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Cohen, Carl. 1997. "What Is Democracy." In *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy,* ed. Carl Cohen. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

Dagger, Richard. 1998. "The Sandelian Republic and the Encumbered Self." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Dewey, John. 1997. "The Foundation of Democracy." In *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy,* ed. Carl Cohen. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

Hankiss, Elemer. 1990. *East European Alternatives.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Harris, Richard A., and Sidney M. Milkis. 1989. *The Politics of Regulatory Change: The Tale of Two Agencies.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Holmes, Stephan. 1989. *Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Laitin, David D. 1995. "The Civic Culture At 30." *American Political Science Review.* 89:168-173.

Lindsay, A.D. 1997. "Democratic Problems and Paradoxes." In *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy,* ed. Carl Cohen. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

Lowi, Theodor J. 1979. *The End of Liberalism.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Lowi, Theodor J. 1992. "The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study." *American Political Science Review.* 86:1-7.

Maicas, Peter T. 1998. "Liberalism's Discontent: America in search of a Past that Never Was." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Mayo, Henry B. 1997. "The Theory of Democracy Outlined." In *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy,* ed. Carl Cohen. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

McCready, Amy R. 1998. "The Limits of Logic: A Critique of Sandel's Philosophical Anthropology." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Mill, John Stuart. 1991. *On Liberty*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Morone, James A. 1990. *The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government*. United States: HarperCollins Publishers.

Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sandel, Michael. 1996. *Democracies Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1975. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale, IL: the Dryden Press.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1997. "Democracy as Competition for Political Leadership." In *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy,* ed. Carl Cohen. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

Taylor, Charles. 1985. *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, Richard. 1992. *Compliance Ideologies: Rethinking Political Culture*. New York: Cambridge University Press.