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Why They Rise Up, or Not
A Study of Linguistic Minorities and
Ethnic-National Mobilization

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Abstract: *Most theories of nationalism focus on majority nationalism and do not provide an adequate explanation of the inaction of most ethnic minorities. The first part of this paper adopts the political process model from social movement theory to study the factors that prompt linguistic minorities to mobilize on ethno-national grounds. Using a large-N statistical model with data drawn from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database, the results indicate that group capacity, a favorable opportunity structure, and strong issue framing facilitate ethno-national mobilization. The second part of the paper employs a most similar system design to compare Uzbek language minorities in Central Asia with the Uyghur linguistic minority in China. The focused-structured comparison confirms and extends the findings of the political process model. In short, isolated communities, an apathetic Uzbek state, and cross-cutting identities have created unfavorable conditions for ethno-national mobilization among Uzbek minorities. Much the opposite has been the case for the Uyghur minority in China.*

Introduction

Ever since the French revolution in the 18th century, scholars have recognized nationalism as a global phenomenon. Nevertheless, the origin and development of nationalism remain the subjects of heated theoretical debate and empirical dispute. Although historians have documented the path of the most visible nationalist movements reasonably well, the non-action of many other potential mobilizations has gone unnoticed.

This paper examines the factors that influence ethno-national mobilizations among linguistic minorities. Language and religion are among the most salient factors that can trigger a nationalist movement. This is not surprising, since nationalism is a movement based on cultural claims. Compared to economic wellbeing or political status, language and religion are essential to one's identity (Kymlicka 1996). Because of the inherent link between language and ethnicity (Gellner 1983; Argenter 2002), this research focuses on minority groups defined by language.

If each linguistic group is considered as a distinctive nation, then there are too few spaces in the world today to accommodate each nation with a state (Gellner 1983). According to Gellner's calculation, there are 8,000 different languages on earth and there are currently 200 states. If we "pretend that we have four times that number of reasonably effective nationalisms on earth, in other words, 800 of them," this will still "give us only

one effective nationalism for ten potential ones!” (Gellner 1983, 45) Thus, the question arises: Why do some linguistic groups mobilize around nationalist claims, while others flatly do not. Why do some mobilized linguistic minorities engage in low stakes and relatively moderate mobilization, while others opt for maximalist claims, even violent separatism?

To answer these questions, a preliminary review of the current theories is required. The following discussion combines the mainstream theories on ethnic nationalism with social movement theory models to analyze the dynamics of ethno-national mobilization of linguistic minorities.

Language and Nationalism

Theorists tend to view nationalism as either a cultural phenomenon rooted in history or a constructed product of the modern era (Motyl 2002). Benedict Anderson is the leading representative of the second view and arguably the founder of constructivism. His landmark 1983 work *Imagined Communities* challenged the earlier wisdom that national myth is ancient and cultural. He revealed how the concept was manufactured by the literate class and refined through the interaction between the elite and the people. In fact, he argued that the modern nation can only be imagined since the stretched territory and sheer size of populations make intragroup intimacy and recognition impossible.

Another important camp of the nationalism literature argues that the process of modernization brought nationalism into existence both in the interest of the state and as a political principle (Gellner 1983). For these modernist scholars, nationalism is simply not a sleeping beauty awaiting the kiss the modernism (Beiner 1999). Despite theoretical disagreements, most scholars (Gellner 1983; Argenter 2002; Anderson 1983; Jung 1987)

agree on the essential role language plays in ethnic identity formation. Whereas Anderson focuses on the uniform use of literary language as the foundation for an imagined community, Gellner stresses the congruence between political and cultural boundaries in a monolingual state. It is “through that language, encountered at mother’s knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed” (Anderson 1983).

It is consensus among theorists that language defines group boundaries, literal or imagined; however, they seldom address the issue of minority nationalism. Majority nationalism is usually either a revolution against a dominant class (e.g. the French middle class against the aristocrats) or a movement against a foreign power (e.g. the post colonialist movement in Africa). In both cases, the nationalists have a relative majority base that challenges the ruling class or foreign power. However, in the case of minority nationalism, the disadvantaged language group is pitted against the majority. Although some linguistic minorities can also argue for the principle of the congruence of political and ethnic boundaries, they are inherently in a weaker position to do so. In fact, most ethno-national minorities never rise up; they never assert their linguistic identities as a foundation for political independence or autonomy within the majority nation-states. The existing literature is therefore inadequate to address the question of what drives ethno-national mobilization among language minorities

Part of the problem lies in the inherent difficulty in studying non-actions. Political scientists, like scientists in general, are studying the casual relationships in the world. Where X happened, they search for what factors cause X and how they produce X. But, when X does not happen, the absence of the X-causing factor may not be sufficient to

establish causality. With a large-N statistical study, it is possible to approach the question in a different way. Instead of asking what prevents some minorities from mobilizing, the focus should be on what factors influence their decision to mobilize on nationalist grounds, and if they do, how their level of movement is affected by various independent factors. In the end, although the question cannot be answered definitively, evidence can be shown that the degree and quality of certain factors can make a linguistic minority more likely or less likely to mobilize on political ground.

Theories for Nationalist Movement

Ethno-nationalist mobilization is a form of social movement which often involves a special sector of the society. In this study, it is the linguistic minority that is mobilizing on a nationalist ground. Therefore, social movement theories are particularly suited for the study of minority nationalism.

Behind most social movement theories today is the rational choice theory. It assumes that individuals are rational actors who weigh benefits and cost before taking an action (Hechter 1996). People join a movement in the hope of gaining something more than they would potentially lose. The assumption is simple, yet very influential in the thinking of most social scientists since Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism. For example, in fieldwork conducted in Ghana, David Laitin (1993) used game theory to illustrate individual choices in language selection. The local Ghanaian parents could choose to send their children to either a school taught in the indigenous language or a school taught in English. Laitin finds that the economic pay-off is not the only factor in making school choice, local honor and external acceptance were equally influential

(Laitin 1993). Thus, rational choice could explain beyond simple economic benefit and cost model.

In addition to rational choice, there are three other important branches of social movement theory: relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and consciousness construction. The first two stress the structural aspects to explain social movement, whereas the last one takes a cultural approach. Relative deprivation focuses on “situations producing individual-level stress or discontent as a major cause of social movement development” (Kerbo 1982, 646). These unsatisfying conditions are usually the result of social stratification or injustice. The “frustration-aggression hypothesis” predicts that as discontent increases, the possibility of social movement increases as well.

Shifting the focus from the underlying motivation to the necessary resources for mobilization, social scientists have developed resource mobilization theory. This current mainstream theory emphasize the ability of the starters to motivate individuals, gain access to power, mobilize social resources and utilize political and economic structures to promote certain objectives (Kerbo 1982). In essence, resource mobilization theorists consider “structure as relatively stable features of a movement’s environment that influence action by shaping opportunities” (Giugni 1998, 372) and “attempt to demonstrate empirically that individual behaviors are channeled by a series of structural constraints” (Giugni 1998, 367).

In recent years, scholars have started to turn their eyes on the “cultural formations” in social movement theory. This “consciousness construction” theory focuses on “how social movements generate and are affected by the construction of meaning, consciousness raising, the manipulation of symbols, and collective identities” (Giugni

1998). However, not all theorists take a diametrical view between structural and cultural approaches. Myra Marx Ferree suggests that: “individuals should be regarded as members of a community whose interests reflect their structural locations” (Giugni 1998, 365-375). As scholars have explained, it is not the particular issue that is important, but also how it is framed (Giugni 1998; Cormier 2003; Cederman and Girardin 2007).

The above four theories provide useful lenses through which to examine social movements, but critics have pointed out theoretical flaws and empirical difficulties in applying them. As implied by rational choice theory, blocked social mobility would lead to nationalist movement. For example, education is a universal channel for upward social mobility, and people with university education expect more financial rewards than others. Thus, when they find their career paths blocked for ethnic reasons, they should be more likely to mobilize. In fact, “this emphasis on the cultural elements of nationalism places intellectuals, in effect those most able to revive, stimulate and diffuse cultural artifacts, at the forefront of any national movement” (Cormier 2003, 529). However, data have shown otherwise. Although decreased opportunities among the intellectuals have been believed to be the causes of the Irish nationalism in the early twentieth century and Canadian nationalism in the 1970s, the data has shown that job markets for college graduates in these two countries were actually expanding, not shrinking (Cormier 2003).

Besides empirical invalidity, rational choice theory also fails to explain extreme acts of ethnic violence, like suicide bombers, when the benefits are few and the cost are high. Thus it was viewed as ineffective to explain non-economic activities (Hechter 1996). In order to reconcile this conflict, Varshney introduced the distinction between instrumental rationality and value rationality. Whereas the former is a “strict cost-benefit

analysis” (Varshney 86), the latter relies on the conscience and perception of the good of the people, independent of the prospect of material or immediate gain. By expanding the definition of rationality, rational choice theory has been able to explain a broader scope of movements.

Critics have also found two problems with relative deprivation theory. The first one is to identify the specific conditions that cause grievance (Kerbo 1982). Another one is that since discontents are behind all movements, relative deprivation cannot explain why a lower level of frustration may cause mobilization when a higher one does not (Cederman and Girardin 2007). Cormier’s study of blocked mobility is such an example. Although the deprivation model is intuitively reasonable, empirically it has led to few discoveries.

By using the resource mobilization model, theorists have been able to locate the fundamental causes of many social movements. However, they have faced serious challenges as well. The first is the free-rider problem. When one can benefit from a movement without joining it, one would not participate at all (Kerbo 1982). Thus, resource mobilization fails to address how people are dissuaded from free-riding. The second problem is essentially the strength of relative deprivation theory. Historically, many social movements occurred without significant structural changes in society and typically they are the result of mass grievance (Kerbo 1982). Thus, a movement could gain momentum before resources became available.

Theory and Hypotheses

Relative deprivation, resource mobilization and consciousness construction each analyze social movement formation from a different perspective: grievance-driven action, resource-utilization, and issue formation, respectively. By extracting the central element from each of these theories, some scholars have proposed a more comprehensive theory: the political process model (Morris 2000). Its three components are mobilizing structure, political opportunity structure, and cultural framing. Mobilizing structure is the internal structure or resource, which includes “informal networks, preexisting institutional structures, and formal organization” (Morris 2000, 446). Political opportunity structure refers to the outside political environment that provides incentive for action. And, cultural framing is the bridge connecting the internal and external structure, “mediating between opportunity, organization, and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation” (Morris 2000, 446).

In a sense, the political process theory is a combination of capacity, opportunity, and constructed ideas. In the past, nationalist theorists have also addressed similar issue of existing network, current situation, and issue formation (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983). Existing network refers to the strength of minority group vis-à-vis the majority, the institutional structure of community, and formal organizations within the ethnic group. Current situation is their political status within the state they reside, treatment by the majority, and incentives for action. Issue formation explains how the elites construct the meaning of their situation, frame collective identities, and manipulate symbols. Table 1 below summarizes the application of political process model to the study of minority nationalist movements.

Table 1. Applying Political Process Model to Minority Nationalist Movement

Political Process Model		
Political Opportunity Structure	Mobilizing Structure	Cultural Framing

↓

Minority Nationalist Movement		
<p style="text-align: center;">External Opportunity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political status in the state • Treatment by majority • Outside opportunity 	<p style="text-align: center;">Internal Capacity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strength of the minority group • Institutional structure • Formal organization 	<p style="text-align: center;">Issue Formation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Construction of meanings • Collective identities • Manipulation of symbols

This model is better suited to study minority nationalist movements than previous models, because it gives a more inclusive analysis of the mobilization process. It incorporates both the internal and the external structure without leaving aside the cultural perspective of nationalism. However, its critics point to the limited assumption of the prior occurrence of opportunity for political movement (Morris 2000). By stressing structural necessity, it neglects the importance of agency and how action could create favorable condition for movement. While the criticism is well grounded, the problem of the alternative is still empirical validation. It is easy to recognize how individual initiatives influence the movement but difficult to prove the causal link. Thus, albeit its limitations, the political process model offers a better means to study minority nationalism. The model generates the following hypotheses:

- 1) The more external opportunity the minority has, the more likely they will mobilize on ethno-national ground.
- 2) The more internal capacity the minority possesses, the more likely they will mobilize on ethno-national ground.

- 3) The better the issue is framed, the more likely the linguistic minorities will mobilize on ethno-national ground.

Research Design

In order to test these hypotheses in the broadest perspective, this research employs a large-N statistical model using the latest data (2006) from the Minority at Risk (MAR) database. MAR contains standardized data on the status and conflict of more than 283 ethnic groups with a population of at least 500,000. It is the most exhaustive and frequently cited database on ethnic mobilization among scholars. Apart from the fact that it is the best data available, it is selected for another important reason. It measures the bases for group distinctiveness of each minority—e.g. language, custom, and religion. This is extremely helpful, because many times, language and religion factors intertwine with each other. In cases where linguistic and religious cleavages overlap, it would be difficult to empirically testify which one is the major cause of nationalism and by what degree. Luckily, MAR allows one to choose only linguistic minorities for more control and thus adds validity to the examination. In the dataset, LANG is the measure for different language group and it is coded from 0-2, 0 means linguistic assimilation with plurality group, 1 when a group speaks multiple languages at least one different from the plurality group, and 2 for a group that speaks primarily one language different from plurality group. Only cases with a LANG score of 2 are selected and this leaves 48 cases. Bivariate correlation and OLS regression models are both used to test the hypotheses.

While the LANG measurement allows one to distinguish linguistic minority from other minorities, some scholars have criticized its measures as inadequate (Cederman and Girardin 2007; Mabry 2011). In MAR, language difference is measured by language

distance – “the genetic relationship of languages that share a common ancestor” – without considering the actual difficulty of learning the language and concrete social impact of such difference (Mabry 2011). Mabry argued that, “the most important political characteristic of any language community in contact with another is the relative social and political status of their two (or more) languages” (Mabry 2011, 203). While this paper does not consider the linguistic difference as a *cause* of ethnic conflict, it is worth addressing Mabry’s criticism. Although LANG may not be a measure of actual difference, it is a good indication that there is a significant difference. A value of 2 in LANG means that the minority language is not intelligible to the majority and vice versa. Therefore, it is safe to assume there is a linguistic barrier and to a great extent, a cultural division between the two. Since language occupies a central position in the formation of ethnicity, as it is the essential medium of communication and preservation of national culture (Argenter 2002), linguistic difference always leads to cultural difference. Because of this strong link between language and culture, the selection based on LANG measure produces a set of cases where minorities are *actually* different from the majority or plurality in terms of culture. Therefore, other factors¹ that might affect the ethnic mobilization of minority can be eliminated and one can focus on how the factors in political process model affect ethnic mobilization of linguistic minorities.

Operationalizing the Dependent Variables

The dependent variable for this study is ethnic mobilization. In MAR, there are a few measures that are directly related to this: protest (0-5), rebellion (0-7), and separatism index (0-3). They are recoded into an Ethnic Mobilization Index (EMI). $EMI = (Protest /$

¹ For example, in the MAR database, BELIEF measures the religious differences between the minority group and the majority. Among the cases selected here, Pearson’s correlation result show no significant correlation (.696 level) between BELIEF and the EMI, the measure for dependent variable here.

5) * 20% + (Rebellion / 7) * 35% + (Separatism / 3) * 45%. Since EMI is a continuum from non-violent protest at one end and separation on the other, each measure is assigned with different weights. First, all the measures are divided by its scale in order to make them comparable to each other. Then, separatism is weighted the heaviest here because it is the most extreme form of political nationalism, separation from the majority nation for absolute autonomy. Protest is weighted the least due to its non-violent nature. In the end, rebellion is weighted higher than protest for its use of violence, and lower than separatism since the measure does not necessarily specify the ultimate level of political demand for the rebels. In total, EMI ranges from 0 to 1.

Operationalizing the Independent Variables

The three independent variables are internal capacity, external opportunity, and issue formation. To operationalize them, five proxy measures are chosen from MAR, group spatial distribution (GROUPCON) for capacity, political autonomy (AUTLOST) for opportunity and political (POLGR), economic (ECGR) and cultural (CULGR) grievance for issue formation.

Group Spatial Distribution as a proxy for Internal Capacity

According to political process theory, internal capacity includes networks, institutions, and organizations within an ethnic community. While the strength of these is difficult to measure and compare across communities, the spatial distribution of population might be a good indication of their efficacy. The concentration of the population matters because only with a large share and concentrated population can a minority be able to construct a self-sustainable political system – “sufficiently large and institutionally complete” (Kymlicka 2003, 40). Generally, the more concentrated a

minority is, the stronger ties they would have, since it is easier to communicate and establish relationships. Although technology has made long-distance connection relatively easy and affordable, when it comes to action, a concentrated group is inherently better suited than a dispersed one. As the question concerns us is the relationship between capacity and mobilization, not capacity itself per se, spatial distribution is a good proxy measure for group capacity. In MAR, group spatial distribution is coded under GOUPCON (0-3), 0 for widely dispersed, 1 for primarily urban or minority in one region, 2 for majority in one region, others dispersed, and 3 for concentrated in one region.

Political Autonomy as a Proxy for External Opportunity

Opportunity refers to the external “political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action” (Morris 2000, 446). In MAR, one measure is the index of lost political autonomy based on year of autonomy loss, magnitude of change, and group status prior to loss of autonomy. In a range of score from 0 to 6, the higher the score, the greater autonomy the minority has enjoyed in the past and the more recent such power has been taken away from them. Scholars have found that path dependence is a strong factor in ethnic conflict (Cederman and Girardin 2007). If a minority has been involved in an ethnic conflict, it is more likely to have more ethnic violence in the future than those who did not have such experience. Similarly, if a minority had enjoyed relative autonomy in the past, they would be more inclined to rise up than those who had never had such privileges. Also, because of their previous independence or autonomy, the external environment or the majorities would be more sympathetic and acceptive to their demand. Therefore, the index of lost political autonomy can be a good measure for external political opportunity.

Grievance as a proxy for Issue Formation

Among the three variables, issue formation is the most troublesome to measure. The efficacy of issue formation only not depends on how the issue is interpreted by the leader, but also how it is accepted by the mass. Both are subjective standards. In MAR, political, economic and cultural grievances are measured by the *highest* level articulated by group leaders or observed by third parties. Explicitly, the codebook states that even if the majority of the people might demonstrate lower level of grievance but radicals expressed higher one, the higher one will be coded for this ethnic group. Although this is not an exact measure of grievances, this touches on some elements of issue framing. One important aspect of issue framing is that how it is framed is more important than the actual grievance. Naturally, the leader has an incentive to exaggerate the issue in order to incite popular sentiment. In this perspective, the higher grievance coded by MAR, the more likely the populace will take action. Although it does not address all features of issue formation, the grievance measure indicate one way issue formation could affect ethnic mobilization. In this paper, the political, economic and cultural grievances are recoded into an index of grievance (0-8) which has an aggregate score of the three.

Analysis

The Significance of EMI Index

In the Minority at Risk database, 282 ethnic groups are recorded. Only minorities with a LANG score of two² are selected for this study and this yields 48 cases³ in 36 countries. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of dependent variable measures.

² In the MAR codebook, LANG score means that “group speaks primarily one language, different from plurality group: Plurality of group speaks the same language AND it is different from plurality group language (e.g., Kurds in Turkey or Iraq).”

³ For a full list of the countries, see Appendix.


Table 2. Distribution of Dependent Variables

	Protest (0-5)	Separatism (0-3)	Rebellion (0-7)	EMI Index (0-1)
Average	0.92	1.69	0.51	0.32
Standard Deviation	1.22	1.34	1.57	0.25
Min	0	0	0	0
Max	4	3	7	0.84
Mode (number)	0 (26)	3 (23)	0 (41)	0.15 (8)

N=48 for Protest and Separatism, N=47 for Rebellion and EMI Index

It is apparent from the table that separatism is the most significant among the three measures from MAR with an average score of 1.69 and with nearly half of the cases recording the highest score of 3. On the other side, average scores for protest and rebellion are relatively low, 0.92 and 0.51 respectively. Also, the modes for them are both 0, indicating inactivity. Based on these three, the EMI index has a score range from 0 to 0.84 and an average score of 0.32. As EMI index reflects the continuum of the nationalist movement, its strength can be shown as its correlation with the rest of the measures and this relationship is graphically represented in Graph 1.

Graph 1. Relationship between Protest, Separatism, Rebellion, EMI index



N=47

The increase of EMI accompanies the increasing scores of separatism and rebellion. In cases where only protest score is high, EMI is relatively low, reflecting the non-violent and less intensive nationalist movement. Whereas all three measures are high, towards the end of the cases, EMI increases significantly as well, representing the violent and intensive mobilization of minorities. Therefore, EMI index is a reliable measure of ethno-nationalist mobilization as its distribution follows the theoretical assumption.

Correlation Check on Independent Variables

Before examining the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables, it is worth making sure that there are no internal correlations between the independent variables. Table 3 below shows the correlations between the three and none of them have any significant relationship with each other.

Table 3. Pearson’s Correlations for Independent Variables

		Group Spatial Distribution	Political Autonomy	Total Grievance
Group Spatial Distribution	Pearson Correlation	1	.096	.215
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.257	.071
Political Autonomy	Pearson Correlation	.096	1	.158
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.257		.142
Total Grievance	Pearson Correlation	.215	.158	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.071	.142	

N=48

Testing Hypotheses

In order to test the bivariate relationships between each independent variable with ethno-national mobilization, Table 4 reports the results of Pearson’s bivariate correlations.

Table 4. Pearson's Correlations for Ethno-National Mobilization Index (EMI)

	Ethno-nationalist Mobilization Index	
H1. Group spatial distribution	Pearson Correlation	.386**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.004
H2. Political Autonomy	Pearson Correlation	.274*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.031
H3. Total Grievance	Pearson Correlation	.758**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.000

N=47

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

According to the hypothesis, the higher capacity the minority possesses, the more likely they would mobilize on ethno-national ground. With group spatial distribution as a proxy measure for higher capacity, Table 3 validates the existence of such correlation. Nearly 40% of data confirmed this relationship. For the second hypothesis, the more external opportunity the minority has, the more likely they would mobilize on ethno-national ground. The correlation is weaker, with a value of .274 and significant at a .031 level. Part of the reason probably lies in the skewed value distribution of political autonomy since two-third of the cases have a relatively low score either 0 or 1 on a scale of 0 to 5. With so many cases with lower score, the relatively insignificant phenomenon is understandable. The strongest evidence is for the third hypothesis: the better [the more exaggerated in this case] the issue is framed, the more likely linguistic minorities will mobilize. The proxy measure, total grievance has a .758 correlation value with EMI index and significant at .000 level. Although the high value is surprising, the strong relationship is anticipated. After all, ethno-national mobilization is a political movement and political grievance is particularly influential among the minorities examined here. Therefore, the initial correlations confirm all three hypotheses.

Table 5. OLS Regression for Ethno-national Mobilization Index (EMI)

	Standardized Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	Significance
Internal Capacity <i>Proxy: Group Spatial Distribution</i>	.022	.197	.043
External Opportunity <i>Proxy: Political Autonomy</i>	.018	.159	.093
Issue Formation <i>Proxy: Total Grievance</i>	.011	.688	.000

N=47

From Table 5, it is obvious that total grievance is still the most influential, explaining nearly 70% of the variance in EMI and significant at .000 level. Group spatial distribution comes the second, with a beta score of .197 and significant at .05 level. Political autonomy is the less significant, explaining 15.9% of the cases and significant only at .1 level. However, political autonomy nearly became irrelevant when group spatial distribution and total grievance are held constant. As demonstrated above, the majority of the variance on ethno-national mobilization can be accounted for by the framing of grievances. The more political grievances are articulated within a linguistic minority, the more likely they will move along the mobilization scale towards manifested nationalist movement and even violence.

Clearly, the third hypothesis is the most supported by the data. This also ties back to and confirms the strength of classic relative deprivation theory, which emphasizes grievances experienced by the minority as the single most important motivation for mobilization. Thus, the intuitive assumption of the relationship is verified here. Group spatial distribution is also significant in the result, and this indicates that concentrated minority does have a higher tendency to mobilize, again reflecting the importance of capacity. And, capacity probably directly links to issue framing: the higher the capacity,

the better the minority will be able to frame their grievances. Comparatively, political autonomy is the least influential factor here and skewed data accounts for some this.

Two-thirds of the score on political autonomy is either 0 or 1.

□ □ □

Although the findings from the statistical studies confirm the importance of group spatial distribution, issue formation, and political opportunities, many factors are left unexamined. Grievance, a proxy measure, only covers a small portion of issue framing, and past political autonomy only captures one part of the opportunity structure. The dynamics of how these factors interact with each other and lead to mobilization awaits further examination. The second part of the paper provides a close-up comparative analysis between the Uzbek language minority outside Uzbekistan in Central Asia and the Uyghur minority in China. In recent years, violent acts from the seizure of government buildings to riots in the provincial capital have brought international attention to the deserts in Northwestern China, homeland to the Uyghurs (Hasting 2011). Comparatively, the Uzbek minorities outside their titular state have produced hardly any visible nationalist mobilization since the dissolution of the Soviet state.⁴ Both Uzbeks and Uyghurs are Turkic linguistic minorities: they speak similar languages and face discriminatory policies from their states of residence. Hence we are left to question why the Uyghur language minority has mobilized, but the Uzbeks have produced only sporadic and anomic activity. The following analysis will demonstrate how a large and

⁴ During ethnic violence that broke out in Southern Kyrgyzstan cities in 2010, the Uzbeks were primarily the victim, not the instigator. In comparison, the 2009 riots in Urumqi were followed after a Uyghur demonstration during the day, which turned into a violent mob at night targeting Chinese people and Han business. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ceased to be a major operational force in 2001 and, even during its active years, there was little evidence to believe that it had represented the interest of Uzbek diaspora communities or articulated any secession objective. Its primary concern is religious, not ethnic (Siddique 2011).

concentrated population, the lack of political entity, and a reinforced identity prompt Uyghurs to mobilize on nationalist grounds while isolated communities, an apathetic and hostile Uzbek state, and cross-cutting identities discourage Uzbek minority mobilization.

Background

The comparative approach adopted here follows a most similar design between two Turkic language minorities. Table 6 summarizes the comprehensive characteristics of the Uzbeks and Uyghurs.

Table 6. Uzbek Minority in Central Asia and Uyghur Minority in China

	Uzbek Minority in Central Asia (Excluding Uzbekistan)	Uyghur Minority in China
Linguistic Family	Karluk Languages under Turkic Language Family	
Intelligibility to the majority groups	All Turkic Family, but different degrees of intelligibility	Different Linguistic Family, mutually unintelligible
Muslim	Islam	Islam
Area	4 million sq km	9.7 million sq km (Xinjiang)
Geography	Mostly Arid Land	Mostly Arid Land (Xinjiang)
Time under Communist Rule	1924-1991	1949-1985
Time under authoritarian regime	1991- (market economy)	1985- (market economy)
Liberal Democracy Freedom House Index	6 (average) Not Free	6.5 Not Free
State Policy	Discriminatory	Discriminatory
Regional Concentration	Varies from 18-50%, median around 30% (estimates)	46%, the majority group in many Southern districts
Population	2.7 million	10.1 million (2009)
Existence of Titular State & Its Policy	Yes, but not sympathetic towards its minority population	No, only small republics established twice during 1940s
GDP per capita	\$ 2,700	\$ 6,094 (\$ 2,898 in Xinjiang)
Life Expectancy	68.58 (average)	74.84
Nationalist Mobilization	No	Yes

Source: CIA World Book, The Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 2010, Freedom House 2012

A most similar system design allows the researcher to control for similarities, because similarities cannot account for different outcomes on the dependent variable, in this case ethno national mobilization. From the beginning, both Uzbek and Uyghur people speak Karluk languages – a branch of the Turkic language family – and the only two Karluk languages that are still used by significant populations. In fact, Uzbek used to be written in the Uyghur alphabet (Abdurakhmanov 1993) and the two languages are still mutually intelligible today. Speaking close languages and holding the same religious beliefs, the Uzbek and Uyghur Muslims share many similar customs and thus are able to communicate with each other without much difficulty. Although Uzbek, along with Kazakh, Turkmen, and Kyrgyz are within the same language family, Uzbek is not considered mutually intelligible with most other Turkic languages.⁵ For the Uyghurs, Chinese is a distinct language that needs to be taught through education. Despite the fact that most Uzbek and Uyghur minorities do speak the majority languages, they are both distinct linguistic minorities in their resident countries.

Today, most Uzbek minorities live in close proximity to their titular state, for example the Fergana Valley, a fertile ground shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In Osh, the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan, nearly half of the population is Uzbek. And 28% of the provincial populations, over 300, 000 Uzbeks, live in the Osh province. Similarly, Uzbeks constitute 40% of the population in Sughd province, the Northeastern region of Tajikistan, and 32% of the population in Qurghonteppa, the third largest city in Tajikistan. In South Kazakhstan Province, Uzbek is about 18% of the population. Across the border in China, most of Uyghurs live in Xinjiang, the largest province of the country. While in Urumqi, the capital of the region, the Uyghur

⁵ Tajik language is actually a Persian language and thus not intelligible to Uzbeks.

population is about the same with that of Han Chinese, in the Tarim Basin, Uyghur is the majority group in many cities and villages.

Bordering one and other, the Uyghur region shares many similar geographic features with Central Asia. Both areas contain vast land that is scarcely populated (Rudelson 1997). Xinjiang makes one-sixth of the Chinese territory, but has less than 1.7% of the 1.3 billion population of China. Similarly, the population density for Kazakhstan is 6 people per square kilometer, among the least 20 populated countries in the world (United Nations 2011). Characterized by mountains, deserts, and steppe, the regions are the historical homeland to nomads. Because of the dry weather, extreme temperature variation, and limited water resources, agriculture has not been the dominant factor in the economy. With the introduction of modern irrigation projects in the 20th century, large crop fields and fruit orchards have been established. However, trade still plays important role in the regional economy since the age of the Silk Road.

Central Asia and Xinjiang are not only geographically contingent, but also culturally connected throughout history. Today, a strict definition of Central Asia only includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. But, in the past, the Uyghur region, Mongolia, and adjacent territories in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran have all been considered as parts of the Greater Central Asia. In fact, the modern borders were only drawn up in the past hundred years. From the Gobi desert to the Caspian Sea, the pan-Central Asia region has been subject to constant invasion, cultural influence from neighboring powers, and population influx throughout history. The relatively flat territory poses no physical barrier for the nomadic people and made migration easy. This also led to numerous confrontations between the nomadic and the

settled peoples. From the Mongol conquest of Eurasia to the Soviet settlement in Central Asia, interactions and exchanges with bordering states have added enormous cultural diversity to the region.

The most significant change beyond ethnicity would be the Islamization of Central Asia by Turkic people since the eighth century. This brought religious unity to the region and also shaped customs within society. The Muslim brotherhood is crucial, because the Central Asian people are surrounded by atheist Chinese, Tibetan Buddhists, and Russian Orthodox. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, this has led to Pan-Turkism, which spreads across the Central Asian Republics and Uyghur region. However, under their shared Islamic belief and Turkic culture, there was a paradox for the Uzbek and Uyghur identity.

Uzbek and Uyghur people have long historical roots in Central Asia. Noticeably for the Uzbek people, they established a powerful state that reached its height with Öz Beg Khan in the early fourteenth century (Soucek 2000). Similarly, the Uyghur Khaganate was an influential regional actor in the eighth and ninth century (Soucek 2000). Despite their historical prominence, the Uzbek and Uyghur people were primarily oases-oriented (Rudelson 1997; Sengupta 2002), and neither of them had “consciousness of belonging to a particular ‘nation’” (Sengupta 2002, 145). Therefore, the present national division among the Central Asian people is a fairly modern and arbitrary phenomenon largely shaped by Soviet ethnic policies (Sengupta 2002). The Soviet regime delineated the borders and created the nationalities for the people in Central Asian Republics. Following the “Big Brother,” the Chinese government also gave the name Uyghur to the settled Turkic population in present-day Xinjiang to distinguish them from

the dominant Muslim minority, the Hui (Milward 2004). Therefore, both Uzbek and Uyghur inherited present-day territory and identity designated by the communist regimes. It was also during this time that both regions underwent industrialization and substantial economic development. The Soviet legacy is still visible today as the architecture in the capital cities and bureaucratic practices in the governments still remind one of the old times.

Since gaining independence in 1990, the five post-Soviet Central Asian states have elected governments and liberalized their economies. Similarly, economic reforms in China since the 1980s have opened up markets in the Uyghur region. Despite rapid economic development in both regions, the respective economies are still relatively vulnerable and dependent on state aid. In fact, the average GDP per capita for Central Asia and Xinjiang are fairly close to each other. As a result, the living standard and income level for the two regions are fairly close.

Also, discriminatory policies practiced by state governments hindered the opportunities for Uzbek and Uyghur minorities. In Central Asia, Uzbek people face exclusionary laws and are targeted by the majorities for their economic potency; in China, allegedly protected by equal treatment under the Constitution, Uyghurs hold only limited and ceremonial political power,⁶ encounter discrimination in employment, and experience racial prejudice in their daily lives.

⁶ Although many “important” posts are filled with minority cadres in the provincial government, it is a common knowledge that the concrete power are only in the hands of top Han cadres, who are often relocated to Xinjiang from other regions (Bovingdon 2002). To illustrate the point here, there is a widespread joke in Xinjiang mentioned by both Bovingdon and Wang. “Late in the 1990s, Jiang Zemin [the President at the time] visits Zhao Ziyang [was the general secretary till the aftermath of Tiananmen Square Protest] at his home in Zhongnanhai [residential and working place of top party officials], full of false cheer, and says, “It’s now all these years after June Fourth, and we can use you again. What do you say?” Though long since resigned to ignominy, Zhao still perks up at these words. Jiang continues: “How ’bout we make you vice chairman?” Zhao smiles, apparently pleased, and indicates to Jiang that he wants to

To summarize, similarities of geography, political history, socio-economic development, and culture (language, religion, and some customs) cannot account for the very different levels and types of ethno-national mobilization across the two groups. The Uyghurs have been increasingly vocal in international society and have confronted the majority through both violent and peaceful means, whereas Uzbek minorities in Central Asia have produced neither a nationalist movement nor any substantial secessionist claims. As the first part of this paper suggests, population distribution, political opportunity and issue formation are the three main factors that affect the level of nationalist mobilization among linguistic minorities. Empirical evidence and anthropological studies reveal that differences in these factors do contribute to the different decisions and actions of Uzbek and Uyghur linguistic minorities. The following analysis illustrates how population density and distribution, the existence of a titular state, and the framing of cultural identity have shaped the mobilization of the Uyghur minority and the de-mobilization of the Uzbek minority.

Population Density and Distribution

As a simple Chinese proverb states, “the more people the more power”: population is always an important factor. The size of population speaks for the strength and potential of a community. Ethnic majorities constantly fear that rapidly growing minorities will eventually overpopulate them, and the minorities know that population size is a great source of bargaining power against the dominant group.⁷ The 8.4 million Uyghur people are mostly concentrated in Xinjiang, especially in the southern region

whisper a message. When Jiang shifts his bulky body closer, Zhao shouts at him, "I'm not a Uyghur!" (Bovingdon 2002, 58-9; Wang 2010, 80).

⁷ The most recent example would be the growing Islamic population in Europe and the tension between Muslim and secular population.

where they enjoy an absolute majority except a few towns built by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC).⁸ In three of the ten most populated administrative districts in Xinjiang, Uyghur people make up more than 90% of the population.

As mentioned above, the Uzbek minority enjoys similar regional concentration in various border regions close to Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, the Uzbek minorities are scattered across international borders. Although the post-Soviet Republic citizens can still move between the independent countries, the politically separated minorities face challenges that the Uyghurs, residing in a single country, do not. Even though technology has made international communication reliable, the physical separation still makes regular gathering and meeting difficult. In Central Asia, the total population of Uzbek minorities is 2.7 million: 1.2 million in Tajikistan, 759, 000 in Kyrgyzstan, and only 490,000 in Kazakhstan. Comparatively, there are 3.5 million Uyghurs in Kashgar region alone, which has been historically the Islamic center of the Turkic minority in China. Table 7 compares the Uzbek population in four Central Asian countries with the Uyghur population in the most populated cities in Xinjiang.

Table 7. Uzbek Minority Population in Central Asia and Uyghur Population in China

Uzbek Minority		Uyghur Minority	
Tajikistan	1,188,563	Kashgar Administrative Offices	3,535,495
Kyrgyzstan	758,550	Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture	729,710
Kazakhstan	490,616	Counties Direct Under Ili Prefecture	678,652
Turkmenistan	252,741	Urumqi City	309,853
Total	2,690,470	Total	5,253,710

Source: CIA World Book, The Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 2010

⁸ XPCC is a special semi-military governmental organization for economic development. Under Chinese governmental system, it enjoys the provincial status since it manages its own settlement cities, farms, factory, and some military forces.

Even though the Uzbek population is significantly smaller than Uyghur when it breaks down into subdivisions within the region, their presence in Central Asia cannot be neglected. After all, the overall population of the Republics is smaller, and Uzbek minorities make up more than a third of the population in many cities. However, the geographical barrier further limits their ability to mobilize across the region. Logically, given that Xinjiang is more than twice the size of Central Asia, communication between the Uyghurs would be more difficult than it is for the Uzbek minority. Further, most of the Uzbek people are settled around their titular state, whereas the Uyghur people reside along the edges of the two deserts, which occupy the majority of the territory. But this situation changed dramatically during the twentieth century. After roads were cut across the impassable desert in Xinjiang, a trip that used to take months now only takes several days (Rudelson 1997). Also, economic development in China has led the government to invest heavily in the infrastructure of the region, bringing the Uyghur people into a well-connected community.

Positioned on the mountains surrounding the Fergana Valley, the Uzbek communities on the other hand are physically much closer to each other; but mountain passes, unlike desert roads in Xinjiang, are more often subject to weather conditions, especially during winter. When these routes are closed, Uzbeks could theoretically have easier access to one another through the fertile Fergana valley, now mostly located in Uzbekistan. However, starting in 1999, the Uzbek government unilaterally closed its border and stopped cross-border mass transportation. This broke the connection between the motherland and the diaspora community. As one Uzbek minority explained:

The bad side is ... when I, being an Uzbek, go to Uzbekistan tomorrow, it will be difficult. I've got relatives ... I can't go freely ... Now look at this!

My relatives are one kilometer away, but I'll have to get a visa from the embassy in Bishkek. (Liu 2012, 48)

Being cut off from the “motherland,” many Uzbek communities lost the only reliable access to other communities beyond the Uzbekistani border. The isolation of individual Uzbek communities from both the mother country and other co-national communities has made regular communication extremely difficult and thus mobilization less possible. Also, it is easier for governments to have checkpoints in the mountains, where roads are few, and harder in the open desert where side trails are many. Thus, scattered in the mountainous region, the Uzbek minority communities are isolated from co-nationals in other Central Asian Republics.

The Existence of a Titular State

The second factor for minority mobilization highlighted in the general model is political opportunity. In this case, the existence of a titular state seems to make the difference. The Uzbek people have Uzbekistan, the most populous state in Central Asia, but the Uyghur people have been stateless for sixty years. Except twice, for brief periods during the early twentieth century, East Turkistan was virtually non-existent; and it is a forbidden subject in contemporary China. Even when the Uyghur minority was able to gain a political stronghold, the proclaimed “independent state” was only able to incorporate a few towns. East Turkistan never encompassed the whole region or even the majority of today's Xinjiang.

For Uyghur people, the absence of a sovereign Uyghur state prompted many to strive for one. “Many Uyghur were particularly disappointed that the independence of the former Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not lead to independence or at least increased autonomy in their own autonomous region” (Gladney 2004, 379).

This probably prompted the early wave of a Uyghur nationalist movement (Gladney 2004). For example, in April 1990, hundreds of armed Uyghurs occupied the local government in Baren, a small town in Southern Xinjiang, and were able to hold off the Chinese military for several days until they were eventually defeated (Hasting 2011). The choice of the Uyghur nationalist target suggested an unmistakable political message, taking over the government; and this was not an isolated incident where ethnic violence had a political undertone. “In August 2008 two Uyghurs in Kashgar ran a stolen truck into a group of soldiers, killing 16 of them and wounding 16 others” (Hasting 2011, 911). Seen as symbols of Chinese dominance, government and military have become the targets for some Uyghur nationalists to express their political demands.

For the Uzbek minorities, there is little room for such political maneuvering. After all, their titular state is just across the border; and they could technically go there for relief any time they choose. The existence of an exit option makes their political demands less persuasive in an increasingly nationalistic atmosphere in Central Asia. Each Republic is only promoting the interest of its own ethnic group without much consideration for the minorities, whose interests are ostensibly already represented through their titular states. While the country of residence has little tolerance for minority voices, the mother country apparently has less interest in its people’s community in neighboring states. When Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov learned about the secession movement in Osh, a bordering city in Kyrgyzstan with a significant Uzbek population, he simply asked them to dismiss their claim in order to maintain regional stability (Liu 2012). Some Uzbeks felt bitter; nevertheless they accepted his leadership.

The Uzbekistani government's obsession with security due to terrorism has only further alienated its diaspora communities abroad. The de facto closure of the border was only one example. It also made the process of migration back into Uzbekistan more difficult (Liu 2012). Thus, caught between a hostile state of residence and an apathetic mother country, the Uzbek minorities have found themselves stranded in enclosed communities and unable to raise "valid" political claims. In the Uyghur case, the absence of sovereign state generated a centripetal impetus, mobilizing people towards a political goal. By contrast, the Uzbek diaspora populations in Central Asia were pushed to the margin by the unwelcoming, centrifugal force from their very own titular state.

Issue Framing and Cultural Identity

As mentioned before, both Uzbek and Uyghur identities were heavily shaped by Soviet or Soviet-style policy. Before that, "ethnoterritorial states had never existed in Central Asia in the first place and that its inhabitants never aspired to achieving state status – until Soviet rule had created and configured them by fiat in the 1920s and 1930s" (Liu 2012, 64). However, even during Soviet times, the introduction of titular republics did not create a pan-nationalist sentiment for each of the leading minority groups. Instead, collective farms actually reinforced pre-existing clan identity. As Akbarzadeh (1996) noted,

The Soviet cotton plantation campaign of the 1950s was achieved through forceful relocation of whole villages from the fertile grounds of the Hissar valley and Gharm region to the southern Vakhsh valley. The settlers brought their traditions with them and kept them unchanged thanks to the minimum-contact kolkhoz system. To the present day it is still quite common to find Uzbek kolkhozyin the Vakhsh valley which have very little to do with their neighbouring, say Gharmi, kolkhozy. The Soviet system, unintentionally perhaps, has preserved the parochial set up of the countryside (1107).

Since group identity is invariably tied to land, these Uzbek minorities ended up having weaker tie to their “motherland.” Also, clan identities in Central Asia today are based less on blood ties, but more on geographical proximity (Akbarzadeh 1996). A relative living across the border may not be considered part of the “family,” but a close friend next door would be. This clan identity is also manifested through politics. In many Central Asian Republics today, political parties are not ideologically oriented and politics are played by several “families” representing different parts of the country.

This primary identity to one’s birthplace, instead of ancestral tie, is also evident among Uzbeks in urban areas. When interviewed, many Uzbeks in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, never considered themselves as minorities. ““Don’t call us a minority! We are a majority in Osh [Kyrgyzstan], and in cities like Jalal-Abad [Afghanistan] and Uzgen [Kyrgyzstan]. Don’t call us a diaspora, either. Diaspora means separation from an original homeland. We’ve been here in these cities for centuries! It is the Kyrgyz who came recently”” (Liu 2012, 11). If their attachment to the state of residence is stronger than that to Uzbekistan, then Uzbek minorities face a significant obstacle in mobilization: they cannot unite under a primary identity, the Uzbek people from Uzbekistan.

By way of contrast, the Communist influence in Xinjiang is much shorter-lived. The Chinese regime did not have effective military control of the region until the early 1950s. Lacking effective local network and cadres, especially Uyghur-speaking ones, the Beijing government could not enforce a thorough reform as it did elsewhere in China (Milward 2004). Thus, the commune system was introduced fairly late in the 1960s and lasted only twenty years till the economic reform during 1980s. As a result, the clan

identity was not reinforced in Xinjiang. Instead, the economic reform created pan-Uyghur solidarity among the people.

The introduction of market economy had two major impacts on the Uyghur people, the massive Chinese in-migration to Xinjiang, and the Uyghur labor migration working in coastal regions. Prior to the economic reform, Uyghur people were the absolute majority ethnic group in Xinjiang. Although there had been steady increase of Chinese population since 1950s, most of them came with the XPCC and stayed in newly built cities. In other words, there were Chinese enclaves within a vast region, but no significant community in Uyghur populated cities. However, since the 1980s, many Han Chinese have moved to Xinjiang seeking economic opportunities, like trading with Central Asian states, tapping natural resources, or simply starting new lives. In thirty years, the demographics of Xinjiang changed drastically. Now the Uyghur population is only slightly higher than the Chinese population, 46% compared to 40%. Even though Uyghur and Chinese still live in segregated quarters within cities, now the two groups do encounter and interact with each other on a daily basis.

This sudden influx of Han Chinese population created a crisis for the Uyghur people as they tried to adjust this new reality. Since political and economic resources are concentrated in the hands of Han Chinese, many Uyghur view Chinese people as invaders. For them, this is a classic “colonial story” where an outside group with advanced development is trying to take over the land of the native people and change their traditions. Of course, this is a biased representation of the situation; nevertheless, it is a mentality shared by many frustrated minorities as one Uyghur vendor testifies: “The Han are a rude people, they look down on us. They think they own Urumqi and act however

they want here” (Kaltman 2007, 115). Thus, despite the economic development in the region, many Uyghurs still consider Chinese people as “colonizers.”

At the same time Han Chinese have been moving into Xinjiang, Uyghur youth are “going out” into the Chinese heartland in search of employment. Once they leave their hometown, local identities lose their significance. To most Chinese people, the internal regional differences between the Uyghurs do not matter. The difference only falls on ethnic or racial distinction, one is either a Uyghur or not. Uyghurs working in the coastal region soon realized that beyond their oasis identities, they shared a common identity as the Uyghur people, which overrides other identities as far as Chinese are concerned. Therefore, the twofold consequence of economic reform brought the Uyghur people in direct contact with the Han Chinese, and organized them along the ethnic distinction. From this, a pan-Uyghur identity beyond the intellectual class is born.

However, the distinction is not as clear-cut for the Uzbek minorities. As mentioned above, the Central Asian people had never envisioned ethnoterritorial political entity; instead, people were grouped by place of residence because different Turkic language groups lived together. This is still true to this day. When Kazakhstan gained independence after Soviet dissolution, Kazak people were not the absolute majority ethnic group of the country; only recently did they make up 50% of the population. Traditionally, all Central Asian people were considered the Turkic people without specific national titles assigned to each group. In fact, even the titular group today is far from being homogenous. Each national group was formed by a variety of ethnic clans, which could have been organized under different subgroups (Sengupta 2002;

Abdurakhmanov 1993). Thus, the distinction between Turkic peoples, though evident, is not as strong as the one between Uyghur and Han Chinese.

Another important factor is economic disparity. In Xinjiang today, the massive Han Chinese migration has unleashed the cruelty of market forces. Uyghurs are constantly discriminated against because of their insufficient Chinese language skills (Kaltman 2007). In fact, lack of proficiency in Chinese has become a major barrier, preventing them from integrating into the greater Chinese market.⁹ Backed by political connection and economic support from relatives in richer provinces, the Han Chinese possesses most of the economic resources and push Uyghurs into less lucrative business (Zang 348).¹⁰ Also, the state-owned oil fields and natural gas pipelines supply energy to the coastal region without distributing the profits to the local Uyghur people. As a result, many Uyghurs are bitter about Chinese stealing their resources and driving them out of the market. Besides the visible economic inequity between Uyghurs and Chinese in Xinjiang, there is also a regional disparity between Western and Eastern regions of China with the former significantly poorer than the latter. As Uyghur started to work in the more affluent cities in the coastal region, they gained first-hand knowledge of how the Beijing government *has* neglected their home region and what their hometown *could* become if more resources were directed toward the Western region.

By contrast, the economic differences between Uzbek minorities and other Turkic majorities are less significant. Although the economic condition in Xinjiang is comparable to Central Asia, the average GDP per capita of the five post-Soviet Central

⁹ However, some businessmen who speak fluent Chinese did benefit handsomely from this access to the Chinese market.

¹⁰ However, the situation is different for petty entrepreneurs and street vendors. Kaltman in his book talk about a story where the Chinese restaurant owner and the Uyghur kebab-stand owner work with each other to attract more customers.

Asian Republics is less than half of that of China. Also, the annual growth rate for these Republics is significantly lower than their Eastern neighbor. The titular groups do have more economic resources than the minorities, but not to the degree one witnesses in China. Also, Uzbeks are traditionally specialized in trade and carpet making, two major industries where they still enjoy control to this day. Despite the economic gap between the Uzbek minorities and the majority group, the former still fare reasonably well since only a few people, even among the latter, are wealthy. Comparatively, the disparity is less significant than the one between the Uyghurs and Chinese. Also, the stagnated economy in Uzbekistan made their motherland less appealing for Uzbek minorities.

For Uyghur, the Han Chinese people are racially different outsiders who are overtaking their economic resources in Xinjiang. Thus, the cultural, social and economic cleavages all fall along on the same ethnic division creating a reinforcing identity for the Uyghurs. For many of them, it is the Chinese people who do not respect their religion, encroach on their living space, and discriminate against them in employment (Kaltman 2007). Although some Uyghur businessmen have become wealthy thanks to their access to the vast Chinese market, most Uyghur people did not benefit as much as Han Chinese did from economic growth. Therefore, the daily interaction with the majority group and the greater integration of the whole region created a Uyghur consciousness against the backdrop of Han dominance.

The Uzbeks are situated in a more complex environment. There is no drastic contrast between the ethnic groups as the one in China; after all, most Central Asians are Turkic people and they have all been long times settlers. The settler versus invader mentality simply does not exist in the region today after independence and Russian

outmigration. In fact, most Turkic people historically have been categorized by their place of residence – their clan identity – not their “nationality,” which did not exist prior to the twentieth century. Even during the Soviet time, a person’s primary identity was not centered on ethnicity. It is only after independence that each titular state started the actual “national project” to build its own historical narrative and cultural distinction. This meant that people do not necessarily base their nationality on ethnicity. As many Uzbek minorities in Osh said, they see themselves as Kyrgyzstani citizens because the city they live in belongs to Kyrgyzstan (Liu 2012). It is difficult to tell how long this “geographically based” citizenship will hold amidst the increasingly nationalistic environment in Central Asia, but as of now their attachment to the land impedes any pan-Uzbek minority mobilization. As a result, the mixed concept of nationality and closer tie to other Turkic people generates a cross-cutting identity for the Uzbek minorities. They are culturally similar to their Turkic brothers, and the economic gap between the Uzbeks and the majorities are not that appalling.

Because the Uyghur identity is reinforced while Uzbek’s is not, their communities are differently orientated. For the Uyghurs, the unavoidable interaction with Han Chinese and the growing Uyghur nationalism made them actively voice their dissatisfaction. From peaceful demonstration to militant uprising, the Uyghur people had their concerns heard both domestically and internationally. Even though their intellectual class has been largely co-opted into the Chinese system, daily experience of marginalization has informed the Uyghur people of their own identity. However, the Uzbek minorities, “abandoned” by their motherland and marginalized by their country of residence, turned inward. Although they had been victims of ethnic clashes, they kept their dissent to

themselves. Community leaders agreed that open protest and secession movement would provide no good for their people, and Uzbek journalists self-censored local minority newspaper to prevent breeding any political extremism or inviting majority suppression (Liu 2012). Instead of transforming the discrimination issue into argument for activism, the Uzbek prized their own seclusion as the sign of their own moral superiority and purity over the majority (Liu 2012). Table 8 summarizes the difference between Uyghur and Uzbek minorities on issue formation.

Table 8. Issue Formation for Uyghur and Uzbek Minorities

	Uyghur Minority in Xinjiang	Uzbek Minority in Central Asia
Identity Contrast	Turkic People vs. Han Chinese	Turkic People vs. Turkic People
Disparity between minority and majority	Increasingly economic gap Chinese holds control of most industries	No significant economic disparity Uzbek holds control of certain industries
Identity Formation	Original settler vs. Chinese “invader” Reinforcing identity	All long time settlers Attachment to birthplace Cross-cutting identity
Orientation	Outward, voicing dissatisfaction	Inward, cultivating self-recognized moral superiority
Result	Mobilize	De-mobilize

In the end, strengthened by large population and regional cohesion, the Uyghur minorities are able to construct a national narrative based on economic disparity and cultural distinction (Hess 2009). From the massive Han migration and economic development in China, the Uyghurs see both the threat and the potential of their own community. Thus, the reinforcing identity created a strong consciousness across the Uyghur people in Xinjiang. Without a political entity, they have mobilized on nationalist grounds seeking their own political, economic and cultural autonomy.

Isolated by geographical and political barriers, the Uzbek minority communities in Central Asia have not been able to forge a regional alliance across international

borders. This cross-cutting identity makes building a cohesive political agenda extremely difficult. Politically marginalized but economically potent, the Uzbek people have been continuously targeted by the majority groups. Yet, the lack of broader linguistic group cohesion has made the Uzbek minorities turn inward. Afraid of retaliation, many Uzbek minorities prefer to remain silent (Liu 2012). Therefore, the very issues that have been framed to prompt mobilization in the Uyghur case have been used to de-mobilize the Uzbek people.

Conclusion

Ethnic nationalism, though often seen on the news, is actually not the dominant choice for most linguistic minorities. In fact, very few language minorities mobilize on nationalist grounds. By using the political process model and utilizing the Minority at Risk database, this study shows that capacity, political opportunity, and issue formation are the three major factors affecting the decision of mobilization. The higher the capacity (measured by population density), the greater the opportunity (measured by previous political autonomy), and the better the issue is framed (measured by exaggerated grievances), the more likely a linguistic minority will mobilize.

In the case of the Uyghur, a Turkic minority with a large and concentrated population well connected by transportation, the lack of political sovereignty actually created an impetus for political action. Facing massive Han Chinese migration and increasing economic disparity, Uyghur has been continuously reinforced by job discrimination, cultural stigma, and lack of political power. All these factors created a fertile ground for the growth of Uyghur nationalism and prompted many of them to take action for their political ideal.

Across the Chinese border in Central Asia, the Uzbek minorities find themselves in a similar, yet distinct reality. Facing discrimination from the majority and the state of residence, their hope for pan-Uzbek mobilization is dimmed by geographical difficulties and de facto closure of border by their motherland. The sheer existence of Uzbekistan and their relative economic well being within the state of residence also renders the political claims by Uzbek minority less persuasive, even though the “exit option” is not a real option anymore. In the end, their tie to the land and connection to other Turkic people create a cross-cutting identity that is difficult for them to forge into a cohesive nationalist agenda.

Future research should consider several possibilities. For example, the examination and quantification of internal capacity still pose a serious challenge for nationalism scholars. Even in a small comparative model here, the vast network dynamic inside a single ethnic group is still a formidable task that needs research innovation. In the comparative study, the 2-million-strong Uzbek minority in Afghanistan, the biggest diaspora population outside Uzbekistan, is completely excluded due to different historical background and recent development. How this community affects their co-nationals and Uzbekistani state policies would be an interesting subject to pursue. This study is only a start for the analysis of minority nationalism, and further academic rigor and attention should be directed to this subject to develop a more substantial understanding of ethno-national mobilization.

Appendix

Table 9. Country List and Their Respective Score for Each Measurement in MAR

Linguistic Minority	Home Country	Group Spatial Distribution (0-3)	Political Autonomy (0-5)	Political Grievance (0-4)	Economic Grievance (0-2)	Cultural Grievance (0-2)	Protest (0-5)	Separatism (0-3)	Rebellion (0-7)
Hazaras	Afghanistan	2	5	2	2	0	0	3	0
Uzbeks	Afghanistan	3	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
Bakongo	Angola	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Armenians	Azerbaijan	3	1	4	1	0	0	3	1
Russians	Azerbaijan	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Biharis	Bangladesh	0	1	2	2	0	0	1	0
Russians	Belarus	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Poles	Belarus	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
Rohingya (Arakanese)	Burma	3	0	4	0	0	1	3	0
Serbs	Croatia	1	2	2	2	1	2	3	0
Turkish Cypriots	Cyprus	3	1	4	0	0	3	3	0
Hutus	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	
Haitian Blacks ¹¹	Dominican Republic	0	0	1	1	0	3	0	0
Russians	Estonia	1	2	1	1	2	0	3	0
Afars	Ethiopia	3	3	3	1	0	0	3	0
Somalis	Ethiopia	3	0	4	1	0	0	3	5
Tigreans	Ethiopia	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Amhara	Ethiopia	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
East Indians	Fiji	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
Russians	Georgia	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
Malinke	Guinea	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bodos	India	3	1	4	0	0	3	3	1
South Tyrolians	Italy	3	1	4	0	0	3	3	0
Russians	Kazakhstan	3	2	4	0	1	0	3	0
Somalis	Kenya	3	1	1	2	0	0	2	0
Hmong	Laos	3	2	4	0	0	0	3	0
Russians	Latvia	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	0
Russians	Lithuania	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
Slavs	Moldova	1	0	4	1	2	0	3	0
Berbers	Morocco	3	1	1	0	2	0	1	0

¹¹ The name was given by the MAR to describe Haitian descendants in Dominican Republic.

Tuareg	Niger	2	1	3	2	0	0	3	0
Ahmadis	Pakistan	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Pashtuns (Pushtuns)	Pakistan	3	1	3	2	0	1	3	5
Mohajirs	Pakistan	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Roma	Slovakia	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
Indian Tamils	Sri Lanka	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
Sri Lankan Tamils	Sri Lanka	2	1	4	2	1	1	3	7
Jurassians	Switzerland	3	0	4	0	0	1	3	0
Russians	Tajikistan	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	0
Malay- Muslims	Thailand	3	1	4	1	1	3	3	5
Russians	Turkmenistan	1	2	0	0	0	2	1	0
Russians	Ukraine	3	2	3	0	1	2	0	0
Crimean Russians	Ukraine	3	2	4	0	2	4	3	0
Russians	Uzbekistan	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
Kosovo Albanians	Yugoslavia ¹²	3	5	4	0	0	3	3	0
Hungarians	Yugoslavia ¹³	3	5	3	1	0	3	3	0
Europeans	Zimbabwe	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
Ndebele	Zimbabwe	3	1	4	2	0	0	3	0
	Average	2.13	1.21	2.02	0.65	0.33	0.92	1.69	0.51
	Standard Deviation	1.06	1.29	1.63	0.79	0.63	1.22	1.34	1.57

¹² The country referred here should be Serbia. It was before the independence of Kosovo.

¹³ The country referred here should also be Serbia where the Hungarian minority resides in the north of the country.

Table 10. Scores of measurement of Independent and Dependent variables for each Linguistic minority group

Linguistic Minority	Home Country	Group Spatial Distribution (0-3)	Political Autonomy(0-5)	Total Grievance (0-8)	EMI INDEX (0-1)
Bakongo	Angola	3	1	0	0
Haitian Blacks	Dominican Republic	0	0	2	0
Amhara	Ethiopia	3	0	1	0
Malinke	Guinea	3	1	0	0
Mohajirs	Pakistan	3	0	0	0
Roma	Slovakia	2	0	2	0
Indian Tamils	Sri Lanka	2	0	2	0
Ahmadis	Pakistan	0	0	3	0.04
Europeans	Zimbabwe	1	0	2	0.04
Russians	Ukraine	3	2	4	0.08
Uzbeks	Afghanistan	3	1	3	0.12
Poles	Belarus	2	1	2	0.12
East Indians	Fiji	0	0	4	0.12
Russians	Azerbaijan	1	0	0	0.15
Russians	Belarus	1	0	0	0.15
Russians	Georgia	1	2	0	0.15
Russians	Lithuania	1	2	0	0.15
Berbers	Morocco	3	1	3	0.15
Russians	Tajikistan	1	2	0	0.15
Russians	Turkmenistan	1	2	0	0.15
Russians	Uzbekistan	1	2	0	0.15
Biharis	Bangladesh	0	1	4	0.27
Russians	Latvia	1	2	3	0.27
Somalis	Kenya	3	1	3	0.3
Hazaras	Afghanistan	2	5	4	0.45
Rohingya (Arakanese)	Burma	3	0	4	0.45
Afars	Ethiopia	3	3	4	0.45
Tigreans	Ethiopia	3	0	0	0.45
South Tyrolians	Italy	3	1	4	0.45
Hmong	Laos	3	2	4	0.45
Tuareg	Niger	2	1	5	0.45

Jurassians	Switzerland	3	0	4	0.45
Serbs	Croatia	1	2	5	0.49
Turkish Cypriots	Cyprus	3	1	4	0.49
Russians	Estonia	1	2	4	0.49
Russians	Kazakhstan	3	2	5	0.49
Slavs	Moldova	1	0	7	0.49
Hungarians	Yugoslavia	3	5	4	0.49
Ndebele	Zimbabwe	3	1	6	0.49
Crimean Russians	Ukraine	3	2	6	0.57
Armenians	Azerbaijan	3	1	5	0.58
Bodos	India	3	1	4	0.58
Kosovo Albanians	Yugoslavia	3	5	4	0.61
Somalis	Ethiopia	3	0	5	0.7
Pashtuns (Pushtuns)	Pakistan	3	1	5	0.82
Malay- Muslims	Thailand	3	1	6	0.82
Sri Lankan Tamils	Sri Lanka	2	1	7	0.84
Hutus	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	3	0	0	
	Average	2.123	1.21	3.00	0.32
	Standard Deviation	1.06	1.29	2.13	0.25

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