The Potential Effects of Federal Campaign Finance Reform on Women Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate

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The Potential Effects of Federal Campaign Finance Reform on Women Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate

Abstract
This study investigates the potential effects of campaign finance reform, namely the banning of party or "soft" money on each candidate group (Democrats and Republicans, men and women) for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Emphasis is placed on the difference in the effect the reform will have on the sexes. Following analysis of the sources and average totals of campaign financing for all of the groups in the 2000 elections, it can be noted that Republican women stand to be affected by campaign finance reform more than any other group, as they received the largest average amount of party money. Meanwhile, Democratic women stand to be the least affected by the reform. Republican men are slightly more likely than Democratic men to be affected by the reform. Therefore, as a whole, the Republican Party stands to lose the most campaign finance dollars through the reform, with Republican women sustaining the largest losses.

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Cameo Kaisler

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Introduction and Background

Campaign finance reform has been at the forefront of political discussion and debate in the United States Congress for more than seven years. On March 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed a new campaign finance reform bill, commonly known as McCain-Feingold or Shays-Meehan, into law. The changes laid out in the bill took effect following the 2002 congressional election, on Wednesday, November 6, 2002.

With new campaign finance provisions in place, it is necessary to consider the potential effects of campaign finance reform on U.S. elections. The study of campaign finance reform could go in several directions, as many aspects of campaign finance law have been changed. The focus of this study is the potential effects that the ban on contributions by the political parties could have on the
success of each candidate group (Democrat and Republican men and women) in fundraising for their campaigns and winning their elections, with a particular emphasis on the effect of the new law on women candidates. Third party candidates were not included in this study, as they rarely receive significant amounts of money from their political parties.

In order to determine whether or not campaign finance reform will affect the four major candidate groups differently, this study analyzed the campaign finance data provided by the Federal Election Commission for all year 2000 U.S. House of Representatives and Senate elections. Fundraising totals were compiled for every Democratic and Republican candidate: men and women, incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates in all fifty states. The data set consisted of 789 candidates.

In order to understand the implications of the current campaign finance reform law, it is useful to know the major provisions of the law, and how they are different from previous laws. An important term in campaign finance reform, and the focus of this paper, is party contribution (or soft money), which is money donated to candidates or state parties from their political party. By the late 1980s, unregulated soft money had become a major part of campaign finance for both Democrats and Republicans, with both parties spending tens of millions of soft dollars on staff salaries, overhead, voter turnout programs, and other political efforts designed to affect the outcome of federal elections (Corrado 2001: 19). The concern over soft money has grown throughout the 1990s. Soft money donations in 1992 stood at $86 million. In 1996 they had increased to $260 million, and in 2000, soft money donations reached over $400 million.

The following chart outlines how much party money was contributed to Congressional and state elections in the 2000 cycle.
The U.S. government passed many different forms of campaign finance laws over the past century, but none is as restrictive as Shays-Meehan. Before the new legislation became law, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) governed all restrictions on campaign financing. The following chart outlines the changes instituted by Shays-Meehan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Organization</th>
<th>Transfers to State Parties</th>
<th>Contributions to State/Local Candidates</th>
<th>Share of Joint Activity*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DNC</td>
<td>$76,398</td>
<td>$2,505</td>
<td>$33,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Sen. Comm.</td>
<td>$38,816</td>
<td>$6,76</td>
<td>$7,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Cong. Comm.</td>
<td>$34,627</td>
<td>$2,921</td>
<td>$14,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Total</td>
<td>$149,841</td>
<td>$6,102</td>
<td>$54,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC</td>
<td>$93,249</td>
<td>$9,544</td>
<td>$36,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Cong. Comm.</td>
<td>$15,853</td>
<td>$1,834</td>
<td>$24,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Total</td>
<td>$129,857</td>
<td>$12,773</td>
<td>$70,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Parties</td>
<td>$279,698</td>
<td>$18,875</td>
<td>$125,018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total: $423,951,000

*Joint activity includes such party-building activities as voter registration drives, voter list development, and get-out-the-vote drives.

Source: Federal Election Commission

The U.S. government passed many different forms of campaign finance laws over the past century, but none is as restrictive as Shays-Meehan. Before the new legislation became law, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) governed all restrictions on campaign financing. The following chart outlines the changes instituted by Shays-Meehan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under the FECA:</th>
<th>Under Shays-Meehan / McCain-Feingold:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Contribution limits in any election (primary or general) by national party committees was $5,000</td>
<td>• National political parties are banned from raising or spending soft money from labor unions, corporations, or individuals. Therefore, they are banned from donating soft money to any candidate, as they will not be able to raise any soft money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per election to U.S. House candidates.</td>
<td>• State and local parties may continue to receive soft money for get-out-the-vote and registration campaigns, but donations are capped at $10,000 per year ($20,000 per election cycle). State party soft money cannot be used for ads for or against federal candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• RNC and DNC, or national party committees and the RNC or DNC combined, could give $17,500 to U.S.</td>
<td>• Individuals will be able to give a total of $37,500 per year to all federal candidates, parties, and PACs. The preexisting limit on total contributions was $25,000 per year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate candidates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Party committees (national and state) could spend $10,000 plus a cost of living adjustment to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support House candidates ($33,780 in 2000).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Party committees (national and state) could spend two cents per eligible voter (adjusted for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inflation) to support Senate candidates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 2000, the spending limits ranged from $135,120 in Delaware to $3.27 million in California.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individuals could donate $20,000 to a national party committee per calendar year, and $5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to other political committees per calendar year, with the total not to exceed $25,000 per year.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bibby 2003: 249-251
The bottom line of campaign finance reform is that it bans soft money contributions to federal level campaigns. Therefore, the amount of soft money contributed to federal candidates’ campaigns in the 2000 elections, and whether or not there is a discrepancy in the amount of soft money donated to each candidate group, will be the most important indicator of whether or not campaign finance reform will affect the genders differently.

Research Question

Considering that both political parties funnel many millions of dollars to their candidates, it is difficult to decipher an immediate difference in the new legislation’s effects on the two parties. It stands to reason that both parties have a great deal to lose under this new law, but is there really a difference? Many political scientists have predicted that the new laws will affect Democratic candidates more than Republicans, as Republicans have proven themselves to be more effective in raising hard dollars (Bibby 2003: 252). However, Republicans have also consistently out-raised and out-spent the Democrats in soft money donations. Thus, both parties have some catching up to do in order to match the fundraising that they have been able to pull together in the past.

According to a study conducted by Paul Herrnson and Kelly Patterson, discrepancies exist in the ways that political parties funnel hard money to different candidate groups. The Democrats distributed 82 percent of their funds to candidates in competitive races (defined as those races decided by 20 percent or less of the two-party vote) (Herrnson & Patterson 2002: 112). The Republicans delivered 91 percent of their funds to GOP candidates in these same contests. Republican Party spending favored House challengers (both competitive and noncompetitive), who received roughly 35 percent of all party funds. Incumbents of both parties received less, reflecting Democratic Party leaders’ desire to capture Republican-held seats, the GOP’s leaders’ desire to expand their party’s majority, and the beliefs of both parties that control of the House majority would be decided in a handful of contests (ibid).

Diana Dwyre and Robin Kolodny reported similar results in their study of party spending during the 2000 elections. They point out that during the 1990s, the political parties took on a more active role in campaigns. For example, parties now engage in voter identification and mobilization, fund-raising, candidate training, oppo-
sition research, issue developments, polling, and media advertising. These activities often put parties at the center of exchanges between candidates, contributors, and consultants, as well as voters (Dwyre & Kolodny 2002: 134). They go on to discuss in great detail the soft and hard expenditures by both political parties during the 2000 election cycle, yet they do not mention gender as a factor once. Instead they opted, as did Herrnson and Patterson, to concentrate on race competitiveness, which once again ignores the issue of gender. In fact, no hard numbers have been made available as to the differences in party spending by gender.

While a great deal has been written about women in federal elections, including women’s campaign financing, very little has been written about how campaign finance reform, such as Shays-Meehan, will affect women candidates. Despite the lack of literature on the topic, there is concern within the women’s political community about the potentially hazardous effects of limiting soft money donations for women candidates.

During the American University course “Women in the 2002 Elections: Another Year of the Woman?” (Government 580.02), representatives from most of the major women’s political organizations and PACs spoke on the topic of women running for higher office, particularly federal office and state governorships. Each of the speakers represented a group or organization that, among their other goals, promotes women candidates for public office, and strives to help women win elections. When asked about their views on how campaign finance reform would affect women candidates, nearly every representative stated that her organization was concerned about how the changes brought about by Shays-Meehan would affect not only their organizations’ abilities to be involved with campaigns, but with the success of women candidates in general.

For example, Erica Henri, Political Director of the Women’s Campaign Fund (WCF), the oldest non-partisan political action committee dedicated to electing pro-choice women running for office at all levels, stated that her organization feels that campaign finance reform will help incumbents and hurt challengers (Henri 2002). She predicted that women will be negatively affected by campaign finance reform through unexpected effects that she fully expects will surface in the wake of a new campaign finance system. Following each passage of the FECA, unexpected results that war-
ranted amendments surfaced during the following election. If the precedent of past FECAs holds true for Shays-Meehan, there will be unexpected results from new campaign finance reform legislation.

The largest player in the game of women’s PAC fundraising is EMILY’s List. Formed in 1985, EMILY, an acronym for "Early Money Is Like Yeast: it makes the dough rise," supports pro-choice, Democratic women candidates. In 1994 EMILY became the third highest PAC money raiser, and by 1998, it was the largest PAC contributor in the U.S. (EMILY’s List 2003). Their President and founder, Ellen Malcolm, agreed completely with Henri about the future effects of campaign finance reform on women. Malcolm stated that she feels groups like EMILY are their own form of campaign finance reform. They fundraise through what is commonly called "bundling." EMILY’s List provides their members (there are currently over 68,000) with information about the candidates that they have endorsed, and their members decide to which candidates they would like to donate money. The members send their checks, made out to the candidates of their choice, to EMILY, which in turn "bundles" the checks and sends them to the candidate. Bundling has been quite successful for EMILY, as they donated $9.3 million to their endorsed candidates in the 2000 election cycle. Malcolm is less concerned about campaign finance reform hurting her organization because, through their method of fundraising, all of EMILY’s money is hard. However, she worries that Shays-Meehan will affect both women and Democrats considerably (Malcolm 2002). Like Henri, she predicts that there will be huge unintended consequences of Shays-Meehan on women and national parties.

With women holding just 13 percent of all seats in the U.S. House and Senate, every dollar counts in helping them to maintain their seats and in helping new candidates attain victory in future elections. Republicans may be better hard money fundraisers, but are they giving an equal portion of hard and soft money to their male and female candidates? Democrats supposedly have relied more heavily on soft money donations than Republicans, but do their women receive more soft money on average than their men?

While Henri and Malcolm expressed concern, they did not provide any systematic basis for their concern. Why is campaign finance viewed as a threat to women running for federal office? As
we will see in the literature review, it has been shown that thanks to
groups like the WCF and EMILY, women fundraise at the same
rates as men. No studies have been conducted to look at men and
women’s fundraising and determine how limitations such as the
ban on soft money are likely to affect their races. This study will
provide an opportunity to predict what the affects of Shays-Meehan
will be on women in the 2004 election. If the results look grim, and
with enough warning, this analysis may be able to help women can-
didates and their supporters make the necessary changes in their
fundraising strategies and prepare themselves for the new frontier
of campaign financing. If the results do not show a potentially neg-
ative effect on women’s candidacies, it will be useful information
to pass along to women candidates and the women’s organizations
and PACs that are concerned about the effects. The relevance of
this study, therefore, lies in its original consideration of gender as a
determinant in party donation.

Literature Review

As women have only recently begun to run for office in
numbers large enough to make good comparisons to male candi-
dates, it is difficult to analyze exactly how campaign finance
reform will affect women candidates. However, how women raise
their funds and whether or not they are as successful as men has
become an important topic to many political scientists.

In her article "Campaign Finance: Women’s Experience in
the Modern Era," Barbara Burrell discusses the commonly held
belief among political scientists and women’s rights activists that
women are less well-represented in U.S. politics because they can-
not fund raise as well as men. Burrell points out that campaign
finance and reform are important topics of discussion, as the
amount of money that individuals and groups have to spend on pol-
itics influences who gets heard, what issues are debated, how issues
are addressed, and who gets elected (Burrell 1998: 26).

The central point of Burrell’s study is that current women
candidates now raise and spend as much or more than their male
counterparts (Burrell 1998: 27). Statistics have shown that women
achieved near equality with men in the financing of their cam-
paigns in 1982, with the real breakthrough coming in 1988 when
female candidates raised and spent a greater average amount of
money than male candidates. That trend continued in the 1990 and
1992 elections as well. To Burrell, these statistics conveyed the message that campaign finance is similar to electoral results: when women run, they can raise the money they need to win (ibid).

Where is women’s campaign financing coming from? While women may be raising as much money, or more, than men, the sources of their campaign financing may be affected in different ways than men’s. Burrell cites FEC statistics that show women’s funding came primarily from individual donors from 1988 to 1994, with women out-fundraising men in individual contributions (Burrell 1998: 30). Their ability to gain large amounts of individual contributions is often attributed to women’s success in attracting individual contributions from other women.

According to a study conducted by Richard Fox, women candidates rely more heavily on women for support in a campaign, but when it comes to financial support, women are not in the habit of making large contributions to political campaigns. This forces female candidates to work harder to raise sufficient funds (Fox 1997: 115). Fox attributes this to the fact that women have not been socialized to contribute to political campaigns. All of these factors lead to women having to spend more time seeking money from a wide variety of small individual contributors.

Slightly different trends exist in PAC money fund raising. Democratic women, on average, raise more money than male candidates in comparable races (open seat, challenger, and incumbent), but Republican women raise less than their male counterparts. A major factor in causing this trend is the high success rate of certain women’s PACs, and the different PAC standards for choosing the candidates that they will endorse.

In 1994 Campaigns & Elections magazine listed 54 state and national women’s PACs. EMILY’s List is the most successful of those PACS. To date, EMILY endorsed and helped raise funds for 55 of the Democratic women who have been elected to the U.S. House, as well as 11 Senators and 7 governors (EMILY’s List 2003). Those statistics alone help to explain why Democratic women out represent Republican women in the U.S. House 38 to 21, and 9 to 5 in the Senate (Center for American Women and Politics 2003). Also contributing to Democratic women having a fund raising advantage over Republican women is the large percentage of PACs that donate only to pro-choice candidates, regard-
Democrats are more likely to hold a pro-choice stance than Republicans, and are therefore more likely to receive PAC support from other major contributors such as the Women’s Campaign Fund, which contributes millions of dollars to pro-choice candidates only in every election cycle (Burrell 1998: 36).

Political scientist Rebekah Herrick has expressed concern about the way in which women and men candidates’ fundraising abilities are compared. She points out that research on female candidates directs its attention on aggregate comparisons only. Herrick believes that a more fair comparison comes from contest specific comparisons (Herrick 1995). Most research on the topic, such as Burrell’s, compares women’s resources and characteristics to men’s resources and characteristics. While this improved the understanding of women’s competitiveness, it did not answer the question: How do women compare to the men against whom they actually run? Herrick’s examination of women running in open seat races in 1992 suggests that how the comparison is made affects the findings. She found that women fare less well when compared to their opponents than when all women are compared to all men candidates. Herrick’s studies also show that, based on data from the 1988 and 1992 elections, women challengers receive less value for their spending than their male counterparts (Herrick 1996). This means that women candidates have to spend more money, and therefore raise more money, in order to receive the same election results as male candidates.

Richard Logan Fox, in his book, Gender Dynamics in Congressional Elections, used yet another method of studying women candidates’ fundraising: concentrating on interviews with actual candidates’ campaign managers, rather than looking at raw numbers. Similar to Burrell’s findings, Fox’s study showed that all female Democratic candidates received the largest portion of their total campaign receipts from individual contributors – which totaled a larger portion than that of their male counterparts (Fox 1997: 112). On the other hand, a major complaint of the campaign managers was that women candidates do not have the same access to traditional fund-raising networks as men (ibid). One campaign manager explained that women do not usually have the ties with the business community that men have and usually have shorter lists of contacts to call for contributions. Another campaign manager recounted a negative experience with resistance from the labor
unions in supporting a woman candidate. The manager felt, based on that experience, that union leadership is still a male enclave (Fox 1997: 114).

Another large barrier for women in raising funds is the lack of support from the candidate’s national party. In one case reported by a woman candidate’s campaign manager, the national party headquarters refused to believe that the candidate was viable and refused funding. Instead, they funded a male candidate for the same seat, despite polls favoring the woman candidate by a large margin. The director of finance for the party stated that this was the "old-boy" network in action and that they gave the male candidate party money because he has contacts in the leadership that the woman candidate did not have (ibid). Overall, 6 of the 25 campaign managers interviewed believed that their candidate was in some way unable to access the traditional fund-raising networks. Although this is not an overwhelming proportion (24%), Fox points out that it represents a significant number of female candidates continuing to struggle with campaign finance.

All of this raises some interesting points about the potential effects of campaign finance reform. Burrell’s study revealed that in each election from 1980 to 1990, Republicans contributed a larger average amount to their female candidates than to their male candidates in U.S. House campaigns (Burrell 1998: 34). Democratic female nominees were also more successful in acquiring direct contributions and coordinated expenditures from their party during that period of election cycles. This trend began to level off in the 1990s, but in many cases, women candidates were still favored for party funding in the 1992 and 1994 elections (Burrell 1998: 35). However, very little research has been done on candidate gender and soft money contributions. Under the new campaign finance legislation, political parties are no longer able to donate to candidates. If Burrell’s study is correct, that change will have a larger effect on the total fundraising of women candidates than men.

Research Design and Methodology

Based on all the information presented thus far, the expected outcome of this study is that Republican women will be the candidate group most affected by campaign finance reform, as they are the least adept at fundraising and receive a large amount of party money. On the other end of the spectrum, Democratic women are
expected to be the least affected candidate group, as they are the best fundraisers and receive the least amount of party money.

In order to determine whether or not these predictions are correct, the campaign finance data for all general election 2000 U.S. House and Senate candidates were collected from the Federal Election Commission website (http://www.fec.gov/). A database was created that included the following information for all general election candidates: party and sex (both separate and combined to make four candidate group categories), total amount of money received, total amount of party contributions to campaign, percentage of total receipts from party contributions, total amount of money received minus party contributions, win/loss, and win/loss margin. The data were then compared to determine patterns and differences between the candidate groups.

In order to provide a complete analysis of the role of party contributions in election success, a number of different tests were run. The first test run was a comparison means across candidate groups for the campaign finance success of each candidate group. This test would reveal whether or not noticeable differences existed in the average amount of total campaign finance receipts, total party contribution receipts, and percentage of total receipts from party contributions between the candidate groups. Next, independent samples T-tests were run in order to determine if any statistically significant difference existed between the means for each candidate group’s campaign finance data. Third, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were made to determine the overall effect of the independent variables (win/loss and each of the candidate groups) on a continuous dependent variable (party contribution and percent total receipts from party contribution). If statistically significant relationships are shown through OLS regressions, it will support the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, which would support the hypothesis.

To take a closer look at the role party contributions play in candidate success, independent samples T-tests were also run comparing the election success (win/loss) of candidates who received varying amounts of party contribution money. This is important in determining whether or not party money plays any role in election success, implying that the loss of party money would affect candidates in future elections. Also, to determine whether or not there is a correlation between the total amount of money raised by a candi-
date and the amount of money donated to a candidate by his or her political party, bivariate correlations were run to compare the correlation by the competitiveness of the race. This test will help to determine whether or not party contributions affect candidates' overall fundraising.

**Table 4: Difference in Party Contribution Money by Candidate Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Groups Compared</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>T-Test for Equality of Means Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Women</td>
<td>$5,547</td>
<td>$31,301</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Women</td>
<td>$36,848</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Women</td>
<td>$5,547</td>
<td>$3,849</td>
<td>.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Men</td>
<td>$9,396</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Women</td>
<td>$5,547</td>
<td>$8,647</td>
<td>.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Men</td>
<td>$14,194</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Women</td>
<td>$36,848</td>
<td>$27,452</td>
<td>.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Men</td>
<td>$9,396</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Men</td>
<td>$14,194</td>
<td>$22,654</td>
<td>.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Men</td>
<td>$9,396</td>
<td>$4,798</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Men</td>
<td>$14,194</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05

Note: All tests showed the same significance result in 1-tailed tests

**Data and Analysis**

The table below shows the raw fundraising means for each candidate group.
It can be noted that Republican women are, on average, the least successful fundraisers and receive the largest amount of party contributions. The percentage of total receipts from party contributions is also the highest for Republican women, which means that, on average, Republican women stand to lose the highest percentage of their total fundraising amounts under campaign finance reform. Democratic women are at the opposite end of the spectrum, as they are the most successful fundraisers and receive the least amount of party contributions of the candidate groups. Republican and Democrat men stand to lose similar amounts of total fundraising without party contributions. These raw numbers support the hypothesis, but are they statistically significant? The following independent samples T-tests answer that question.

A statistically significant relationship does in fact exist between Democratic women and Democratic men, and between Democratic women and Republican men. These relationships are not surprising, as a large gap exists in the average difference between the amount of party contribution money received by those groups. However, a statistically significant difference was not
shown between Republican women and any other group. This is surprising, considering that the differences between Republican women and all other candidate groups were the largest. The most likely explanation for this lack of statistically significant relationship is small sample size. Unfortunately, despite combining House and Senate results in order to increase the number of women in the sample size, the total number of Republican women was just 41. This small sample size makes it difficult to show statistical significance in any type of test. This problem surfaces in other tests as well.

To shift the focus from candidate group to the impact of party contribution on electoral success, independent samples T-tests were run to compare win/loss by party contributions received.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amounts of Party Contribution Compared</th>
<th>Percent Candidates receiving amount of Party Contribution</th>
<th>T-Test for Equality of Means Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Party Contribution</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>.011*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Party Contribution</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $1000</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>.060**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $1000</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $1800</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>.011*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $1800</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $10,000</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $10,000</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05  
**Statistically significant in one-tailed test, t >1.65

These results reveal an inconsistent pattern in the relationship between party contribution and election success. When comparing candidates who received no party contribution dollars (20 percent of candidates), to all candidates who received some/any party contribution (80 percent of candidates), a statistically significant relationship did exist. The relationship produced a positive significance, which means that candidates who received party contributions were more likely to win than candidates who received no
party contribution. When comparing candidates who received less than $1000 in party contribution money (40 percent of candidates) to candidates who received more than $1000 in party contributions, a statistically significant relationship was shown with a confidence interval of 94 percent, just one percent short of the traditionally accepted confidence interval of 95 percent. Upon further investigation with a one-tailed independent samples T-test (rather than the two-tailed tests run for the rest of this study), a statistically significant relationship was found. This implies that there probably is a statistically significant tendency for candidates who received more than $1000 to have better election success than candidates who received less than $1000. The next party contribution amount break that was used was $1800, as that represented the fifty-fifty split between candidates based on party contribution. Here we again see a statistically significant relationship favoring candidates who received larger amounts of party money in election success.

Finally, candidates who received large sums of party contribution money, over $10,000 (25 percent of candidates), were compared with candidates who received less than $10,000 (75 percent of candidates). No statistically significant relationship was shown here. This is most likely because candidates who received very large sums of party money tended to be in more competitive races, where their chances of winning are lower than candidates in less competitive races. Small sample size is not likely to be the cause for a lack of statistical significance for the relationship between win/loss and receiving over $10,000 in party contributions, as 199 of the 789 cases were in this category. Thus, no relationship between election success and receiving large amounts of party money could be shown. What we can understand from this model is that, up to $10,000, party contribution receipts help to predict win/loss.

A number of bivariate correlations were run to determine if any relationship exists between the total amount of money raised by candidates and the amount of party money received by candidates. These correlations were run comparing all candidates, and also by the competitiveness of the race. At no level of race competitiveness, nor when comparing all candidates, could a statistically significant correlation be shown between these two factors.

There are a number of explanations for this lack of correlation. It is generally accepted by political scientists and has been
documented for many years that incumbents almost always fundraise more successfully than any other candidate group, for a number of reasons (Jacobson, 2001: 89). However, even though incumbents tend to have high amounts of total campaign finance receipts, they may not receive large amounts of money from their parties, as incumbents also tend to be in noncompetitive races. Herrnson and Patterson (2001) discussed this pattern in their previously mentioned work. Thus, no correlation would exist between total receipts and party contributions for incumbents, who make up more than half of all candidates, as many incumbents run unopposed. Also, we have already documented that Republican women are the least successful fundraisers, but received the most amount of party money of the candidate groups. It could be argued, based on the example of Republican women, that candidates who received the lowest amount of total receipts will receive the most party money. This relationship is not supported by any of the tests either. Thus, no correlation can be shown between total campaign fundraising receipts and party contributions. This implies that parties do not systematically favor candidates based on their fundraising success, nor does fundraising success determine party contributions.

To consider the impact of the loss of party contributions on election success another way, please refer to charts 1 and 2 in the appendix. These charts show, in raw number format, the impact of campaign finance reform to candidates that won and lost in the 2000 elections, divided by candidate group. Here it can be seen that Republican women who won their races are the most vulnerable to the loss of party contributions, as their total receipts would decrease the most with that loss. Once again Democratic women are at the opposite end of the spectrum from Republican women, and Republican men and Democratic men are somewhere in-between. The same patterns can be seen when comparing candidates who lost their races.

Finally, in order to pull all of the tests together and form a model which represents the relationships between all of the independent and dependent variables studied, two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were created. These models explain the impact of the independent variables, win/loss and each individual candidate group, on the dependent variable, the amount of party contribution dollars in Table 5, and the amount of total receipts from party contribution dollars in Table 6.
This model does not show a statistically significant difference between win/loss and party contribution. However, it does show a statistically significant relationship between Republican women and the total amount of party contribution in dollars. The relationship is significant with a 99 percent confidence interval. Democratic women are not included in the regression model data because they served as the base group in the model. A trend is apparent in the model, as Republican women have the highest standardized beta (or beta weight) value; Republican men are next, followed by Democratic men. The standardized beta value explains how much affect an individual variable has on the model as a whole, with relation to the other independent variables. The trend tells us that Democratic women would have the smallest affect on this model, as they received the least party money of any candidate group. This supports the hypothesis and the predicted results of the independent samples T-tests, which could not be shown due to small sample size.
However, it should be noted that the adjusted R square \((p \leq 0.05)\) in this model is 0.008, or 0.8 percent. This means that this model is explaining less than one percent of the total variance in the dependent variable. Thus, while this model supports the hypothesis, it is a weak indicator of the overall relationship between the candidate groups and party contribution.

The following table represents the same data as chart 5, but this time the dependent variable is the percent of total receipts from party contribution instead of party contribution in dollars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Percent Total Receipts from Party Contributions</th>
<th>OLS Unstandardized Beta</th>
<th>OLS Standardized Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Win/Loss</td>
<td>-3.151**</td>
<td>-.239**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Women</td>
<td>1.848</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Men</td>
<td>.909</td>
<td>.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Men</td>
<td>.806</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>789</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted (R^2)</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here we see a strong correlation between the percent of total receipts from party contributions and win/loss, but not with candidate groups. Again, the significance is shown at a 99 percent confidence interval. Because we see an inverse relationship with win/loss, the model is explaining that the higher the percentage of total receipts from party money a candidate relied on, the more likely the candidate was to lose. As we know, Republican women rely on party money the most and they were also the most likely candidates to lose their elections, so this relationship makes sense. It is difficult to say exactly what this will mean under campaign finance.
finance reform, but considering that it supports that Democratic women win the most often of candidate groups, and Republican women win the least often, we can probably assume that those problems will only worsen when Republican women suffer the loss of party contributions and Democratic women remain relatively unaffected. Also, note the difference in standardized beta values – they decrease from Republican women through the other candidate groups, which implies that even though a statistically significant relationship does not exist between the candidate groups and percent of total receipts from party contributions, the same type of relationships still exist between the independent and dependent variables. Once again we see a low adjusted R square, .055. While this is an improvement from the first regression model, it still fails to provide strong support for the relevance of the model, as it explains just 5.5 percent of the variance between variables. For both regression models, small sample size may be to blame.

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

Overall, these statistical evaluations indicate that the hypothesis was correct – Republican women do stand to lose the most under campaign finance reform, while Democratic women stand to be the least effected candidate group. While none of the evidence to support this hypothesis is overwhelming, with future research a better case could be made in its support. The number one problem with this study is sample size. It is extremely difficult to show statistically significant relationships when using just 41 candidates to represent an entire candidate group. Therefore, these are humble findings, and further research is necessary in order to determine any true relationships between election success and party contributions.

However, there is merit in looking at raw numbers when small sample size is the problem. Clearly, Republican women do not fundraise as well as the other candidate groups. While no strong regression model that explains a great deal about the relationship between party contributions, candidate type, and win/loss can be shown following this study, the high correlations are encouraging, and with a larger sample size more may be explained about the relationships between these variables.

The number one suggestion for future research is to add more candidates. If sample size remains a problem once addition
al cases have been added, a random sample of candidates with an over-sample of women may be drawn in order to determine differences between candidate groups. It is important to note that so long as women represent only a small portion of candidates and elected officials, studies such as these will be incredibly difficult to complete.

Other ways to improve this study would be to look more closely at the relationship of vote margin (race competitiveness) and party contributions along gender lines. It would be useful to compare the candidate groups in races of different levels of competitiveness, as well as comparing incumbents, challengers, and open seats. Again, a larger sample size will aid in this process. Drawing smaller case studies and performing more in-depth research on individual races could also prove useful in drawing conclusions about the role of party money in win/loss and competitiveness. Considering the differences in individual and PAC contributions would also help in drawing conclusions about the fate of each candidate group, as their strength in those areas is likely to help make up for a loss in party contribution.

One important factor to consider as well is the possibility that Shays-Meehan / McCain-Feingold may be ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In *Buckley v. Valeo*, a 1976 case that set the precedent for campaign finance, the Court ruled that limiting a candidate’s spending is a violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution – the right to free speech. It has been predicted by many political scientists and journalists that the constitutionality of the new campaign finance legislation will be challenged on these grounds as well. Arguments in the first legal challenge to the campaign finance law began on December 5, 2002. However, despite these potential threats to campaign finance reform, it is likely to persevere in some form. Despite *Buckley*, the U.S. Congress has continued to fight for new types of campaign finance reform, particularly the recent movement towards a ban on soft money. Even if the limitations on issue advocacy advertisements were to be overturned by the Supreme Court, the general ban on party money is likely to remain. The general public feels that the reform is important, and the bill was very popular among voters. A number of candidates have even run campaigns on campaign finance reform support.
Even if the ban on party money were overturned, this study will remain relevant for other reasons. It provides a different look at campaign financing from those taken by most political scientists, as it considers how well political parties have been supporting their female candidates with relation to their support of male candidates. This study also considers the importance of monetary support from political parties in being able to fundraise from other sources, and in election success. It also looks at fundraising as a function of win/loss, rather than just in raw dollars raised. If the evidence supported in the literature review is correct, then the fact that women fundraise as well as men is not enough to predict their ability to win. The important question is whether or not the amount of money that women are fundraising is enough to help them be competitive and win their races. This study tells us that Democratic women are raising enough money to be competitive in their races, but Republican women are still struggling. The database created for this study will remain extremely useful for a number of analyses besides the potential effects of the ban on party contributions, and is likely to serve as a tool to study other aspects of U.S. Congressional elections.

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.R.380


