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Theories of Gold Price Movements: Common Wisdom or Myths?

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Abstract
This paper examines several of the explanations commonly provided regarding gold and its price movements. We consider the safe haven, inflation hedge, and dollar destruction hypotheses. The results are mixed. Our data does not support the theories that gold is a safe haven or an inflation hedge. We find that gold is a zero-beta asset and there is a strong negative correlation between gold and the value of the US dollar in the post Bretton-Woods era. The decomposition of gold prices under a semi-structural model finds the aggregate demand shock, monetary policy shock, and precautionary demand shock of gold all only have modest influence on the price movement of gold.

Keywords
Gold price, Safe Haven, Inflation Hedge, Zero-Beta Asset, Structural Shocks

Cover Page Footnote
This paper is one chapter of the authors’ bachelor’s honors theses of economics. This piece of work started in the fall term of 2008 in the macroeconomic workshop led by Professor Robert Barsky. We are very grateful for the generous help and valuable advice we got from Professor Barsky and Professor Lutz Kilian. We owe an intellectual debt to Professor Kilian on the Cargo Index of world economic activity. All errors are our own.
1. Introduction

Gold has a unique status in the economic world: a precious medal with wide uses, a store of wealth, and for a long time, the measure of economic power of nations and the cornerstone of international monetary regimes. In recent years, the world witnessed an aggressive growth in gold price. The role of gold in investment has drawn more attention since this transformational economic crisis began to unfold in 2008. This paper is another attempt to disentangle the price movement of gold after the Bretton-Woods system, the last international monetary regime based on gold. To what extents can we understand the price movement of gold? Can we find support for some popular opinions about gold on finance media? For instance: is gold a safe haven, a negative-beta asset, or an inflation hedge? How should we think about gold: a commodity or a currency? This paper provides some thoughts on these questions.

1.1 Gold and the Gold Standard

Returning to gold standard has never been seriously discussed for decades. After waves of gold reserves sales in the last fifteen years or so, gold is being seen more and more as a common commodity. But history has a long shade in economic thinking and economic activities; one cannot fully understand the current status of gold and its price fluctuations while totally disregarding its history.

Gold has been used in rituals, decorations, and jewelry for thousands of years. Its unusual chemical properties—high density, superb malleability, imperishable shine—and its genuine rarity all contribute to it being the most coveted commodity in nearly every culture. But it is not until in the late nineteenth century when the gold standard formed that gold went onto the central stage of global economic life. In that half a century, on one hand there was a huge supply shock of gold as a result of the Gold Rushes; on the other hand there was soaring demand for a global monetary medium of high value to finance the rapid industrialization and the emerging international trade and banking. And the fact that Britain, the indisputable super power then, had adopted the gold standard and a series of historical incidents led all major economies save China signed up to gold by 1900.

The gold standard, under which gold coins and fiat money could be converted at banks freely at a pre-set official rate and nations settled balance differences in gold, has intrinsic deflationary pressure: the inelastic supply of gold always made the money supply insufficient in a growing economy with rising productivity (insufficient liquidity). To keep up with demand for money, monetary authorities developed the “gold-exchange standard”: bank notes of major economies could also be treated as reserve assets. But the faith in the convertibility of foreign reserves (ultimately the commitment of monetary policy of reserve-currency...
countries) was always fragile. The huge global deflation after the collapse of foreign reserves under the interwar gold-exchange standard and the “neighbor thy beggar” policies largely caused the Great Depression.

After the Great Depression and WWII, a new international monetary system, the Bretton-Woods system was founded. The implemented Bretton-Woods system was a fix-exchange-rate gold-dollar standard regime. Under it, the U.S. monetary authority was immediately put into a dilemma: with the U.S. being the sole de-facto reserve-currency country, whichever policy the Fed implemented—expansionary or tight money, it would lead to either the erosion of confidence on the dollar or a deflationary pressure worldwide. Also, domestic policy goals, such as maintaining economic growth and low employment, and the responsibility of reserve-currency country to stabilize the value of the dollar were often conflicting. These problems worsened in 1960s with the increasing expenditure on social welfare programs and the war in Vietnam. Pressure from foreign governments and speculators on financial markets and U.S. government pushed Bretton-Woods System to an end in 1973.

Since 1973, gold could be publicly traded with little government intervention. It is no longer directly linked to any nation’s monetary policy or the value to any currency. The central banks continued to hold considerable amount of gold reserves as strategic assets (“war chest”) but the government demands are not that active and influential as they were in gold-standard years. Private demands can be further

1.2 Gold Demand
Gold has both private demands and government demands. As previously discussed, in the gold-standard era, government demand is monetary gold. In post Bretton-Woods era, central banks still hold great amount of gold reserves as strategic assets (“war chest”) but the government demands are not that active and influential as they were in gold-standard years. Private demands can be further

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1 The implemented Bretton-Woods system is pretty different from the designs. See the book “A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System” for reference.
2 This is only the case in the West. In all Communist countries, private possession and trading of gold bars or coins were prohibited. These policies ended in the Eastern Bloc countries and the former Soviet Union countries in early 1990s. But in countries like China or North Korea, the state still holds tight control over gold production and private possession of gold.
3 For instance, see the paper “The benefits of expediting government gold sales” by Henderson and Salant et al.
4 Most governments don’t increase their holds for gold. Many countries began to their gold reserves. On the whole, government demands have been negative (in other words, net supply) for at least a decade. Only few countries, like Russia and China, are increasing their gold reserves in recent years.
divided using different criteria. One division is investment (ETFs, bullions, bars etc.) and non-investment (jewelry, industrial and dental) demands. Another division is depletive uses (manufacturing and dentistry) and non-depletive uses (bullions, jewelry, ornamentation and hoarding etc.).

What are the shares of different gold demands? We couldn’t find any data for the gold-standard era. But there have been estimates that between half and two-thirds of the annual production went to private uses. One snapshot of recent years’ gold demand breakup came from 2007. In that year, the gold reserves of central banks and international institutions (IMF, for instance, is a large holder of gold reserves) decreased by 504.8 tons, which meant a negative demand or a net supply. All newly mined gold went to private sector: More than two thirds of it (2398.7 out of 3558.3 tons) went to jewelry, the industrial and dental demands used up approximately 13% of the production. The remaining fed private investment needs. Geographically, India consumed 773.6 tons of gold, about 20% of the world’s production; greater China region consumed 363.3 tons, ranking the second. In terms of “stock”, a rough estimate is that the total above-ground stocks of gold are about 161,000 tons now, 51% of which are in terms of jewelry. Official sectors hold nearly 30000 tons (18%), (private) investment 16%, and industrial 12%.

1.3 Gold Supply

Gold supply comes from mining, sales of gold reserves, and “old gold scrap” (the recycling of gold). The gold mining went hand in hand with the geographical discovery of the earth by mankind. During the Gold Rushes years (from 1850 to 1900), about twice as much gold was mined as in previous history. The annual production of gold continued to increase dramatically in the twentieth century: from less than 500 tons per year in the 1900s all the way to more than 2000 tons per year in late 1980s. In the last fifteen years though, the annual mining production fluctuated around 2500 tons, which revealed the increasing difficulty of finding new deposits and mining and extraction in non-rich sites. Most of the gold left to be mined exists as traces buried in marginal areas of the globe, for instance, in the rain forests of Indonesia, the Andes and on the Tibetan plateau of China. Gold mining has been bringing environmental disasters in forms of mercury linkage, deforestation and waste rocks among others to Africa, Latin America and East and Southeast Asia. This has drawn more and more attention

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5 The discussion is in Barsky and Summers (1988).
6 The 2007 demand data is from World Gold Council website.
7 Whether this figure means the amount of gold have been mined in all human history or only those that are available to this generation is unclear.
8 The sources of data for the gold worksheet are the mineral statistics publications of the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) and the U.S.Geological Survey (USGS)—Minerals Yearbook (MYB).
1.4 Gold Price Movements

We chose the perspective of testing some commonly-held or heatedly-debated opinions about the price of gold as a means to analyze its price movement. Several common-wisdom “theories” are considered:

Firstly, people claim that as gold remains the eternal symbol of wealth in people’s minds; people will switch their investments to gold in ages of turbulence. Gold is the “safe haven” on the financial market. To test this hypothesis, we look into various “fear” measures: volatility in the stock market, consumer expectations of the future, and bond risk premiums (the difference in yield between Aaa and Baa bonds) and check the correlations of those and gold price movements. A somewhat related hypothesis—the negative-beta asset hypothesis (“gold goes up when everything else going down”) is also tested.

Secondly, people marketing gold investment products will always describe gold as an “inflation hedge”. A straightforward analysis is provided on the real gold price (level), the return of gold and expected and actual inflation to test this claim.

Instead of viewing gold as a special asset, we suggest the data suggest it is more reasonable that we view gold as another currency, whose value is a reflection of the value of U.S. dollar. We investigate extensively on the relationship between gold price and dollar and dollar-valued assets in section 5.

Some other less theoretical sayings are considered too, for example the effect of surging demands in India and China and the central bank gold reserve sales on the gold price.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in this study. The next three parts discuss three hypotheses one by one: section 3 focuses on safe haven hypothesis and whether gold behaves as a negative beta asset, section 4 is on inflation hedge hypothesis, and section 5 investigates the relationship between gold price and U.S. dollar. Section 6 reports results from multiple linear regressions. A semi-structural VAR model is constructed and analyzed in section 7 before we conclude.

2. Data

Our data includes real gold price, various “fear” indicators, U.S. inflation rate, real long-term interest rate, indicators of real economic activity and the exchange rate. For gold price, we used the closing price on the last trading day for gold each month on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The data series ranges from January 1956 to October 2008 and is available on the Commodity Research Board (CRB) website. The figures are in 2008 dollars. Overall, gold prices appear to have been in a downward trend since the peak in the early 1980s but showed an
impressive upward movement in recent five to ten years, as shown in Figure 1. A simple serial correlation test showed the monthly gold price is highly serial correlated. Figure 2 shows the trend of monthly gold returns, or month-to-month gold price changes, in percentage. It is not serially correlated but quite noisy.

Figure 1: Real Gold Price 1978-2008

Figure 2: Monthly Gold Returns 1978-2008
We considered three “fear” indicators for this study. The first one is the stock market volatility; in this case the squared monthly returns of the S&P 500 Index suggested by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1988). The second is the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations, which represents sentiment of the general public about the economy in the near future. Higher scores represent optimism and lower scores represent pessimism. The index is by construction stable. The last one is a bond premium: the difference in yields between Moody rated Aaa and Baa seasoned corporate bond. This widening of the premium is an indicator of growing uneasiness on the market.

The actual inflation measure is just the monthly change of the Consumer Price Index (urban, all goods). The expected inflation measure comes from the University of Michigan/Reuters Survey of Consumers, in which they reported the median price change the consumers expected over the next twelve months.

We have two measures regarding the value of dollar. The first one is the exchange rate, to be specific, the Trade Weighted Exchange Index provided by St. Louis Fed. The index is de facto the exchange rate of U.S. dollar against a basket of currencies, which includes currencies from the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden. High values for the index mean a relatively strong dollar, and low values for the index mean a weak dollar. The second one is the value of dollar-backed assets, in this case the real ten-year Treasury bond rate.

We consider three macroeconomic activity measures: monthly return of the S&P 500 Index, U.S. industrial production (detrended) and the cargo freight rate index used in Kilian (2007).

Our sample period is from January 1978 to December 2007. We used monthly data.

3. Safe Haven Hypothesis and Gold as a Negative-Beta Asset

People often associate gold with the notion of a safe haven. We define safe haven assets to be assets that people would like to invest in when uncertainty and fear increases. These assets would preserve their values in times of turmoil or recession. So we investigate the overall relationship between return on gold and various fear measures mentioned above to testify this hypothesis. If this

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9 This index is based on the relative scores (the percent giving favorable replies minus the percent giving unfavorable replies plus 100) of each of the five survey questions. Higher scores represent optimism and lower scores represent pessimism. The indices are monthly published by Reuters and Survey Research Center of University of Michigan.

10 The monthly available series include: US Industrial Production Index, U.S. CPI, Kilian Dry Cargo Freight Rate Index and University of Michigan Consumer Expectation Index. The Moody’s BAA and AAA seasoned corporate bond yields, Trade Weighted Exchange Index: Major Currencies, 10-year Treasury bond rate are averages of daily data.
hypothesis is true, if people become more fearful in the markets, the price of gold should rise. The safe haven hypothesis is closely related to the negative-beta-asset hypothesis. We define negative-beta assets to be those whose returns are negatively correlated with macroeconomic performance, measured by monthly return of S&P 500, the dry cargo freight rate index introduced in Kilian (2007) and the U.S. industrial production in our study. First, we look at the “fear premium” side to the safe haven hypothesis.

3.1 Gold and Volatility

We started looking at the effect of volatility on the price of gold to test the safe haven hypothesis. Looking at Figure 3, a graph of the logged real price of gold and the constructed volatility measure, the safe haven effect is not evident. Many of the most salient moves in the graph either provide evidence that is contrary to the idea of gold being a safe haven, or provide no evidence at all. From 1978 to 1980, the price of gold rises from $611 to $1897 (in 2008 dollars), while volatility falls from 37 to 33. The safe haven hypothesis does not require volatility is the only factor in gold price movements, and there is a lot of noise in the volatility data from month to month, but we would expect the overall mean of volatility to be elevated during a tripling of the gold price. Additionally, elevated levels of volatility such as 1998 to 2003 are accompanied by falling gold prices. One period where the fear premium seems to hold is from 1987-1988 where volatility is at its highest level ever in the sample period and the price of gold rises. The only caveat is the price of gold does not rise by as much as the fear premium hypothesis would lead us to expect.

Figure 3: Gold & Volatility

![Graph showing gold price (real, logged) and S&P500 volatility from 1980 to 2005.](image-url)
Regressing monthly real gold price on the constructed volatility measure yields an R-squared of only .0001 and a p-value of the beta coefficient .424. So it is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the volatility measure at .289 means a one percent rise in volatility leads to a monthly increase in the real gold price by 29 cents, which is economically insignificant. This confirms what the graph shows. Gold price and volatility are uncorrelated and changes in volatility do not seem to have any effect on the price of gold.

One reasonable interpretation of this phenomenon is that market participants do not interpret volatility in the market as risk and thus see no reason to buy gold. Evidence of this is in the technology sector boom in the late 1990s where volatility rose to much higher levels but the gold price declined. The volatility increase in this period was a result of equities rising by large amounts day after day. If investors were afraid of anything, it was that they would wake up late and miss an opportunity for a huge return.

Nonetheless, there are two spots in Figure 3 where volatility and gold prices move in tandem: 1987 and 2007, two periods of genuine stress in the markets. They suggest we look at alternative measures of fear to further investigate the fear premium hypothesis.

3.2 Gold and Consumer Expectation

Substituting the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations (ICE) for the fear indicator leads to a similar result. For the “safe haven” hypothesis to hold here, gold should rise as the expected index falls. For comparison with the S&P 500 constructed volatility measure, ICE should be high when volatility is low. Graphically, the “safe haven” relationship looks stronger. During the 1990s as the expectations index was rising, the price of gold was falling, and then when ICE began to fall in 2000, gold began to rise. The same relationship held in the 1980 period with the large increase in the price of gold at the same time of a large decline in ICE.

Simple linear regressions showed that one percent increase in the expectations index leads to a decrease in monthly gold return by $23.90. The R-squared from this model is .006; not much of the variation in monthly gold return is explained by consumer expectations. The p-value of .1307 also makes the coefficient statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, the sign is consistent with the theory; if consumers have low expectations of the economy and are thus fearful of the future, the price of gold should rise.

We would expect consumer expectations to give an overall picture of longer term trends in the economy. This characteristic would make ICE less able to inform the return on gold prices for any given month. Using quarterly and bi-annually gold returns yields coefficients of -38.71 and -42.83, respectively. Both coefficients are statistically significant, and the R-squared increases as the
frequency decreases. The interpretation is that declines in consumer confidence are more reliably indicative of increasing gold prices in the longer term.

3.3 Gold and Bond Premium

The bond premium we constructed is Moody’s Aaa Corporate Yield subtracted from Moody’s Baa Corporate Yield. In scarier times, Baa bonds are relatively more risky because lower rated companies become relatively more likely to default, thus investors require a greater premium over the Aaa yield. In 1982 and 1983, the bond premium rises significantly while the gold price falls. In 1991, there is a spike in the bond premium (perhaps related to the Savings and Loan crisis and or the declaration of the Persian Gulf War) but no similar spike in the gold price. The same thing happens again from 1998 to around 2002 as the bond premium jumps while the price of gold falls or stagnates.

The safe heaven hypothesis fails here again: The regression result of a $7.13 decrease in the monthly gold return for a one percent rise in the bond premium is economically insignificant and the p-value of .35 makes it statistically insignificant. Moreover, the sign contradicts the hypothesis. As the bond premium rises, the gold price should also be rising as should gold returns. The theory of buying gold in hopes of high returns during hard times in the market is defeated. We next turn to gold and its relationship over time to the market in general.

3.4 Gold as a Negative Beta Asset

We then turn to the negative-beta asset hypothesis. First, we look into S&P 500. In 1981, gold appears to peak with the S&P 500. In 1983, they appear to bottom out together. In 1984, they again appear to peak together. This co-movement appears roughly throughout the sample period with the exception of 1990-2003. These thirteen years are probably the foundation upon which the hypothesis that gold is a negative beta asset is based. The simple linear regression rejects the negative beta asset hypothesis. Regressing monthly gold return on the difference in the S&P 500 month to month yields a coefficient of .0221 with a p-value of .7382 (using the logarithm of the S&P 500 yields nearly identical results) and an R-squared of .0003. This means, not only does the S&P 500 explain less than 1% of the variation in monthly gold return, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for the S&P 500 is zero. McCown and Zimmerman (2006) get the same result over a slightly different sample period of 1970 to 2003, stating that, “gold shows the characteristics of a zero-beta asset.” Zero-beta in this instance means gold does not follow or counter the S&P 500 at all, instead, it is uncorrelated.

The second macroeconomic condition indicator is the index of U.S. Industrial Production. We regressed monthly gold returns on the difference in industrial production from one month to the next. The coefficient was -3.87 with a p-value
of .4766. This is statistically insignificant and tells us the same thing as our analysis of gold and the S&P 500. Gold is not a negative beta asset. If anything, it is a zero-beta asset.

Our last measure of macroeconomic performance is more global. It is the index of dry cargo freight rates constructed in Kilian (2007). Cargo freight rates are a particularly good indicator of economic activity because the supply of ships is very sticky. If there is a demand surge due to increased economic activity, it takes a long time for new ships to be built to accommodate the new demand. Thus, in the short to medium term, there are large increases in shipping rates. These large increases leave room on the way down for huge plunges. This sensitivity makes shipping rates a good indicator of exactly what is going on in the world markets at a given period in time. Our data comes in the form of percent changes from one month to the next and 1978-1982 do not look promising for the negative-beta hypothesis. The only really convincing negative-beta movement is around 1990 to 2001 where cargo freight rates spiked for a little bit and the gold price bottomed. The regression of monthly gold returns on the cargo freight rate change yields a coefficient of .0818 and a p-value of .5533. Negative beta theory fails again. Figure 4 confirms gold is a zero-beta asset as the slope from the regression line for the scatter plot of monthly gold returns and cargo freight rate change is nearly zero.

4. Gold as an Inflation Hedge
Gold is also commonly believed to be a hedge against inflation. We define inflation as the general rise in the price level (rather than an increase in the money supply) and use changes in the Consumer Price Index as the measure of monthly inflation. To be a hedge against inflation as the idea is most commonly understood, gold would not only have to be uncorrelated with inflation, it would have to be negatively correlated.

In 1978, Roy Jastram, a professor of business at Berkeley, wrote a book titled *The Golden Constant* that says since the 1560 gold has held its purchasing power in England and the United States. The theory also claims commodity prices move towards the gold price rather than the other way around. This thinking is in line with inflation hedge theory: an investment in gold should at minimum retain its purchasing power by responding to rising inflation through increased returns. Stated differently, as the general price level is increasing, or the purchasing power of the dollar is decreasing, gold will increase in value thus counteracting an investor’s loss in purchasing power. We expect gold prices to respond more to expected inflation rather than actual inflation, because it is the perception of future inflation risk that this hypothesis posits as the reason for fluctuations in the gold price. Our measure of expected inflation comes from the University of Michigan/Reuters Survey of Consumers. The survey reports the median price change expected over the next 12 months. A graph of expected inflation shows it to be somewhat sticky. When actual inflation is rising sharply as it did in the early 1980s, people were expecting it to come back down. When it falls sharply as it did in 1987 and 1998, people were expecting it to rise back to a more normal level.

If the price of gold responded to inflation alone, a graph of the real gold price would be a horizontal line. If gold prices responded to inflation among other things and a graph of the real gold price was an upward sloping line, we would assume its returns outpaced inflation as we would assume its returns trailed inflation if the line sloped downwards. A graph of nominal gold prices should slope upwards at or above the rate of inflation if gold were to be a hedge against inflation. All these examples are assuming the current United States environment of constant targeted inflation of two to three percent each year.

For our Consumer Price Index monthly data, the beginning of a period is the first day of the previous month and the end of the period is the first day of the current month. Because the gold price data is from the last day of the previous month to the last day of the current month, we do not have to use lagged variables to capture effects of inflation on gold.

### 4.1 Gold and Expected Inflation

At the first sight, there seems to be a close relationship between the gold price and expected inflation. The two variables nearly mirror each other, through the
peaks of the early 1980s, to the decline in 1986, to the troughs in 2000. However this relationship is very crude. Looking closer, we can see that in 1983 inflation is dropping dramatically, but the gold price is rising. There are also numerous instances such as 1986, 1988, and 1998-2004 where either expected inflation or the gold price are making large moves but the other remains quite stable or behaves in a way contrary to what inflation hedge theory would suggest. McCown and Zimmerman (2006) find the same result for monthly returns, however, they do find when annual frequency (but not quarterly frequency) is used higher inflation is associated with higher gold returns. Regressing monthly gold returns on the logarithm of expected inflation yields a coefficient of 3.98 with a p-value of .5833. The simple linear model rejects the inflation hedge hypothesis.

4.2 Gold and Actual Inflation
When actual inflation is used as the independent variable, the coefficients are much smaller and are even more statistically insignificant. A graph of expected and actual inflation gives some insight as to why this is true. Actual inflation is much more volatile than expected inflation. People do not wildly change their expectations of future inflation but instead look to see what has happened both in the recent past and further back historically to inform their expectations. As stated earlier, expected inflation is sticky. Actual inflation, on the other hand, fluctuates a lot even when it is in a downward or upward trend. From 1985 to 1992, expected inflation rises a little bit gradually while actual inflation rises sharply, plateaus for a year, rises sharply again, only before dropping dramatically in 1992. These whiplashes are not as present in the expected inflation index and thus that model allows for a stronger relationship with gold returns.

5. Gold and the U.S. dollar: the Dollar Destruction Hypothesis
Connected to the idea of gold and inflation is the theory of gold responding to “dollar destruction.” Inflation can also be defined as increases in the money supply. As the money supply increases while productivity and output remain the same, prices increase. This has occurred on numerous occasions as bad governments print large amounts of money and eventually send their countries into hyperinflation. The somewhat analogous story, as purported by defenders of this theory is that when, by decreasing interest rates, or running a budget deficit, the Federal Reserve or the government decreases the value of the dollar. They believe the best defense to the loss of purchasing power that comes about from these government and government-like actions is to buy gold. This is distinct from the inflation hedge theory because it involves not only loss in purchasing power due to the general rise in prices, but also to a loss in purchasing power in a global environment due changes in exchange rates that are unfavorable to dollar holders. We look at the issue from two angles: first, we investigate the
relationship between gold and real interest rates, and second, we investigate the relationship between gold and exchange rates.

5.1 Gold and Real Interest Rates

The real interest rate hypothesis suggests that as real interest rates in the United States increase, investors should sell their gold and buy treasuries. There are multiple rationales for this behavior. First, if the return to a risk-free asset, or any asset for that matter increases, the demand for that asset should also increase, thus decreasing the funds available for purchases of gold. Another rationale is related to the value of the dollar. As the U.S. real interest rate increases, the demand for the dollar should increase as investors from around the world should be purchasing dollars to take advantage of treasuries that now carry a higher return. As they purchase dollars the value of the dollar should increase, thus decreasing the relative value of gold. If an ounce of gold is worth $50 today, and tomorrow the dollar is worth twice as much as a result in a surge in demand, that same ounce of gold should only be worth $25. However, following the same analogy, future gold investors should now expect a higher yield from gold as the required rate of return has risen as a result of a rise in the real interest rate. Thus, when real interest rates rise, we would expect a decrease in the gold price and a later rise in the gold return.

The real interest rate used here is the 10-Year Treasury bond rate minus the expected inflation number discussed earlier. The argument for using expected inflation here instead of actual inflation is similar to the earlier argument. According to the real interest rate hypothesis, the price of gold would be affected by future expectations of inflation, not old values. We can see in the early 1980s as gold performs two drops, the real interest rate has two peaks. From 1987 to around 2006, the relationship does not appear to be as strong but it still appears to be there. For our real interest rate monthly data, the beginning of a period is the first day of the previous month and the end of the period is the first day of the current month. Once again, because the gold price data is from the last day of the previous month to the last day of the current month, we do not have to use lagged variables to capture the relevant effect of the real interest rate on gold.

Regressing monthly gold returns on real interest rates yields a coefficient of -3.31 with a t-statistic of -2.89 and an R-squared of .022. This means a one point rise in the real interest rate is associated with a $3 decrease in the price of gold over a month. This is economically insignificant as a one point rise in interest rates is huge. Regressing monthly gold returns on real interest rates for the current period, previous period, two periods past, and three periods past results in two significant coefficients: the contemporaneous coefficient is -9.85 with a t-statistic of -1.92. This is the same sign as before and is what we expect, a drop in gold prices (we can assume a fall in monthly gold return for the current period is the
same as an immediate drop in gold prices). The coefficient for three periods (months) in the past is 16.919 with a t-statistic of 3.312. Thus, increases in the real interest rate in the past lead to increases in the monthly gold return. It is worth noting the R-squared value increases to .057 from .022 for this model with three independent variables. A one point rise in real interest rates this month corresponds to a decrease in gold prices this month of $9.85, and an increase in gold prices three months from now of $16.92. This is what we were expecting. Once the real interest rate rises, monthly gold returns should rise as investors are now demanding a higher rate of return since the return on risk-free assets has risen.

5.2 Gold and the Dollar Exchange Rate

Figure 6 shows the logarithm of the real gold price and the value of the dollar. To some degree it resembles the gold and real interest rate graph, only it is much smoother. Throughout the entire period (although less so from 1990 to 1997) the gold price and the dollar exhibit an inverse relationship. For example, from 1978 to 1982, the dollar falls and gold rises, from 1982 to 1987, the dollar rises and gold falls. Peaks seem to match up very closely with troughs, and even smaller dollar movements such as those that occurred in 1982-1983 are matched inversely by gold price movements. This graphical analysis suggests gold has a very strong relationship with the value of the dollar.
The simple linear regression confirms this. We used the difference in the dollar value from one month to the next as the independent variable. The coefficient is -7.4. It has a t-statistic of -4.71 and an R-squared of 0.057. A rise of one unit (because the index oscillates around a base value of 100 this is approximately a one percent rise) in the value of the dollar decreases the real price of gold by $7.40. Put it into the current price level of gold, which is about 800 dollars per Trojan ounce, this amount is approximately one percent, which can be considered economically significant.

A graph of real interest rates and the dollar shows the relationship discussed above. They move pretty well together with real interest rates being a slight lead. However, in 1997, the relationship breaks when the value of the dollar increases significantly. The cause of this decoupling of dollar value to real interest rates was the Asian financial crisis in 1997 after the Thai government could not defend the baht and maintain its peg to the dollar. As Asian currencies crashed, the relative value of the dollar increased thus resulting in the mountain top shown in the graph. As of about 2006, the real interest rate and dollar relationship seems to have been restored.

5.3 Gold as a Currency

To summarize, the dollar destruction hypothesis stands. Gold has unique features in comparison to other commodities. From its physical properties, gold is largely unproductive except in minor mechanical manufacturing and dentistry. One main demand of gold is in jewelry, which largely will be passed down from generation to generation. It is so durable to the point that gold mined each year adds (2,000 to 3,000 tons) very little to the existing stockpile (approximately 150,000 tons). Furthermore, from the little gold demand data available (from the World Gold Council), gold demand, and no sector of gold demand (jewelry, investment & ETF, etc) appear to have any effect on gold prices. Preliminary research shows all coefficients to be statistically insignificant for the short sample period for which data is available, 2001-2008.

Perhaps more important, gold has played a role as universal means of exchange through most of human history. Thus, it makes sense to think of gold as another currency. Along this line of thinking, gold value is simply relative to other currencies, and thus the gold price in real dollars should have an inverse relationship to the value of the dollar. Because high real interest rates increase the value of a currency, high interest rates should also in the shortest term have an inverse relationship with gold (and in the longer term increase gold monthly returns) and this is what we find.

To further examine the idea of gold being more of a currency than a commodity, we regressed gold returns on the CRB index (differenced) and stored the residuals. We then regressed these residuals on the one-period lagged residual
(to correct for serial correlation) and also the same factors mentioned earlier in the paper to see if the effects of interest rates, industrial production, inflation, and so on, were influencing commodities in general or were specific to gold prices. If coefficients showed up with significant relationships to the residuals, then we could conclude there is some component of gold price movement that cannot be captured by the general movement of commodities. The results are reported in Table 1 below. The first column of numbers shows the coefficients for many simple linear regressions, and the next column shows the coefficients for a single multiple linear regression.

The coefficients do not mean much, but the significance for the multiple linear regression is close to our previous results. The dollar appears to have an effect on gold prices that is outside its effect on commodities in general. This would suggest gold is more of a currency than other commodities. In multiple linear models, consumer expectation is also significant. In our previous results, it was nearly significant, so this is not a real clash. The only real change is that real interest rates no longer show up as significant and the p-value of .34 is quite large. It is possible inflation expectations are taking away from some of this relationship as discussed before, or it may just be that real interest rates affects gold in the same way as they do other commodities. They are all assets after all which must earn some rate of return.

The simple linear regressions in Table 1 all show up with statistically significant coefficients (with the exception of volatility), so there is not much to infer here other than individually, the relationship between these factors and gold prices is not fully accounted for in general commodity price movement.

Table 1  Gold as a Currency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Simple Linear Regressions</th>
<th>Multiple Linear Regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Expectations</td>
<td>-.0503**</td>
<td>-.03809*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Premium</td>
<td>.0211**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Expectation</td>
<td>.0126*</td>
<td>.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Interest Rate</td>
<td>-.0025**</td>
<td>.0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar Value</td>
<td>-.0064**</td>
<td>.0059**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Production</td>
<td>-.0084**</td>
<td>-.0044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Freight Rate</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.1752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>363 or 367</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dependent variable is the residual of monthly gold returns regressed on the change in the CRB Index. **p-value < .05, *p-value < .1
6. Multiple Linear Regression Models

We now do several multiple linear regressions to see the *ceteris paribus* effects of the above-mentioned factors. Model 1 incorporates all the independent variables from the simple linear regressions earlier. The results are shown in Table 2. The coefficients of independent variables in Model 1 are similar to those in the simple linear regressions, showing the correlations between independent variables are not large. Model 3 is slightly more restrictive, limiting the regression to only the best fear indicator, inflation indicator, and market indicator as defined by highest significance from the simple linear regression. All of the independent variables from the dollar destruction section are included. The results once again remain unchanged except for slight changes in the magnitudes of the coefficients. None of these multiple linear regression models are particularly interesting however, prompted by McCown and Zimmerman’s (2006) finding that inflation is not a factor in the short term but in the long term, we applied our same models to annual frequency. The results shown in Table 2 are different. Table 2 also compares Model 2 for monthly and annual frequencies, along with Model 3 for monthly and annual frequencies.

Previous research says inflation becomes significant over longer periods of time. To explain this, we can consider how we think about gold. When gold demand is broken down, only 15% is investment demand, the rest is jewelry consumption, industrial and dental\(^{11}\). If we think about gold as a good or production input, rather than money, it is not far fetched to assume its price over time should rise along with the general rise in prices. The Consumer Price Index is derived the change in prices of a basket of goods, maybe computers, refrigerators, bread. If you throw gold into that list, it should rise along with everything else over longer frequencies. Nonetheless, in shorter time frames, the 15% of gold demand that is investment is moving the price all over the place as it considers factors such as the value of the dollar and real interest rates.

To explain the insignificance of expected inflation (which is counter-intuitive by earlier analysis), we need to think about inflation, real interest rates, and the value of the dollar together. As we have said earlier, they are intertwined. Regressing the difference in the dollar value on real interest rates yields a coefficient of 1.06 with a p-value of .0571 and an R-squared of .12. Regressing the difference in real interest rates from one period to the next on the logarithm on inflation yields a coefficient of 1.22 with a p-value of .008 and R-squared on .224. If inflation is perceived to be increasing, people can reasonably understand interest rates will rise. If real interest rates rise, it can be believed the value of the dollar will increase. Both increases in real interest rates and increases in the value of the dollar lead to drops in the gold price. Although a higher interest rate may

lead to higher gold returns in the future, this multiple linear regression is contemporaneous and thus does not capture this effect. Instead, we probably get a lower coefficient on expected inflation due to people anticipating the effects such inflation will have on real interest rates and eventually the dollar.

### Table 2 Multiple Linear Regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.67</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Premium</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>19.48</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-2.58</td>
<td>-9.04</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Interest</td>
<td>-4.43**</td>
<td>-6.92**</td>
<td>--3.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar Value</td>
<td>-5.98**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-6.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Freight</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>30.52</td>
<td>68.20</td>
<td>25.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Obs</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The dependent variable is monthly/annual gold return. **p-value < .05, *p-value < .1

#### 7. A Semi-Structural VAR Model

In the previous section, we showed very roughly the correlation between macroeconomic factors of interest. The above-mentioned multiple linear regression models are not proper for investigating the responses of gold price to changes in those macroeconomic aggregates and vice versa as there is consensus among economists that the price of gold is endogenous. Nevertheless, we are interested in which factors drove up the real price of gold and their relative contribution in different times of history. In order to do so, we perform impulse response functions, variance decomposition (VDC) and historical decomposition (HDC) of the real price of gold using a semi-structural vector auto-regression (VAR) model.
7.1. Methodology

VAR allows us to examine the dynamics between variables in the models with the presence of movements of other variables. The power of a structural VAR is that it can give us mutually independent shocks (structural shocks) which enable us to track how the cumulative effect of one given shock alone on the price of gold. Also, we can identify the contribution of one shock in the price movement of gold at given points in history. We first estimate the reduced form VAR using the least squares method. Then, we orthogonalize the reduced-form errors in VAR using Cholesky decomposition to get the structural errors. By orthogonalization we actually assume a particular recursive relationship, which must be an economically sensible framework. We will defend the structure and assumptions of the model below. For the purpose of this study, we use a semi-structural VAR model because we cannot specify all the structural shocks under the recursive structure. For instance, it is impossible to set apart the influence of real exchange rate per se on real price of gold as we know the real exchange rate is endogenous, therefore, any thought of “exchange market shock” cannot be structural.

Given the fitted structural VAR model, we can readily obtain the impulse responses of the return of gold to the specified structural shocks. Furthermore, we can compare the contributions of different structural shocks to variability of return of gold, as measured by the prediction mean squared error. It is meaningful to point out that this kind of forecasting variance decomposition (VDC) is retrospective conclusion; it can only depict the average of a certain sample period. Alternatively, based on impulse response functions, we could put ourselves into certain points in history and computer the cumulative influence of certain structural shocks on return of gold until that time. This is historical decomposition (VDC).

7.2. A semi-structural VAR model

My semi-structural VAR model consists of five monthly series:

\[ y_t = (rea_t, \pi_t, r_t^{ante}, e_t^r, P_t^{rg}) \]

where \( rea_t \) is the dry cargo freight rate index mentioned earlier, \( \pi_t \) refers to U.S. inflation measured by percentage change of CPI from 12 months ago, \( r_t^{ante} \) denotes the expected (ex ante) real long-term interest rate we discussed earlier, \( e_t^r \) defers to the real exchange rate between U.S. dollar and a basket of major currencies, for which we use “Price-adjusted Trade Weighted Exchange Index” constructed by Federal Reserve Board, and lastly, \( P_t^{rg} \) is the real price of gold (logged). The sample period is January 1973 to
December 2007. In estimating the model, I allow lags of up to two years (24 lags, as our data is monthly).

7.3. Identifying Assumptions

The reduced-form VAR is:

\[ y_t = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{24} A_i y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_i \]

The structural VAR model is:

\[ B_0 y_t = \alpha' + \sum_{i=1}^{24} B_i y_{t-i} + u_t , \]

where \( u_t \) is mutually uncorrelated.

By some algebra, we can show that \( \alpha = B_0^{-1} \alpha' \), \( A_i = B_0^{-1} B_i \) and \( \varepsilon_i = B_0^{-1} u_t \). It follows that we can use Cholesky decomposition to transform the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form errors \( \sum \varepsilon_i \) into that of structural error \( \sum u_t \). Specifically,

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\varepsilon_i^{\text{rea}} \\
\varepsilon_i^{\pi} \\
\varepsilon_i^{r(\text{ante})} \\
\varepsilon_i^{\text{exchange}} \\
\varepsilon_i^{\text{gp}}
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
a_{11} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{21} & a_{22} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
a_{31} & a_{32} & a_{33} & 0 & 0 \\
a_{41} & a_{42} & a_{43} & a_{44} & 0 \\
a_{51} & a_{52} & a_{53} & a_{54} & a_{55}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
u^1_t \\
u^2_t \\
u^3_t \\
u^4_t \\
u^5_t
\end{bmatrix}
\]

We can name a few of the orthogonalized shocks, namely, \( u^1_t, u^3_t \) and \( u^5_t \). \( u^1_t \), which is only related to the change of US industrial production, is referred to as the aggregate demand shock for industrial commodities (aggregate demand shock for short). As commonly postulated, the Federal Reserve bases their targeted interest rate on real economic activity and inflation. \( u^3_t \) is likely represents monetary policy shocks that affect the \textit{ex ante} real long-term interest rate (10-year Treasury bond in this case). \( u^5_t \) reflects innovations other than aggregate demand shocks, monetary policy shocks and some other unspecified shocks underlying inflation and exchange rate that can affect the real gold returns. Presumably it could contain many components. But as I will argue below, the behavior and timing of the estimated shocks were consistent with what the safe haven hypothesis would have predicted. So we name this to be “gold-specific...
demand shock”. By the above specification, we impose the following assumptions:

First, we assume that fluctuations in real economic activity, for which the cargo freight rate index is a proxy, can affect inflation, exchange rate, ex ante real interest rate and the return of gold in the same month, but not vice versa. This is very reasonable as manufacturing production tends to behave sticky or sluggish.

Second, we hypothesize that the monetary policy shock and the “residual” structural shock influencing the exchange rate and the gold-specific demand shock will not affect inflation, at least not in the same month. The empirical evidence for this is vague, so we believe that it is acceptable to add this assumption in constructing the model.

Third, we impose the restriction that the gold-specific demand shock and the underlying but unspecified structural shock on exchange rate won’t affect the ex ante real interest rate at least in the same month. How the exchange rate and the Fed-monitored T-bond rate interact empirically is an intriguing issue. So this assumption is debatable, but nevertheless, one can hardly rule out this assumption as being one reasonable alternative. Also, we exclude the possibility that gold-specific demand shock can affect exchange rate of US dollar against major currencies, which is not a big matter to our topic.

Lastly, we implicitly postulate that there is no gold supply shock in our model. The rationale for this is that gold is an extremely durable asset. The amount of newly-extracted gold each year is negligible comparing to the stock of gold worldwide, and therefore will hardly affect the price. But we fully understand that this assumption is somewhat presumptuous in the sense that the price of gold is determined mainly by the amount of gold on open market. The change in central bank gold reserves is potentially a huge influence on gold price. But to get an accurate measure and timing of these actions is not easy. There is little research looking into this field, we will try to take this factor into account in our future drafts of this paper.

7.4 How Gold Returns Respond to the Specified Shocks

Figure 6 plots the impulse responses of real price of gold to unit structural shocks. Figure 7 plots the cumulative impulse responses of real price of gold to unit structural shocks. (See on the next page)

An unexpected aggregate demand expansion of industrial commodities, which often associates with global economic expansion, will cause gold returns to fluctuate in the first twenty months; mostly it will drag it downwards. After twenty months, the expansion will lift gold returns, but very modestly. From the cumulative graph, we can see an aggregate demand shock will lower gold returns. This pattern seems to verify the story of negative beta asset, which claims the movement of gold price is in the opposite direction to most other commodities.
But notice the magnitude of the effect is not very noticeable, even in the starting months. Without the bootstrap confidence intervals, we cannot judge whether it contradicts the zero-beta asset conclusion stated earlier.

**Figure 6  Impulse Responses of Various Structural Shocks**

**Figure 7  Cumulative Impulse Responses of Various Structural Shocks**
An unanticipated monetary expansion will have a similar effect on gold returns as the aggregate demand shock does: it will modestly disturb gold returns. The effect will diminish after about twenty months. Cumulatively, a positive monetary policy shock (loosening the money supply) will lower gold returns, which is consistent with the economic theory such as Capital Asset Pricing Model: the monetary expansion will lower the return of Treasury securities. In equilibrium, gold should also have lower returns, but in the short-term, there is an expected substitution effect, driving gold returns up and down. Again, the monetary policy shocks are of a very modest magnitude.

The gold-specific demand shock will have an immediate significant positive effect on gold returns, but that effect diminishes very quickly, within two or three months. This resembles the sensitive and ever-changing sentiment in the financial market and its effect on gold returns. The historical decomposition will give additional evidence that this shock is likely to be the precautionary demand shock.

### 7.5 Contribution of Each Shock to the Variability of Return of Gold

As shown in Table 3, the variability of return of gold is overwhelmingly determined by the unspecified shock relating to exchange rate. In the first ten phases, that unspecified shock accounts for over 90% of the variation. The aggregate demand shock, monetary policy shock and gold-specific demand shock each contribute 3% or so. As forecasting steps increase, the aggregate demand shock plays a bigger role. If we use 200 as a proxy for infinity, \( u_4 \) still contributes over 62% of the variation. The share of the aggregate demand shock is nearly 21%, the monetary policy shock, 3.5%, the gold-specific demand shock, 4%. This variance decomposition (VDC) table (Table 3) verifies the concurrent correlations we observed in the in simple linear regressions: the fear premium and aggregate demand can explain little of the movement of real gold price.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>( u_1' )</th>
<th>( u_2' )</th>
<th>( u_3' )</th>
<th>( u_4' )</th>
<th>( u_5' )</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.2618</td>
<td>0.1557</td>
<td>1.5417</td>
<td>95.5197</td>
<td>0.5211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0.069</td>
<td>3.8326</td>
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<td>1.5165</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1.2933</td>
<td>0.0563</td>
<td>5.4692</td>
<td>91.9857</td>
<td>1.1955</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0.042</td>
<td>5.2007</td>
<td>92.6111</td>
<td>1.1234</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>92.8748</td>
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<td>2.7242</td>
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<td>8.5212</td>
<td>3.1065</td>
<td>64.4125</td>
<td>4.0175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.6 The Cumulative Effect of the Specified Shocks on the Return of Gold

Figure 8 is the historical decomposition of return of real gold. The figure shows that the specified structural shocks could not explain the average movement of real gold price at monthly level that well. There is some evidence that the spikes of real gold price in 1980 are only related to gold-specific demand shock, raising the possibility that the gold-specific demand shock is the “fear” precautionary demand shock. The spike in 1983 can be tracked to both gold-specific demand shock and aggregate demand shock. The downward trending real gold price in 1990s is mostly related to aggregate demand shocks among the three. And the recent boom in gold price since 2005 until the outbreak of the recent recession is related to both aggregate demand and gold-specific demand.

Figure 8  Historical Decomposition of Return of Gold
8. Conclusion

This paper reexamines several commonly-held opinions about gold price movements. We consider safe haven, inflation hedge, and dollar destruction hypotheses. The safe haven hypothesis claims that gold returns will increase as fear increases. We use three alternative measures of fear: volatility in the S&P 500 Index, the consumer expectation in Michigan Survey of Consumers and Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond premium. Gold returns do not have significant correlation with any of these measures. Related to safe haven hypothesis is the idea of gold being a negative-beta asset. We tested this hypothesis with S&P 500 returns, U.S. Industrial Production and Kilian’s Dry Cargo Index and rejected it in favor of the zero-beta asset alternative. The inflation hedge hypothesis postulates the negative correlation between expected inflation and the return of gold. Our analysis disproves that hypothesis for shorter term frequencies. We find a very significant relationship between the price movement of gold, real interest rates and the exchange rate, suggesting a close relationship between gold and the value of U.S. dollar. The multiple linear regressions verify these findings.

The decomposition of gold price under a semi-structural VAR model shows that aggregate demand shocks, monetary demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks have only a modest influence on the price of gold. The unspecified structural shock underlying exchange rates is the driving force of the gold price.

The central message of the paper is that gold’s relationships with fear and inflation are not what most people believe. We should not regard gold as a mysterious asset that is immune to fluctuations and behaves uniquely on the market. Rather, we should regard it as another currency, whose value is a reflection of the value of the U.S. dollar and U.S. monetary policy.

References


