Res Publica XVI
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LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR

Volume XVI of *Res Publica* has arrived! For that we can thank the hard work of its student editors, especially co-editors Amy Uden and Michael Burgess. They have chosen capitols from here and abroad and from ancient times to the present to grace the cover: an appropriate choice given their conscious effort to produce a journal offering analysis on classical and contemporary themes and featuring international and American locales.

The impressive quality and variety of papers contained in this volume reflects the students’ efforts, but it also reflects the culture of academic excellence the department as a whole has developed over the years. The culture is maintained by the faculty’s commitment to a particular institution, the two-course sequence beginning with research methods and ending with the senior seminar. It is in these classes that students learn to channel their intellectual curiosity about the world into researchable questions, normative frameworks, and empirical models. The department is subject to the same forces we study: institutions shape our culture and culture anchors our institutions.

A short inventory indicates the amazing array of interests our culture of intellectual curiosity has created. From the national arena to the local venue in the US, and from international institutions to values among world nations, the range and variety of the topics studied is stunning. IWU political science students in this volume explore many unexpected places from Sub-Saharan Africa to Australia – even the “dark continent” of their own backyard, e.g., the McLean County Board. In reading this journal, you will move from the influence of the public mood on the US Supreme Court, to the impact of postmaterialist values on “hung” parliaments in Northern Europe and Canada, to an understanding of what will be required for Iran to transition to democracy.

Intellectual curiosity is indeed alive and well in our department. It ranges far and wide. Please let your own curiosity do the same as you peruse these pages.

**James Simeone**  
April 2011  
Bloomington
EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION

In assembling Res Publica XVI, we have had the honor of engaging a span of scholarly work that is broad in both method and substance. Perhaps more than any other edition, this year’s journal represents many of the unique research threads that make up the discipline of political science.

The concept of “res publica” itself also suggests the dynamic and diverse character of political science. The phrase itself has been used in incredibly diverse contexts, from the title of the early Roman political writings of Cicero, to the name of a contemporary Estonian populist party. The world has been witness to much of the power and volatility of politics in the year 2011, making it all the more evident that political scholarship requires continued commitment to intellectual inquiry, in order to further our understanding of this dynamic field.

Res Publica, as one of the few undergraduate scholarly journals in existence, provides a unique venue for nascent scholars to contribute to the intellectual dialogue. Our contributing authors have used the skills they have developed during their undergraduate careers to create original research, tackling issues from the international realm to the local level of government. We offer our thanks and congratulations to these contributing authors for their willingness to engage the scholarly dialogue, building upon their already excellent academic accomplishments.

Furthermore, we express our appreciation to Kim McDonald and Jillian Schmitz for their dedication and patience in assisting us with the creation of Res Publica. We also thank the Illinois Wesleyan political science faculty for entrusting us with the task of assembling a journal that is not only a representation of the diversity of our department, but also of our larger university. This product, created by the hard work of Wesleyan students, represents the outgrowth of the faculty’s investment in our intellectual development and of their continued support throughout the editorial process.

Michael Burgess & Amy Uden
Authors’ Biographies

Michael Browning is a senior Political Science major. He currently works for the City of Bloomington Legal Department and enjoys the public service aspect of his job. His research interests focus on the Supreme Court of the United States, especially in relation to public opinion. His work is fueled by his belief that in a constitutional democracy, it is vital to question if the law truly is anonymous and above the people, or if it is subject to the times and popular sentiment. Michael is also an avid St. Louis Cardinals fan, and enjoys spending time pursuing his interests in music and politics. In the near future, Michael plans to attend law school to pursue his strong interest in constitutional law and human rights.

Jennifer Biess is a senior at Illinois Wesleyan University, and will graduate in May of 2011 with a double major in Political Science and Sociology. She interned in the Scottish Parliament researching affordable housing issues in the Highlands, and participated in the summer internship program at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). She is a member of various groups on campus, including Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Kappa Phi. After graduation, Jennifer plans to pursue a career and further her education in policy research.

Sara Ghadiri graduated in December 2010 with a double major in Political Science and Philosophy and a minor in Music. A member of Phi Beta Kappa, she served on the Executive Board for Sigma Alpha Iota Music Fraternity, as Vice President for Pi Sigma Alpha Honor Society, and was a former Editor of Res Publica. Sara spent the summer of 2009 in Iran collecting data for the project published in this journal, and it was accepted and presented at the 2011 Illinois Political Science Association Conference. Sara will be attending University of Iowa College of Law this fall where she hopes to pursue a JD with a concentration in International Law.

Amy Uden is a senior Political Science major and History minor, and works as a Political Science Lab Assistant. She has been involved in several campus organizations, including Pi Sigma Alpha, Phi Beta Kappa, and other honors societies, as well as music groups, College Republicans, and especially DRL campus Christian ministry. Amy also studied abroad in 2009 with the IWU Madrid Program. Her research interests include political theory, religion and politics, and redistricting. She has worked with the McLean County Administrator’s office as a Budget Analysis Intern, and hopes to continue to work in state or local government following graduation, along with possibly pursuing a graduate degree.
Megan Weinstein is a senior at Illinois Wesleyan University, and will graduate in May of 2011 with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science. Her interests include inter-governmental organizations and peace and conflict reconciliation. Megan participated in the Technos International Week in Tokyo, Japan during the summer of 2009, studied abroad with the European Union program based out of Freiburg, Germany the spring of 2010, and will be traveling to France for May Term of 2011 to study French political culture. Megan also worked with the Lamu Center of Preventative Health as part of an Action Research internship the spring of 2011. After graduation, she plans to return to Europe to pursue her Master’s Degree in Global Studies.

Michael Burgess is a senior Political Science major with a focus on international and comparative politics. On campus, he participates in Pi Sigma Alpha and is a member of the track team. He studied abroad during the fall of 2009 in Nagoya, Japan. After graduation, he plans to pursue a Master’s Degree in International Affairs.

Chris Schaeffer is a junior Political Science major from Arlington Heights, IL. Chris has been involved on campus in activities such as club volleyball, and has been the president of his fraternity. He interned this past summer at the U.S. District Court in Chicago. Within political science, his research interests focus primarily on political theory. After graduation, he anticipates either attending law school or graduate school in political theory.
SUPREME COURT RESPONSIVENESS: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE VOTING BEHAVIOR AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Michael Browning

Abstract: This study attempts to explain why the Supreme Court responds to public mood by analyzing individual justice liberalism and comparing it to public liberalism between the years of 1970 and 2001. Three theories suggesting why the Court may respond to public opinion are discussed, including the replacement, political adjustment, and the attitude change hypotheses. The method of using Court reversals to determine the ideology of the Court is presented and implemented. Along with ideology and the public mood, the overall Court mood is used as an independent variable to explain the driving force behind changes in individual justices’ voting behavior. The study concludes that the Court mood is the strongest and most significant factor in changes in judicial voting behavior, while public opinion and ideology explain little to none of the variance.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s role in American society is one of the essential parts of the checks and balances of the United States government. The lifetime tenure of justices frees them from the tyranny of public mood during election seasons and allows them to decide cases on the basis of the law rather than public preferences. In Federalist Paper No.78, Alexander Hamilton argued that if periodic instead of lifetime appointments were made, the temptation would be too great to consult popularity rather than the Constitution and the laws. In Federalist Paper No.76, Hamilton also described the Court as “the least dangerous branch” because of its inability to make laws and policies of its own. It is also arguably the least democratic branch, because it is the most independent branch. However, despite the Court’s immunity from public opinion due to the process of appointments, as opposed to elections, evidence suggests the Court still regularly decides in line with public opinion. William Mishler, Reginald Sheehan¹, Kevin McGuire, and James Stimson² analyze the relationship between public opinion and the Supreme Court using Stimson’s index of public mood from 1992 and 1999, respectively. In their analyses, Mishler and Sheehan find that the Supreme Court responds to public opinion at a lag of five years with an R-squared of .66, significant at the .01 level. McGuire and Stimson find a relationship at a lag of one year with an R squared of .71, significant at the .05 level. Given these data, public opinion has an influence on the Court, but because lifetime appointments separate the justices from direct accountability to public opinion, there must be other explanations as to why public opinion affects the Court.

THEORIES OF RESPONSIVENESS

To best explain how the Supreme Court might be affected by public opinion, three theories are generally used. The Dahl-Funston hypothesis, also known as “replacement hypothesis,” articulates that because the president and senators’ beliefs and positions are in line

¹ Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 1994; 1996.
with the public mood when elected, their choices for justices are also likely to reflect that mood. Dahl argues that a president generally gets to appoint two justices for every four years spent in office, which can effectively “tip the balance on the normally divided Court.”\(^3\) Mishler and Sheehan note that this theory is consistent with the attitudinal model of judicial decision making which states that justices assume the bench with ideologies and beliefs that typically remain constant throughout their tenure.\(^4\)

The political adjustment hypothesis is much more direct, as it states that justices might purposefully change or tweak their positions in order to bring their decisions in line with the public mood. Political adjustment suggests that justices are concerned with the enforcement of their decisions. This hypothesis is best summed up by Justice Frankfurter in *Baker v. Carr*. Frankfurter wrote “The Court’s authority – possessed of neither the purse nor the sword – ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”\(^5\)

The “attitude change hypothesis” is the final of the standard three theories on court-public relations. It conflicts with the attitudinal model in that it specifically theorizes that a justice’s personal ideology might change in time to fit with broad and enduring changes in public opinion. Judges, like other members of society, are affected by societal norms, even if they are unaware of society’s effects on them. Mishler and Sheehan acknowledge that the attitude change hypothesis cannot reliably be tested because there are no independent measures of social change, and McGuire and Stimson do not even theorize on the matter, preferring to test the replacement and political adjustment hypotheses instead.\(^6\)

**THEORIES OF MEASURES**

McGuire and Stimson set up their empirical analysis by using Stimson’s 1999 index of public mood as the independent variable and the Supreme Court’s liberalism as the dependent variable.\(^7\) However, they identify a unique problem with analyzing all of the Court’s cases as an indicator of the Court’s ideology, citing McGuire, Smith and Caldeira\(^8\) in their theory explaining why reversals provide better indicators of the Court’s ideology.

The reversal hypothesis relies on the idea that lower courts’ decisions “center around the Supreme Court’s ideal.” This idea states that because lower courts are restricted by *stare decisis*, they make decisions that attempt to reflect policy outlined in Supreme Court precedents.\(^9\) This “vertical *stare decisis*” causes lower court decisions to cluster around the moderate center of the Court’s known preferences. Potential litigants estimate their chances of winning given these known preferences, and decide to seek *certiorari* based on those chances. If the Supreme Court is perceived as conservative, more liberal lower court decisions will be considered too liberal for

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\(^3\) Dahl 1957, quoted in Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 171.

\(^4\) Mishler and Sheehan 1996.


\(^7\) McGuire and Stimson 2004.

\(^8\) McGuire, Smith, and Caldeira 2004.

\(^9\) Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994.
the Court. In other words, there would be more conservative petitioners making accurate (and inaccurate) estimates as to their likelihood of winning at the Supreme Court level. These accurate estimates become reversals, while the inaccurate estimates become affirmances. McGuire, Smith, and Caldiera write that “as the Court becomes more conservative, there are more liberal policies that will be reversed by the justices and fewer conservative lower court decisions that they will reject.” Thus the reversals, or the accurate estimates, reflect where the Court lies ideologically, while the inaccurate estimates portray an incorrect image. Tests of the reversal hypothesis reveal that when using only reversals, the Court appears to be liberal through the Warren Court and then more conservative through the Burger and Rehnquist courts, until Clinton’s appointments brought the Court back towards a moderate center. Using only affirmances showed close to the opposite, suggesting that the Warren years were very conservative years for the Court, something widely known to be untrue. The reversal model also explains 82% of the variance in the ideological composition of decisions, where the standard model using both reversals and affirmances only accounted for 70%.

McGuire and Stimson also test the reversal hypothesis. Their data support their hypothesis, showing affirmances with an $R^2$ of .03, reversals with .60 and all cases with .57. The most compelling results of their research show significantly strengthened relationships between Court composition/public opinion and the liberalism of Court outcomes when using reversals as opposed to all the cases. Given the reversal hypothesis, there is a strong argument that using both affirmances and reversals contaminates models attempting to illustrate the liberalism of Supreme Court decisions, and that previous studies of the Court may have underestimated the effect of public opinion.

Another research issue concerns the response time of the Court to public opinion. Mishler and Sheehan predict a lag in the evidence of a response to public opinion in the Court’s decisions because replacing justices takes time, as does political adjustment. According to their theory, justices would only logically respond to enduring shifts of public opinion. Norpoth and Segal criticize the lag theory, stating that “if the Court only acts on change that has endured, their decisions should be influenced by contemporaneous as well as lagged public opinion.” The time lag concern is worth discussing because Mishler and Sheehan show that public opinion is “significantly and positively correlated with trends in the Court’s decisions at a lag of five years; and the relationship approaches significance at $t+3$ as well.” The absence of evidence of a lag at one year, two years, and four years may be attributed to the short length of the time series used. In reply to Norpoth and Segal’s concern that justices should be affected by contemporaneous opinion, Mishler and Sheehan respond that justices may only respond to

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14 Mishler and Sheehan 1993.
15 Norpoth and Segal 1994, 712.
16 Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 92.
durable shifts in public opinion, something that contemporaneous opinion has not yet had time
to prove. They expand their theory to explain a small impact of public opinion in the first year
that will “gradually increase over time before ending or leveling off at some impossible-to-
predict future point.”17 Their results support this theory.

THEORIES REGARDING INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

Mishler and Sheehan also examine the issue at an individual level. They look at
Supreme Court justices in a psychological manner, reasoning that attitudes are affected by
personally held beliefs, the strength of those beliefs, how they are expected to behave, and
societal norms.18 Their hypothesis states that justices with more extreme ideologies will be less
likely to move to the center (public opinion), while justices who are already moderate will be
more likely to move one way or the other. They use yearly data from the Supreme Court Data
Base from 1953 – 1992, analyzing only justices who served for 12 years or longer. Evaluating the
percentage of liberal votes cast by each justice each year, they compare it to Stimson’s public
mood index from 1991. Their analysis supports their hypothesis, showing “that moderate
justices are more consistently responsive to fluctuations in the public mood than either liberal or
conservative justices.”19

All three analyses by Mishler and Sheehan20 and the analysis by McGuire and Stimson
show that decisions of the Court diverge from public opinion around 1980.21 This could be
to caused by a sharp increase in liberal public mood coupled with several increasingly moderate to
conservative appointments to the Supreme Court that began in the Reagan years and continued
through Bush Sr., thus affecting the balance of the Court.22 This would be consistent with the
replacement hypothesis as well as Mishler and Sheehan’s theory that moderate justices are the
swing votes that cause the Court to follow public opinion.23

RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS

In approaching my analysis of individual Supreme Court justices, I start by questioning
if Supreme Court decisions between the years of 1970 and 2001 reflect long-term public opinion
trends. Given that they do, are moderate justices providing swing votes that cause Supreme
Court decisions to follow public opinion?

The hypothesis stating that the Supreme Court follows public opinion due to moderate
justices is based on the theories of Mishler and Sheehan that state that moderate justices are
more likely to be affected and swayed by public mood than more ideologically extreme justices.

17 Mishler and Sheehan 1994, 718.
18 Mishler and Sheehan 1996.
19 Ibid., 189.
22 Mishler and Sheehan 1993.
23 Mishler and Sheehan 1996.
As a result, a balanced Court will appear to follow public opinion rather closely in its decisions, because the moderate justices swing the decision in the direction of the public mood. I expect the empirical evidence between 1970 and 2001 to support the hypothesis that as the Court becomes ideologically imbalanced, its decisions will stray from public opinion.

MEASURES

Mishler and Sheehan observe the relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions by individually examining each of the nine seats on the Supreme Court between 1953 and 1992. They measure each justice's ideology by doing a content analysis on newspaper editorials at the time of the justice's nomination to the Supreme Court. They code each justice as either extremely conservative (-1), moderate (0), or extremely liberal (1) and sum the scores to determine the ideological balance of the Supreme Court for each year. This method of coding efficiently identifies the ideology of the Court, but it makes a critical error by assuming that a justice's ideology stays the same throughout their tenure. Two justices within the scope of my study, Justices Blackmun and White, disprove that theory altogether. In the model, ideology scores for each justice were calculated by using a moving average of their liberalism scores from their previous three years on the Court.

Mishler and Sheehan also limit their study to justices who served a minimum of twelve years, presumably because twelve years provides a sufficient amount of time to see how the justice's ideology reflected in his or her decisions. Because of the already limited number of cases, I decided to use all justices who served between 1970 and 2001. Where multiple regression models turned up insignificant results, bivariate correlation was used as an alternate attempt at observing the relationship.

To determine the ideology of Supreme Court decisions, Mishler and Sheehan use the Supreme Court Database and calculate the percentage of liberal votes cast by the justice in question for each year. They exclude per curium opinions, memoranda, and judicial power decisions because of the difficulty in coding the ideological direction of a decision or the routine nature of these types of decisions. I will be using the Supreme Court Database, which provides the data for each justice's vote as well as the vote's ideological identification. I will also include all decisions that could be coded, as some per curium opinions do have a discernable ideological direction. The database codes votes and decisions as liberal if, in criminal procedure, First Amendment, civil rights or due process cases, the vote is pro-individual, pro-affirmative action, pro-female in abortion, or pro-civil liberties, to name a few. In economics or union cases, liberal votes and decisions are pro-union, pro-debtor, anti-business, or pro-consumer, etc. Conservative votes and decisions are coded as the opposites of the liberal votes. Exact lists of coding criteria are found in the Supreme Court Database codebook.

To create a liberalism score for each justice, the votes were tallied for each year of their tenure. The total liberal votes were then divided by the total number of cases in which an

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24 Mishler and Sheehan 1996.
25 Ibid.
ideological direction was discernable, producing a justice liberalism score for that year. The restrictions on this model were that the votes were only tallied from reversals, as they are a better indicator of a justice's ideology.26

In addition to concerns about Court ideology, another measurement issue deals with the independent variable of public mood, which has proved a challenge to measure accurately throughout much of the literature. James Stimson solves this seemingly daunting task with his public mood index. His index is available on his website, and many scholars, including those cited in this study, rely on it as a dependable indicator of the liberalism of public opinion on a yearly basis.

With the variables of individual justices' ideologies, the overall Court's ideology, and the public's overall political mood affecting the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions between 1970 and 2001, the model will attempt to establish a nuanced analysis of how individual justices make their decisions. It should be noted that 2001 provides a good stopping point because Stimson's standard error on his public policy mood index gets exponentially larger in more recent years. The independent variables for each individual justice are the Court's mood, the individual justice's ideology, and the public's mood. The dependent variable is the justice's liberalism score for each year he or she served on the Court.

Table 1 below represents the overall model strength for each of the time lags considered in the study. Figure 1 graphically depicts the relationship between the Court mood and public opinion over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realtime</th>
<th>Time +1 Years</th>
<th>Time+2 Years</th>
<th>Time +3 Years</th>
<th>Time+4 Years</th>
<th>Time+5 Years</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
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<td>.510</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>.370</td>
<td>.322</td>
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<tr>
<td>Significance (2-tailed)</td>
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<td>.003</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.001</td>
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<td>.072</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
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</table>

Table 1: Overall Model Strength for Time-Lagged Models

Figure 1: Public Opinion and Court Mood
(Realtime, with Court Mood Trend Line)

DATA ANALYSIS

In order to find the point at which justices can be expected to respond to public mood, models for the current year and five time lags were run for the entire Court mood. Bivariate correlation models show that the Court responds to public mood immediately (realtime) and also at time lags of one, two, and three years. While the four year lag was also significant, it was less so, and the five year lag did not return any significant results.

This is not surprising, as justices may be responding both to immediate public trends as well as prolonged public changes in mood, which fits with the argument of Norpoth and Segal. The study continued by focusing on realtime as well as the three year lag because they were the most statistically significant with the strongest correlations to public mood.

Models were run testing the justices' liberalism scores against public mood in realtime and at a lag of three years. The justices' ideology and the Court's overall mood were used as controls. As mentioned before, ideology was calculated using a moving average from the votes of the previous three years. This measure of ideology accounts for the theory being tested here: that justices do not make decisions based off of a solid, unchanging ideology. Instead, my ideology measure allows for a changing judicial attitude. By using an average of the previous three years, the ideology score balances out what might be considered outlier years when the docket contained uncommon numbers of certain types of cases. In the years examined, 1970 through 2001, eighty percent of cases concerned either criminal procedure, civil rights, first
amendment, economic activity, or judicial power. Of these, 22% were criminal procedure, 19% were civil rights, 9% were First Amendment, 18% were economic activity, and 13% were judicial power. This balance of law issues allows the study to accurately examine the ideology of each justice.27

The purpose of the model was to find out which justices responded to public opinion, and thus affected the outcome of the Court’s decisions, causing the overall Court mood to follow public opinion. The results, however, did not follow that line of logic. Very few of the justices showed any significant correlation with public opinion at all. Those who did, Justice Souter in realtime, and Justices Blackmun and Burger at a three year lag, reacted by moving away from public opinion, rather than parallel to it. In the cases of Blackmun and Burger, ideology turned out to be a strong driving force, with Betas of .758 and .395 respectively. When it comes to the moderate justice thesis, this model failed to show a strong correlation with public opinion.

Findings concerning ideology were also surprising, as this is not typically a dominant factor in justices’ votes. The attitudinal model of judicial decision making states that justices make decisions based off of attitudes or ideologies that remain the same throughout their tenure. However, the results of this model tell quite a different story. After observing changes in justices’ liberalism scores from year to year, the model was designed to assume that the attitudinal model was partially incorrect, instead asserting that justices’ ideologies actually do change throughout their tenure. Room was made for this hypothesis by calculating the justice ideology independent variable as a moving average of previous years’ votes. Even with this moving ideology variable, ideology only appeared to significantly affect Justice Blackmun’s votes in realtime and T+3 (with strong Betas of .818 and .758 respectively), and Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist in T+3 (with weaker Betas of .395 and .304, respectively). Because Justice Blackmun started his tenure conservatively in the 1970s and ended quite liberally during the 1980s, the resulting ideological shift logically accounts for the change in his voting behavior better than public mood, even though public liberalism declined during the 70s and increased during the 80s. In addition, though his voting record correlated with public mood at T+3, it did so in a negative direction (Beta of -.430). This negative correlation might exist because his shift in liberalism is actually quite a bit more dramatic than the public’s, which usually tends to be slow and even. Justices Burger and Rehnquist’s ideologies, on the other hand, correlate positively with their voting records. It may be possible that their role as Chief Justice has something to do with their ideologies playing into their decisions more than the other justices, but that hypothesis could only be addressed in another study.

The results show that the strongest variable affecting justice’s votes was the Court’s overall mood. Aside from Breyer and Souter’s bivariate correlation exceptions (most likely due to their small sample sizes of years on the Court), Court mood came in as the strongest

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27 Further study has shown this statement to be incorrect. Data shows that justices vote with different ideologies depending on the law issue at hand. By aggregating all of the issues, this study has produced an inaccurate measure of the justices’ ideologies. See 2011 research by Michael Browning for a resolution of this issue.
significant independent variables affecting each justices' votes. This is to be partly expected, as Court decisions are composed of justice's votes, but given that there are nine justices, it is noteworthy that overall Court mood is such a strong force on an individual justice's vote regardless of ideology. A likely explanation for the importance of Court mood is that as the overall mood of the Court shifts to accommodate public opinion, justices adjust their vote in order to stay relevant. This can especially be seen in the results for some of the moderate justices (who are potential swing votes) at a three year lag, namely O'Connor, Kennedy, and Powell. Burger is even surprisingly affected by the overall Court mood, suggesting that even ideologically extreme justices care about their relevance to the Court.

While the results of the model do not point to individual justices as the reason behind the Court's correlation with public opinion, they do suggest that the composition of the Court is important. However, the variance in individual justices' voting behavior contradicts parts of the attitudinal model by suggesting that justices change their votes to be in line with the overall mood of the Court. This casts some doubt on the replacement hypothesis as the sole explanation for why the Supreme Court tends to correlate with public opinion. If the replacement hypothesis affected Supreme Court voting in any significant way, we would not see much of a change in voting behavior during the 11 year period between 1994 and 2005 when the composition of the Court did not change at all. The results of this model (from 1994-2001) do not show a static Court, but instead show an almost random pattern during those years. The small sample size restricts the conclusions that can be made from this observation, but it does suggest that there is more to be explained concerning how the Supreme Court behaves as an institution. The results of this model suggest a combination of rational choices made by individual justices, while the overall Court follows the theory of political adjustment with occasional shifts that occur when justices are sometimes replaced by their ideological opposites.
Table 2: Realtime Multiple Regression Model  
Dependent Variable: Individual Justices’ Voting Patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model and Independent Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Adjusted R-Square</th>
<th>Overall Model Sig.</th>
<th>Court Mood (Sig.‡)</th>
<th>Ct Md. Std. Error‡</th>
<th>Ideology (Sig.)</th>
<th>Id. Std. Error</th>
<th>Public Mood (Sig.)</th>
<th>PM Std. Error</th>
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<td>Marshall†</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.502* (.02)</td>
<td>.162 (.451)</td>
<td>.437* (.033)</td>
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<td>Stevens</td>
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<td>.544** (.002)</td>
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<td>.489* (.040)</td>
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<td>-.200 (.423)</td>
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<td>.518 (.188)</td>
<td>-.047 (.911)</td>
<td>.509 (.197)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Souter†</td>
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<td>.513* .010</td>
<td>.899** (.009)</td>
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<td>.067 (.818)</td>
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* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
† Multiple Regression model insignificant, results displayed are from bivariate correlation,
‡ Variable Betas measured with Pearson Correlation; Standard Error measured with F-Test.
Table 3: Time +3 Years Multiple Regression Model
Dependent Variable: Individual Justices’ Voting Patterns

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*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
†Multiple Regression model insignificant, results displayed are from bivariate correlation,
‡ Variable Betas measured with Pearson Correlation; Standard Error measured with F-Test.
CONCLUSIONS

While this study failed to explain the reason that the Supreme Court follows public mood, it did bring to light a reason why it does not. Given the results of this study, it can be asserted that moderate justices are no more likely to heed public mood than extreme ideological justices, or that extreme ideological justices may pay attention to public opinion in a negative way (see Burger, T+3). What remains to be seen is how the Supreme Court follows public opinion overall without any of the individual justices being significantly affected by the public mood. Several explanations exist, including the possibility that while none of the justices are significantly affected, there is enough variation in the group that the seemingly random back and forth movements of the justices actually amount to an adherence to public mood. Yet another possibility is that the cases and votes in this study were not broken down by issue.28 Some justices’ ideologies can change significantly depending on the issue, and a more careful study may show that some individual justices actually do follow public opinion on certain issues that are important to the American public. Finally, this study was restricted by a small number of cases, and while the liberalism scores for each justice are seemingly accurate, the number of years for some justices on the bench were simply too few to study. Despite these limitations, this study achieved significant results and was able to verify that the overall mood of the Court is a powerful factor in judicial decision making. Further research into voting blocks, as well as Court leadership and swing voting, may reveal why the Supreme Court correlates strongly with the overall public mood and whether or not it falls in line with the political adjustment hypothesis.

28See author’s 2011 work for testing of this hypothesis.
WORKS CITED


WHAT'S THE HANG UP?:
EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF POSTMATERIALISM ON HUNG PARLIAMENTS
Jennifer Biess

Abstract: Elections in majoritarian states are supposed to produce single-party majority governments. However, the most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial majoritarian parliamentary democracies – the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia – failed to produce majority governments. No single party won a majority of the parliamentary seats in any of these three elections, a condition commonly referred to as a hung parliament. Despite the literature’s tendency to dismiss hung parliaments as electoral abnormalities, this recent wave of hung parliaments among such similarly situated states suggests the presence of an underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes. The current study analyzes the role played by the rise of postmaterialist values in advanced industrial societies in the occurrence of hung parliaments through multiple least squares regression. While the study is not able to arrive at a universal explanation for hung parliaments in all three cases, it is able to explain hung parliaments in Australia and Canada.

INTRODUCTION

Elections in majoritarian states are designed to produce single-party majority governments. However, the most recent elections in the three main advanced industrial majoritarian parliamentary democracies – the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia – failed to produce majority governments. No single party won a majority of the parliamentary seats in any of these three elections, a condition commonly referred to as a hung parliament. Despite the literature’s tendency to dismiss hung parliaments as electoral abnormalities, the recent wave of hung parliaments among such institutionally similar states suggests the presence of an underlying causal factor that contributes to these outcomes. This study seeks to analyze the role played by the rise of postmaterialist values in the occurrence of hung parliaments in advanced industrial societies.

After the UK’s 2010 general election, its hung parliament sparked a national conversation over electoral reform. However, there is widespread disagreement over which system is best. If the UK and other countries seek to ameliorate their “hung parliament problems” and want to enact electoral reform, it is imperative to first understand what causes hung parliaments. Armed with that information, these countries can make educated decisions about more appropriate electoral systems. While this discussion is limited to three specific countries, the general lessons can be extended to other advanced industrial states, especially those with majoritarian electoral systems.

1 Kalitowski 2008.
2 Wheeler 2010.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The Westminster Model

The UK, Australia and Canada are all built on the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy, also referred to as the majoritarian or plurality model. Westminster model democracies generally have two-party systems. Proponents of this structure emphasize the ability of the two-party system to provide voters with a clear choice between two alternatives and produce dominant single-party majority governments.\(^3\) Two party systems also tend to be one-dimensional in that the two parties generally only differ on one main issue.\(^4\) Electoral systems in majoritarian polities generally follow the first-past-the-post style of elections and use single member districts. Whoever wins the most votes in a given district, whether a plurality or a majority, wins the seat. While this is the most common electoral format in Westminster model democracies, there are some exceptions. Australia uses the alternative vote system, in which voters order the candidates in terms of preference. First, they calculate the vote based on voters’ first choices. If no candidate wins a majority, the candidate who received the least number of votes is eliminated, and his or her votes are redistributed to the voters’ second choice candidate. This process continues until one candidate wins a majority of the votes in that district; thus, it is often considered a true majority election formula.\(^5\)

Despite their electoral and party structures, third parties have been able to win seats in all three states included in the current study, albeit with varying degrees of success. Generally, one of the two traditional parties represents the ideological left, which is popular with the working class, and the other stands for the ideological right, which traditionally appeals to the middle class.\(^6\) In the UK, the traditional parties are the Labour Party, which has historically been ideological left party, and the Conservative Party, which has been the ideological right party; however, the Liberal Democrat Party has emerged as a strong, ideologically centrist third party. In Canada, the established national parties are the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, where the Liberal Party represents the ideological left and the Conservative Party embodies the ideological right. A variety of minor parties are prominent. Together minor parties have garnered about thirty percent of the votes in recent elections.\(^7\) Two-party politics is strongest in Australia. The Australian Labor Party is the traditional party of the ideological left, while the Liberal-National Coalition represents the traditional party of the ideological right. Although there are a variety of minor parties, the most notable is the recent rise of the Green Party in Australia, which has increased its share of the vote from 1% in 1990 to 12% 2010.\(^8\)

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\(^3\) Lijphart 1999.
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Inglehart 1990.
\(^7\) Parliament of Canada.
\(^8\) Newman 2004-2005 (for years 1987-2004); Australia Votes 2007; Australia Votes 2010.
Hung Parliaments

Elections in Westminster model parliamentary democracies are designed to produce stable single-party majority governments. However, exceptions do occur, and these exceptions are referred to as hung parliaments. By definition a hung parliament is “one in which no party has an overall majority,” meaning also that no single party has won more than half of the parliamentary seats.9 Generally, hung parliaments have been interpreted as isolated electoral anomalies.10

The most recent elections in the UK, Canada, and Australia have all produced hung parliaments. Before Australia’s 2010 election, its most recent hung parliament occurred in 1940.11 In the UK, before the 2010 general election the most recent hung parliament occurred in 1974.12 Of the three states compared in the present study, Canada has experienced hung parliaments most frequently. Of the nine federal elections held between 1957 and 1979, six resulted in hung parliaments. However, from the 1980 election until the 2004 election Canadian federal elections produced majority governments each time. The federal elections of 2004, 2006, and 2008 all produced hung parliaments.13 However, the phenomenon of hung parliaments has largely been ignored in the literature. The purpose of this study is to identify factors that explain this current wave of hung parliaments in advanced industrial Westminster model parliamentary democracies.

The Decline of Class-Voting and the Rise of Postmaterialist Values

Traditionally, class has been the primary electoral cleavage. Some scholars argue, however, that in advanced industrial societies the emergence of new social issues has led to a decline in the dominance of class-based voting.14

Clark and Lipset argue that the importance of class in advanced industrial societies is decreasing because “in recent decades traditional hierarchies have declined and new social differences have emerged.”15 Clark and Lipset claim that class-based voting has declined and is being replaced by post-industrial politics, which they refer to as the New Political Culture (NPC). The following circumstances define the NPC: (1) social and economic issues are clearly distinguished; (2) social issues and consumption issues are more salient as compared to fiscal/economic issues; (3) issue politics and more widespread citizen participation are increasing while hierarchical political organizations have declined; and (4) the NPC views are more prevalent in younger, more educated, and more affluent people and societies.16 Clark and Lipset ground their reasoning in terms of the economy and the family, which relate to the decreased influence of hierarchical social structures. It is these hierarchies, they argue, that

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9 BBC News 2010.
10 Kalitowski 2008.
11 Liddy 2010.
15 Clark and Lipset 2001, 40.
16 Ibid., 278.
maintain rigid class structures. They contend that political issues change with increased affluence: with increased affluence, people will take basic security needs for granted and consider other things, including lifestyle and amenity issues. This decreases the power of class and hierarchy.\(^{17}\) They also argue that the family has embraced more egalitarian values, which further decreases the importance of hierarchical arrangements in society.\(^{18}\)

However, Hout, Brooks, and Manza dispute Clark and Lipset’s claim that class is declining; instead they argue that class is becoming more complex. They concede that dichotomous class models are no longer appropriate, but affirm that this does not mean class is dying. Hout and his colleagues make several specific criticisms of Clark and Lipset’s work. First, they point to the persistence of income inequality despite the growth of the middle class to show that class is still relevant in the modern context.\(^{19}\) From a methodological stance, they argue that the Alford Index used by Clark and Lipset to measure the decline of class-based voting is too crude and underestimates the importance of class in voting.\(^{20}\) Most importantly, they argue that Clark and Lipset do not clearly make the case relating hierarchy and class.\(^{21}\) This critique points to the conceptual gap in Clark and Lipset’s argument.

While Clark and Lipset focus on hierarchical societal structures that promote rigid class stratification, Inglehart’s theory of postmaterialist values focuses on the impact of increased affluence on an individual’s value priorities, drawing primarily on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. His argument is two-fold. First, Inglehart posits that when people experience economic scarcity and hardship they will give high priority to economic security and safety needs. However, people in an environment of affluence do not experience the same scarcity, so they will move beyond economic security and safety needs and place more value on higher order aesthetic and intellectual needs, which he refers to as postmaterialist values.\(^{22}\) Second, Inglehart stresses that the conditions in which one grows up are most important, since it is when values form. Because of this he stresses that the impact of postmaterialist values should increase over time as more people grow up in affluent circumstances.\(^{23}\)

Inglehart recognizes that materialist values, those based on economic security and safety needs, will still be prevalent in society. This leads him to argue that postmaterialists will prefer change-oriented political parties.\(^{24}\) Traditionally, the “change-oriented” parties are those of the ideological Left. This would lead affluent, middle-class voters to vote for Leftist political parties despite their class-based connection with the parties of the Right. Furthermore, working class

\(^{17}\) Clark and Lipset 2001, 41.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., 51.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., 60.
\(^{20}\) The Alford Index is calculated by subtracting the percentage of middle class voters who vote for the traditionally working class party from the percentage of the working class that vote for the working class party.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., 63.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 59.
\(^{23}\) Inglehart 1971.
\(^{24}\) Ibid.
\(^{25}\) Ibid.
voters, who are more likely to experience scarcity and possess materialist values, may choose to vote for the parties of the Right who traditionally espouse those values. Because of this, Inglehart contends, “The rise of Postmaterialist issues, therefore, tends to neutralize political polarization based on social class.”

Dalton characterizes Inglehart’s framework as “the most systematic attempt to describe the value changes that are transforming advanced industrial societies.” Dalton makes a clear distinction between materialist and postmaterialist values. Values that stem from physiological needs, which include both sustenance and safety needs, are deemed materialist; these values include economic stability, economic growth, fighting rising prices, strong defense forces, fighting crime, and maintaining order. After safety and sustenance needs are met, people can attend to their social and self-actualization needs. Postmaterialist values stem from these higher order needs and include having a less impersonal society, having more say in your job or community, having more say in government, valuing free speech, believing that ideas count, and valuing green space.

However, he also identifies two key areas of criticism of Inglehart’s argument. The first pertains mostly to Inglehart’s methodology. Several studies argue that Inglehart’s value index is closely associated with the tides of economic conditions instead of the conditions of one’s childhood. The other school of criticism debates the nature of value change. Flanagan argues that values are changing on more than just a single material/postmaterial dimension, while Braithwaite contends that societal values are moving from security-based to harmony-based values. Dalton concedes that Inglehart’s theory is overly simplistic, but also contends that critics who disagree on the nature of value change can fit their frameworks within Inglehart’s broader one.

Beck presents another critique of the postmaterialist values argument. He posits that societies have moved from the first modernity to the second modernity. The first modernity entails “the collective patterns of life, progress and controllability, full employment and exploitation of nature;” however, the developments of the first modernity have been fraught with unintended consequences, which the second modernity must now rectify. Thus, the recent concern with issues like environmentalism and nuclear disarmament, which are postmaterialist values from Inglehart’s perspective, actually is the result of the consequences of development during the first modernity. Thus, for Beck the second modernity is reflexive. While Beck presents an interesting alternative thesis to the discussion of value change, he still seems to agree that postmaterialist society or second modernity has different values than materialist society of first modernity. Thus, while the exact nature of value change is still being

26 Inglehart 1990.
27 Ibid., 259.
29 Ibid.
31 Beck 1999, 2.
32 Ibid.
debated, scholars agree that values have changed in advanced industrial societies; it is this point that is central to the current study.

Both Dalton and Inglehart posit the existence of a New Politics dimension that accounts for the emergent postmaterialist values. Dalton distinguishes between the “Old Politics” and “New Politics” to differentiate between traditional and postmaterialist political alignments. Class is the primary factor that structures the old political cleavages, with the Old Left representing the working class and labor unions and the Old Right identifying with business interests and the middle class. New Politics is the postmaterialist political dimension. While Dalton recognizes that Old Politics is still the primary ground for partisan conflict, he argues that New Politics affects party systems in advanced industrial societies, because “it can cut across the established Old Politics cleavage.” Since new political cleavages do not line up with old political cleavages, the emergence of this second dimension does not further polarize the major parties. Also, non-established parties have been more likely to adopt postmaterialist positions than the major parties, which has helped smaller parties be more successful. Furthermore, the introduction of the New Politics cleavage has contributed to partisan dealignment, which refers to “the erosion of the social group basis of party support.” This trend has increased electoral volatility and loosened the hold that the cleavages of Old Politics had on voter choice.

This may also help to explain the importance of anti-party sentiment amongst electorates in the UK, Canada, and Australia. Belanger contends that there is a feeling of “political malaise” in postindustrial nations; people are becoming more critical of political parties, especially after those parties fail to meet the electorate’s expectations for policy and service provision. While Belanger does not specifically connect his argument to those made by Dalton, this could be due to Dalton’s claim that it is generally minor parties that embrace postmaterialist platforms rather than the traditional parties. Similarly, Belanger argues that while this feeling is detrimental to major parties, it can be positive for third parties. Political malaise manifests itself in two forms: negative attitudes toward the major parties, which he calls specific antiparty sentiment and negative attitudes towards parties per se, which he refers to as general antiparty sentiment. He finds that antipartyism brings people to vote for third parties. This is especially true of people who feel specific antiparty sentiment; however, third parties who utilize antiparty rhetoric and paint themselves as “antiparty parties” benefit from general antiparty sentiment as well.

33 Dalton 2002; Inglehart 1990.
34 Dalton 2002, 134.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Dalton 2002.
38 Ibid., 183.
40 Ibid.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

But why are these developments relevant to the recent wave of hung parliaments in majoritarian states? The decline of the old political cleavage of class and the rise of new political postmaterialist issues has complicated the way in which people vote. The choice is no longer between two distinct alternatives as proponents of the Westminster model claim. Class is declining in its importance because other issues – postmaterialist social issues – are rising in saliency. Thus, voters are no longer simply voting for whichever party most naturally represents them based on their class background.

This study will draw primarily on Inglehart’s conception of postmaterialist values and Dalton’s analysis of party politics in response to the rise of these values. The central hypothesis of this work is that the decline of Old Politics and the concurrent rise of New Politics explains the increased frequency of hung parliaments in advanced industrial Westminster model parliamentary democracies. From this, I posit two hypotheses:

\[ H_1: \text{The decline of class-based voting increases the likelihood of hung parliaments} \]

\[ H_2: \text{The increase of postmaterialist values increases the likelihood of hung parliaments} \]

Following Dalton’s argument that the rise of postmaterialist values has contributed towards party dealignment, I also predict the following:

\[ H_3: \text{Decreased partisanship increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.} \]

Furthermore, non-established parties are more likely than traditional parties to embrace and support postmaterialist issues. From this, I expect that minor parties that have incorporated postmaterialist values and also antiparty sentiment towards major parties because they have not adapted to these issues, which leads to the following hypotheses:

\[ H_4: \text{Increased specific antiparty sentiment increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.} \]

\[ H_5: \text{Incorporation of post-materialist values by minor parties increases the likelihood of hung parliaments.} \]

METHODS

This study is a small comparative case study that includes the following cases: the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These cases have been selected because they are all advanced industrial Westminster model parliamentary democracies that have experienced recent hung parliaments. This study approaches hung parliaments not only from a cross-national perspective, but also from a longitudinal one. General elections from the following years are included in the study: from 1983 until 2010 in the UK, from 1984 until 2008 in Canada, and from 1987 until 2007 in Australia.
OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT

Dependent Variable:

*Occurrence of Hung Parliament:* While a dummy variable could be used to denote whether or not a state’s general election resulted in a hung parliament, this study operationalizes the hung parliament variable instead as the size of the majority, in terms of parliamentary seats obtained by the party that wins the most seats in the election. Explicitly, this will be measured as the percentage of parliamentary seats won by the “winningest” party, which controls for the size of the parliament. This variable indicates a hung parliament when the value of this measure is less than fifty percent.

Independent Variables:

*Class-based voting:* To measure class-based voting the Alford Index is used. This measure subtracts the proportion of middle-class voters who vote for the working class party from the proportion of working class voters who vote for the working-class party.

*Postmaterialist values:* To measure the prevalence of postmaterialist values in each of the states in this study, I use the four-item index of postmaterialist values from the World Values Survey. This index is derived from the following question series: “If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most important?” The answer choices are: “maintaining order in the nation,” “giving people more say,” “fighting rising prices,” and “protecting freedom of speech.” Depending on their answers to both questions, respondents are coded as materialist, postmaterialist or mixed. For each country, the measure used is the percentage of respondents that are coded as postmaterialist on this index.

*Strength of Party Identification:* To measure strength of party identification, the following question is used: “Would you call yourself a very strong (fill in party), fairly strong, or not very strong?” The measure used is the percentage of respondents who indicate very strong party identification as a proportion of the total sample, which includes respondents who did not identify with a political party.

*Strong Antiparty-sentiment:* In accordance with Belanger’s operationalization of this sentiment, questions from election studies asking for the respondent’s feelings toward major parties are used. If the respondent expresses negative feelings toward both major parties, they exhibit specific antiparty sentiment. Questions used to measure this variable are worded similarly to the following: “How do you feel about the [insert appropriate party]?” Strong antiparty sentiment is measured as the percentage of respondents that indicated strong negative feelings toward both major parties.

41 European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file; World Values Survey 2005 official data file.
Index of Third Party Ideology: This index ranges from zero to two and is comprised of two criteria: social justice issues in minor party ideologies and success of green parties. With regards to the former, third party platforms are referenced where available for mentions of social justice and equality for women and minority groups. Where party platforms are not available, secondary data describing the political parties is used. Environmentalism is another prong of postmaterialism. However, the presence of this cannot be measured by looking at party platforms because in the contemporary political climate, most parties, not just third parties, take a stance on environmental issues. A better indicator of the importance of environmental issues is the presence of a green party. However, the mere presence of a green party does not indicate that it is politically strong. Therefore, this study counts only green parties that won at least one parliamentary seat in the general election. These two indicators, inclusion of women’s and minority rights into the party’s election platform and the presence of a seat-winning green party, are combined into an index of post-materialist value incorporation. This index ranges from 0 to 2, where zero means neither criterion is met. One indicates that one of the criterions is met, and two indicates that both criteria are met.

DATA AND ANALYSIS PLAN

Most of the data for this study is gathered from the Australian Election Study (AES), the Canadian Election Study (CES), and the British Election Study (BES). However, the data regarding postmaterialist values came from the World Values Survey (WVS). While it would have been ideal to measure postmaterialist values using the various national election studies, no question or set of questions regarding postmaterialist values has been consistently asked across all three nations over time. Although the waves of the WVS do not directly correspond to the election years in the UK, Canada, and Australia, this data is preferable because it asks consistently worded questions to respondents in all three nations for each wave, providing greater consistency over time and across cases. Therefore, the data for each country from the wave of the WVS that is closest to the election is used as a measure of postmaterialist values at the time of the election. Finally, data regarding the dependent variable is obtained from election result archives. The data will be analyzed using a series of multiple least squares linear regressions. Preliminarily, bivariate correlations are run at each stage of the analysis to test for multicollinearity. Next, regression models are run for the entire model using data from all three cases. Then, separate regression models are run for each country individually. Because of the small number of general elections included in this study, a significance level of .10 is used.

DATA ANALYSIS

Analysis Across All Cases

The bivariate correlations show that multicollinearity exists between the percentage of respondents who exhibit antiparty sentiment and both the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the Alford Index of class voting. To account for this, five separate multiple regressions are run: one including all variables (Model 1), one excluding antiparty
sentiment (Model 2), one excluding strong party identifiers (Model 3), one excluding class voting (Model 4), and finally one excluding both strong party identifiers and class voting (Model 5). Model 2 and Model 5 completely alleviate the effects of multicollinearity from the analysis.

Table 1: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in All Cases
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by the winningest party (1983-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Make-Up (Variable excluded to account for multicollinearity)</th>
<th>Model 1: All variables included</th>
<th>Model 2: Strong Antiparty Sentiment Excluded</th>
<th>Model 3: Strong Party Identifiers excluded</th>
<th>Model 4: Class voting excluded</th>
<th>Model 5: Class voting and Strong party identifiers excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class Voting (Alford Index)</td>
<td>0.050 (.140)</td>
<td>.069 (.097)</td>
<td>.072 (.140)</td>
<td>.072 (.140)</td>
<td>.072 (.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist Values</td>
<td>-.144 (216)</td>
<td>-.359* (188)</td>
<td>-.152 (218)</td>
<td>-.167 (209)</td>
<td>-.188 (210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Strong Party Identifiers</td>
<td>.421 (.377)</td>
<td>.992** (.311)</td>
<td>.442 (.381)</td>
<td>.442 (.381)</td>
<td>.442 (.381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Antiparty Sentiment</td>
<td>-1.709* (.096)</td>
<td>-1.880* (.948)</td>
<td>-1.603** (.723)</td>
<td>-1.887** (.687)</td>
<td>-1.887** (.687)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Third Party Ideology</td>
<td>-6.149 (5.161)</td>
<td>-6.958 (5.750)</td>
<td>-6.738 (5.179)</td>
<td>-6.705 (5.245)</td>
<td>-7.317 (5.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>.454</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>.378</td>
<td>.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>3.692</td>
<td>5.365</td>
<td>4.229</td>
<td>3.885</td>
<td>4.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Significance</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10

Model 1 includes all five variables. The model is significant (p<.027) and accounts for 41.8% of the variance in the dependent variable, the percentage of parliamentary seats won by the winningest party. However, because of the multicollinearity, the only variable that is significant is antiparty sentiment in the expected direction: as strong antiparty sentiment increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases, which means that hung parliaments are more likely. Excluding antiparty sentiment from the analysis resolves the problem created by multicollinearity.

Model 2, which excludes anti-party sentiment and resolves the multicollinearity problem, is significant (p<.006) and accounts for 45.4% of the variance. Both postmaterialist values and strong party identifiers are significantly related to the percentage of seats won by the winningest party in the hypothesized directions. As the percentage of respondents who are postmaterialist increase, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases making hung parliaments more likely. As the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases.
Models 3, 4 and 5 exclude strong party identifiers, class voting, or both, respectively. Each of these models is significant; however, the only significant independent variable is antiparty sentiment. This suggests that the antiparty sentiment variable is picking up on variance in the dependent variable that can be attributed to class voting and strong party identification. Class voting and the third party ideology index are not significant in any of the five models.

The United Kingdom

Amongst only the UK cases, bivariate correlations show that class voting is significantly negatively correlated with the third party ideology index, and postmaterialist values are significantly and negatively correlated with the percentage of respondents that are strong party identifiers. This again poses the problem of multicollinearity. To avoid multicollinearity a variety of different regression models are run. The first model includes all five independent variables. Models 2 through 6 each exclude one of the independent variables. These models do not completely alleviate the multicollinearity issue, since no single variable is responsible for this problem as in the overall analysis. To completely resolve multicollinearity, Model 7 excludes both class voting and postmaterialist values, and Model 8 excludes both the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the third party ideology index.

Table 2A: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in the UK: Models 1-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by the winningest party (1983-2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model Make-Up</strong> (Variable excluded to account for collinearity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1</strong> (All variables included)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Party Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Antiparty Sentiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Significance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001
Table 2B: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in the UK: Models 5-8
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by the winningest party (1983-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Make-Up (Variable excluded to account for collinearity)</th>
<th>Model 5 Strong Antiparty Sentiment Excluded</th>
<th>Model 6 Third Party Ideology Excluded</th>
<th>Model 7 Class voting and postmaterialist values excluded</th>
<th>Model 8 Strong party identification and third party ideology excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Class Voting</td>
<td>Postmaterialist Values</td>
<td>Strong Party Identification</td>
<td>Strong Antiparty Sentiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.399 (.571)</td>
<td>1.043 (.662)</td>
<td>1.771 (733)</td>
<td>-7.346 (9.903)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.699*)</td>
<td>.909 (.428)</td>
<td>2.234** (475)</td>
<td>-8.773 (6.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.178)</td>
<td>(.474)</td>
<td>(.663)</td>
<td>(.829)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.410 (.474)</td>
<td>-5.61 (.829)</td>
<td>-.510 (2.405)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.649 (.474)</td>
<td>.835 (.576)</td>
<td>.406 (.256)</td>
<td>.331 (.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.3772 (.576)</td>
<td>.8572 (.576)</td>
<td>.2348 (.256)</td>
<td>.503 (.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(220)</td>
<td>(107)</td>
<td>(249)</td>
<td>(707)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001

None of the models are significant. However, in Model 6, which excludes the third party ideology index, class voting and the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers are significant. These relationships are significant in the hypothesized directions: as the class voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases, and as the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. While Model 6 itself is not significant, it accounts for 83.5% of the variance in the dependent variable. This suggests that lack of significance may be attributable to the small sample size.

The prevalence of postmaterialist values is not significant in any of the models. Antiparty sentiment is not significant in any of the models and is not significantly correlated with any of the other independent variables. This stands in sharp contrast to the overall analysis where antiparty sentiment is highly correlated with two of the independent variables and the only significant independent variable when it is included in the model. This and the overall insignificance of any of the models suggest that the UK does not follow the pattern observed in the overall analyses.

Analysis of Canada

Amongst only the Canadian cases, the third party ideology index is excluded from the Canadian analyses because it did not vary. All cases received a value of one, because there have
consistentl beem third parties that espouse postmaterialist values, but a green party has never
won a parliamentary seat. The bivariate correlations indicate that postmaterialist values are
significantly correlated with the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and
the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment. Also, class voting is
correlated with strong antiparty sentiment.

Again, these correlations introduce the problem of multicollinearity to the multiple
regression analysis. To account for this multiple models are run. The first model includes all
four independent variables. Models 2 through 5 each exclude a different independent variable.
Model 6 excludes both the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers and the
percentage of respondents who exhibited strong antiparty sentiment. Model 7 excluded both
class voting and postmaterialist values.

Table 3A: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Canada: Models 1-3
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by
the winningest party (1984-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Make-Up</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Variable excluded to account for collinearity)</td>
<td>All variables included</td>
<td>Strong antiparty sentiment excluded</td>
<td>Postmaterialist values excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Voting</td>
<td>-704</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.554)</td>
<td>(.482)</td>
<td>(1.268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist Values</td>
<td>-4.599</td>
<td>-2.091**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.160)</td>
<td>(.571)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Party Identifiers</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.427)</td>
<td>(.554)</td>
<td>(1.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Antiparty Sentiment</td>
<td>1.634</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.2242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.282)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.915</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>.14409</td>
<td>21.847</td>
<td>1.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Significance</td>
<td>(.195)</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
<td>(.395)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10
Table 3B: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Canada: Models 4-7
Dependent Variable: Occurrence of Hung Parliament, in percentage of seats won by the winningest party (1984-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Make-Up</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Variable excluded to account for collinearity)</td>
<td>Strong Party Class voting Identifiers excluded</td>
<td>Strong party Class voting excluded</td>
<td>Strong party Class voting and strong antiparty sentiment excluded</td>
<td>Class voting and postmaterialist values excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Voting</td>
<td>-.574 (.605)</td>
<td>.334 (.371)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist Values</td>
<td>-4.292* (1.259)</td>
<td>-4.376** (1.205)</td>
<td>-2.046*** (1.232)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Party Identifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td>.590 (.584)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.493 (1.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Antiparty Sentiment</td>
<td>1.255 (1.381)</td>
<td>2.552 (1.642)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.755 (1.508)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.895</td>
<td>.819</td>
<td>.934</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>15.153</td>
<td>10.026</td>
<td>43.577</td>
<td>2.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Significance</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10

Model 1 is not significant, nor is any of its independent variables, which is most likely due to the various multicollinearity issues present in this model. In all of the subsequent models, the prevalence of postmaterialist values is the only significant independent variable. Furthermore, the relationship always is in the hypothesized direction: as the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. Furthermore, only models 2, 4, 5 and 6 are significant, but models 3 and 5 are not. The key difference between these two sets of models is that the former includes the postmaterialist values variable and the latter does not. The most instructive comparison is between Model 6 and Model 7 both of which completely resolve any multicollinearity problems. Model 6 accounts for 93.4% of the variance in the dependent variable and only the postmaterialist values variable is significant, while Model 7 excludes postmaterialist values and only accounts for 26.6% of the variance. This suggests that the prevalence of postmaterialist values is most important in explaining the size of the parliamentary majority in Canadian elections.

Analysis of Australia

When analyzing only the Australian cases the third party ideology index is also excluded because it does not vary. While there has also been a history of third parties espousing postmaterialist values, the 2010 election is the first federal election in which a green
party candidate won a seat in the House of Representatives. However, the 2010 Australian Election Study data is not available at the time of writing and the election has been excluded. Therefore, all Australian elections scored a value of one for the third party index variable.

Table 4: Postmaterialist Values and the Occurrence of Hung Parliaments in Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1 All variables included</th>
<th>Model 2 Strong antiparty sentiment excluded</th>
<th>Model 3 Postmaterialist values excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class Voting (Alford Index)</td>
<td>-1.060 (.321)</td>
<td>-1.076*** (.088)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist Values</td>
<td>.362 (.154)</td>
<td>.424** (.081)</td>
<td>.339*** (.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Strong Party Identifiers</td>
<td>1.043 (1.963)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.88** (.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Antiparty Sentiment</td>
<td>-.172 (10.473)</td>
<td>-5.634* (1.588)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>.923</td>
<td>.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test</td>
<td>10.185</td>
<td>21.036</td>
<td>53.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Significance</td>
<td>(.230)</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10

The percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers is significantly correlated with the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment, which indicates multicollinearity. The problem of multicollinearity is addressed by running three different models. Model 1 includes all four independent variables. The second model excludes the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers. The third model excludes the percentage of respondents who exhibited strong antiparty sentiment.

Due to multicollinearity, the first model is not significant nor is any of its independent variables. However, Model 2 is significant and accounts for 92.3% of the variance in the dependent variable. All three included independent variables are significant. Model 3 is also significant and accounts for 95.8% of the variance in the dependent variable. All the variables included in the model are significant.

In Model 2, the percentage of respondents who exhibit strong antiparty sentiment is significant in the expected direction: as the percentage of respondents exhibiting antiparty sentiment increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. In Model 3, the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers is significant in the expected direction: as the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases making hung parliaments more
likely. Class voting is significant in both Model 2 and Model 3, but not in the expected direction: as class-based voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. In both Model 2 and Model 3, the prevalence of postmaterialist values is significant, but not in the expected direction. The data show that as the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. Possible reasons for these unexpected results will be discussed in the following section.

**DISCUSSION**

This study set out to find a causal explanation for hung parliaments that is applicable across all cases. The significance of Model 2 in the overall cross-country analysis, as well as the significance of postmaterialist values and the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers, all support the theory that the rise of postmaterialist values and corresponding developments contribute to the increased prevalence of hung parliaments. Three of the five hypotheses are supported: those regarding the prevalence of postmaterialist values, the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers, and the level of antiparty sentiment (H₂, H₃, and H₄). The hypotheses regarding class voting and the ideology of third parties are supported. The simultaneous support of the postmaterialism hypothesis and the lack of support for class voting suggest that these two developments occur independent of each other and lends credence to Hout, Brooks, and Manza’s argument that class is not declining. However, the country-by-country analysis shows that no consistent relationship exists across all three cases. The analyses of each country show a different relationship between the independent and dependent variables, which suggests that the national context plays an important role in hung parliament electoral outcomes.

*The UK*

The analyses of the UK cases show that my theory does not account for the results of the general elections in this case. Of all three countries, the UK is the only case in which none of the multiple regression models are significant. This could be due to a variety of factors. Firstly, class-based voting remains strongest in the UK. Dalton finds that class interests continue to be important in British politics, but that this influence has declined by approximately fifty percent between 1950 and 2000. However, even with this decline class voting in the UK is still higher than the other cases in Dalton’s study, the US, France and Germany. This is congruent with the finding in Model 6 of the UK analyses that as class voting decreases – as indicated by lower scores on the Alford Index – the percentage of parliamentary seats won by the winningest party decreases. Thus, the decline in class voting that has been noted by Dalton is related to increasingly narrow electoral margins. However, this study uses a much smaller time period than Dalton’s investigation, which suggests that the observed trends are less pronounced. This could explain why the class-based voting variable was only significant in one model and why no models are significant.

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42 Dalton 2002.
Dalton also finds that the UK has lower levels of postmaterialist values than many other advanced industrial nations.\textsuperscript{43} It seems that the UK is lagging behind Canada and Australia in terms of the developments of these values. This case exhibits less pronounced changes than Canada and Australia, and the significance of the models could then be more highly impacted by the small number of cases. In order to better understand the UK case, it would be useful to use a longer period of time. It could be useful to not only go further back in time but also analyze new data that comes out in the future. This will help to identify whether or not the rise of postmaterialism and the decline of class are becoming stronger in the UK.

\textit{Canada}

Of the three countries included, the analysis of the Canada shows the clearest support for the postmaterialist theory. The increased prevalence of postmaterialist values is related to a decline in the percentage of seats won by the winningest party in each significant model where the postmaterialist values variable is included. Furthermore, each model that includes the postmaterialist values variable explains more than 80\% of the variance in the percentage of seats won by the winningest party. However, the postmaterialist values variable is the only significant independent variable in any of the models. From the bivariate analyses, we see that the prevalence of postmaterialist values is positively related to strong antiparty sentiment and negatively related to the percentage of respondents who are strong party identifiers. Since the data are only bivariate correlations it cannot be discerned whether the change in postmaterialist values causes a change in antiparty sentiment and strength of party identification or vice versa. More research is needed to determine the causal direction of these relationships.

According to the theory presented here, one would expect that the increased prevalence of postmaterialist values amongst the electorate is causing increased antiparty sentiment against major parties and a decline in the percentage of people who consider themselves strong party identifiers because major parties have not incorporated postmaterialist values into their platforms. Also, decreased levels of class-based voting are related to levels of strong antiparty sentiment. Again, the causal direction of this relationship cannot be proven without further research, but it is hypothesized that as people become more disgruntled with the traditional parties, they will be less likely to vote with their natural “class” party.

Finally, class-based voting is not significant in any of the models. This lends further credence to Hout, Brooks, and Manza’s argument that class may not be declining as a significant electoral cleavage. The fact that class-based voting and postmaterialist values are not related to each other also further indicates that the processes of increasing postmaterialist values and declining class are independent of each other.

\textit{Australia}

The Australian case provided two unexpected results. Both class-based voting and the prevalence of postmaterialist values are related to the percentage of seats won by the

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
winningest party, but in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. Firstly, as class-based voting decreases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases. Secondly, as the prevalence of postmaterialist values increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party increases.

In order to explain these findings, it was necessary to examine the responses to the individual questions in the World Values Survey (WVS) from which the postmaterialism index is derived. Between the two Australian waves of the WVS (1995 and 2005), the biggest shift in respondents’ first priority is a ten percentage point increase in the number of respondents who named maintaining order in the nation. Furthermore, maintaining order in the nation is cited as respondents’ first choice about twice as often as fighting rising prices in both 1995 and 2005.

These results can be reconciled with Australia’s recent economic and security situations. With regards to its economy, Australia experienced seventeen consecutive years of economic growth until the global financial crisis. After the financial crisis, Australia’s economy rebounded after only one quarter of negative economic growth, and the government expects to return to budget surpluses by 2015. This history of strong economic conditions in Australia explains the comparative unimportance of economic issues when measured against maintaining order in the nation.

In the early 2000s, illegal immigration became Australia’s most salient security issue. The increased importance placed on the issue of illegal immigration is most likely driving the decline in postmaterialist values from 1995 to 2005 and may account for the observed positive relationship between postmaterialist values and the percentage of seats won by the winningest party. Results from the Australian Election Study indicate that the percentage of seats won by the winningest party may be a function of the degree of consensus in the Australian electorate on which party is seen as best on issues of national security and defense. Thus, the salience of security issues causes a decrease in the level of postmaterialist values, and the divide in the electorate over which party is best suited to handle these issues could be correlated with declining electoral majorities. Furthermore, this shift from viewing the coalition as overwhelming more capable of dealing with security issues may have led some voters - most likely working class voters who had voted for the coalition because of their strong position on national security - to return to their “natural” class-based parties. This accounts for the finding that as class-voting increases, the percentage of seats won by the winningest party decreases. In the future, it will be interesting to see how class-based voting and postmaterialism are impacted if and when the issue of illegal immigration loses political salience.

LIMITATIONS

This study is limited in a several ways. First, only a small number of elections are included for each case. This is due to the lack of Australian data, as the Australian Election

44 CIA World Factbook 2010.
45 McAllister and Clark 2010, 16.
Study only bean being conducted in 1987. In order to cover a comparable time span for each country, the data for earlier elections for Canada and the UK are not included. In closer analyses of these two cases, it would be beneficial to use a longer time span.

Also, another central weakness is the operationalization of the third party ideology index. The index was not detailed enough to allow for adequate variation between cases and had to be excluded from both the Australian and Canadian analyses, which made it impossible to test the fifth hypothesis in these analyses. Where it has been included in the analysis, the third party ideology index is never significant. This could be due to the limits of the measure and not the unimportance of third party ideology itself. A better measure would account for more dimensions of postmaterialist values than social justice and environmental issues and allow for a wider range of variance. Data from the election studies could be used in crafting such a measure, since questions are generally asked about which party is seen as most capable of dealing with various issues. These sorts of questions could be useful in creating a more nuanced index. However, a more in depth understanding of third party ideologies and how that ideology is manifested is required in order to do this. If this concept were accurately measured, further analysis may in fact show that it does play a role in explaining electoral outcomes.

FUTURE RESEARCH & CONCLUSIONS

Since this study cannot conclude that its framework provides a universal explanation for the occurrence of hung parliaments, future research should focus on the individual countries included in the study, in order to better understand the role of the national context. Future research should also investigate the impact of illegal immigration on postmaterialist values and on electoral outcomes in Australia. The Canadian case should be further evaluated in order to ascertain why postmaterialist values play a much larger role there than in other countries. Alternative explanations should be investigated for the UK, since this theory does not seem to explain the cause of its hung parliament. Also, antiparty sentiment should be further researched since it was the variable that most often exhibited a relationship with the other independent variables. Research is needed that investigates the causal relationship between antiparty sentiment and class voting, postmaterialist values, and strong party identification. This could prove important in better understanding the role of these variables in contributing to the occurrence of hung parliaments.

This study has endeavored to find a universal explanation for the occurrence of hung parliaments in advanced industrial democracies. However, the current study has not met this lofty goal. While the implications of the rise of postmaterialism seem to explain hung parliaments in Canada, the UK and Australian cases do not provide such clear-cut support for the present theory. Despite these mixed results, this study has found some causal factors that influence electoral results in majoritarian parliamentary democracies. This is an important first step in explaining why hung parliaments occur and to what extent the national context plays a role in these outcomes.
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WHAT WILL TIP THE SCALE?: TOWARD A THEORY FOR UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN IRAN
Sara Ghadiri

Abstract: The world watched Iran in 2009 to see what the aftermath of its presidential election would hold. It seemed as if the stage was set for regime change—all requisite factors appeared to be present. Yet the theocratic Iranian regime that has been in place since 1979 remains as entrenched as ever. This leaves us at an interesting juncture. What is the reason for this entrenchment? What explains the fact that the 2009 election did not spark a successful democratic transition? I posit that Iran has an additional factor that must be taken into account when considering democratic transition: its institutional structure. It is not enough for the opposition to coalesce around a symbolic figure—they must coalesce around a real leader with enough power to push for democratic change. However, if this leader is to arise out of the system, he or she will likely be tainted by the system through which power was gained. This phenomenon will stunt any push for change that might come from within the ranks of the elites. As the result of a systematic examination of normal mechanisms for the occurrence of regime change, this study concludes, then, that a push must then come from elites outside of the system if Iran is to achieve democratic transition.

IRAN 2009: WHAT HAPPENED?

The world watched Iran in 2009 to see what the aftermath of its presidential election would hold. It seemed as if the stage was set for regime change—all requisite factors seemed to be present. The economy was faltering, divisions were arising within the elite, parts of the opposition had coalesced, large portions of the population were mobilized in protest, and the international and expatriate communities had become involved. Add to this litany the fact that there existed a history of active struggle for democratic rule, a relatively homogeneous population, few border contentions, high literacy rates, movement towards modernization, and high urbanization, and nearly every typical indicator of a transition seemed to be in place. Yet the long-standing Iranian regime remains as entrenched as ever. This leaves us at an interesting juncture. What is the reason for this entrenchment? What explains the fact that the 2009 election did not spark a successful democratic transition? In order to understand what is required to tip the scale in favor of democratic transitions in Iran, we must examine factors that tipped the scale in other cases, and then attempt to understand why it is that Iran does not follow these models.

The goal of understanding regime transition in Iran is framed by the context of understanding the influence of factors that could cause regime change in Iran, along with predicting what factor or factors will tip the scale towards democratic transition. In this study, I first analyze and assess the current status of the aforementioned factors that can tilt a regime towards transition or indicate that a regime is headed towards a transition. I then posit that the institutional structure through which the most powerful Iranian leaders have arisen was purposefully designed to parcel out just enough power for them to have political influence, yet
still keep each one from truly realizing enough power to convince any other faction that they ought to lead. Upon examining this institutional structure, I find one factor vital to Iran achieving a democratic transition: A clear leader must emerge who can organize the opposition, either by virtue of his own power or the conglomeration of power to which he has access, all while avoiding becoming tainted by the system through which that individual gained power.

In order to achieve a successful democratic transition, political scientists must first attempt to understand the concept of democratic transition. For this study, a democratic transition refers to a precise moment in time in which a regime “makes a qualitative leap in levels of democracy, either from an authoritarian regime to an electoral democracy or from a semi-autocratic regime to a more democratic system.” With this definition in mind, where does Iran stand?

LITERATURE REVIEW

In 2005, Michael McFaul noted that Iran has “the best structural endowments for democracy that is still ruled by an authoritarian regime.” McFaul’s observation sets an interesting tone for this inquiry. Iran employs a three branch institutional scheme, but exhibits several idiosyncrasies. There is a two-part leadership between the President and Supreme Leader in the executive. In addition to these two institutions, Iran’s executive branch includes the Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, and Council of Guardians. Inherent in this large executive is the illusion of checks and balances, because all power lies either directly or indirectly in the hands of the Supreme Leader. Another of its idiosyncrasies comes in the fact that Iran also has elections. The candidates for all elections, however, must first be screened by the half-cleric, half-jurist Guardian Council. These elections do feature high turnout and high public interest, and while recently of questionable validity, they still present a potentially democratic institution that could function liberally were it given the opportunity.

I first examine the literature on democratic transition. The broad-based theories that currently exist generalize based on cases that share a common geographical location. These theories, however, are often not generalizable to other geographic areas. In spite of this, these theories can still be examined and used to extract factors that have triggered transition in other countries as a starting point. This framework can then serve to evaluate the factors at play in Iran. This approach acknowledges that there are several factors that tend to predispose regimes towards democratization. Although these vary based on time or place, they can be separated into four categories of factors: economic, political, social-cultural, and geographic.

In the economic category, the greatest factor is the strength of the economy. A weak economy, signaled by high unemployment, high inflation, and low growth, is often seen as the fault of the government. Haggard and Kaufman also note that in years preceding democratic

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1 McFaul et al. 2008.
2 McFaul 2005.
3 CIA World Factbook 2010.
transitions, patterns of declining growth and increasing inflation tend to be evident.\textsuperscript{5} Though economic crises are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause a transition, poor economic performance reduces inter-elite bargaining power and strengthens anti-regime opposition movements. Even where economic crises are not the source of factional conflicts between hard- and soft-liners, however, they are likely to widen them.\textsuperscript{6} Economic factors such as these surface so prevalently in situations of regime transition that they seem to be the only factors that can be generalized across geographic areas.

In terms of political factors, almost all of the studies on development and democracy focus on the interests, choices and strategies of political actors. Furthermore, most research on transitions focuses on the interests and strategies of regime and opposition elites, along with the constraints facing them.\textsuperscript{7} Political factors for regime change vary widely and include domestic and international features. For example, opposition cohesion can point to a regime that may be tipping towards transition.\textsuperscript{8} Institutionally, a two-ballot electoral system can often be helpful in producing a successful transition, and have been helpful, especially in Africa.\textsuperscript{9} O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory states that divisions within the authoritarian regime itself cause change.\textsuperscript{10} This model fits many Latin American transitions, but not post-Soviet ones. Contrary to their theory of internal divisions of the regime, however, elite pacts, or agreements between elite leaders, also might facilitate successful transition, as has been the case in Africa.\textsuperscript{11} There is, however, little support for the second theory outside of that continent.\textsuperscript{12} Additional political factors for regime transition include international engagement and external pressure, though the extent to which those are relevant varies widely by geography and by case.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, Bratton and van de Walle, as well as McAdam et al., have pointed to popular mobilization and contentious collective action as a cause of democratic transition.\textsuperscript{14} Bratton and van de Walle note that collective action often played a critical role in pushing African authoritarian rulers to initiate liberalization.\textsuperscript{15} If this trend holds in Iran, it is possible that we could see these protests play an important role there as well. Work by McAdam et al. makes the stronger claim that democratization and contentious collective action are inseparable. In fact, McAdam et al. argue further that “democratization, then, never happened without contention,” however, they also note that there are “only certain cases in which contention causes democratization.”\textsuperscript{16} Popular

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{6} Ibid.\textsuperscript{7}
  \item Geddes 1999.\textsuperscript{8}
  \item Van de Walle 2006.\textsuperscript{9}
  \item Ibid.\textsuperscript{10}
  \item O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986.\textsuperscript{11}
  \item Geddes 1999.\textsuperscript{12}
  \item Ibid.\textsuperscript{13}
  \item Bunce and Wolchik 2010.\textsuperscript{14}
  \item Beissinger 2002, 14.\textsuperscript{15}
  \item Bratton and van de Walle 1997.\textsuperscript{16}
  \item McAdam et al. 2008, 269, 272.
\end{itemize}
mobilization and contentious collective action did not cause transitions in Latin America; they did, however, force elites to begin negotiations in Eastern Europe.17

There are also social-cultural factors that might tip the scales in favor of democracy, including a history of active popular struggle for democratic rule, a homogeneous population, and high literacy rates.18 McFaul also points towards movement towards modernization and high urbanization as explanatory factors for transition. This category, however, has less literature devoted to it. Recent work is being done on the impact of social media and the Internet in relation to the socio-cultural organization of protest movements, but much still remains unanswered about how new media “digital democracy” contributes to pushes for democracy across the world. It is certainly clear that the increased prevalence of Facebook, Twitter and other Internet sites are changing the way people communicate, and that has some sort of impact on democratic transitions.

The geographic considerations for regime transition focus mostly on having a set of clearly defined state borders and a clear sense of who is a part of the state.19 McFaul also indicates the importance of having few border contentions. This category essentially establishes that countries that are involved in external conflict or border disputes are less likely to transition, as transitions do not occur as commonly during wartime. This is a well-studied factor, but Iran does not have border disputes that would make this an issue.

In addition to these bodies of literature surrounding specific groups of factors, Geddes notes that “it seems as though there should be a parsimonious and compelling explanation of the transitions, but the explanations proposed thus far have been confusingly complicated, careless about basic methodological details, often more useful as description than explanation, and surprisingly inconsistent with each other.”20 Most of the generalizations that have been proposed have failed either to accommodate the details of the real-world variation or to explain that variation. To combat this, many attempts have been made to classify types of authoritarian regimes in order to better understand them and generalize based on those types. There are current theories and models that seek to separate these types of regimes, most popularly Geddes' division of authoritarian regimes into personalistic, militaristic, or single-party regimes, and Howard and Roessler's tree typology categorizing countries using the relative freedom of their elections.21 Geddes notes that military regimes are those where a group of officers decide who will rule and exercise some influence on policy, while single-party regimes' access to political office and control over policy are dominated by one party. In personalist regimes, access to office and the fruits of office depend solely and completely on the discretion of an individual leader.22 Iran's constitution, however, enshrines both guardianship and popular rule in the constitution, and puts far more power in the hands of the people and individuals other

17 Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Ulfelder 2005; McAdam et al. 2008.
19 Rustow 1970.
20 Geddes 1999, 117.
21 Howard and Roessler 2006.
22 Geddes 1999.
than the Supreme Leader than a traditional personalist regime. It also has no political party system that would give rise to a single-party regime, and the Supreme Leader is not a military general, nor did his power come about because of a military coup.

Howard and Roessler, on the other hand, divide regimes into five classifications: closed authoritarian, hegemonic authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies. These categories are defined by freedom of elections and status of civil liberties and move from most restrictive, closed authoritarian, to most free, liberal democracy. Howard and Roessler differentiate competitive authoritarian regimes from hegemonic authoritarian systems by identifying cases where the winning party or candidate received over 70% of the popular vote. Ahmadinejad won the 2009 election with 63%, which would put Iran in the competitive authoritarian camp. However, there were wide allegations of fraud in this election, in addition to the candidate vetting system, which calls into question how truly "competitive" these elections are. It seems, then, as if it is unfair to label these elections as competitive. As it has been shown, Iran evades both of these classification systems, and, even when forced, appears as a hybrid or seems to be caught between two categories. Existing classification schemes concerning regime type and factors for regime transition do not encompass the unique situation in Iran. I thus reject these classifications and approach Iran as a case study on its own.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR IRAN'S 2009 ELECTION

The presidential election of 2009 cannot be considered as a harbinger of reform or revolution without understanding the underlying dynamics of the election. This election was pitched by the Western media as a powerful impetus for the democratic movement. For context, we must take a historical perspective. Iranian elections have always been a struggle between reformists and conservatives. Reformists, also called soft-liners, "seek more expansive powers for republican institutions," while conservatives, or hard-liners, "support the absolutist power of the Supreme Leader and related unaccountable institution." In 1997, Iran saw the election of its first "reformist" president, Mohammad Khatami. In 2000 it saw a reformist victory in the Majles (also called the National Assembly, or Islamic Consultative Assembly), including the solidification of the 2nd of Khordad Coalition, a coalition of 18 reformist groups that was formed after Khatami’s 1997 win. In 2001, Iran saw Khatami’s reelection. However, 2004 saw widespread allegations of fraud in the parliamentary elections. In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a “true believer in the antidemocratic and anti-liberal dictates of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini” and hard-line conservative, was elected. Ahmadinejad

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23 Tezçür 2008.
24 Ansari 2009.
26 Boroumand and Boroumand 2000.
27 McFaul 2005.
represents the most conservative of the factions in Iran gaining power.\textsuperscript{28} The 2008 parliamentary elections were marred by the mass disqualification of reformist candidates.\textsuperscript{29} With this electoral history, Iran approached the 2009 elections.

Four candidates for the presidency were cleared to run in 2009 by the Guardian Council. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the sitting president, was backed by the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Mohsen Rezaei, also a conservative, was deemed the pragmatic and technocratic successor of former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mehdi Karroubi, a long-time politician and reformist cleric, campaigned on nationalization of the oil industry. Mir Hossein Mousavi, another leader in the reformist camp, was designated as the ideological successor to Mohammad Khatami. These candidates illustrate the main elite cleavages that exist in Iran.\textsuperscript{30} One side champions a fundamentalist, confrontational approach to domestic as well as international problems. Internally, the fundamentalist group works to suppress all dissidents, even among its own allies, and quell any voice of moderation. Internationally, it pushes an aggressive and uncompromising program. In contrast, the opposite camp, the reformists, favor an open society at home, one that is able to move on a democratic path, albeit step-by-step, while pursuing a rational and clear diplomatic approach to Iran's international problems. Even with these broad groupings, however, four candidates surfaced in the election. While they can be grouped into reformists and conservatives, stark ideological differences existed between each individual candidate, even those from the same side of the ideological divide.

Mousavi was and is the most publicized of the reformist candidates. However, he was and is not the most “reformist.” He marketed himself as a “religious intellectual” dedicated to lawfulness and advancement of Iran, both economically and socially. His campaign materials expressed that his platform consisted in “coming to make an Iran far from lies, superstition, and backwardness.”\textsuperscript{31} His revolutionary credentials allowed him to pass through the candidate vetting system of the Guardian Council, and his status as a sayyid, or direct descendant from the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), solidified his religious credentials. Once he passed through, he stated that he would push for the same policies that Khatami had espoused: equality of the sexes, freedom of speech and other civil liberties, and the resumption of relations with the West, provided that Iran would not suffer great costs because of it. His base was made of the urban middle class, professional elites, women, and young voters.\textsuperscript{32} They were well educated, and many of them had relatives that have left Iran in favor of economic or academic opportunities elsewhere. Many groups printed individual campaign literature supporting Mousavi,\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Textir 2008.
\textsuperscript{30} Milani 2009.
\textsuperscript{31} Settād-e Javānān-e Hamieh Khātami 2009.
\textsuperscript{32} Esfandiari et al. 2009.
\textsuperscript{33} During my visit to Iran from May 2009-July 2009, I personally collected campaign literature from all four candidates. The references to campaign materials regard materials that were collected and translated between May 30, 2009 and June 12, 2009. Please see contact author for images and translations of campaign materials.
including workers groups, student and youth groups, and martyr groups.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, he had the support of filmmakers, actors and actresses, athletes, and a group of reformist-leaning clerics.\textsuperscript{35} His popularity was partly due to the fact that he was not a cleric, and partly the fact that he, as the most prominent reformist, was not Ahmadinejad.

In a manner unusual for an Iranian election, Mousavi’s wife was also quite prominent during the campaign, and has remained prominent since. She appeared often on his campaign literature, and has appeared with Mousavi and spoken in public as well. She has been described as a “Michelle Obama-like figure” and has her own political credentials, including a PhD in Political Science from one of Tehran’s premier universities, as well as a chancellorship at the premier women’s university in Tehran.\textsuperscript{36} She is an ardent supporter of women’s rights, though also has revolutionary Islamic credentials. Her influence in this structure is unclear; however, it is clear that her prominence in this election gave the Mousavi campaign credence in his women’s policy as well as strengthened his support among women.

Karroubi, the other reformist, had a slightly different platform and base. His policies were and remain the most reformist, even more so than Mousavi. His advisers are among the country’s most respected reformist technocrats, and he ran on a specific program of reforms targeted at specific electoral groups such as women, students and non-Persian minorities.\textsuperscript{37} Along with policies supporting fiscal responsibility and strengthening the rule of law, Karroubi promised that, if elected, “he would sign Iran up to international protocols on women’s rights, and would end patrols by the country’s religious police, who enforce Islamic dress codes for women.”\textsuperscript{38} Karroubi has the support of both the largest student group and the largest group of university graduates who came out of that activist student group.\textsuperscript{39}

Another candidate, Rezaei, represented the military faction within the right-wing movement, and was the face of the pragmatic conservative movement that included former President Rafsanjani for this election. Rezaei’s agenda included criticism for Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory rhetoric and “games of chicken” in the international sphere. He mentioned reducing military service from two years to one, and also promised to incorporate more ethnic minorities in his cabinet. His economic agenda revolved around better management of oil revenues and more robust economic planning. He also wanted to develop Iran by easing relations with the West and being less confrontational. Rezaei had largely technocratic support, and as a technocrat himself, ran as the “architect of the Iranian economy.”\textsuperscript{40} His support base in the election, which continues even after the fact, was made of conservatives who were dissatisfied with Ahmadinejad’s carelessness in politics and economics, yet were still staunch

\textsuperscript{34}The martyr community in Iran holds a significant amount of clout in politics. The government entitles veterans, martyrs, and their families to special benefits and recognition. Their support is “revolutionary support” and the individual who can capture this support has important social capital.

\textsuperscript{35} Summary Testimony of Actors/Artists, Athletes, Religious Scholars, and Families of Martyrs 2009.

\textsuperscript{36} Esfandiari et al. 2009.

\textsuperscript{37} Esfandiari et al. 2009.

\textsuperscript{38} Laban-Mattei 2009.

\textsuperscript{39} Esfandiari et al. 2009.

\textsuperscript{40} Rezaei Campaign Flyer 2009.
supporters of the regime and individuals within it. Their issue was more with Ahmadinejad himself and less with the status quo.

Among all of the 2009 candidates, Ahmadinejad’s platform was (and remains) best known. He ran largely on his agenda and his populist past record. Ahmadinejad supports very seclusionist policies, and advocates for programs that have alienated Iran in the international sphere, including the nuclear program. He is best noted for his “clampdown on all forms of dissent – on press, on women, on bloggers, on dual nationals--and for strengthening the role of the revolutionary guards and the revolutionary guard culture that has developed with the former commanders and former members.” Allegations abound that Ahmadinejad used state funds for travel, and for “bussing in supporters from one district to another so he looks like he has big crowds at many events.” Local papers also reported during the run-up to the election that his government handed out “gold coins, cash and 400,000 tons of potatoes to rally support.” Allegations of corruption abound even beyond this. For example, during the campaigning period, Mousavi campaign materials raised questions for Ahmadinejad regarding where $207 billion in oil revenues went.

Ahmadinejad’s base in the election was drawn from the lower class, both in rural areas and among the urban poor. His populist policies of handouts to individuals either in the form of money, loans, or food, have endeared him to these classes. These families are often also the families of martyrs or have members in the Basij, the paramilitary force that was responsible for some of the violent clashes during the protests. Their support is crucial to the maintenance of the existing power structure, as control of the paramilitary force is paramount for suppressing dissidents in the streets.

However, the matters at stake in this election should not be confused. None of the candidates spoke of any serious overhaul of the Islamic system. They were, and are, all fully committed to the idea of the Islamic republic. A nuanced examination suggests that the concepts of “Islamic-ness” and “republican-ness” were actually in question. The broad-based ideological coalitions that exist in Iran continue to follow the patterns suggested by this election. They are thus split between the reformist and conservative camps. However, there remains no complete unification within these movements. Additionally, is important to note that, strictly speaking, there are not organized political parties in Iran that parallel those that exist in other countries. The “parties” that exist are largely ideological coalitions around political figures, and thus the nature of the political system is largely centered on individual players within the system. Several conservative groups have come together under two separate coalitions, which are called the United Front of Principlists and the Broad and Popular Coalition of Principlists. Some conservative groups remain outside either coalition. Similarly, several reformist groups,

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41 Esfandiari et al. 2009.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
45 Esfandiari et al. 2009.
46 CIA World Factbook 2010
such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front (also known as Mosharekat) and the Mojahideen of the Islamic Revolution came together as a reformist coalition in advance of the 2008 Majles elections.47 Another influential reformist group is the National Trust Party, of which both Mousavi and Karroubi are members, though the group supported Mousavi in 2009.48 These facts present Iran against an unusual backdrop as compared to other cases examined in the literature about regime transition. From this point, I move to the analytical portion of this study, in which I examine the presence of factors for regime transition within the Iranian case, and note the circumstances of their failure to produce typical regime transition.

In our consideration of the political climate, it is important to also note the history of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reign in Iran. Khamenei rose to power after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. His religious credentials have been questioned--when Ayatollah Khamenei took the seat of Supreme Leader, the constitution was amended to allow the post to be held by a lower-ranking theologian, as he did not have the religious rank of Khomeini.49 He has often been at odds with high-ranking clerics regarding his interpretations of Islam and his place as Supreme Leader is more fragile than he would admit. In the months preceding the 2009 elections, he had clashed individually with Khatami, Mousavi, Rafsanjani, Larijani, and even Ahmadinejad. It is his precarious position that set the stage for the 2009 election.

IRANIAN REGIME CHANGE ANALYSIS: FACTORS FOR TRANSITION

METHODS

Because of the unique nature of the Iranian case, a case-study approach examining the specific factors for transition in the aftermath of the 2009 elections serves as the only theoretical approach that allows the depth required to fully understand Iran in the light of the literature. Iran has not, to this date, had a truly successful democratic transition. Yet, as McFaul et al. note, a “serious analysis of the external influences on internal change cannot focus only on cases of democratic development, but must also look at instances of regime change when the outcome was not democracy.”50 Comparative studies in general rarely use Iran because of its uniqueness, and this trend holds true in group case studies regarding democratic transition. I have thus selected Iran on its own for two reasons: first, because the fragile nature of the politics of the region suggest that this topic requires inquiry that can only be comprehensively achieved through a case study, and secondly, because examining factors for a democratic transition is just as necessary where they did not succeed as where they did. Because I am assessing a certain point in time as the “tipping point” for democratic transition, all of the data that will be used to assess the aforementioned economic, political, and social factors for democratic transition is from three months prior to three months after the 2009 election.

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 British Broadcasting Company 2010.
50 Mc Faul et al. 2008, 8.
ECONOMIC FACTORS FOR TRANSITION IN IRAN

Iran faces a number of significant economic challenges. Internal challenges include: the large role of oil export revenues in financing government spending and vulnerability to oil price fluctuations, dependence on gasoline imports to meet domestic energy needs, high inflation, unemployment and poverty levels, reported domestic economic mismanagement, and widespread economic inefficiency. The central role of oil exports makes the economy quite volatile and vulnerable to changes in oil price. For example, the price of oil dropped 38% between 2008 and 2009, leaving Iran with budgetary problems, and giving credence to the rentier state theory. This theory states that in countries that are largely dependent on the export of one commodity, the revenues from that commodity are used to co-opt groups through patronage or placate large swaths of society with public aid. Political instability can be expected when there is a downturn in commodity revenue and the state no longer can use that revenue. In the cases of oil crises in the 1970s, populations that were plunged into poverty blamed their governments and gradually took the risk of demanding change. It would not have been unlikely, then, for a similar effect to have taken place with the drop in oil prices in 2009.

On June 9, 2009, in the days preceding the election, an inflation rate of 23.6% was released by the Central Bank of Iran. Unemployment figures had skyrocketed from 10.5% in 2005 to 17% in 2009. Additionally, the International Monetary fund had projected that Iran’s economy would expand less than it had in previous years, up by only 3.2% in 2009, which is down from 4.5% in 2008 and nearly 8% in 2007. Real GDP growth was estimated by the IMF to have decelerated to 2–2.5% in 2008-09, from almost 7% in 2007-08.

These economic problems spread dislike of Ahmadinejad to the lower and middle classes as well. “Dismissing opposition to Ahmadinejad as a north Tehran phenomenon, limited only to affluent urban areas, is insulting to the millions of middle-class Iranians who have suffered the most under his tenure.” Affluent Iranians, much like affluent individuals anywhere, are not affected as sharply by high inflation and unemployment. It is people of modest or low income who feel the pinch when an economy begins to falter and slides into stagnation. These are the people who end up in the streets protesting, which will be discussed in the next section.

Not only do economic downturns cause public discontent, but they can also cause elite fragmentation over policy. Lisa Anderson points out that “divisions between ‘hardliners’ and ‘softliners’ are not necessarily linked directly to differences over economic policy”. However, “even where economic crisis are not the source of factional conflicts...they are likely to

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51 Ilias 2010.
52 Anderson 1999.
53 Geddes 1999.
55 International Monetary Fund 2010.
56 Ibid.
57 Moaveni 2009.
exacerbate them.” This points to an important interplay between factors, further confusing the possibility of assigning causality. Most significantly, though, economic downturns generally spell trouble for the ruling government.

These factors present the necessary economic platform for democratic transition: the state of the economy, especially inflation and unemployment, had led to widespread discontent. As Anderson notes, “for incumbents, deteriorating economic performance cuts across social strata and affects a wide swath of society.” The abysmal economic conditions in Iran, then, are widespread and far-reaching, therefore presenting us with the requisite platform to provoke a democratic transition. Yet in 2009 even with these economic factors in mind, Iran failed to achieve a democratic transition. Continued evaluation of possible triggers and indicators thus becomes necessary, and my analysis hence moves to the examination of political factors.

**POLITICAL FACTORS FOR TRANSITION IN IRAN**

As a framework for this political discussion, van de Walle noted several suggestive patterns in his analysis of African cases of transition. He showed that opposition cohesion is positively correlated with opposition electoral victory, though it “is not a cause of transition but rather a consequence of a growing probability of transition due to a number of interrelated factors.” This study, therefore, focuses on opposition cohesion as a predictive indicator for transition. The Iranian opposition is loosely consolidated as what is known as the “Green Movement” or the “Green Wave.” It has three symbolic leaders: Former President Mohammad Khatami, Former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, and the sixth Speaker of the Parliament (Majles) Mehdi Karroubi. The opposition movement began with the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and the development of the 2nd of Khordad Coalition. This coalition is a very loose association of factions that includes moderate right and democratic-Islamist groups. In the 2009 election, the coalition had come together around former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. He was deemed a “smart move to garner votes from the anti-Ahmadinejad elements within the Islamic right while at the same time inoculating the reformist movement against accusations to be essentially counterrevolutionary.” This rejuvenated the coalition, which had suffered defeat in 2005 when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was first elected president. It appeared as though the opposition was coming together. Even after the elections, these candidates both filed petitions protesting the election results, citing similar ballot inconsistencies. They made several public appearances together, and pushed for an investigation into the election.

Secondly, van de Walle notes that the majority of the cases examined that had successful electoral transitions took place in two-round systems (TRS). This means that in a case with TRS, we might be more likely to find a transition. A two-round system, as described by the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, works in the following manner: The first round is conducted in

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58 Anderson 1999, 96.
59 Ibid., 97.
60 Van de Walle 2006, 78.
61 Posch 2009, 1.
the same way as a single-round plurality/majority election. In the most common form of TRS, this is conducted using FPTP. A candidate or party that receives a specified proportion, normally an absolute majority of valid votes, is elected outright, with no need for a second ballot. If no candidate or party receives an absolute majority, then a second round of voting is held and the winner of this round is declared elected. Van de Walle notes that two-round systems “facilitate opposition unity.” Iran uses this system, and the 2005 election was pushed to the second round. Had the election of 2009 been pushed to a runoff between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Karroubi’s followers would have thrown their support behind Mousavi, as both of them come from same group and both draw support from within the 2nd of Khordad Front. The election, however, rife with allegations of fraud, did not go to a second round. In my travels, I heard it widely theorized that the fraudulence in the election was perpetrated for just this reason.

As suggested by varied authors throughout the literature, no transition is embarked on without some kind of internal division within the regime itself.” This happens most often in cases of single-party electoral hegemonies. Since 2005, Iran has become more like one of these electoral hegemonies, mostly because of the alleged fraud of 2009. If we take Iran as one of these hegemonies, we can examine the role of the fragmentation of the elite in Iran. Currently, there are four main leaders within the regime in Iran: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Expediency Council chair Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

During Ahmadinejad’s first term as president, a split developed within the conservatives. The split places pragmatic conservatives, led by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, against an emergent ultra-conservative faction led by Ahmadinejad. This division has only become more inflamed in the final years of Ahmadinejad’s last term and has been exceptionally vicious since the June presidential vote. Ayatollah Khamenei had tried to remain above the factional politics of Iran. He has generally preferred to pit various blocs against one another to perpetuate his own top position in the Iranian political system. The election fallout from 2009 was so intense because of the popular discontent, however, that Khamenei was faced with the choice of intervention or the potential loss of his position. The Supreme Leader, in a risky but calculated move, came out in support of Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners, angering parts of the conservative ideological group. This backing prompted Rafsanjani and his pragmatic and technocratic conservative followers to come out against the Supreme Leader and instead ally with Mousavi’s reformists. Khamenei’s outright support of Ahmadinejad exacerbated this and other divisions.

The last player in this complex milieu is Iran’s current speaker of parliament, Ali Larijani, whose family now controls two of the three branches of the Iranian government — Ali

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63 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19.
64 Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR) Intelligence 2009.
65 STRATFOR 2009.
66 Ibid.
controls the legislature while his brother, Sadegh, heads the judiciary. Ali Larijani has emerged publicly in opposition to Ahmadinejad, often finding himself at odds with Ahmadinejad's inflammatory rhetoric. He was also one of the few regime officials to publicly warn that many Iranians questioned Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2009 presidential election. The Larijani-Ahmadinejad split exemplifies the ideological rift in the conservative camp as well, framing pragmatists against fundamentalists over Ahmadinejad's behavior.

Besides the split between political leaders, there has also been a split between the leading clerics in Iran. Following the election of 2009, many of the most powerful ayatollahs, including Hossein Ali Montazeri, Yousuf Sane'i, Jalaluddin Taheri, and Hossein Mousavi-Tabrizi, "openly defied Khamenei, dismissed the election, and either called for a fresh vote or else implied that even that would no longer be sufficient." In the aftermath of the election, Khamenei began to have trouble with many senior clerics in the holy city and seat of Shia Islam, Qom. The Supreme Leader has also been publicly denounced by Grand Ayatollahs Bayat Zanjani and Vahid Khorasani, who refused to meet him during his 10-day visit to Qom. There was also discontent from Grand Ayatollah Safi Golpayegani, Makarem Shirazi, and Sobhani over the handling by Khamenei's office of the 10-day show in Qom, where "private" meetings turned into photo opportunities and displays of the Supreme Leader's authority. The level of discontent from such a large number of these clergymen hints at a certain weakness for Khamenei. He must have the support of these individuals in order to maintain his power, and divides within these religious leaders could also hint at trouble lurking beneath the surface.

These ayatollahs have significant clout with the general population, many of whom look to the ayatollahs for guidance in life as well as in religious matters. The most politically significant intra-clerical rift is between Rafsanjani and Khamenei. Rafsanjani has repeatedly challenged decisions by Khamenei, and Khamenei has responded threateningly to him. This split has extended through the senior clerics, as they have taken either the side of Rafsanjani or Khamenei. Three more Grand Ayatollahs—Javadi Amoli, Shobeiri Zanjani, and Makarem Shirazi—have "politely" criticised Khamenei for not challenging Ahmadinejad's non-deferential behavior toward Rafsanjani. Grand Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili did not visit the Supreme Leader on the latest trips to Qom either, because of how Rafsanjani has been treated by Khamenei. It is not only the split in the political elite that is present in Iran, but also in the religious elite. Even with splits in both of these elite groups, we are still at a loss for a reason why transition did not occur.

Geddes (1999) notes that little evidence was found to support the claim that pacts increase the likelihood of democracy. They may have had that effect in isolated cases, and Geddes notes that "we cannot rule out the possibility that the likelihood of both pacts and stable democracy is increased by the existence of well established, coherent parties" that can make and

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67 Wright 2009.
68 Milani 2009, 12.
69 Bozorgmehr 2010.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
Because Iran does not have an established party structure, a discussion of pacts in reference to parties is not particularly relevant, and is not a transition factor that we can consider in this case.

International engagement and external pressure are also factors that are of consequence to democratic transition. Levitsky and Way posit a theory of leverage and linkage to explain the effectiveness of international intervention in democratic transition. International actors exert leverage in different ways, including political conditionality and punitive sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and military intervention. Leverage raises the cost of repression, electoral fraud, and other government abuses. However, Western leverage over electoral authoritarian regimes is “rarely sufficient to convince them to democratize.” According to Levitsky and Way, leverage is “most effective when combined with extensive linkage to the West.”

The United Nations issued a non-binding resolution condemning the post-election protests and the crackdown on protesters. In addition to the UN, the United States also passed resolutions condemning Iranian actions regarding the election. On June 19, 2009, ABC News reported that President Obama warned Iran that “the world was watching.” Major European politicians, including Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Angela Merkel also issued statements condemning the actions. The UN General Assembly passed Resolution A/C.3/64/L.37 on October 29, 2009, which condemned the government response to the protests. This resolution, which passed with 74 yes, 59 abstain, and 48 no votes, contained an explicit reference to the 2009 elections, in that it expressed “particular concern at the response of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the Presidential election of 12 June 2009 and the concurrent rise in human rights violations.” The leverage factor, then, is present.

The West, though Iran would fain admit it, does have linkages in the case of Iran, but not by the usual methods of trade, foreign investment, or mutual involvement in international organizations. Iran has a very large diaspora community in many European countries as well as the United States. The Iranian diaspora population, based on a compilation of the most recent national censuses from major receiving countries (excluding Turkey), is estimated in the range of two to four million, with an estimated 691,000 to 1.2 million in the United States alone. This community was involved in the protests in the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as other European countries, and many send sizeable remittances back to Iran. Additionally, the expatriate community runs radio broadcasts, internet sites, and satellite channels that are routed into the country both legally and illegally, and the BBC now supports a Persian service. Because the leverage and linkage between Iran and the West is unusual, it is difficult to say whether it can be thought of as extensive enough to meet Levitsky and Way’s requirements.

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72 Geddes 1999, 140.
73 Levitsky and Way 2005, 23.
74 Ibid.
75 Sciutto and Marquez 2009.
76 UN General Assembly 2009, 2.
77 Hakimzadeh 2006.
78 Ibid.
What is certain, however, is that the international community was indeed “watching” during these protests. While no military action was undertaken, action was taken through diplomatic channels. This action, however, did not create enough momentum for a democratic transition.

The most internationally prominent feature of this discussion is the protests that occurred after the June 2009 elections in Iran. Protests are examples of contentious collective action, which is defined as collective events which represent "potentially subversive acts that challenge normalized practices, modes of causation, or systems of authority. The case of Iran can be approached with this notion of protests. There are three types of contentious collective action: riots, general strikes, and anti-government demonstrations. Of these three, two occurred in Iran. Most of what occurred in the two months following the 2009 presidential elections were anti-government demonstrations, which are “any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.” Some of these demonstrations, however, degenerated into riots, which are described by Ulfelder as “any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.”

June 12, 2009 saw thousands of protesters pour into the streets, later clashing with police. On June 15, seven people were killed during a march by Mousavi supporters in Tehran, state media said, and protests broke out in other cities. Tens of thousands of pro-Mousavi demonstrators marched in northern Tehran in June 16. June 20 saw state television report that 450 people were detained during clashes in Tehran in which 10 people were killed. These actions certainly qualify as contentious collective action under Ulfelder’s typology. The question of the political logic behind these protests remains unanswered. The reasons for individuals flooding the streets are numerous, though analysts have been unable to completely explain the mass riots. They were clearly expressions of pent-up frustration and anger at the regime. The extent to which they were instrumentalized by the opposition, however, remains to be seen, though many marched in green clothing, carrying pictures of Mousavi. At this point, it does not appear that the protests were effectively used to channel political motives past the months after the election. These protests, however, did not trigger democratic transition.

We have now examined the economic and political considerations for democratic transition and found them all met. There is still the problem that all factors point to transition. However, there has been no regime change. With the economic and political factors in mind it is now necessary to examine social-cultural factors.

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79 Ulfelder 2005.
80 Ulfelder 2005, 320.
81 Ibid.
SOCIAL-CULTURAL FACTORS FOR TRANSITION IN IRAN

There are several social-cultural factors that might tip the scales in favor of democracy, including a history of active struggle for democratic rule, a homogeneous population, and high literacy rates, as well as modernization and high urbanization. Iran has a hundred-year history of active struggle for democratic rule. The norms, traditions, and organizations characteristic of a democratic civil society existed in various forms for most of the twentieth century, and they endure to this day. Most recent in Iran’s collective memory is the Islamic Revolution of 1979. This event, as well as the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11 (which was caused by dissatisfaction with economic stagnation, influence of Western power, results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, and the Russian Revolution of 1905), in addition to the popularly supported 1953 coup by Mohammad Mossadegh (that prompted the nationalization of the oil in the face of Reza Shah’s Western-friendly oil policies), are both examples of the history of popular expression of discontent with the government.

Iran also has a relatively homogeneous population and has maintained a unique national identity even through its long history of invasion and occupation. Though the dominant ethnic group, the Persians, make up only 51% of the total population, literary and artistic traditions have served to unite the populace behind an Iranian identity. Additionally, most of these minorities, including the 24% Azeri Turks, are integrated into Iranian society, participate in politics, and identify with the Iranian nation. For example, of candidates running in this past election, Mousavi is an ethnic Turk, and Karroubi is an ethnic Lor, however, neither of them faced problems regarding their ethnicity in the elections or in their moves toward power.

If we use Lipset’s factors of higher levels of education and urbanization and more sophisticated and varied means of communication, it is apparent that Iran is also moving towards modernization. In Iran, 36% of the population of tertiary age is in tertiary education (post-high school education program), up from just 18% in 2002. The overall literacy rate is 77%, and that rate is even higher, 96.6%, among youth aged 15-24. Iran also scores high on many other proxies for measuring modernization, including level of urbanization and density of communications connectivity. 68% of total population lives in urban areas, and the current rate of change in urbanization is 2.1%. Additionally, Iran is incredibly connected in terms of communications density. It ranks seventeenth in the world in number of internet users, twelfth in number of land lines in use, and twenty seventh in number of mobile phone users. High levels of internet use coupled with the extensive use of social-networking sites such as Facebook

82 McFaul 2005.
83 Behnam 1986.
84 Ibid.
85 Beehner 2006.
86 Lipset 1995.
87 UNESCO UIS 2008.
88 CIA World Factbook 2010.
89 Ibid.
and Twitter, as well as YouTube and large e-mail listservs, indicate that Iran is on the forefront of communication. After examination of socio-cultural factors in addition to all other varieties, it seems that Iranian regime change should have occurred in keeping with the political science literature. We are still at a loss for the explanation of why Iran did not experience a democratic transition in 2009. There must be another factor.

ANOTHER FACTOR?

I posit that Iran has an additional factor that must be taken into account when considering democratic transition: its institutional structure. The government of Iran consists of a three branch scheme, but with certain additions. As mentioned previously, there is a multi-part leadership in the executive, with the Supreme Leader as head of state and the President as head of government. The executive branch also includes the Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, and Council of Guardians. Iran has a unicameral legislature, the 290-member Majles. The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Judiciary.

The interaction of the political structure and the elite cleavage structure is of greatest interest in this study, as it is the elite structure that largely leads the ideological factions due to the personalistic nature of Iranian politics. The aftermath of the 2009 elections saw important implications in this structure. I argue that it is this structure that reinforces the fractionalization of the elites, and that this fractionalization prevents a realization of the possibilities in coalition organization.

Within this structure, there are certain elected bodies and certain unelected bodies. The most notable feature of the system is that the “Supreme Leader either directly or indirectly controls almost every aspect of government.” Of all of the bodies in the executive, the Council of Ministers, Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, and Council of Guardians, the only one completely elected by the people is the Assembly of Experts. It is important to note, however, that all candidates for all elected officials must first be vetted by the Guardian Council, which is half appointed by the Supreme Leader and half nominated by the judiciary and confirmed by the parliament. The institutional structure is intentionally designed to dissipate power and consolidate power simultaneously. It is clear that the Supreme Leader has considerable power; it remains that the factions in Iran are still quite powerful throughout all of these institutions. How is this possible, and what does this mean for Iran's prospects for democratic transition?

The Iranian system of government is confusing and convoluted. Figure 1 demonstrates this confusing yet ultimately somewhat ingenious structure. The Supreme Leader is the most important official in Iran, but seeks input on policy decision from a small circle of elite advisors, including the President. The President’s influence is dwarfed by that of the Supreme Leader,

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90 Afshari and Underwood 2009.
91 CIA World Factbook 2010.
92 Beeman 2004, 57.
but it is by no means negligible. Though the Iranian president's policymaking power is under the direct oversight of the Supreme Leader, especially in issues of foreign policy, this is not to say the president is powerless. As proven by Ahmadinejad, the president can be the voice and face of the entire nation. The behavior of the president within the international community directly affects the issues that are most important to Iranians, including issues of trade and human rights. Furthermore, the president does actually have the weight necessary to implement domestic economic and human rights policies as he sees fit. This is the kind of power in which all of the individuals grappling for power are interested.

Figure 1: Power-Flow of Iranian Elected and Unelected Institutions

The Guardian Council is key to the Supreme Leader's position, and is the most powerful group in the government. The Council must approve all bills passed by parliament and has the power to veto them if it considers them contrary or inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law. The Council is currently chaired by Ayatollah Jannati, the most conservative high-ranking cleric in Iran. While the Supreme Leader can change the rulings of the Council, he does so rarely as to attempt to preserve the legitimacy of the body, preferring to instead install like-minded individuals in the positions instead. The Council can also bar candidates from standing in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts, and thus holds quite a bit of power, as they decide who can and cannot be in the running to gain power. They determine the players in the game, and thus can alter the playing field as well by restricting what role any given individual can play.

The Assembly of Experts is not a particularly active body, but it ought not be cast aside as a do-nothing body. It meets but twice a year, and its sole purpose is to elect a Supreme Leader, monitor his performance, and remove him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his duties. There are 86 members in this body, and it is headed by Former President Rafsanjani.

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93 Esfandiari et al 2009.
94 Whatley 2009.
95 BBC 2009.
96 Ibid.
Here, we can see Rafsanjani’s strategy. It is unlikely that an Assembly would ever be chosen that would remove Khamenei, because the Guardian Council approves who can and cannot run for Assembly seats. Rafsanjani has been president once, but has tried running for president since then and reached the runoff election in 2005. Since his loss in 2005 to Ahmadinejad, he has moved to pursue other venues for power. Rafsanjani is poised for when Khamenei either passes away or for some other reason falls from power. As head of this committee, he will direct the selection of the next Supreme Leader. Whoever is chosen will owe a great debt to Rafsanjani and thus, Rafsanjani stands to gain very much from a change in leadership. His main goal at present is to remain powerful — he will not endanger his political position any more than he has to for fear of losing his game of time. This means that he will likely not throw weight behind the reformists again while he still perceives a threat.

The Expediency Council is the Supreme Leader’s advisory body. It has ultimate adjudicating power in disputes over legislation between the parliament and the Guardian Council. The members, who are prominent religious, social and political figures, are all appointed by the Supreme Leader. In October 2005, the Supreme Leader gave the Expediency Council supervisory powers over all branches of government, delegating some of his own authority as is permitted in the constitution. This body is also chaired by Rafsanjani, and again, we can see him simply waiting for his opportunity to use the political capital he has accumulated thus far to secure even more power.

The Majles is largely a podium for addressing the public. Its powers are severely constrained, and thus the legislation that is passed is mostly irrelevant, for legislatively-driven change is all but impossible given the Guardian Council’s oversight. The speaker of the Majles, however, can use his place to make public statements on behalf of legislators. For example, Larijani and Karroubi, who have both held this position, have used it to issue statements and gain public attention. The power of this institution as a legislative body, then, is not as important as the role it plays as a venue to establish the power of the speaker.

While none of the candidates spoke of any serious overhaul of the Islamic system, it is clear that they saw an opportunity to grab power in the system. Whenever such weakness is identified, however, it is sometimes the case that an individual will not join with others and form pacts, but rather sojourn alone. While there is evidence that Rafsanjani has been to Qom to speak with leading clerics on behalf of Mousavi, ultimately he is a pragmatist and a self-server. His silence since the election “may well reflect a desire to hedge his bets so as to protect his influence and power over whoever remains in control.”

Karroubi has also moved away from Mousavi following the election, recently choosing instead to pursue a more confrontational policy towards the government, thereby dashing any hopes of a united reformist opposition. When Mousavi announced the creation of a new
movement, the Path of Green Hope, Karroubi said that he would not be joining it. Instead, Karroubi is focusing his efforts on pressuring the government on the allegations of rape and abuse of opposition supporters arrested in the post-election crackdown—an issue to which the Iranian populace is very sensitive. His high moral ground as a cleric allows him the ability to criticize the government on this issue, and the nature of the topic endears him to the people. His success with this approach during the 1979 revolution might lead him to believe that such tactics will be equally successful this time around. This move, however, further splits Mousavi’s base of support. Karroubi does not have enough power in the system to be successful alone.

I examined earlier the coalition of the opposition, and examined how the opposition had come together in support of Mousavi. It is because of these powerful figures that the opposition was able to move together as it did before the election. Unfortunately, having such strongly delineated factions within the groups hurts the ability of the opposition to maintain a coalition with a clear and definite leader post-election. The institutional structure has allowed too many heavy-hitters that have gained power in the institutional arena. They have created a body of elites with citizen followers that are not content with the current system, yet refuse to completely defer to or support one individual that could truly push the movement forward for fear of loss of personal power. Though Mousavi is the symbolic head of the movement, the power he would need to sustain the Green Movement is not in his hands. The institutional structure through which he and the other powerful leaders arose parcels out just enough power for them to have a modicum of political clout, yet still keep each one from truly realizing enough power to convince any other faction that they ought to lead. Too many of these individuals (and others, including Khamenei’s first choice for the 2005 presidential election and the current mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Qalibaf) do not perceive the political opportunity to form such an alliance without severely losing personal power.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In the time following the June 2009 presidential election, the stage was set. All of the factors that, in other locales, point towards or have caused democratic transitions were present. The economy was down, growth had slowed, oil prices were down, divisions had erupted within authoritarian regime itself, the populace was mobilized and there was contentious collective action in the streets, the opposition moved to support Mir Hossein Mousavi as their candidate in the election, and the international community was engaged with external pressure from the US, UN, and European Union. Iran has a history of active struggle for democratic rule, a homogeneous population, few border contentions, and high rates of literacy, urbanization, and modernization. Had the elite factions been willing to choose one leader and throw all of their power behind him, or if any of the leaders had been able to collect enough individual power to pose a real threat, Iran would have had a tipping factor that, on top of all of the other

101 Butters 2010, 2.
indicators that marked Iran as ready for change, plus Khamenei’s weakness, might have triggered a democratic transition.

As it stood in 2009, the post-election movement lacked a real leader. The impetus for movement was there—the symbol of movement is Mousavi, but the actors behind the scenes have to stop forcing their way through the door all at once and let someone go first. It is not enough for the opposition to coalesce around a symbolic figure—they must coalesce around a real leader with enough power. This leader, however, if they are to arise out of the system, will be tainted by the system through which they gained power. This will stunt any push for change that might come from within the ranks of the elites. A push must then come from outside. This leaves us with several questions for further research. Who are the players outside of the system? Where are they? What are the extra-institutional powers that players outside of the system can gain? And perhaps most interestingly, what will be the role of further protests in Iran?

There is no answer as of yet. The political landscape in Iran is ever-changing, and Iran analysts have continually posited reasons for the durability of Iran’s authoritarianism. Political actors jump from seat to seat, moving from Speaker to President to Expediency Council chairman, attempting to achieve power through as many alleys as possible, yet are continually thwarted by the nature of the institutional structure. The institutions are designed to be debilitating, provoking competitions between actors, thus making it exceptionally difficult to garner enough power to exact change from within the system. As details arise about the nature of the relationships between these elite players, further examination will be required to assess if there is movement within the elites towards alliances, or if it appears that someone has found a way to gain more power outside of the system. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for regime change to come from within the system. Simply by virtue of the fact that all elites must be vetted by the Guardian Council, there will never be actors that will be able to both gain power and unseat the regime. The elites are tainted, and thus any change will be as a result not, as Geddes claims, from elites and their discourse and alliance structure, but from motion outside of the elites. An outside force must be able to gain extra-institutional power that can rival that of the Supreme Leader, and that requires some sort of catalyst, be it a severe miscalculation or misstep by the Supreme Leader, or his death. As is the trend that is evident in the history of Iran, only time will tell.
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Abstract: Electoral redistricting shapes political scientists’ perceptions of partisan polarization and incumbency. This paper examines the redistricting process at the county level of government, using the cases of McLean and Champaign Counties, Illinois. This research analyzes the McLean County board’s voting cleavages in order to highlight considerations of nonpartisan electoral bodies. With Champaign County as a comparison, it also uses a series of linear regression models to analyze redistricting’s effects on county incumbency and board composition. Redistricting impact proved insignificant, but the study demonstrates correlations between county electoral composition and state-level electoral trends, and also confirms the important influence of partisanship on redistricting and electoral outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

In February of 2007, the McLean County Board voted to take a stance regarding a legal ban of smoking indoors in Illinois, with eleven out of nineteen members voting against a board declaration of support for the ban. At a time when the issue was a contested topic at the state level of government, the board members, though not capable of directly impacting the state legislation’s outcome, felt compelled to declare a position. Ideological and personal considerations undoubtedly played into this vote, which did not split cleanly along party lines, although the issue had partisan overtones at the state level. Significantly, such votes often occur on the McLean County Board, in spite of its reputation as a nonpartisan body. At other instances in the board’s history, members have chosen to take similar stances on everything from video gaming to terrorism. For an ostensibly nonpartisan body, this behavior raises questions of a more nuanced background story of board interaction.

County governments receive very little attention from political scientists, and have been famously acknowledged to be the “dark continent of political science,” although perhaps they deserve more attention than they generally stimulate. Political scientists often perceive county government as insignificant because of characteristics such as local specificity and nonpartisanship. Yet why, in a body with allegedly little partisan influence, would board members feel the need to act in such an ideologically driven fashion? Issue positions like those taken on the smoking ban could be harmful to board cohesion and personal interaction, and could also risk alienating state-level legislators whose work controls county intergovernmental constraints. Under these circumstances, the risks of the situation seem high compared to the psychological pay-off involved. This anecdote highlights just one instance of interest within county politics, suggesting the merit of further study in this area.

This study will examine one of the most highly contested issues in political science within the unusual framework of a county government—that of electoral redistricting. This research will use cases from central Illinois for an exploratory look at a largely ignored subject.

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1 Gilbertson 1917.
Reapportionment problems touch many aspects of political science, from incumbency to partisanship. In this exploratory study, the role of partisanship in McLean County Board voting is examined, as well as the applicability of redistricting theory to county government. A comparison of McLean County, a body with a reputation for little partisanship, to Champaign County, a more competitive body, as well as to other findings in the field, could provide a springboard for further research on the role of these political issues in all levels of government.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is little doubt that electoral redistricting is a hotly contested issue at federal, state, and local levels of government. Incumbency advantage, district competitiveness, and partisan competition constitute some of the concerns expressed by scholars and politicians with respect to redistricting. For purposes of this county government research, the most directly relevant issues are those of partisan competitiveness. Generally, scholars agree that the institutional arrangements for redistricting do impact partisan competitiveness.2 Partisan and bipartisan plans pursue different ends, and deal with the often-competing interests of the party organization and individual incumbents. No definitive answers exist for these questions of seat efficiency and polarization. While some perceive redistricting as beneficial to democratic representativeness and responsiveness, others find that its impact is limited or diminishes over time.3 Overall, the exhaustive redistricting literature emphasizes the importance of partisan competition in the reapportionment process, and the redistricting process’s well-studied nature at the national and state levels far eclipses its examination within the context of counties.

Addressing the situation of county-level redistricting also implies examining urban-rural representation, bringing nonpartisan voting effects to the forefront. Regional voting patterns tend to be insignificant alongside partisan splits, unless they are somehow institutionally reinforced.4 Even if a split based on non-partisan characteristics exists for a legislative body, its impact is less likely to hold up over time without the backing of some structural trait of the body, such as its electoral districts. At this point, McLean County’s historically limited competitiveness becomes relevant to the discussion. Partisan competitiveness sparks interest most often when a formerly weak party becomes stronger, which seems to be the case in McLean County at this time, as two-party competition has only recently developed. For instance, in the case of post-war Southern realignment, as migration or social changes caused the growth of the Republican Party, the shift was aided by congressional redistricting, and incumbents had to adjust representation accordingly.5 Southern realignment could provide a comparative example for the perceived strengthening of partisan competitiveness in McLean County. This case’s progression of social change and gradual

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3 Cain 1985; Squire 1998; Gilligan and Matsuska 1999.
5 Polsby 2004; Sundquist 1983; Shafer and Johnson 2006; Basinger and Ensley 2007.
electoral change can provide a springboard story for future research on county reapportionment.

When measuring partisan competition, scholars look to the attitudes of both candidates and voters within elections. In state legislatures, parties both provide a default cleavage structure and help with institutional and ideological organization. While that approach examines electoral impact of partisan competitiveness, party formation and competitiveness may apply differently at the local level where legislative indicators are not fully developed. When applying this to county or local party context, past research often stresses both the importance of a “trickle-up effect” of party, and points out that although variations exist in county-level party organizations, even without a clear chain of command, local parties undergird electoral process.

However, little of the existing research deals with the shape and make-up of partisan competitiveness within county government. While Beck discusses county demographics in relation to party, even his work does not explicitly examine county governments. This provides another basis for comparing the constituent make-up and partisan competitiveness of counties. Although party organization may not be directly tied to the redistricting process in the county, the connections between these fields of study suggest that vibrant partisan competitiveness has significant implications in the electoral redistricting process. As more intense competitiveness arises, the level of partisanship in redistricting will also likely rise. MacManus extends these studies with a compilation of county make-up survey responses dealing explicitly with board elections and partisanship. Although she notes a trend toward increased competition reported in board elections, she also suggests at several points that the effects of term structures and other generally influential institutional electoral arrangements have received no empirical testing at this level.

Intertwining these several different bodies of scholarship will add to the scholarly conversation by linking these fields to the “dark continent.” The county can provide a venue through which to examine the variance of electoral competition and party development in a different ideological environment. The states have often been dubbed “laboratories of democracy” by political scientists, and by similar logic, local governments can bring experimentation to new levels and throw structure of government into even sharper relief.

While reviewing the scholarship on redistricting, Theodore Arrington discusses the multiplicity of issues touched by redistricting questions, including party, race, representativeness, local boundaries, and decision making in the face of competing criteria. Less weighed down in bureaucratic and federal limitations, local governments can be uniquely situated to embrace

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6 Basinger and Ensley 2007.
7 Wright and Schaffner 2002.
9 Beck 1974.
10 MacManus 1996.
11 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 1932.
12 Arrington 2010.
future redistricting questions by implementing different plans and experimenting with new technologies. Connecting local partisan competition to redistricting politics, along with applying these principles to the county level of government in both McLean and Champaign counties, may provide new perspective to our knowledge of electoral redistricting and partisanship.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

The use of theoretical approaches that examine incumbency and partisan advantage in conjunction with redistricting has been supported by a wealth of empirical evidence, particularly at the national level. Most research distinguishes between partisan, bipartisan, and nonpartisan redistricting processes. County governments experience electoral reapportionment in a similar manner to those at state and national levels of government, yet application of redistricting theory to counties has seldom occurred. Conversely, normative theory suggests that, particularly when we emphasize democratic representation, local governments provide for citizen-government interaction in unique and more direct ways. Moreover, local context can also indirectly play a significant role at high levels of government, due to mixed influences such as perceived competition, ideological similarity, and complacency effects. In addition to partisan representation, constituent-based representation, such as urban-rural interest splits, can play an important role at this level, though perhaps only if institutionally reinforced in the county legislative body. Therefore, applying redistricting theory to county governments has potential normative significance. The approach here will be, to the greatest extent possible, to apply the theoretical frameworks surrounding redistricting to the county level of government in an exploratory type of study.

Based on this foundation, redistricting will be examined through the implications of partisan competitiveness, or lack thereof, in the county environment. McLean County is historically a one-party Republican county, but has experienced a strong trend toward increased two-part competition over the last generation. Historically, the political divisions in the county were more likely to be urban-rural than Democratic-Republican. McLean County’s urban-rural divisions are also somewhat similar to the up-state versus down-state split of Illinois at large. As the county has become more competitive, the county board’s “nonpartisan” reputation has increasingly been called into question. This does not, however, indicate that Democratic considerations have replaced urban ones on the McLean County Board, because party lines have not necessarily coincided cleanly with urban and rural areas thus far.

This research also examines Champaign County as a useful electoral comparison and control. Champaign County and McLean County are similar in size and close in proximity. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2009 estimates, Champaign County’s population is 195,671, and McLean County’s population is 167,699.
Both counties have twin-cities at their center, with influential universities, high mobility, and parallel urban-rural divisions. The county board structures of the two also have similar features, with relatively large elected bodies and staggered terms. Despite these similarities, Champaign County has a reputation for being a much more partisan. An examination of the voting margins for election to the Champaign County Board as compared to those of McLean County provides empirical evidence supporting this claim (See Figure 1 below). Since questions of partisanship play so heavily into redistricting, these two cases supply a controlled comparison of the state of partisanship within counties.

Figure 1: McLean and Champaign Counties’ County Board Average Margins of Victory, 1980-2009

Electoral Competitiveness in McLean and Champaign County Board Races

Since partisan composition of electoral districts plays such a vital role in the redistricting process, the existence or lack of existence of partisan competitiveness in the county has key significance. This solidifies the rationale for examining partisan competitiveness in conjunction with electoral redistricting in McLean County and other counties. Furthermore, the increasing population of McLean County, fueled by migration to the twin cities of Bloomington-Normal may be intensifying two-party competition. It may also be producing higher levels of partisanship in its elected legislative body. Empirical confirmation for these trends would assist in applying the standard theories of redistricting to the county level of government. If this is the case, partisanship could be expected to be the most salient in the politics of redistricting. The hypotheses will therefore include the following:
H1: As partisan competition in the county electorate increases, partisan decision-making in the county board also increases.

H2: As the role of partisan competitiveness in the county board increases, standard electoral trends accompanying redistricting will also become more evident in the county.

These hypotheses focus primarily on the existence of, or increased growth of, partisan competitiveness. This phenomenon is not always active at the county level, but plays a strong role in determining redistricting plans’ outcomes and effects. Because of the role of competitiveness in redistricting theory, its place in McLean County must be established. The questions concerning redistricting theory are contingent upon this first descriptive aspect of research concerning the nature of county representation, so only after uncovering this relationship should the other hypothesis be pursued.

EMPIRICAL MODEL AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 1

This study uses a number of basic linear regressions to test its theoretical framework. A very limited level of compiled data exists at the county level of government, so measures had to be created. For the first hypothesis, the model aims to discover the impact of partisan competitiveness in the county electorate as a whole on county board decision-making considerations or cleavages. Board decision-making splits will be measured based on a comparative group cohesion score, defined as the average percentage of each groups’ cohesion over the percentage of average total board cohesion. These cohesion scores were based on aggregated roll call voting patterns for pairings of individual members across time. Roll call votes are a standard measure of legislator behavior. Although increasingly less common in recent years for the McLean County Board, roll call voting occurs at the county level for controversial or procedurally significant votes. These votes can potentially explain members’

17 To construct these cohesion scores, individual board members’ roll call voting histories were initially established. Then, pairs of individual members were matched up to create member to member cohesion scores for each pair of members on the board. Cohesion can be described as the number of votes together out of the total number of votes on which both member voted. Once these scores were compiled, group averages were calculated, i.e. Republicans voting with Republicans, Democrats voting with Democrats, and so on. Again, because some board members did not vote in every roll call, either due to absence from meeting, abstention, appointment to the board mid-year, or (in the case of the chair) procedure, the cohesion scores for each pair of members come from the percentage of votes “together” out of votes in which both members voted. Unanimous votes always remain within the set, because although they elevate the scores slightly, members did have opportunity to vote non-unanimously and chose not to do so. In the case of some members who voted only on one or two votes in the course of the year, their scores were outliers that skewed the average. Accordingly, if an individual member votes on less than one third of the roll call votes, their percentages do not make up a part of the board average scores. One third of the votes functioned as the threshold because it minimized the number of cases that would be removed while still accounting for the problem of outliers. However, in order not to haphazardly remove nuance from the voting patterns, this rule only took effect in situations for which theoretical justification existed, such as in the case of board chairpersons or members with partial-year terms.
actions based on their ideological framework better than any other measure. Using this measure of the comparative frequency with which members of different groups on the board vote together will serve as a proxy measure for how important the different considerations of party and regional interest are to board decision-making. If board members vote together by group substantially differently from how they vote as an overall body, movement across time or in comparison to county electorate trends may be revealing about partisan competitiveness and its role in the board as a legislative body.

Independent variables in the model include the state of Illinois’ presidential and gubernatorial margins (Republican vote minus Democratic vote), McLean County presidential and gubernatorial models, the change in composition of the county board in the previous election year, the number of uncontested seats in the previous election year for each party, and the number of incumbents reelected in the election of the year before the cohesion scores. Each of these variables demonstrates the strength of partisan competition in the electorate, as opposed to the existence of an electorate not dominated by only one party or ideological framework. Furthermore, since this study also attempts to uncover the impact of redistricting on county boards, it controls for redistricting with a variable indicating the number of years since the last redistricting process.

The model examines the McLean County Board’s roll call voting back to 1982, the year when the current County Board ten-district structure came into place. Within the data set, each case covers a two-year time span, including election data from only election years and board decision-making data from the election year and the following year. This time lag provides a built-in attempt to gauge the effects of competition in the county at large, measured through various election results, on the board’s decision-making cleavages. Using the two-year span as the unit of analysis presumably meshes the actual outcome of the various elections with county board actions. Previous studies on electoral redistricting also examine the impact of redistricting on incumbent security and partisan composition over an extended period of time, strengthening the rationale for using two-year intervals as opposed to the one-year intervals common in roll call analyses.18

In terms of other measures, the presidential and gubernatorial votes measure the strength of partisan competition in the county as compared to a control of the state for macro-level trends. State-level data serve as the control because factors that impact McLean County will presumably be more likely to parallel those of impacting Illinois more closely than those at the national level. Including a variable representing the strength of local parties, such as those from each party who filed to be precinct committeemen, may also have been beneficial, but the data for this component were not available.

Changes in board composition also play a large theoretical role in explaining the variance in the dependent variable. This research tracks board composition as it changes in election years by measuring the number of Democrats elected out of the total number of

available seats, including those for unexpired terms that were up for election. Especially in the case of McLean County, increasing Democratic presence on the board would suggest a more competitive body, in a fashion that may parallel the growth of Democratic competition in the county over time. The number of uncontested seats from each party could work in opposite directions, as Republican uncontested seats would indicate less competition, but Democratic uncontested seats may mean the opposite in a generally Republican county context. The average margin of victory for McLean County Board seats serves as a final indicator of competition. To measure this margin, Republican percentage of the two-party vote is used. The average of each Republican candidate’s strength across all of the districts shows the electoral strength, and therefore measures change the same way as the mathematical margin. Greater margins of victory indicate a less competitive county, and in the model, should be negatively related to the expected outcome of movement in cohesion scores based on increased party competitiveness. The controls for incumbent reelection and redistricting also attempt to incorporate redistricting theory, by taking into account the potential for the board to have its partisan composition influenced by these factors.

As explained above, the models separate the board into Republican, Democratic, rural, and urban groups, in order to uncover the strength of each of these cleavages as considerations for board decision-making. More fit in a model indicates that board group cohesion moves in relation to changes in county partisanship. In other words, increased group cohesion suggests possible increased prevalence of group association in members’ decision-making. The model tests whether or not movement in board group considerations occur based on the impact of increased partisanship within the county electorate. Significant results indicate that a group on the board votes more cohesively with increase of county partisanship. Practically speaking, the shape of McLean County’s efforts to redistrict in 2011 may be determined by whether or not urban-rural considerations remain consistent. Therefore, in order to explain which group votes together most strongly in conjunction with the level of partisan competition in the county, the model has been run with each group’s cohesion scores individually serving as dependent variables. Results of each model appear as follows:

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19 In 1998 for McLean County, and in 2002 for Champaign County, incomplete election records left out some of the districts. Accordingly, a margin that averages the preceding and following years’ election margins has been created as a substitute measure, in order to preserve all possible cases.
Table 1: Models of McLean County Partisan Competitiveness and Average Board Roll Call Vote Cohesion, by Group, 1982-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Republican Cohesion</th>
<th>Democratic Cohesion</th>
<th>Rural Cohesion</th>
<th>Urban Cohesion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>62.430</td>
<td>4.165</td>
<td>-149.789</td>
<td>137.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47.428)</td>
<td>(204.299)</td>
<td>(266.206)</td>
<td>(86.509)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Presidential Margin</td>
<td>-.614</td>
<td>1.323</td>
<td>-1.030</td>
<td>5.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(903)</td>
<td>(3.889)</td>
<td>(5.075)</td>
<td>(1.647)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>-2.892**</td>
<td>2.410</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>-.780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(186)</td>
<td>(.800)</td>
<td>(1.045)</td>
<td>(3.399)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean Presidential Margin</td>
<td>1.092</td>
<td>-1.587</td>
<td>.938</td>
<td>-5.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(805)</td>
<td>(3.467)</td>
<td>(4.524)</td>
<td>(1.468)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>3.057**</td>
<td>-2.939</td>
<td>-.285</td>
<td>-.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(243)</td>
<td>(1.048)</td>
<td>(1.368)</td>
<td>(4.444)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Composition</td>
<td>-1.215**</td>
<td>.960</td>
<td>.365</td>
<td>-1.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent Democrats Elected)</td>
<td>(214)</td>
<td>(.921)</td>
<td>(1.202)</td>
<td>(3.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean Uncontested Races-Republican</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>-.322</td>
<td>-.796</td>
<td>-6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(145)</td>
<td>(.625)</td>
<td>(.816)</td>
<td>(2.65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean Uncontested Races-Democratic</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(226)</td>
<td>(.972)</td>
<td>(1.268)</td>
<td>(4.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean County Board Average Margin</td>
<td>-1.132*</td>
<td>.342</td>
<td>.753</td>
<td>-1.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rep. Vote)</td>
<td>(334)</td>
<td>(1.437)</td>
<td>(1.875)</td>
<td>(6.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLean Incumbents Reelected</td>
<td>-.189</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.551</td>
<td>-.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(962)</td>
<td>(.269)</td>
<td>(.351)</td>
<td>(.114)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistricting Year</td>
<td>-.287</td>
<td>.278</td>
<td>.388</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.218)</td>
<td>(5.246)</td>
<td>(3.589)</td>
<td>(2.221)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N  
14 14 14 14
Adj. R-squared  
.751 .030 -.942 -.589
F-Test  
4.917 1.040 .369 .518

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p ≤.1, ** p ≤.05, ***p ≤.01

Table 1 presents the results for each of these models, although none are statistically significant overall. Interestingly, the model explains the most for Republican group cohesion and the least for rural group cohesion. By this logic, rural-urban splits on the board could be influenced least by changes in the partisan composition of the county. While this may suggest that these considerations vary less over time in board decision-making, it also may suggest that urban-rural groupings' importance to the board simply moves inconsistently as compared with county partisanship. On the other hand, the random variance in cohesion scores based on member personality, along with the limited number of cases, could be interfering with or diminishing the effects of any discernible trend. Within the models, some of the variable's
correlations are significant, but the findings are mixed in terms of their movement in the direction anticipated. The number of cases limits possibility for significance in these models, as well as others throughout the study. However, this limited “N” comes from the fact that the current board structure did not come into place until 1982, so cases before this time would cause internal inconsistency within the model.

The model for Republican group cohesion on the board had the greatest explanatory power. When the average margin of victory for board seats increased, meaning that Republicans were more secure, they voted together less frequently. This suggests that insecurity, or increased competitiveness, would impact board decision-making along partisan lines. The significance of this model of increased county competitiveness on Republican voting cohesion suggests that party may be becoming more important to board process. On the other hand, as the board becomes more Democratic (Board Composition Change), Republican cohesion also decreases. Bivariate correlations between the various indicators of partisan competition and board cohesion measures also present mixed findings. In most cases, cohesion scores across years waver around a central score, but do not trend in any particular direction. This creates difficulty in identifying the overall strength of voting cleavages on the board, and distinguishing partisan or urban-rural considerations from those of particular members’ voting habits and personalities. In McLean County’s specific case of redistricting, to rule out institutionally reinforcing urban and rural considerations in the board decision-making process may at this point be empirically unsupported.

To clarify some of these models’ mixed findings the bivariate relationships between Board Composition Change, Average Margin of Republican Victory, and each of the cohesion scores were examined. Interestingly, the only correlation that achieved significance, aside from those measuring similar phenomena, was that of Democratic Cohesion and Board Composition Change. Since Board Composition Change measures the increase in the percentage of Democrats elected to the board, the expected positive correlation (.458*) occurred. For this correlation only to achieve significance among the other measures suggests that Democrats, as the smallest group on the board, tend to experience the effects of partisan competition the most. Accordingly, their voting patterns on the board, including their relative tendency to vote together as a group, move significantly with their strength in the board composition. This finding has interesting implications for board voting patterns if the board’s composition continues to become more competitive, as predicted.

A graphical representation of two of these group cohesion measures, Republican and rural, as compared to McLean County’s presidential vote margin, displays some of the ambiguity surrounding groups’ cohesion scores. Depicted visually below in Figure 1, contrary to the hypothesis, rural voting patterns have stayed equally cohesive and even discernibly increased as partisan competition has increased (shown in terms of a decreasing Republican margin of victory over time). Republican voting cohesion, on the other hand, seems to neither trend upward nor downward over time, though it may be in the process of increasing slightly. In spite of statistical insignificance, this trend, at least in McLean County up to the present, would seem to indicate that partisan decision-making on the board has not necessarily become
a more salient cleavage even as the partisan competition of the board changes. These findings emphasize the benefit of maintaining the urban-rural split in McLean County’s board, and the type of decisions faced by board members, concerning issues like zoning, may support this emphasis.

Figure 1: Republican and Rural Board Members’ Average Cohesion and McLean County Presidential Voting Margins, 1982-2009

Significance issues for all of the data supporting this hypothesis again make it difficult to draw substantive conclusions. Perhaps, however, this reinforces a different aspect of local government and partisanship. Because of its face-to-face nature, partisan competitiveness may have a less overt impact on county government. Alternatively, these measures may not be the best depiction of the interactions that take place within county government. For instance, more qualitative or content-based analysis could better represent the influence of different voting considerations on the county board.
This study has also hypothesized that in counties with greater partisan competitiveness, electoral redistricting has a greater impact on county board composition. This model utilizes variables similar to those that made up the independent variable set in the previous model. This portion of the studies deals with the effects of redistricting on various measures of board security and incumbent advantage. Table 2 presents the data from Champaign County, an adjacent jurisdiction with a history of much higher partisan competition.

The first regression uses as its dependent variable the composition of the counties' respective boards, measured in terms of percent of Democrats elected. While this variable does not measure total board composition because it accounts only for those elected in each election cycle and county board members have staggered terms, its change from year to year captures the shape of change in board composition. By looking at this measure first, one can gauge whether or not redistricting has any influence on board composition at the county level.

The model's independent variables consist of multiple controls, including state and county presidential and gubernatorial margins of victory. Controlling for the overall change in the political or partisan forces impacting the county will allow for any effects of redistricting to be distinguished from the general pattern of board composition change that might have occurred even without redistricting. In this model, the logic of including uncontested races has shifted slightly from that in the first model of this study. Here, uncontested races contribute a general control for the tone of the board in terms of its normal trend of competition, and accounts for local electoral patterns in specific districts. The percentage of incumbents reelected also serves as a control in this situation. Incumbency advantage and redistricting effects are often tied to one another in the literature. Yet if the counties experience robust incumbency advantage effects from year to year, their impact would skew the perception of redistricting effects, and for this reason, incumbency also serves as an independent variable.

Finally, the redistricting variable should, according to the hypothesis, influence the board composition. As the years since a redistricting process occurs lapse, the redistricting's effects on board elections should decline. The table below presents the results of this model for both Champaign County and McLean County:
Table 2: County Board Redistricting and Board Composition Measure, 1982-2009  
Dependent Variable: Board Composition (Percent Democrats Elected)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Champaign County</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>McLean County</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-37.730</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>83.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(41.370)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(102.756)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Presidential Margin</td>
<td>1.192</td>
<td>State Presidential Margin</td>
<td>.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td>State Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>-.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.185)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Presidential Margin</td>
<td>- .634</td>
<td>McLean Presidential Margin</td>
<td>-.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.998)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.872)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>-2.107*</td>
<td>McLean Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>-.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.366)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.569)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Uncontested Races-Republican</td>
<td>-1.224*</td>
<td>McLean Uncontested Races-Republican</td>
<td>-.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.550)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Uncontested Races-Democratic</td>
<td>2.033**</td>
<td>McLean Uncontested Races-Democratic</td>
<td>.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.881)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign County Board Average Margin (Rep. Vote)</td>
<td>-1.190</td>
<td>McLean County Board Average Margin (Rep. Vote)</td>
<td>-.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.824)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.730)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Incumbents Reelected</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>McLean Incumbents Reelected</td>
<td>-.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.156)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistricting Year</td>
<td>.609*</td>
<td>Redistricting Year</td>
<td>.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.802)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.633)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 14 14  
Adj. R-squared .744 .291  
F-Test 5.192* 1.591  

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p ≤ 1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01

In this model, a positive relationship exists between the lapse in years after redistricting and change in board composition, although it is only significant for Champaign County. One feasible explanation hinges on the Republican strength. As more time passes from the redistricting more Democrats are elected, so perhaps redistricting favors board Republicans. Yet another possibility is that the relationship between these two variables does not capture redistricting effects within the right time span or type of measurement. Especially in Champaign County, where the board is more competitive and composition may be more stable, a simple measure of board composition change may not reveal the full story of redistricting effects. Again, the problem of a small sample size surfaces as well, since various races’ individual characteristics may impact board composition more, especially at the county level.
Because of the ambiguity accompanying an exploratory study such as this, it was necessary to measure redistricting effects in terms of other dependent variables as well. Board Composition may only suggest one part of the total impact redistricting has on a county board. The next model examines the effect of redistricting on incumbent reelection rate. If county government parallels other governmental bodies, redistricting may be used to make incumbents safer. Therefore, using incumbent reelection rates as a measure of the impact of redistricting on the nature of the county board ultimately meshes with the logic of the question. The construction of the incumbency dependent variable was similar to that used in other studies, and consists of a percentage of incumbents reelected out of the total number of seats up for reelection. In some instances, this may not account for the fact that incumbents chose not to run for reelection. However, eliminating these instances from the possible pool of seats up for election may remove some of the data’s descriptive power because the fact that incumbents chose not to run for one reason or another could also be an effect of redistricting. Therefore, retaining the total number of possible seats in which incumbents could have run and won for the basis of comparison in the variable contributes to its theoretical power to explain. With the logic of this variable set forth, the findings of the impact of redistricting on incumbent reelection rates for McLean and Champaign Counties are listed in Table 3 below:
Table 3: County Board Redistricting and Board Member Security Measures, 1982-2009
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Reelection Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Champaign County</th>
<th>McLean County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Independent Variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>77.936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(110.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Presidential</td>
<td>-1.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin</td>
<td>(2.578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Gubernatorial</td>
<td>-1.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin</td>
<td>(.534)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Presidential</td>
<td>1.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin</td>
<td>(2.487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>2.659*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Uncontested Races-Republican</td>
<td>1.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.884)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Uncontested Races-Democratic</td>
<td>-1.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.848)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign County Board Average Margin (Rep. Vote)</td>
<td>-1.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Composition Change (Percentage of Democrats Elected)</td>
<td>.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistricting Year</td>
<td>-.801*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.873)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj. R-squared</strong></td>
<td>.522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F-Test</strong></td>
<td>2.576</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01

For McLean County especially, this model has the least explanatory power of any of the models put forth in this study, and is also not significant. However, this could be more indicative of a truth about the county level of government than it would appear. In other levels of government, one would expect measures like redistricting, the composition of a legislature, and the partisanship of the surrounding district to play a significant role in explaining incumbency advantage. Interestingly, only in the Champaign model did redistricting play a statistically significant role in explaining the movement in incumbency reelection rates. Furthermore, in Champaign County, redistricting did impact incumbency in the expected direction, since as time since redistricting increased, incumbent advantage decreased. The findings of this model, therefore support the second hypothesis, although the models achieved only mixed levels of significance.
The final model presented below follows a similar logic in terms of controls to that of the two preceding models. Here, however, average election margin of county board races serves as the dependent variable. This shuffling of variables attempts to test the different directionality of effects on various measures of redistricting effect in order to uncover the most useful way of examining these questions at this level of government. Cycling dependent variables in this way allows for more discovery of what measures function best as controls or capture variation the most. Average Election Margin for county board races depicts the level of safety that victors experience in the election, along with the general competitive nature of the county. This would estimate redistricting effects on the general competitiveness of the county board races which would potentially be linked to each county boards’ composition in the long run.

Table 4: County Board Redistricting and Board Race Competitiveness Measures, 1982-2009
Dependent Variable: Average County Board Election Margin (Republican Percentage of Two-Party Vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Champaign County</th>
<th>McLean County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Average Margin</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>37.623 (7.699)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Presidential Margin</td>
<td>- .638 (.455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>- .471 (.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Presidential Margin</td>
<td>.340 (.449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Gubernatorial Margin</td>
<td>1.167* (.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Uncontested Races-Republican</td>
<td>.789*** (.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Uncontested Races-Democratic</td>
<td>-1.175** (.368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Composition Change (Percent Democrats Elected)</td>
<td>.384 (.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Incumbents Reelected</td>
<td>-.180 (.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistricting Year</td>
<td>- .309 (.912)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Champaign</th>
<th>McLean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj. R-squared</strong></td>
<td>.917</td>
<td>.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F-Test</strong></td>
<td>17.022***</td>
<td>2.516</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01
The significance of the Champaign County model with average margin as the dependent variable causes it to stand out from among other models in the study. Problematically, most of this significance and explanatory power could come from the uncontested seats variables, which are among the only independent variables also significant in this model. This suggests that collinearity may also have occurred, discrediting the model. For example, in Champaign County, these variables most likely move together with the average margin of victory because there are fewer contested seats, so they pull the average more severely and the movement is thus more significant. The logic behind retaining the uncontested seat variables, however, was an attempt to control for local effects, wherein a board member may remain unchallenged for years because of his or her high name recognition in the community. Alternatively, in McLean County, even these measures do not have a significant correlation with the dependent variable. In addition to the uncontested races variables, the Champaign County gubernatorial margin achieves significance in this model, though the opposite is true for McLean County. The most plausible explanation here comes from Champaign’s more competitive county make-up, which causes it to move more in line with the pattern of the state.

In this model, redistricting does not have a significant correlation with Republican electoral strength. Again, this insignificance possibly results from the small number of cases available here. Theoretically, with a larger number of cases, if a negative correlation were sustained, it would suggest that as time passes after a redistricting, the gap between Republican and Democratic electoral strength shrinks. In some ways, this could be opposed to the hypothesis that redistricting will directly impact board composition by altering the status quo of electoral districts, potentially improving prospects for change. On the other hand, redistricting could strengthen the majority party, causing its electoral strength to increase most when the time lag since redistricting is at its least, so this negative correlation could also have some theoretical justification.

With models that have so little statistical strength due to their small number of cases, the overall picture of these findings may be more important than the predictive success of the individual variables. The fact that greater explanatory power and more instances of significance occurred in Champaign County models than in McLean County models provides insight into redistricting theory on a broader level. McLean County’s board has been demonstrated by Hypothesis 1 and Table 1 to be the much less competitive body. Interestingly, it shows less overall tendency to fit the basic tenants of redistricting theory in political science literature, such as expected redistricting effects on incumbency, electoral safety, and board composition. Perhaps redistricting’s impact only arises in a more partisan political culture, where electoral competition provides more of an impetus in the redistricting process. Champaign County’s models’ comparatively high levels of explanatory value in some ways confirm the expectation that McLean County’s redistricting issues are much less centered on partisan lines.
CONCLUSIONS

In spite of statistical significance issues that followed from the data’s limited number of cases, the findings presented in this study fill a gap in the existing literature. Although an increased number of cases could provide more conclusive statistical evidence, the expectations of increased partisan strength in county board decision-making in McLean County have thus far failed to surface. The findings of this study are exploratory and suggest possible patterns in electoral politics of county redistricting and board members’ decision making. For example, the number of roll call votes taken by the county board decreases dramatically within the sample time frame from 1982-2009. As the board increased its reliance on committee structure in government, its partisanship may not surface in roll call voting as reliably as in previous years. The discussion of voting cleavages within the McLean County Board would therefore necessitate further examination, although in general it would seem that increasing partisan competition has the most correlation with the cohesion of the Republican group of board members, and the urban-rural group cohesion patterns do not seem to vary in a specific direction over time. A final note on this segment of the study draws attention also to the significant bivariate correlation between board composition change and Democratic voting cohesion, which again may indicate that future increases partisan competition could continue to impact the strength of party as a mechanism for the formation of voting blocs on the county board. Because of Republican model strength and the seemingly contradictory picture of continuing urban-rural group cohesion, I also find it likely that the impact of partisan influence in McLean County may be increasing, but just as in the case of Southern realignment, may not yet be fully iterated in the legislative body of the county board.

The models comparing the impact of partisan competition on redistricting trends suggest that a more competitive partisan county government follows trends of electoral politics and redistricting more closely than a less partisan body. However, the redistricting process itself has minimal discernible impact in both communities, at least in terms of measurement used in this model. Although results were mixed within the models, the McLean County data’s lack of significance in the relationships between standard measures of electoral competition and board composition, incumbency, and member security all suggest that units of government with strong two-party competition have more consistent patterns of electoral behavior. This broad finding may assist public administrators and managers in understanding the principles behind different redistricting schemes.

A more detailed look at redistricting impact or a comparison of redistricting processes from county to county could be valuable additions to future research. For instance, covering a broader range of counties would assist in minimizing the small N issues with the model and would add greater confidence to the findings of this exploratory study. Furthermore, measuring redistricting only in terms of time lapsed since the last redistricting process most likely limits the measure of the impact of this variable. One useful addition would be a measure that included the impact of the redistricting on different districts and their partisan makeup. This would require an in-depth examination of individual counties’ redistricting processes year by
year. Again, the impact of having this improved measure would help scholars isolate the impact of redistricting at the county level.

Other measures could generate more explanatory power about the workings of partisan competition within county boards themselves. For instance, including committee votes and action would be relevant in a situation with more cases. Analyzing the use of party as a decision-making mechanism for board members through a content analysis of divisions on issues at board meetings could also be insightful. One additional possibility for measuring the strength of local party organizations would be the percentage of precinct committeemen chairs filled by parties.

This study strengthens the framework of the literature, applying it to a new level of government with the suggestion that bodies that are traditionally less partisan experience less well-defined impact of redistricting and national party-strength trends. In linking the study to the literature, Broach’s ideas of institutional reinforcement of non-partisan divides parallel the research of this study.20 Interestingly, the conclusions from these models also bolster his claim that redistricting effects apply more clearly in two-party systems than elsewhere. Even in the face of insignificant findings, this exploratory study has attempted to lay the groundwork for a fresh method of applying party development, competition, and redistricting theory to America’s “dark continent.” County government directly impacts the lives of citizens in tangible ways. The role of electoral competition in its operations, although it varies from county to county, is important for developing an understanding of politics in the most neglected level of government.

20 Broach 1972.
WORKS CITED


New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (dissenting opinion).


EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A PLAN TO MAKE THE GRADE
Megan Weinstein

Abstract: Since World War II, millions of immigrants have settled into European societies. While many of these ethnic minorities are entering their second and third generation within their host countries there is still a deep sense of disunity and alienation. Some researchers suggest that the best way to acculturate these migrants into society is through structural integration where migrants are exposed to and involved in institutions such as the educational system. To examine the importance of education’s impact on socio-cultural integration, this article examines the effect of educational structures on the socio-cultural integration of Europe’s ethnic minority populations, including foreign-born migrants. More specifically, this report examines the relationship between socio-cultural integration and starting age and duration of compulsory education.

INTRODUCTION

In almost any immigration country, the integration of minorities into the host society is vital to the cohesion and harmony within that society. Since World War II, Europe has witnessed a large influx of immigrant populations, mainly due to temporary and guest worker programs followed by permanent settlement. Many of these migrants, even two or three generations after settling, encounter economic and social disadvantages, discrimination, xenophobia, and exclusion from civic and political participation. Of the many vehicles through which integration can be improved, structural integration, and more specifically education, has gained recent esteem within studies conducted by the European Union. These studies have recognized that education is able to set the ground work for further integration in both the cultural and structural realms because it reaches the population at a young age.

Policymakers throughout Europe are aware of the dangers of social exclusion and have been experiencing greater pressure to adopt effective approaches for increasing the integration of these new members into their respective host societies. The European Commission has called for leadership committed to overcoming social division and adopting policies that will promote equality. This is a problem that is not likely to go away on its own. In an increasingly globalized world, migratory movements will continue to bring an influx of minority populations, and as long as there continue to be cultural differences, there will be a distinct need to increase levels of social tolerance and inclusion.

This research inquires how institutions, particularly compulsory education, play a role in advancing the integration of migrant cultures in Europe. The role of education has been generally neglected by policymakers in the past, but holds value because of the state’s ability to make structural changes which may further affect socio-cultural aspects of integration.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Defining Integration

This research examines the inclusion process of migrant populations within the social and institutional realms of the host society. Within social science research, several terms have been used to describe this phenomenon including but not limited to: absorption, adaptation, race relations cycle, assimilation, acculturation, inclusion, incorporation, and integration. For the purpose of this research, the focus is on social integration, referring to “the process by which people who are relatively new to a country become part of a society.”¹ This consists of “the inclusion and acceptance of immigrants into the core institutions, relationships, and positions of a host society.”² According to the Council of the European Union, it acts as a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the member state.³

Integration vs. Assimilation

The most common terms used to describe this process are integration and assimilation. The notion of integration differs from assimilation mostly in historical conception. Historically, assimilation has been viewed as a unidirectional process where migrants are forced to abandon their own culture in order to adapt to the host society. This often arouses negative connotations of suppression, ethnocentrism, and violence. This reaction stems from the rise of abusive nationalism throughout Europe in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Some of these extreme forms of nationalism motivated attempts to create culturally homogenous nations; in the process, ‘assimilation’ became a form of cultural suppression. The most obvious cases of such occurrences include Germany throughout WWII and the “brutally homogenizing” aspirations of Jacobian Republicanism in France.⁴

However, Rogers Brubaker argues that, in reality, there are two distinct forms of assimilation: the general and abstract term and the specific and organic term. The specific and organic term depicts assimilation as “convert into a substance of its own nature, as the bodily organs convert food into blood, and thence into animal tissue... to absorb into the system, incorporate.”⁵ In this sense, this form implies a sense of total absorption and is the form of ‘assimilation’ most associated with negative historical connotations.⁶ Meanwhile, the general and abstract form of ‘assimilation’ is rooted in the idea of increasing similarity or likeness. Here, assimilation regards only the notion of becoming similar, to make similar, or to treat as similar. This version of the word is being used more widely in the past decade. Authors are challenging the taboo by incorporating the term in their research instead of integration.⁷

¹ Rudinger and Spencer 2003.
² Boswick and Heckmann 2006.
⁴ Brubaker 2003.
⁵ Oxford English Dictionary.
⁶ Brubaker 2003.
Schnapper state that it does not need to just be a one-sided process but can instead be used to shrink the differences and social distance between two or more groups or parts of them. Regardless, “assimilation” does have negative and distorted connotations that require continual clarification.⁸ Because of this, for pragmatic and communicative purposes, ‘integration’ serves as a more appropriate word than ‘assimilation’ within the realm of migrant integration. It better serves as a concept that is adequate for scientific purposes as well as for communication with policy makers and the wider public.

Modes of Integration: Integration of a Nation

Methods of migrant regulation vary from country to country. However, they have often been generalized into four main approaches for the incorporation and integration of migrants into society: assimilation, differential exclusion, multiculturalism, and two-way integration. These approaches to integration are strongly connected with the past immigration trends unique to each country, as well as the historical concepts of nationalism and citizenship. Each approach demonstrates a cultural view of integration and places integration responsibility on the migrant population, the host society, neither, or both.

The first main category focuses on the complete assimilation of migrants in terms of learning the national language and adopting the social and cultural practices of the host society. As previously discussed, the concept of assimilation usually includes migrants giving up old practices in order to fully adopt the new national identity. Therefore, the responsibility of integration falls entirely on the shoulders of the migrants. This approach is appropriately titled an “assimilationist approach” by both Castles and Crul.⁹ Meanwhile, the differential exclusion method focuses more on the separation of migrants and the host society. Typically, this form is found in countries with temporary migration schemes like guest-worker or labor programs. Migrants are considered strictly temporary and are therefore not given the right to family reunification or permanent residence. This leaves migrants only temporarily integrated in the labor market and excludes them from integrating into other levels of society such as political participation and national culture.¹⁰ The next category is referred to as the “multiculturalism” approach. Unlike the assimilationist and civic integration approaches, multiculturalism does not assume the existence or necessity of homogenous and monocultural nation-states. It instead works through the concept of pluralism in accepting cultural diversity and community formation and emphasizes the promotion of equality.¹¹ This is often times carried out through anti-discrimination legislation and equal opportunities policies. The responsibility of integration falls more on the host society as it is expected to accept newcomers along with the cultural practices they carry.

While the previously described approaches to integration have been prevalent in the past, the European Union is now encouraging member states to adopt an approach that focuses

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⁸ Heckmann and Schnapper 2003.
⁹ Castles 2002; Crul and Schneider 2009.
¹⁰ Castles 2002; Crul 2009.
¹¹ Castles 2002; Crul and Schneider 2009, “Children of Turkish Immigrants”. 
more on the fusion of the migrant and host societies. In this “two-way integration” both the migrants and the receiving societies must change in the process of integration. In reality this supposes two separate one-way processes in which the burden of change falls on both actors.\footnote{Christian 2007.} Christian Joppke states that this occurs in the dual presence of civic integration and the antidiscrimination measures found in the multiculturalist approach.\footnote{Joppke 2007, “Transformation,” 247-248.} This method is supported by the European Union because it acknowledges that integration is not a one-sided process.\footnote{Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003.} Both the migrants and host communities are active participants in the integration process, each with their own characteristics, reactions, and levels of adaptation.\footnote{Penninx 2005.} There is an inherent interaction between these parties, and successful integration incorporates a change in the perspectives of both the migrant population and the host community.\footnote{Rudinger 2003, 5.}

This push towards two-way integration is relatively recent, only gaining serious attention in the past five years. Methods of assimilation, differential exclusion, and multiculturalism still exist in many European countries. Those countries that have adopted the two-way integration method have done so quite recently. Therefore, past ideologies of each nation still have a large effect on the attitudes towards immigration and integration today. The level of socio-cultural integration, social tensions, and discrimination can still be largely influenced by this history.

Process of Integration: Integration of Individuals

While the national ideologies regarding immigration and integration are extremely influential in determining the nation’s capacity for integration, the actual process takes place at the individual level. Opportunities and incentives for integration manifest themselves in multiple spheres of active life, whether going to the office, participating in local sports clubs, or even just eating at a local restaurant. Integration acts as a multi-dimensional phenomenon which manifests itself through 3 key systems: Legal/political, cultural, and structural integration.

Legal/political integration refers strictly to the process of immigrants’ inclusion as members of the political community. The fundamental aspect of this process regards the naturalization of immigrants and national policies directed at citizenship requirements. These policies determine the difficulty with which migrants are able to claim national citizenship and therefore gain full access to the political system. This access serves as a precondition for exerting influence on the political system and provides a way for immigrants to partake in the host society.\footnote{Bosswick and Heckmann 2006.} Often, the level of difficulty of naturalization relates back to the national ideals of integration. For example, Germany, until roughly five years ago, did not consider itself an immigration country (‘Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland’) and thus employed a strict
system of differential exclusion, which made gaining citizenship relatively difficult compared to other European states. Even today with its new acceptance of two-way integration, the citizenship requirements are still extensive. Meanwhile, the French assimilationist model allows for full-fledged citizenship to those who subscribe completely to the principles of the country’s political system and accept its national ideals. However, while naturalization is quite simple, upon subscribing to this culture one forfeits any state recognition of individual cultural or religious heritage and receives no safeguards against discrimination. In general, the legal/political aspect of integration has a large impact on an immigrant’s ability to partake in society as the stepping stone to gaining legal and political rights. However, this one-way form of integration focuses solely on the burden on the immigrant and has little effect on the host culture. Such legal/political inclusions are a necessity but not sufficient for full integration.

While legal/political integration is necessary for access to legal rights and the political system, it is through cultural and structural integration that two-way integration takes place and migrants are able to fully acculturate with the host society. Cultural integration refers to the cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal changes experienced as migrants acquire the core competencies of the host culture and society. It places the individual’s personal identification within the social system and determines whether they continue to identify with their national culture or, rather, see themselves as a part of the host society. This does not necessarily mean that immigrants must completely forego the culture and ideologies of their respective countries of origin; cultural integration promotes an interactive, mutual process in which the host society also experiences change as it adapts and learns to relate to the newcomers. Typically, cultural integration includes knowledge of the host country language and cultural standards; it involves adapting to a new way of life and social participation in the host culture. Such adaptation associates higher rates of immigrants in social networks of the host society, including but not limited to friendships, partnerships, marriages, and membership in voluntary organizations.

Structural integration is closely linked to cultural integration but includes migrants’ participation in the “core” institutions of the host culture. Bosswick and Heckmann title this ‘placement’ and define it as the process of an individual gaining a position in society, which enables them to partake in socioeconomic institutions and gain cultural, social, and economic capital. It includes the attainment of access to position and status within the economy and labor market, the educational institutions, the housing system, etc. Bosswick and Heckmann argue that structural integration is the most essential aspect of integration, for it enables migrants to partake in socioeconomic institutions and gain capital, which, he believes, leads to cultural integration over time.

While these different forms of integration have been discussed separately, it is important to note that they are extremely interconnected. Heckmann argues that structural integration

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18 "Migration Citizenship Education - Germany."
19 Bosswick and Heckmann 2006.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
has the greatest effect because it introduces immigrants to the society and the host culture through co-workers, classmates, neighbors, etc. Furthermore, failing to integrate migrants into the institutions of a nation can severely impair their ability to culturally integrate because they have no way of gaining capital and prominence within society. However, the same can be said for the effect of cultural integration. Becoming acculturated in society and understanding the basic social skills relevant to the host culture can positively impact migrants’ abilities to succeed in the labor market. Because integration is such a cyclical concept, it is imperative that policies address both the structural and cultural aspects of integration as key to a better acculturated society.

IMPACT OF EDUCATION

One strategy for integrating ethnic migrants begins with the reform of procedures, practices, and policies that address the foundational systems through which integration takes place. A key example of this is the education system. The education system serves as a major vehicle for integration because of its direct impact upon both structural and cultural integration. The beauty of education is that it targets youth while they are still at impressionable ages and has the ability to help set the foundation for their future success. However, education can also be indirectly discriminatory or exclusionary if it fails to narrow the gap between the achievements of migrants and host nationals.

Within the European Union, it is widely recognized that education serves as an excellent medium through which a state can increase equal opportunities and foster the recognition of diversity. It is because of this that the education sector is the main field of targeted integration policies among European Union member states. Even those states averse to minority-specific anti-discrimination and equal-opportunity policies have adopted education measures to aid in the integration battle.23

In terms of cultural integration, entrance into the school system usually marks immigrants’ earliest and most intensive contact with the host society, and education has been found to play an important role in shaping immigrants’ cultural identities and relations with host nationals. Policymakers suggest that education can bridge cultural gaps in times of high social tension and negativity towards migrants. The exposure of both migrant youth to the host culture and the host culture to the migrant youth encourages the recognition of diversity.24 Education serves as a form of two-way integration where migrant students are exposed to the culture of the host society and adapt to social mores, while, simultaneously, students of the host culture are exposed to ethnic diversity and can expand social understanding. Furthermore, participation in education encourages social contacts and relationships across cultural and ethnic boundaries. According to the European Commission and Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), it is through social contacts and the climate created by the

23 OECD, 3.
24 Ibid., 8.
possibility of such contacts that people develop a sense of belonging in a particular social space.25

Structurally, education encompasses the fundamental building blocks of opportunity that allow individuals to get ahead in society. Upon leaving the school system, students are supplied with the necessary know-how and intellectual skills needed to partake in socioeconomic institutions and to gain a position in the labor market.26 The level to which students are able to integrate within the school system determines the opportunities and resources available to them later on in life. One of the most recognized aspects of education’s structural effect on integration focuses on migrants’ perceived lack of skills, particularly language. It is through the acquisition and full competency of language that migrants are able to gain comparable social and economic capital within the host society. Without such skills, migrants compete at an inherently unequal level with host-country nationals and are often left much more vulnerable to social exclusion and further disintegration. It is not uncommon for migrant youth to be raised speaking a language that is foreign to the host society. In such circumstances many students actually begin learning integral language skills only upon entering the school system.

The realm of education encompasses multiple facets that may influence success levels for migrants both within school and later on in the labor market and which may therefore have an impact on cultural and structural integration. These include systematic structure, curriculum, level of segregation, special programming, bilingual opportunities, and allocation of funds.

INDICATORS

Education

While multiple aspects of education are relevant to migrant achievement, this study focuses on the technical and social benefits of education through a specific focus on educational structure, comprised of the age requirements and specific tracking of education. Educational structures vary across countries, especially in the extent to which they constrain and maximize choice and in how easy they are to navigate.27 Variations in structure may shape the pathways that migrant children take into the labor market, higher education, and their lives as citizens.

According to The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) surveys, which address issues of structural integration by comparing education and labor market positions, there is a direct relationship between educational structure and attained levels of education of migrants (in this specific case they look at second generation migrants).28 These surveys demonstrate the impact of compulsory educational structure on second generation migrants’ ability to adapt and keep up with host-country nationals in terms of educational competencies.

25 OECD, 6.
26 Entzinger 2003, 33.
27 Holdaway, Crul, and Roberts 2009.
28 Crul and Schneider 2009.
For this project, the first indicator of educational structure is starting age. The starting age of migrant children can have a large effect on their capacity for integration because the beginning of formal education often times marks the beginning of many students’ full exposure to the host culture. This means that students who enter formal education earlier are more likely to be exposed to social culture and language education during a critical period of emotional and cognitive development. Furthermore, it is not unusual for migrant students to be raised where the home language is other than that of the host culture. Therefore, their exposure to this language does not begin until the beginning of formal education.

In this study, only the starting age for compulsory education is included because it is completely inclusive of the migrant society. While pre-primary education, often termed kindergarten, has been shown to have positive effects on the educational attainments of migrants, there is a significantly smaller proportion of the migrant population attending pre-primary education in comparison to children of the host society. Including those ages in the measurement may exclude a large portion of the migrant population.

The second indicator of educational structure is the length of time between starting age and the age of first selection track. This indicator shows the greatest amount of variance. For example, in Germany the selection of first track begins at age ten when students are placed in three rather strictly separate school levels (Hautschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium). Coupled with the later starting age, migrant students in Germany thus have comparatively little time to pull themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position. This early selection often leaves more migrants students in the lower qualifying streams, especially Hauptschule, which is the lowest track of secondary schooling. This is relevant for the exposure to the majority language and a mixed social environment, but also for the chances of acquiring the necessary skills and level of schooling for being tracked into higher qualifying strands of education. The longer a child of immigrants has had the chance to be in education before a decision is made about the most suitable track, the higher are her/his chances to access pre-academic paths. The problem is that being tracked in lower qualifying school types frequently limits the choices for professional careers afterwards.

Integration

The dependent variable in this study is the level of socio-cultural integration of the migrant population. This pertains to the level at which migrants are integrated into the host society, in terms of proficiency and use of the host-country language, mutual stereotypical attitudes, and interethnic social contacts. It is recognized that integration outcomes are affected by the interplay of a range of factors and that comprehensive measurement of this would include language proficiency, amount of societal organizations migrants were regularly involved in, mutual stereotypical attitudes, and the relationships they formed with members of

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29 Eurydice, 130.
30 Eurydice, 11.
31 TIES, 6.
32 TIES, 10.
the host society. Unfortunately, due to resource constraints, the amount of involvement in social organizations and interethnic relationships are not available for this study. However, measures of discrimination and ethnic tension are readily available. The indicators that will be used to measure the dependent variable are the feelings of discrimination based on ethnic origin and the extent to which there exists discrimination in each host country, as measured in the Eurobarometer 71.2 (2009), and the amount of tension felt between people of different races and ethnic groups, as measured in the Eurobarometer 72.1 (2009).

Specifically, the questions being analyzed are:

**Eurobarometer 72.1:****

QA15_1: In all countries there sometimes exists tension between social groups. In your opinion, how much tension is there between each of the following groups in (OUR COUNTRY)?

   Different racial and ethnic groups:
   
   (1) A lot of tension
   (2) Some tension
   (3) No tension
   (4) DK

**Eurobarometer 71.2:****

QE1_1: For each of the following types of discrimination, could you please tell me whether, in your opinion, it is very widespread, fairly widespread, fairly rare, or very rare in (OUR COUNTRY)?

   On the basis of ethnic origin:
   
   (1) Very widespread
   (2) Fairly widespread
   (3) Fairly rare
   (4) Very rare
   (5) Nonexistent

QE3_1: In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed on the basis of one or more of the following grounds? Please tell me all that apply.

   Ethnic origin mentioned
   
   (0) Not mentioned
   (1) Mentioned

QE4_1: In the past 12 months have you witnessed someone being discriminated against or harassed on the basis of one or more of the following grounds? Please tell me all that apply.

   Ethnic origin mentioned
   
   (0) Not Mentioned
   (1) Mentioned

QE16_1: Do you have friends or acquaintances who are of an ethnic origin different than yours?

   (1) Yes
   (2) No
   (3) Don’t Know
DESIGN AND STRATEGY

My formal hypotheses for this research are as follows:

H1: Nations in which compulsory education begins at an earlier age will have higher rates of socio-cultural integration.

H2: Nations in which compulsory education allows for more time between the starting age and the age of first specific track selection will have higher rates of socio-cultural integration.

The methods used to test these hypotheses are based on a quasi-experimental design that focuses on population surveys from seven countries: Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom. This case selection allows for a variety of dissimilar educational structures. Scandinavian countries, on the one hand, have a single structure for all students until age sixteen and generally have automatic progression of students through the years. On the other hand, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands have differentiation in students’ routes through school beginning at age twelve or earlier. Comparatively, this study includes France because of its intensive use of options and channeling within the general structure and the United Kingdom for its coexistence of several parallel structures.

The unit of analysis is the individual respondent from these selected countries and the revised survey sample size contains an N of 7,248 total respondents. Findings first analyze the effect of educational structure measures on individual discrimination and social tension responses through cross-tabular descriptive statistics accompanied by Pearson’s Chi Square levels of significance and the Gamma measure of association. Then, to control for country, crosstab analyses will be run and measured with Pearson’s Chi Square and Gamma measures as well. Finally, the study will examine the foreign population proportion, GDP per capita, and unemployment rates within each country to examine their separate effects on integration. The dependent variables as taken from the Eurobarometer surveys have been re-coded on a 0-1 scale with 0 representing the highest level of discrimination or social tension within each question and 1 being the lowest level of discrimination or social tension within each question. This means that higher responses (those closer to 1) represent higher levels of integration and vice versa. Furthermore, an index has been created to represent the summation of all dependent variables regarding measures of discrimination. This will measure the cumulative effects in order to demonstrate the feelings of discrimination and tension across the board. The scale ranges from 0 to 1 in .25 unit increments where 1 again represents the lowest level of discrimination/highest level of integration and vice versa.

One recognized potential problem within this design is the fact that the population being measured for the dependent variable may not have necessarily gone through the national school system in which they reside. Therefore, there is the potential that the sample will not be representative of the population parameter.
The independent variable measures are outlined as follows:

Table 1: Independent Variable Measures by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start Age</th>
<th>Track Age</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>% Foreign Population</th>
<th>GDP Per capita</th>
<th>Percent Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>36,600</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>39,200</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>39,500</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>32,600</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>34,800</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general spread of the dependent variables is as follows:

Table 2: Model Dependent Variable General Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discrimination Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Spread</td>
<td>28504</td>
<td>0.6441</td>
<td>0.25001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Discrimination</td>
<td>29768</td>
<td>0.9736</td>
<td>0.16044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Discrimination</td>
<td>29768</td>
<td>0.8951</td>
<td>0.30640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of Ethnic Origin</td>
<td>29458</td>
<td>0.5700</td>
<td>0.49509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Tension</td>
<td>25659</td>
<td>0.6481</td>
<td>0.32850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Index measures*

Discrimination spread overall is concentrated in the middle-high range with 70.1% of respondents claiming it to be fairly widespread (26.9%) or very widespread (43.2%). Personal discrimination was only mentioned by 2.6% of the respondents. However, the proportion of respondents reporting witnessing discrimination of others was much higher at 10.5% of respondents. Meanwhile, 43.0% of respondents reported having friends of a different ethnic origin.

The index measure, which ranged from 0 to 4 in .25 increments, had a mean of 3.09 and a standard deviation of .606. The distribution shows two major spikes around 2.75 and 3.75. To achieve a 2.75 score, respondent’s responses would include a “fairly widespread” measure of discrimination along with the recognition of 2 of the 3 other discrimination variables (personal discrimination, other discrimination, or reporting no friends of a different ethnic origin). To achieve a score of 3.75, respondent’s responses would include a “fairly widespread” measure of discrimination along with the recognition of all 3 other discrimination variables. This shows that, in general, much of the sample reports relatively high levels of discrimination.
CONCEPTUAL FINDINGS

Table 3: Bivariate Correlations for Migrant Integration (All Countries)
Independent Variable: Starting Age in Country’s Educational System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Gamma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination spread</td>
<td>155.915</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Discrimination</td>
<td>7.684</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(at the .05 level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Discrimination</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of Ethnic Origin</td>
<td>6.385</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Tension</td>
<td>77.932</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Bivariate Correlations for Migrant Integration
Independent Variable: Duration (in years) Between Starting Age and Track Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Gamma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination spread</td>
<td>228.391</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Discrimination</td>
<td>25.980</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Discrimination</td>
<td>40.293</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of Ethnic Origin</td>
<td>106.451</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Tension</td>
<td>162.218</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 1

The cross-tabulations examining the relationship between the starting age of compulsory education and the dependent variables are significant at the 0.05 level, with the exception of those measured against the witnessed discrimination of others. The results demonstrate a positive correlation between starting age and levels of social tension with the highest peaks at ages five and seven. This finding supports the research hypothesis. However, the results demonstrate that there is actually a negative correlation between starting age and levels of discrimination; as the starting age increases, the level of discrimination decreases. This means that as the age at which students begin compulsory schooling increases, levels of integration also increase. These findings do not support the research hypothesis.

Furthermore, for all cross-tabulations, the Gamma measure of association is quite low, ranging from -0.111 to 0.127. Therefore, while the correlation between starting age and the dependent variables is significant, the change in starting age only accounts for a very small, if any, proportion of the change in the dependent variables.

Hypothesis 2

The cross-tabulations examining the relationship between the duration of time between the starting age and first track age of compulsory education are significant at the .001 level. The results demonstrate a negative correlation between duration and levels of discrimination; as duration increased, the level of discrimination decreased. This means that as duration increases, levels of integration also increase. This finding supports the research hypothesis. However, the results also demonstrate a positive correlation between duration and the levels of
social tension; as duration increased the level of social tension increased. This means that as duration increases the levels of integration decrease. This finding does not support the research hypothesis.

However, for all cross-tabulations, the Gamma measure of association is again very low, ranging from -0.018 to 0.192. These results demonstrate that the change in the amount of time between starting compulsory education and the age of first track selection only accounts for a very small, if any, proportion of the change in the dependent variables.

**Ethnic Minority Control**

In preparation for the country control, the responses of those identifying as an ethnic minority in comparison to those not claiming ethnic minority status were examined. Respondents identifying as an ethnic minority show significantly different results than those not claiming ethnic minority status. The discrimination indicator’s spread remains consistent on all levels. However, there is a much higher percentage responding “Very Widespread” among respondents identifying as an ethnic minority than those not claiming ethnic minority status. Meanwhile, the personal discrimination measures, other discrimination measures, and those reporting friends of different ethnic origin varied greatly with those claiming ethnic minority status showed higher rates of discrimination than those not claiming ethnic minority status. Within personal discrimination, 23.1% mentioned being personally discriminated against compared to the 1.7% of non-ethnic respondents. Within other discrimination, 29.7% of ethnic minorities responded that they had witnessed somebody else being discriminated against due to ethnic origin compared to the 9.6% of non-ethnic respondents. Finally, 81.9% of respondents identifying as an ethnic minority reported having friends of a different ethnic origin while only 55.8% of non-ethnic respondents reported having friends of a different ethnic origin.

**Country Comparisons**

In an attempt to control for the effect of individual countries upon the dependent variable, a linear regression was run with the United Kingdom as a dummy variable. However, the results could not be properly calculated because of the multicollinearity of the independent variables. To further investigate the effect of educational structures within each country, several cross-tabulations were run. The results were not significant, but may still be of interest.

To compare the variables controlling for country, the countries with the same starting ages for compulsory education and the countries with the same duration of schooling before the first tracking were matched up and compared. If countries with the same dependent variables differ greatly, it is more likely that other country-specific variables are throwing off the data. If they are similar, it may mean one of two things. The hypothesis would appear stronger because a) there would be a continuation of effects across country borders, or b) countries with similar
educational structures may also be quite similar in other structural and policy-oriented ways, and the measures could be a result of these common variables. To compare within starting age, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are paired up, both starting schooling at age five; Germany, Austria, and France are paired up, all starting school at age six, and Denmark and Sweden are paired up, both starting schooling at age seven. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have very similar responses for the discrimination spread, personal discrimination, and other discrimination. Meanwhile, friends of ethnic origin varied with 16.9% more respondents claiming friends of a different ethnic origin in the United Kingdom than in the Netherlands. However, this could be a result of higher levels of ethnic minority responses within the United Kingdom. For social tension, the United Kingdom reported much lower levels than the Netherlands.

Germany, Austria, and France showed varying results. For discrimination spread, Germany and Austria demonstrated similar findings, with Austria reporting a higher spread of discrimination. However, France reported a much higher spread of discrimination than both Austria and Germany. The responses for personal discrimination and other discrimination were relatively comparable for all three countries. The number of respondents reporting having a friend of different ethnic origin was much lower in France. Social tension variables for Austria and France were very similar but Germany reported much less social tension.

Finally, Denmark and Sweden reported very similar results for all measures except for the perception of other discrimination. Here, Denmark reported much higher numbers of respondents witnessing discrimination of others at 20.2% compared to the 6.2% of Sweden. To compare within duration, Austria and Germany are paired up, both with four years of duration between starting compulsory education and the age of first track. Denmark and Sweden are paired up, both with nine years of duration between starting compulsory education and the age of first track.

Austria and Germany reported similar findings across all measures. Within discrimination spread, Austria reported with slightly higher discrimination measures, but the difference was mild. Affirmative responses for personal discrimination, other discrimination, and having friends of a different ethnic origin were also very closely matched. The most variation occurred within the social tension variable. Here, Austria reported more social tension with 47.7% of respondents reporting “A Lot of Tension” compared to the 36.9% within Germany, 46.8% reporting “Some Tension” compared to the 54.9% within Germany, and only 5.5% reporting “No Tension” compared to the 8.3% within Germany. This difference may be influenced by the fact that Austria had more respondents of ethnic minority than Germany. Denmark and Sweden were again compared for duration and therefore demonstrate the same results as stated before when compared for starting age.

33 For percentage spreads of different dependent variables, see Tables 5-7 in the appendix.
CONCLUSIONS

Overall, while the effects on integration of both the starting age of compulsory education and the duration between this age and the age of first track selection were significant, they were not of sufficient magnitude for the hypotheses to be supported. The effect of the independent variables on integration accounts for very little of the change in the dependent variable. Therefore, it can be concluded that there are other factors that have a greater effect on integration than educational structure.

In an attempt to account for such other factors, a multiple regression was run to examine the effects of the percent foreign population, GDP per capita, and unemployment rates. Again, there was a high level of significance, but with a very low Pearson’s R-squared measure of association. It appears that the data may be picking up nuances because of the large number of cases being utilized. With such a large number, any variation in the data will impact the results, even if the independent variable is only accounting for a very small proportion of the dependent, as seen with the Gamma measures of association. Even upon controlling for country, foreign population percentage, GDP per capita, and unemployment rates, the data shows very little variation. Therefore, it is possible that the measurement for integration is incomplete or inaccurate. It could also be the case that the sample is not representative because it includes those who may have not gone through the education system of the country in which they reside. The most likely error is that of internal validity. The measures of socio-cultural integration do not appear to be accurately evaluating the theoretical concept.

Upon examining the results of the first hypothesis, the direction of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables must be addressed. In order to support the research hypothesis, the effect of starting age on discrimination and social tension should show a positive relationship. While this was the case for the effect of starting age on social tension, the effect of starting age on discrimination demonstrates a negative relationship overall.

Upon examining the results of the second hypothesis, again the direction of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables must be addressed. In order to support the research hypothesis, the effect of duration of compulsory education on discrimination and social tension should show a negative relationship. While this is the case for the effect of duration of compulsory education on discrimination, the effect of duration of compulsory education on social tension demonstrates a positive relationship overall.

While the discrimination and social tension indicators were meant to cumulatively measure the level of two-way integration, it appears that they may be measuring two different things. After examining the results of the first hypothesis, several potential explanations for this peculiarity surfaced. Upon further inspection, it seemed as though the measures of discrimination may address the manifest discriminatory acts which occur in society, while social tension addresses the more passive feelings of insecurity among those of different ethnic backgrounds. In general, acts of discrimination have a high occurrence within structural and institutional aspects of society. It may be the case that starting school at an earlier age allows for more potential for discrimination to occur or for the perception of discrimination to occur. If a
student has more time in school exposed to the hierarchy of the host culture, they may feel more discrimination than if they were still at home. Furthermore, migrant parents with children in school are going to be more conscious of discriminatory acts that their child may undergo within the institution, which may further hamper the results. Social tension, on the other hand, may still decrease for the reasons hypothesized. While early entrance does allow more potential for acts of discrimination, the overall exposure to the student population may still reduce social tensions through the forming of friendships and relationships and the general cultural exposure of the host culture to the migrant culture and vice versa.

Unfortunately, the results of this research do not support the second hypothesis, thereby negating expected conclusions. In fact, they are completely reversed. The main explanation for this phenomenon simply points out the potential insufficiency of the dependent variable. As previously mentioned, there is a multiplicity of influences on integration. Perhaps the inclusion of a greater number or greater variety of these influences would hold more significant and similar results. When controlling for the country variables, there appeared no real pattern in the results. Apart from the differentiation explained by the number of respondents claiming ethnic minority status, most of the results were not cohesive. Furthermore, some of the results, such as the very low discrimination and social tension scores of Germany, appeared out of place considering the high political and media attention that such issues have received in recent years. This again may allude to the measurement problems of the dependent variable.

Overall, the inconsistencies within the data create real challenges. While the project demonstrated some provocative results, they are extremely difficult to interpret because they fail to paint a clear picture. One aspect of this is simply the limitation of the methodology. Due to time constraints and the impracticality of extended cross-tabular analyses, few opportunities to test various controls existed. A suggestion for future research would include indicators for both the independent and dependent variables with more variance. This would eliminate the problem of multicollinearity, allowing the researcher to run logistic regressions. These improvements in methodology would expand the scope of the data and provide for clearer interpretation. Furthermore, as previously suggested, further research should include a greater variety of indicators to measure socio-cultural integration. Future research may be able to build upon the foundation laid by this project, in order to further our understanding of the link between European integration and education.
APPENDIX

Table 5: Discrimination Spread (by percent) for Model as Controlled by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Discrimination</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-existent</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Rare</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Rare</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Widespread</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Widespread</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Dichotomous Variables: Affirmative Responses for Experiences of Discrimination (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Friends of Different Ethnicities</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Respondents’ Perceived Level of Social Tension (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
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PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY: POWER-SHARING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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Abstract: Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in the world. Theories of power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that allow for higher levels of power-sharing are often more successful at consolidating democracy and stability in highly divided societies, like those common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By examining the electoral system, executive type, and level of decentralization, this study first determines the level of institutional power-sharing for each of the 48 Sub-Saharan states. Next, it compares these levels of power-sharing to indicators of democracy and state stability to determine if more power-sharing does correspond to greater democracy and stability. Using a bivariate analysis and factoring in region, the data shows that there is a strong and significant correlation between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of democracy and state stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

INTRODUCTION

The Sub-Saharan region of Africa is arguably one of the most divided and conflict-prone regions in the world. The region is home to more than a thousand languages, and in the past twenty years most Sub-Saharan countries have experienced violence ranging from ethnic rebellions to genocide. The chronic instability and deep cleavages of the states in this region present comparative political scientists and institution crafters with a unique challenge: how to implement a democratic system that is truly representative and stable. This challenge is heightened by the question of how to set up a system that is not susceptible to failure and gives all parties involved an incentive to see it succeed. Power-sharing, it is theorized, can provide solutions to both of these problems. The ability for power-sharing institutions to include all major parties in the decision-making process would appear to make them ideal candidates for alleviating the tensions that exist between competing groups in Sub-Saharan states. For the aforementioned reasons, power-sharing institutions are considered especially relevant not just to the divided societies of Africa, but those across the globe.

Sub-Saharan Africa provides a hard test for determining how effective power-sharing institutions can be in states that are often extremely divided and have experienced violence relatively recently. Disputed elections have produced violence, and tension between ethnic groups has often resulted in conflict, exemplified most shockingly by Rwanda. The resurgence of violence is often a concern to both policy makers within these states and the international community, as violence in one state can destabilize the surrounding region. Successful power-sharing is theorized to prevent the outbreak of violence by bringing all major stakeholders to the table. Evidence of this can be found in Burundi, where in 2009 the last rebel group, the National Liberation Forces, laid down their arms and were recognized as a legal political party.

1 Oppong 2006; Global Report 2009.
2 Freedom House 2010: Burundi.
Such instances seem to provide evidence that power-sharing can promote peace and successfully integrate opposing groups into the political process. However, power-sharing is not without its critics. The formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may only serve to institutionalize differences and exacerbate existing tensions. Granting groups considerable levels of autonomy may only serve to weaken the state, as it can potentially lead to secession as in the case of Southern Sudan. Because of the controversial nature of power-sharing institutions, both its proponents and critics must be considered.

This study will approach the topic of power-sharing first by taking a step back to consider the arguments and evidence of supporters and detractors of power-sharing institutions. The purpose of this study is not to consider why states adopt power-sharing institutions. Instead, it is to examine whether those Sub-Saharan states that have adopted institutions allowing for higher levels of power-sharing have experienced higher levels of democracy and stability. This study seeks to answer that question by comparing the institutional levels of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan states to their measured levels of democracy and stability. While power-sharing institutions are often cited as solutions for mitigating conflict and consolidating democracy in cleaved states, surprisingly enough, their influence as yet has not been tested in Sub-Saharan Africa.

THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST POWER-SHARING

The importance of determining whether or not power-sharing institutions improve democracy and reduce conflict cannot be overstated. Establishing systematic evidence to evaluate the impact of power-sharing institutions is both theoretically and politically important for determining if these arrangements promote long-term peace, manage conflict, and consolidate democracy in ethnically divided societies. There exists an extensive literature dedicated to these very issues, which has been developed over the past several decades. This paper draws substantially from the seminal work by Pippa Norris in 2008 in which the theories of power-sharing are tested in a large number of cases across the globe. These power-sharing regimes are characterized by formal institutional rules that give multiple political elites a stake in the decision making process. Power-sharing constitutions share common characteristics that include the following: executive power-sharing among a grand coalition of political leaders drawn from all significant groups, proportional representation of major groups in elected and appointed offices, and cultural autonomy for groups.

It is argued that in post-conflict or ethnically cleaved states the only viable types of settlements capable of attracting agreement from all factions are power-sharing regimes that avoid winner-takes-all electoral outcomes. The more inclusive these power-sharing arrangements are the more likely they will develop stronger support from stakeholders and therefore ensure stability. While other methods of resolving conflict in ethnically divided societies have been attempted in the past, such as partition, these are often costly and end in

3 Norris 2008, 22.
failure. Street indicates that power-sharing addresses the key issues that have caused ethnic tension and hostility, and thus is ideal as a remedy to such problems. Institutions that allow for the horizontal and vertical dispersal of power are most relevant to heterogeneous societies that have a history of conflict and are in the process of democratizing. In Africa there is a tendency for elites to concentrate power at the center and use repressive means as a way of asserting control. Avoiding such circumstances is necessary if there is to be any substantial consolidation of democracy. The use of power-sharing in these segmented societies guarantees all significant stakeholders a place in the national or regional governments and provides a strong incentive for politicians to accept the legitimacy of the rules of game, moderate their views, and collaborate with rivals. Norris suggests that power-sharing institutions also encourage support for democracy by avoiding winner-take-all elections and guaranteeing minorities a voice in the government. With assurances that they will not be excluded from government, minorities are also less likely to take actions that might undermine the stability of the state.

While power-sharing institutions are often cited as being the best option for highly divided societies, there are still those who challenge the claims that power-sharing institutions are best for promoting democracy and mitigating conflict. Power-sharing regimes may in fact serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages and deepen rather than alleviate them. Explicitly recognizing the rights of ethnic groups can make it more difficult to generate cross-cutting cooperation in society by reducing electoral incentive for compromise. The formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may magnify the political importance of these identities. Solutions to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic factions as fixed and grant each group rights and autonomy may in fact reinforce sub-national identities. By de-emphasizing such identities it may be possible to turn citizens towards a concept of society that is more inclusive and tolerant of other groups.

In addition to reinforcing societal divisions, Spears argues that power-sharing institutions lead to a surprisingly unstable form of government that at best only provides a short reprieve from violent conflict. Power-sharing arrangements are difficult to achieve and even more difficult to put into practice, and do not stand the test of time or resolve conflict. At the same time power-sharing regimes in post-conflict societies have an extremely difficult task ahead of them; they must bridge the cleavages of groups in conflict. Power-sharing is not about forming a grand coalition of friends, but reconciling groups that are enemies. Including warring parties and excluding moderates can have negative consequences for divided societies using power-sharing. Using Rwanda as an example, Spears suggests that it is as difficult to forge an alliance with a member of the opposition as it is to form an alliance with someone who is

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4 Street 2004.
5 Bratton and Rothchild 1992.
7 Spears 2002.
8 Ibid.
9 Jarstad 2006.
considered a murderer. For many of these ethnically divided or post-conflict societies, power-sharing can be equated to making a deal with the devil and is therefore unlikely to last.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: PR OR MAJORITARIAN?

Of the factors considered in this study, the type of electoral system a state institutes is arguably the most important. Electoral system design is a crucial variable in democratic stability because it provides the means by which political parties or minorities are either included in or excluded from government. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems typically employ open or closed party lists or the use of a single transferable vote. In a study of several Sub-Saharan states, Reynolds finds that those states using proportional representation were more successful and stable democracies.10 Lijphart (2004) notes that the type of electoral system is crucial because it is significantly related to the development of the party system, type of executive, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive.11 States using plurality methods are more likely to have a two-party system and a one party state with a more dominant executive. PR, on the other hand, is likely to be associated with a multi-party state, coalitions, and a more equal legislative-executive relationship. These characteristics define the consensus model of democracy that relies on separation, instead of concentration of power.12 The former two characteristics are significant for the representation of a diverse number of groups in divided societies, while the later prevents an executive take over. Like Reynolds, Norris also finds that states making use of PR are more successful at democratic consolidation, as opposed to those using majority or plurality electoral rules.13

However, proportional representation has several shortcomings, often cited by its critics. To begin with, the low voting thresholds that are characteristic in many proportional representation electoral systems give small minority group representatives little incentive to appeal to people outside their own ethnic group, while moderate political leaders may be branded as traitors for attempting to appeal to a wider base. Proportional representation also may serve to institutionalize and reinforce ethnic tensions in society by failing to provide political leaders with incentives for cross-group cooperation. As Lardeyret (1991) argues, PR systems are inherently more unstable since coalition governments cannot cope with serious disagreements. This leads to instability as the executive is left vacant and time is needed to construct a new coalition and government. These small minority parties tend to wield an undue amount of power as they are often the swing votes in coalitions. PR’s tendency to allow even extremist parties into government is also problematic as they often are anti-state. Lardeyret’s most important criticism is that PR is the worst system to adopt for ethnically divided states in Africa.14 Elections often degenerate into a competition between ethnic groups over public office

10 Reynolds 2009.
and the best way to counteract this is to encourage members of each group to run against one another on trans-ethnic issues in single member districts.

Majoritarian electoral systems, in contrast to PR, are characterized by the use of either a majority or plurality system. Majority systems usually employ a second ballot, while plurality systems typically use a first-past-the-post method and both types of systems also make use of single member districts (SMD). These majoritarian systems are thought to encourage bridging strategies and force political leaders to appeal to a wider base of voters. It is theorized that more moderate electoral appeals should therefore foster social tolerance and cooperation. Parties must combine the differing interests of as many voters as possible and offer their electors a coherent program that they will govern by. A moderation of parties also comes from this, as most of the votes parties receive are from undecided voters in the middle. As Barkan suggests, in agrarian societies - common in Sub-Saharan Africa - PR often does not produce electoral results that are much more inclusive than majoritarian systems with SMD. In addition, majoritarian systems make elected members directly responsible to constituent concerns and provide each district with a representative at the national level. Conversely, PR tends to weaken the links between voter and representative as each region has no definitive representative. This in turn reduces the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation.

Majoritarianism, like PR, has a number of shortcomings. Critics of majoritarian systems argue that winner-takes-all elections often fail to produce stability in post-conflict or divided societies. According to Lijphart, in ethnically divided societies “majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy.” Majoritarian regimes often fail to incorporate minorities into the government and encourage excluded groups to resort to alternative methods to express their demands. These can range from violent protests to civil war, and even state failure. Majoritarian systems are also capable of producing vagaries, such as the exclusion of substantially supported third parties and a parliamentary majority being won with fewer total votes than the opposition. Established democracies may be able to tolerate such representational anomalies, but these could prove catastrophic for fledgling African democracies.

PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENTS

The concept of a parliamentary executive, or using the legislature as a source for the executive, lends itself well to power-sharing and is advantageous for a number of reasons. The prime minister and cabinet can only continue to hold power so long as they have the support of the majority of the legislature. There is then a stronger incentive for the executive and

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19 Binningsbo 2006.
legislature to collaborate, which increases inter-electoral flexibility and acts as a safeguard against unpopular prime ministers.\textsuperscript{22} Prime ministers also tend to lead more collegial cabinets, as opposed to the hierarchical cabinets found in presidential systems. This creates more collective accountability, as the ministers must present a united agenda. Overall, parliamentary executives offer more forms of accountability and come closest to exemplifying power-sharing.

Opposed to a parliamentary system, the decision to use a presidential system poses several risks. To begin with, both the president and the legislature have a rival source of power, the people, which can make it difficult to resolve deadlocks and disputes.\textsuperscript{23} The fixed term lengths of a presidential system are less flexible, whereas an unpopular prime minister can be much more easily removed from power and replaced without destabilizing the entire government. Presidential executives can also be a slippery slope for fledgling democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, which have led to authoritarianism in the past.\textsuperscript{24} Additionally, presidential systems are more unstable and thus more susceptible to regime collapse, while the winner-takes-all outcomes of presidential elections simultaneously raise the stakes and make it less likely that the loser will accept the outcome. To add to this, the combination of the roles of both the head of state and head of government reduces the checks and balances on the executive.\textsuperscript{25} Presidential systems also lack in representativeness and legitimacy, both of which are crucial to democracy.

Presidential systems are often criticized and seldom defended. However, Shugart and Carey offer four areas in which presidential systems are superior to parliamentary systems. These areas are accountability, identifiability, mutual checks, and an arbiter.\textsuperscript{26} Presidential systems are superior when it comes to the principle of maximizing direct accountability between voters and elected officials. Presidents, being directly elected by voters, cannot be removed due to shifting coalitions or unpopularity in the assembly. Voters can also more easily identify who they are voting for in a presidential race. Under parliamentary systems, especially those using PR, voting on party lists might be the only way voters can influence the executive. The mutual checks created by presidential systems also ensure that the executive can check the legislature and vice versa. In parliamentary systems the executive is not in a position to resist or check assembly initiative.\textsuperscript{27} Finally, the distance between the president and the assembly means the president cannot threaten the legislature by declaring a measure before the assembly a vote of confidence. Instead, a president can act as an arbiter or moderator of disputes to secure legislative agreement.

\textsuperscript{22} Norris 2008, 141.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 132.
\textsuperscript{24} Shugart and Carey 1992.
\textsuperscript{25} Lijphart 2008.
\textsuperscript{26} Shugart and Carey 1992.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
The choice of electoral system and executive type influences the horizontal checks and balances of power in the central institutions of the state. On the other hand, decentralization determines vertical power-sharing among multiple layers of the government. Political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization are arguably constitutional solutions to help mitigate conflict, consolidate peace, and protect minority communities. Decentralized governance has several advantages. First, it generates more democratic participation, representation, and accountability. Democratically elected local and regional bodies give voters more opportunities to participate in the democratic process increasing the accountability and responsiveness of local officials. Next, fiscal decentralization reduces corruption by increasing the transparency and accountability of elected officials. This point should be noted in regards to Sub-Sahara Africa, as many of the states in the region are some of the most corrupt in the world. Another advantage is the strengthening of public policy by allowing local governments to create and implement region specific policies. This is an important point for Sub-Saharan states, as the large size and diversity of the groups and regions within these states likely leads to issues pertinent to only a particular constituency. The flexibility of decentralization is also typically associated with better administrative efficiency in regards to public services and regulations, as these are molded to fit each community. The advantages of decentralization are of great relevance to highly divided societies, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they can assist in accommodating multiple interests. While there are many different ways to achieve decentralization, a study conducted by Nicholas Charron found that accommodationist forms of vertical power-sharing, such as ethno-federalism, outperform integrationist forms of vertical power-sharing in heterogeneous societies, in regards to quality of government. This suggests that accommodating interests, as theories of power-sharing argue, is more successful.

It is worth noting that with regards to plural societies, common in Sub-Sahara Africa and defined as states that contain multiple groups identified by ethnicity, religion, language, and a multitude of other characteristics, federalism and decentralization are important strategies for protecting the interests of spatially concentrated groups, especially if the administrative boundaries reflect the distribution of these groups. As Norris and Lijphart indicate, if the boundaries of sub-national governments are based on real social boundaries, the plural communities within these boundaries can become homogeneous within their region and thereby reduce communal violence and accommodate a multitude of interests within a single state. Even in plural societies where ethnic groups are dispersed, decentralization can be used to facilitate the representation of local minorities. Locally elected officials and local decision making can assist in managing conflict by including leaders drawn from minorities and manage sensitive cultural or educational matters. Decentralization as a means of power-sharing allows the diverse groups within plural societies to protect their rights and defend their interests.
While the case for decentralization is strong, critics often charge that decentralized governance is overly complex and leads to slow response times. By adding another layer of government bureaucracy, decentralization may increase costs, decrease efficiency, and result in poor services. The proponents of centralized governance argue centralization enhances integration, leads to more decisive action, and is more cost effective. The claim that decentralization increases representation and accountability has also met criticism. With numerous levels of government it may be unclear as to who to appeal to, and the responsibilities of representatives at different levels may overlap. The existence of multiple levels of government can also lead to the rise in regional parties, which in turn may fragment the party system at the national level. Decentralized governance also increases the possibility of clientelistic relationships forming between politicians and private citizens. Under such circumstances corruption may actually expand, not contract. The persistent conflict in Nigeria and Sudan indicates that federalism has had a less than perfect record in Africa. There are critics, as Norris indicates, that argue when multiethnic communities are intermingled, territorial autonomy is ineffective at managing conflict. The creation of sub-national structures may break up the state, while increased demands for autonomy may lead to conflict and even secession. In decentralized states where boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines it may lead to the rise in ethnically based parties or encourage politicians to use the ‘ethnic card’ as a means of attracting votes. This reinforces ethnic identities, generates competition and conflict among groups, and destabilizes democratic institutions. Institutional arrangements that facilitate territorial autonomy may also provide ethnic leaders with access to the media and legislature where they can promote an agenda of intolerance and discrimination.

TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE?

Substantial evidence exists for both supporting or decrying power-sharing. Since power-sharing draws on both electoral and federal institutions as well as a system’s executive structure, it is unlikely that there will soon be a consensus on the effects of power-sharing. Either power-sharing institutions do as theorized or they are flawed, but this question must not be understudied. Previous studies have either drawn on a broader sample or an altogether different part of the world. With supporters of power-sharing designating it a source of democracy and peace, the obvious place it needs to be tested is where democracy and peace are often absent: Sub-Saharan Africa. With the preceding literature in mind and the focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, this leads to two hypotheses.

32 Norris 2008, 164.
33 Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999.
These two hypotheses suggest that power-sharing institutions do provide more democracy and stability, and this study attempts to either support or disprove them.

**H1:** Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater levels of democracy.

**H2:** Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater state instability.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

Sub-Saharan African is a region where attempts at democratic rule have resulted in mixed success. The states within this region have implemented a variety of institutions, some with greater degrees of power-sharing than others. The wide variety of cases in Sub-Saharan Africa allows for the examination of levels of democracy and state stability from cases with relatively little or no power-sharing, to those states with relatively high levels of power-sharing. This study will use a most similar case design for the Sub-Saharan region. Using this design is intuitive because it will determine whether power-sharing can explain the increased presence of democracy and stability. Since the study is examining only Sub-Saharan Africa there are a number of variables that need to be controlled. These factors include low levels of development, recent transitions to democracy, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, and former colonization.

In order to study the effects of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study will examine all 48 states that comprise this region, according to the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs. The institutions and measures of democracy and stability will only be examined as to where they stand as of 2010. While studying the changes in democracy and stability over a period of time would be insightful, this study does not attempt to accomplish this due to the relatively fluid and dynamic nature of political institutions in Africa. Determining a time frame in which a majority of the Sub-Saharan states’ political institutions remained stable would be near impossible. To assess the relationship between the variables, a bivariate analysis will be used to determine correlation between three variables: Power-Sharing Index Score, Freedom House Score, and Failed States Index Score.

The four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa – Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern – will also be included as control variables. The regions are defined using the UN’s definitions of regions with three exceptions. First, Sudan is considered part of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet under the UN’s classification is part of Northern Africa. For this study Sudan is grouped with Eastern Africa because of its location and proximity to other East African states. The next two exceptions are Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Both of these states are defined as being part of Eastern Africa. However, upon further review and consultation these states were included as part of Southern Africa. This is due to their geographic location and because without these two cases Southern Africa would have been comprised of a mere five states.

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34 See appendix for full list of states and their scores.
The independent variable in this study is institutional power-sharing. It is measured by the extent to which the formal institutions of a country allow for the inclusion of all major political actors in the decision making process. In determining the levels of institutional power-sharing, I will look at the three major institutions related to power-sharing: the electoral system, type of executive, and state decentralization. Decentralization in this study refers to political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. These three institutions are the most critical to power-sharing and ensuring the consolidation of democracy.

Those states that use PR, a parliamentary executive, and federalism have higher levels of power-sharing. States that utilize a majoritarian electoral system, presidential executive, and are highly centralized constitute systems, that according to the literature, allow for very little power-sharing. To quantify levels of power-sharing I have developed a 10 point index ranging from 0-9 that rates countries levels of power-sharing based on the aforementioned factors of electoral system type, executive type, and degree of decentralization. All three factors will be based on a 4-point scale, from 0-3, with higher scores indicating more power-sharing.

For the electoral system the scale goes as follows: Proportional representation = 3pts; Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) = 2pts; SMD or Plurality = 1 pt; appointed legislature or non-existence of the national legislature = 0pts. For the electoral system variable, only the type of electoral system used for the lower house is considered in this index. The use of PR is associated with higher levels of power-sharing due to the low barriers it presents to parties trying to gain representation in the legislature. Such low barriers allow a multitude of parties to attain seats in the national legislature. MMP is a compromise in that it is neither PR nor majoritarian, but represents a middle ground between the two. While not as inclusive as PR, it is a step above majoritarian systems in terms of power-sharing. The problem with MMP is that often the threshold for the PR part of the system is as high as 5% or more. This means that groups dispersed throughout the country may not be able to attain representation. Majoritarian systems using SMD are seen as the least conducive to power-sharing as it is often much more difficult for minor parties to gain representation. The United States and United Kingdom are commonly cited examples of how such systems often lead to either a two party state or a one party system. There are cases in which the national legislature is either wholly appointed or non-existent. As this runs contrary to the purpose of power-sharing, which is to promote democracy, such institutions are regarded as allowing no degree of power-sharing.

The next institution considered is the executive branch, coded as follows: Parliamentary system= 3pts; Semi-Presidential= 2pts; Presidential= 1pt; appointed executive or monarchy =0pts. A parliamentary executive is associated with higher levels of power-sharing because the executive is often drawn from a coalition of parties that make up the majority in the lower house. Parliamentary systems also allow for the changing of the executive in a much more stable manner without the need for another national election. Systems that divide executive power, typically between a president and prime minister, are referred to as semi-presidential. While such systems do allow for the election of a prime minister and president these two
officials typically come from the same party. Semi-presidentialism can also be dangerous if the prime minister and president are from different political parties as this can result in executive deadlock and competition for power. Established democracies like France might be able to survive these situations, but in less stable states this could be a catalyst for conflict. Presidential systems invest all executive power into a single person and in addition to being less representative, elections to this position can be seen as a zero-sum game in highly divided societies. This gives the losing parties less incentive to accept defeat, as recent elections in Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire have shown. The appointment of the executive, such as by an occupying force, or a monarchy like Swaziland represent an executive in which no power-sharing can take place as the institution is utterly undemocratic. It should be noted that in this index those countries that have a president and prime minister are only considered semi-presidential or parliamentary if the prime minister is chosen from the lower house or directly elected. If the president appoints the prime minister as part of his cabinet the system is considered presidential because the president is still effectively considered the head of state and head of government.

The final factor, decentralization, can be broken down into three categories and goes as follows: Federations = 3pts; Decentralized Unions = 2pts; Unitary States = 1pt. States with no central government or little to no control over territory =0pts. Federal institutions create another level of democratic representation in which minor or local parties can gain representation. This additional level of government also grants a degree of autonomy to these locales and allows them manage local affairs. Decentralized hybrids, similar to Tanzania, have devolved powers down to local levels of government and represent a step in the right direction in terms of power-sharing. However in these systems nearly all important decision making and real power still rests with the central government, especially in fiscal matters. A majority of Sub-Saharan states represent a highly centralized unitary structure. Under such systems, there is little, if any, devolution of power and nearly all decisions come from the central authority. If a state is failed, like Somalia, any form of devolution of powers is impossible. The state cannot even consider local or regional issues, let alone address them. With no place for representation from the local to national level, it is impossible for groups to share power.

Not all states will fit perfectly within these definitions. Even two states that are presidential republics may have nuanced differences that set them apart. Levels of centralization and electoral systems can be especially complicated. States are often simply identified as federal or unitary. For others though decentralization may be viewed as much more subtle process that involves incremental steps. The study of electoral systems usually involves identifying the rules of the system in place. For example, it is often important to distinguish between open and closed list PR. The inability of the index to include such detail is a limitation. However, nearly all state institutions can be classified under one of the three sub-

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35 Norris 2008, 173.
36 See Appendix for Power-sharing Index (PSI) Table.
37 Lijphart 1999.
38 Norris 2008, 170.
categories. The index considers the most relevant institutions and system types, which allows it to accurately rank states based on their levels of institutional power-sharing.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The first dependent variable is democracy. Democracy will be measured using the composite score of a country on the Freedom House Liberal Democracy Index. Freedom House uses the Gastil Index, a 7-point scale for measuring political rights and civil liberties. While other measures of democracy were considered, Freedom House was the only one with scores for the year 2010. Changes in a states' ranking are also explained along with any relevant political changes that took place. The index also does not favor any particular type of democratic institution. In other words, by default it does not consider a parliamentary executive any more democratic than a presidential executive.

Freedom House, an independent think tank based in the United States began assessing political trends in the 1950s. In 1972 it switched to the Gastil Index which assigns ratings of the political rights and civil liberties for each state and then categorizes them as free, partially free, or not free. The index tracks the existence of political rights by looking at the electoral processes, political pluralism, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties are measured in terms of the existence of freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights. The classifications are based on a checklist of questions, which includes ten separate items that relate to the existence of political rights and fifteen items concerning civil liberties. These items assess the institutional checks and balances of power on the executive by the legislature, an independent judiciary, and the existence of political rights and civil liberties. These also include self-determination and participation by minorities, and free and fair elections laws. Each item is given a score from 0-4 and all are equal when combined. The raw scores of a country are then converted into a 7-point scale of political rights and a 7-point scale of civil liberties. These two scores are then combined to determine the average rating of a state and whether it is free, partly free, or not free.39

Although it provides scores for nearly all states and independent territories as well as being a long running time-series of observations, there are several flaws and biases. First the process used by Freedom House suffers from lack of transparency, so it is impossible to check the reliability and consistency of coding decisions. The items used to measure political rights and civil liberties also cover a wide range of issues, some of which might not necessarily be indicative of democracy. Since no breakdown of the composite scores is made available it is impossible to test which of the items correlate most with democracy. While it is biased in the sense that it measures only liberal democracy, it is widely used and trusted as providing an accurate representation of a states' level of democracy.40

The second dependent variable is state stability. To measure this I utilized the Failed States Index from ForeignPolicy.com and the Fund for Peace. The Failed State Index defines a

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39 Freedom House.
40 Norris 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; See Appendix for Freedom House Scores.
state as failing when it loses physical control over its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide public services, and inability interact with other states are also characteristics. The index includes 177 states and the Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an original methodology developed over the past decade. The CAST model employs a four step trend-line analysis, (1) consisting of rating twelve social, economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) identifying idiosyncratic variables or factors; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that shows the conflict history of the states being analyzed. The twelve indicators used are: Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.

The ranking a state receives is based on the total combined scores of these twelve indicators. Each indicator is measured on a scale from 0-10, with zero being the most stable and ten being the most unstable. These indicators are then combined to form a scale from 0-120 in which higher scores indicate more instability. The CAST methodology has been peer-reviewed over the past decade by independent scholars, educational, government, and private institutions (Fund for Peace). Since the ratings are meant to measure the vulnerability of a state they cannot predict when a state might collapse or experience violence. Although the trend lines that these scores produce may be used as a means of determining the future direction of a state. Unfortunately the raw data used in creating these rankings is not readily available due to it being drawn from millions of news articles and reports. However the index values are readily available to the public.

REGION

Region is factored in due to the potential effects it may have on stability and democracy. As has happened before in Africa, a result of civil war is often human flight. A massive influx of refugees can place a great strain on the recipient country. The violence that drove these refugees might not only follow them, but their sudden presence in a foreign state has the possibility of inciting a xenophobic backlash among the native population. Another dangerous possibility is the chance rebel groups may use neighboring states as a launching point for attacks. Regional conflict has the potential to destabilize all surrounding states and maintaining stability is undoubtedly easier if neighboring states are not imploding due to civil war. Region is also important when considering democracy because of the idea of regional diffusion. In other words, democracy in one state has the potential to influence and spread to surrounding states. The ideas and institutions adopted by one state can impact those of another. If all states within a particular region had adopted democratic institutions, while states outside of this region had failed to do so, one could conclude that regional factors played a role in spreading democracy.

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41 Foreign Policy.
42 See Appendix for Failed States Index Scores.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As the data test the two competing bodies of literature on power-sharing institutions and the possible effects of region, there are several expected outcomes. If the data support the hypotheses that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing have higher levels of democracy and stability, then there should be a positive correlation between the Power-Sharing Index Score (PSI) and Freedom House Score (FH). There should also be a negative relationship between the PSI Score and Failed States Index Score (FSI). If the data do not support the hypotheses, the opposite will be seen in the results. A third outcome in this case is possible. The results may support none of the stated hypotheses and there simply might not be a significant relationship in either direction. This would truly be disappointing as it would imply that no set of institutions is likely to be any more effective in Sub-Saharan Africa.

If region does have any significant affect on democracy and stability we should see this in the form of significant positive correlations between the individual regions and FH Scores and FSI Scores. The absence of such significant correlations means we can rule out region as having any meaningful impact on a state’s measured level of democracy or stability. However, the presence of any significant findings would indicate that there are regional factors that are influencing how stable and democratic a state is. The number of cases used in this study, 48, while relatively large for a comparative study, also means each individual case can have a larger effect on the overall results. While this small number may justify the use of a ninety percent confidence level, statistical significance will only be given to results achieving a ninety-five percent confidence level.

Table 1 shows the results of the bivariate correlation between the FSI Score, PSI Score, FH Score, and region. The first notable result can be seen in the strength and significance of the correlation between democracy and stability. While this association may seem obvious, it indicates that these two characteristics are not simply two random and unrelated concepts. Instead, it points to the fact that these are two characteristics of a state that are strongly associated with each other. Since power-sharing institutions are theorized to improve these two aspects of a state, it is crucial they actually be related. The next significant result is the strong correlation between institutional power-sharing and democracy. This indicates that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing also have correspondingly higher levels of democracy. This supports the hypothesis that a higher level of institutional power-sharing is associated with more democracy. The correlation between power-sharing and stability also turns out to be significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence and moderately strong. The negative correlation is expected here as it shows that higher levels of power-sharing correlate negatively with instability. This supports the second hypothesis that higher levels of institutional power-sharing will be associated with more stability. As we see with these results, region has no significant relationship to either of the dependent variables. Thus the findings exclude region as being strongly associated with stability or democratization.
Table 1: Correlation between power-sharing (PSI), stability (FSI), democracy (FH) and Region
Dependent Variables: FSI Score and FH Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FH Score</th>
<th>FSI Score</th>
<th>PSI Score</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Central</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FH Score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSI Score</td>
<td>.703**</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI Score</td>
<td>.455**</td>
<td>-.318*</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>-.233</td>
<td>(.438)</td>
<td>(.852)</td>
<td>(.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.574**</td>
<td>(.257)</td>
<td>(.939)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central</td>
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<td>.181</td>
<td>-.090</td>
<td>.316*</td>
<td>.331*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>-.213</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.292*</td>
<td>.306*</td>
<td>.185</td>
</tr>
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<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
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</table>

**p<0.01, *p<0.05

The other significant findings reveal that the regions correlate with each other, in all but one instance, because they all share the similar characteristics of high instability and lower levels of democracy. The one instance in which the regions do not correlate with each other is in the case of Central and Southern Africa. This is most likely because Southern Africa is arguably the most stable and democratic region of Sub-Saharan Africa, while Central Africa is the worst in these regards. 43

CONCLUSIONS

Theories of power-sharing suggest that institutions that allow for the inclusion of all major actors will produce more democracy and greater stability. These consociational systems have been studied extensively over the past several decades by scholars such as Norris and

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43 If Zimbabwe and Mozambique are grouped in with Eastern Africa the results of the correlation differ greatly for Southern Africa and alter the conclusions that can be drawn. When this is done, Southern Africa has a correlation with stability of -.319 that is significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. This is almost exactly the same strength of the correlation between power-sharing and stability. This indicates that the stability of a region plays a role in state stability. The relationship between democracy and Southern Africa also improves to .261 with a significance of .073. The correlation with power-sharing also increases to .277 with a significance of .056. What these alternate results point towards is that Southern Africa has adopted institutions with more power-sharing. In doing so the result has been higher levels of democracy and stability.
Lipjhart, producing a debate about their effects. This study has attempted to contribute to that debate by testing the relationship between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and democracy and conflict in the tumultuous region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing are associated with greater democracy and stability. While these findings by no means conclude the debate, the results clearly support proponents of power-sharing. There has been very little work done to study the effects of power-sharing institutions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The theoretical literature predicts two sets of competing hypotheses on the expected outcomes of increased power-sharing. However, previous studies have not focused on the part of the world where these institutions may be needed most. This study takes the first step in determining whether or not power-sharing institutions do work Sub-Saharan Africa.

With many African states deeply divided and under duress, studies of this kind can assist policymakers in determining the correct institutions to implement. Looking to cases like South Africa, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, other states can see how power-sharing institutions have assisted in creating free and stable states. This study should not be viewed as the final word on power-sharing institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Examples exist within Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ethiopia and Niger, where states have moved to institutions allowing for greater degrees of power-sharing and yet their levels of democracy and stability remain dangerously low. It is important for scholars to continue studying the precise reasons as to why power-sharing has been more effective in some states than others.

The aforementioned cases of failure point towards factors affecting power-sharing not covered in this study. It is possible that corruption or lack of funds has prevented such institutions from functioning as they are theoretically designed to function. The literature also makes an important distinction between those states that are highly divided or post-conflict. This difference is important because past conflict can make it more difficult to bring all major actors to the table, while cleaved societies may simply be seeking a means of fairer representation. Deeply divided societies with a high degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization may also affect the duration of such institutions as the possibility of conflict can be greater. As mentioned in the design section of this study, institutional duration was something that unfortunately had to be omitted for logistical reasons. However, examining the duration of power-sharing institutions would go far in disproving the critics that power-sharing institutions do not last, or vindicate their theories about the fragility of such institutions.

The purpose of this study was not to try and account for every possible factor influencing the success or failure of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, it was meant to act as a starting point for future research. To gain a better perspective on what conditions are conducive to the success of these institutions and what may lead to their failure requires a more in depth look into the regions and individual cases. In doing so it can also be more fully understood how power-sharing institutions affect regime change and the formation of political parties. With that being said it is critical that we determine which set of institutions are most likely to provide democracy and stability for the states of Sub-Saharan Africa.
## Appendix

List of Sub-Saharan States, Scores, System Type, and Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FH Score</th>
<th>FSI Score</th>
<th>PSI Score</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Decentralization</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>83.7</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Pres.</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>Central</td>
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<td>Pres.</td>
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<td>Western</td>
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<td>Southern</td>
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<td>Central</td>
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<td>Executive</td>
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<td>Maj.</td>
<td>Semi</td>
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### Power-sharing Index Table (PSI)

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<th>Score</th>
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<th>Decentralization</th>
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<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Federal</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Majoritarian (Plurality/FPTP w/ SMD)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>Appointed or non-existent</td>
<td>Monarchy or Appointed</td>
<td>Failed State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Fund for peace. www.fundforpeace.org (November 2, 2010).


INTRODUCTION TO THE CLASSICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT ESSAYS

These essays were selected by Professor Simeone as the three best essays for one of the assignments in last fall’s theory class. Students in the theory classes work on their persuasive essay writing skills. The claim-objection-rejoinder format requires students to state their views with economy and precision. Students vote for the best essay; the winner receives the coveted “Certificate of Merit.” The majority in the fall section chose Sara Ghadiri’s essay. Which would you choose?

The full title of the class is Classical Political Thought: Democracy in Athens and America. The class has multiple goals; it fulfills both the department’s theory requirement and an “intellectual traditions” general education category. On the political science side, this class needs to introduce students to the important debate over the drivers of state behavior among realists, constructivists, and liberal institutionalists. On the general education side, the class is intended to introduce students to the great texts of classical political thought and the key questions that prompted those texts. These goals are addressed in part by reading Thucydides’ masterwork, History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides forces students to consider whether just wars exist and the role of rhetoric in democratic societies.

The class also reads Sophocles, Plato, Aristophanes, and Aristotle. Plato’s Crito provides the essay contest question: under what conditions are democratic dissenters, i.e., those who disobey the law of a limited government, justified?

Socrates makes at least three arguments in the Crito for why he ought to obey the jury sentence against him: (1) because one ought “to fulfill all one’s agreements, provided they are just” (49e); (2) because disobedience destroys “the Laws, and the whole state as well” (50b); and (3) because one is “even more bound to respect ... your country” than one’s father (51b).

Richard Kraut believes that despite these arguments, Socrates’ view does allow for a measure of civil disobedience such as the philosopher displayed in the Apology. This is because Socrates also argues that “you must do what your city and your country commands, or else persuade it that justice is on your side” (51c). The addition of the persuasion option creates an opening for dialogue and civil disobedience. But how wide is this opening for civil disobedience, and what principles justify it?

To provide more specificity, we turn to the different answers to this question offered by Americans Abe Fortas and Howard Zinn. For Fortas the opening is very narrow because only invalid and unconstitutional laws should be disobeyed, proper dissent is limited to breaking only these laws, and dissenters must accept the punishment that comes even with breaking unjust laws. Kimberley Brownlee calls this a “deference to the law” approach. Zinn argues that both parts of Fortas’ deference view—the limit on proper disobedience and the requirement of accepting state punishment—are fallacious.

Students were asked to write an essay giving reasons for holding that either Fortas or Zinn has the more defensible position.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF LAW
Michael Browning

Abe Fortas describes himself as a man of the law, saying that “each of us owes a duty of obedience to law,” claiming that it is “a moral as well as a legal imperative.” Fortas has great reverence for the United States’ system of government and law and its constitutional framework, but admits that if he had been a “Negro” in the Deep South, he would have disobeyed the state segregation laws. In his essay on Civil Disobedience, he groups “trespassing on private and official premises” with “assaults upon recruiters for munitions firms and for the armed services; breaking windows in the Pentagon and in private stores and homes; and occupying academic offices.” He dismisses excuses for this kind of conduct as “nonsense.” Fortas reconciles his belief in the rule of law and his belief in disobeying unjust laws by insisting that only unjust and unconstitutional laws be disobeyed. Furthermore, he believes that law breakers must accept their punishment, in what he describes as the “great tradition” of civil disobedience. But when Dr. Martin Luther King ignored an injunction by the state and led a protest in Birmingham that the Supreme Court later upheld as illegal, Fortas was one of the dissenters, saying that he had “no moral criticism to make of Dr. King’s action in this incident, even though it turned out to be legally unjustified.” How can one insist that a law breaker is morally justified and at the same time believe that there is a moral imperative that the law breaker owes a duty of obedience to the law?

Howard Zinn asserts that even Fortas himself cannot reconcile the two. Zinn claims that Fortas’ overall argument is inconsistent because “more and more, Fortas’ definition of what is moral coincides almost exactly with what is constitutional, and what is constitutional is what the Supreme Court decides.” Thus Zinn argues that Fortas’ belief reduces morality to law, which leaves little room for the sometimes extraordinary exceptions in which civil disobedience is needed to change unjust laws and situations. Arguing in line with Henry David Thoreau and other famed civil dissenters, Zinn says that “if political science does not include a moral philosophy and the idea of civil disobedience, it becomes merely a register of whatever regulations the politicians of the time have ordered.” Referring back to Fortas’ example of Dr. Martin Luther King, Zinn asks “why was it right for Dr. King to accept an unjust verdict corroborating an unjust injunction, resulting in an unjust jail sentence?” Zinn regards these acts as oppressive, and insists that a law breaker should not be willing to admit wrongness and fault just because the Supreme Court or any other court decided the other way. He writes that “when unjust decisions are accepted, injustice is sanctioned and perpetuated.”

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 34.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 35.
7 Ibid., 34.
8 Ibid., 29.
9 Ibid.
Fortas vehemently disagrees, contending that an individual cannot “pick and choose” which laws to obey and accept the consequences. His regard for the rule of law falls under the fair play theory, in which he says that “a citizen cannot demand of his government or of other people obedience to the law, and at the same time claim a right in himself to break it by lawless conduct, free of punishment or penalty.” Fortas also goes on to condemn the use of violence in protest, claiming that there are plenty of forums for civil discourse that allow dissidents to persuade their government peacefully. Fortas notes that it is a city’s duty to provide these forums, and that “an enormous degree of self-control and discipline are required on both sides”. If this fair play theory works as Fortas asserts it does, then civil dissentsers have a duty to follow laws or accept punishment for the laws they break in protest.

Unfortunately for Fortas, fair play is a theory and not a real world application. The example that he cites with Dr. King in Birmingham reveals his inconsistencies. The government does not always provide adequate forums for discourse, and specifically denied the venue for Dr. King. Zinn notes that “if we check Fortas’ language carefully, we note that the government being bound by law is an expectation, while the citizen’s being bound by law is a fact.” Fortas admits that “it is a deplorable truth that because [police] are officers of the state they frequently escape the penalty for their lawlessness.” Zinn further insists that Fortas’ reliance on the Supreme Court has not only failed in specific circumstances (like that of Dr. King and Dred Scott), but is also inherently unfair because “the Court is still a branch of government...and in the never-ending contest between authority and liberty that goes on in every society, the agencies of government, at their best, are still on the side of authority.” Additionally, the government does pick and choose which laws it enforces, so the idea that a citizen cannot pick and choose as a form of discourse contradicts the notion of fair play.

A system of government that allows for effective political discourse in all situations would have no need for civil disobedience, but it is fallacious to assume that such a government exists in the United States. History has proven that civil disobedience is sometimes a last resort option to effect change in policies. Should the protest of unjust laws, whether in speech or in action, be punished because of the theoretical implications of fair play? Violence and other harmful actions certainly deserve stricter scrutiny than other forms of protest, but the idea that Dr. King and Dred Scott were wrong because the Supreme Court declared it so is inconceivable, yet that is what Fortas’ logic requires. The laws in question for Dred Scott and Dr. Martin Luther King violated the notion of what it means to be human, and there are no theories of law that can justify the punishment inflicted on them. Moreover, there is no validity in arguing that the justice system has eventually worked out these past atrocities. The individuals affected by unjust laws will not be comforted by the assurance that it will all work out in the end. Thus, the only theories of law that can account for true and effective civil discourse are those that provide exceptions for one of the most valuable forms of speech in our nation’s history, civil disobedience.

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10 Fortas 1968, 33.
11 Ibid., 36.
12 Zinn 2002, 23.
13 Fortas 1968, 33.
14 Zinn 2002, 8.
The opportunities for civil disobedience to occur within democratic institutions are abundant. However, the extent to which persons can exercise civil disobedience is the subject of great debate among scholars. To be clear, the term civil disobedience “has been used to apply to a person’s refusal to obey a law which the person believes to be immoral or unconstitutional.”1 Some believe, as does Howard Zinn, that this practice should entail certain excitable actions that are more extreme and blatantly unlawful in their execution.2 Others, like Supreme Court Justice Fortas, believe civil disobedience should ultimately acquiesce to the rule of law within a democratic institution.3 Overall, Fortas’ argument is more defensible because “the motive of civil disobedience does not confer immunity for law violation.”4 A democratic government provides alternative methods for countering unjust or unconstitutional laws.

Civil disobedience should not supersede the rule of law because in the American constitutional system, the rule of law is dually prescribed to both citizens and the government. The actions and consequences are limited and equal to both the population and the government that is in power. Fortas defends this claim when he states, “Just as our form of life depends upon the government’s subordination to law under the constitution, so it also depends upon the individual’s subservience to the laws duly prescribed.”5 Individuals who practice civil disobedience should be bound by the laws, for if they are not, then the social compact between the citizen and government is broken. Fortas furthers this notion when he claims, “A citizen cannot demand of his government or of other people obedience to the law, and at the same time claim a right in himself to break it by lawless conduct, free of punishment or penalty.”6 A mutual acceptance of the Constitution and laws is necessary to preserve democratic institutions and ensure continued success. Socrates ponders this proposal when he asks Crito, “Do you imagine that a city can continue to exist and not be turned upside down, if the legal judgments which are pronounced in it have no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons?”7 Even Howard Zinn, who is in disagreement with this position, recognizes the importance of the state when he explains, “surely the state is an instrument...for the achievement of human values.”8 However, if the rule of law is to be determined and enforced on a biased and individual basis, then the state cannot exist to further any human values. Therefore, the rule of law should be enforced, even in light of civil disobedience, so that democratic institutions can ensure order and continuation of furthering the human values in pursuance.

Despite the position posited by Fortas, numerous objections can be made to the contrary. The utilization of more extreme measures within civil disobedience is necessary to continually aid the growth of democracy. Also, these forms of disobedience create a quicker avenue for change within the democratic system. Zinn supports these claims when he suggests that civil

1 Fortas 1968, 30.
3 Fortas 1968, 30.
4 Ibid., 32.
5 Ibid., 33.
6 Ibid.
8 Zinn 2002, 10.
disobedience should “resist the government’s actions against the lives and liberties of its citizens; to pressure, even to shock the government into change; to organize people to replace the holders of power…” Regardless of the speed of change this strategy suggests, this form of civil disobedience is misapplied for the success and continuation of human values and democracy. Fortas expounds on this point when he states, “Civil disobedience, even in its broadest sense, does not apply to efforts to overthrow the government or to seize control of areas or parts of it by force...These are programs of revolution.” These forms are inferior to peaceful demonstrations of civil disobedience because they undermine the democratic institutions and demand unlawful practices to alter the nature of government.

Although these ‘exciting’ and confrontational forms of disobedience may produce quick and rapid results, they merely perpetuate the extreme measures for all future forms of disobedience. Fortas explains this claim more eloquently when he declares, “Unremitting pressure...will undoubtedly expedite response...but the reaction to repeated acts of violence may be repression instead of remedy.” The extreme measures of civil disobedience will be met by more extreme measures to suppress the unlawful and insubordinate actions of the participants. Furthermore, “Violence is never defensible – and it has never succeeded in securing massive reform in an open society where there were alternative methods of winning the minds of others to one’s cause and securing changes in the government or its policies.” If extreme measures are continually utilized to “overthrow the government,” then there will be no peaceful transitions from one ruling party to the next. As a direct and dire result, the legitimacy of a democratic institution is undermined for the violent and coercive forms of majority or minority revolution. Instead, “it is basically conscience, justice, and a long and entirely justified view of national interest that impel the...majority to rectify an intolerable situation.” This mirrors Socrates’ belief, which states that “you must do whatever your city and your country commands, or else persuade it that justice is on your side; but violence against mother or father is an unholy act, and it is a far greater sin against your country.” Ultimately, a democratic government is an arena for debate, contemplation, and compromise in which the conflicting ideologies and beliefs of a diverse citizenry are negotiated to further human values and justice.

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9 Ibid., 7.
10 Fortas 1968, 30.
11 Ibid., 38.
12 Ibid., 40.
13 Ibid., 39.
14 Plato 1993, 91.
Abe Fortas and Howard Zinn both present arguments defending civil disobedience, but Zinn has the more defensible position. Both of them argue within the framework of the fair play theory of obligation, where obligation is derived from the expectation that both parties will follow the rules of the game. Zinn, however, argues that the individual ought to be able to negotiate their side of the rules.

Fortas states that we owe a duty of obedience to law as a “moral and legal imperative.” Zinn counters, stating that the Fortas is inconsistent. According to Zinn, Fortas is actually arguing that obedience to the law supersedes obedience to morality. To that point, Zinn argues, “there can be no moral imperative to obey an immoral law, unless the very idea of obedience has an overriding moral value.” We cannot, therefore, obey immoral laws. The rule of law as described by Fortas is a necessary condition for justice. Without the rule of law, we would have no justice, and justice is paramount.

Zinn debunks the necessity of Fortas’ rule of law, however. He has four claims: that the idea that disobedience is wrong because it fosters a general disrespect for all laws, including good ones, is false; it is empirically false that disobedience of bad laws creates disrespect for all laws; while civil disobedience can have a proliferating effect, it does not lead to a general breakdown of order; and the idea that civil disobedience will not lead to “bad” groups using civil disobedience. These claims all entail that the rule of law is not necessary for justice.

It is from the rule of law, though, Fortas claims, that we derive order. The rule of law means that individuals must accept rulings of the court and serve what punishment they are dealt regardless of their immorality. We risk losing any semblance of that order and the stability of the law would be undermined if we do not accept the punishments given to us. Order, he argues, is just because it allows for change by the ballot box, or by peaceful means of protest. Fortas seems to place order before justice.

Zinn argues contrarily that order and justice ought to be on the same footing. Were that the case, he says, everything would be fine and no protest or civil disobedience would be necessary. It is actually because the rule of law hides injustices, that civil disobedience is necessary. The rule of law does not create order, but rather pretends to keep the peace in order to perpetuate a false social conception of order. Individuals protest because the rule of law does preserve justice. Thus, the rule of law should not be preserved by acquiescing to unjust punishment. It is to this point that Zinn argues that those who commit acts of civil disobedience should not be compelled to serve punishment for disobeying an immoral law. “When unjust decisions are accepted, injustice is sanctioned and perpetuated.” If we do not require the rule of law for a sense of order, and we do not wish to sanction injustice, it is best that we commit acts of civil disobedience. If justice and order are not held in equal esteem, justice ought to be above order.

15 Fortas 1968, 18.
17 Ibid., 29.
Conversely, Fortas states that the system and the structure thereof allow full opportunity for both the state and the individual to bring their claims before a court, thereby limiting the amount of injustice that should occur. He also claims that the system promotes lawfulness for all, and states, “just as we expect the government to be bound by all laws, so each individual is bound by all laws.” Furthermore, Fortas argues that a citizen cannot demand that others obey a law while he does not follow it and is free of punishment.

Zinn rejoins that the language indicates that the government being bound by law is expected, while the citizen’s being bound is a fact. Thus, Fortas’ claim that the law seeks to equalize the citizen and the state in manners to present contention is inconsistent. Zinn argues that the government picks and chooses what laws it chooses to follow, citing the inconsistent adherence to the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that if that is the case, citizens should be allowed to pick and choose what laws they follow based on their individual concept of morality? It is for this reason that Zinn argues that if there is to be obligation from the fair play conception, both sides ought to be able to decide the rules.

\[18\] Fortas 1968, 33.