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Prospects for Peace and Democracy: Power-Sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most politically unstable and undemocratic regions in the world. Theories of power-sharing and recent studies have indicated that institutions that allow for higher levels of power-sharing are often more successful at consolidating democracy and stability in highly divided societies, like those common in Sub-Saharan Africa. By examining the electoral system, executive type, and level of decentralization, this study first determines the level of institutional power-sharing for each of the 48 Sub-Saharan states. Next, it compares these levels of power-sharing to indicators of democracy and state stability to determine if more power-sharing does correspond to greater democracy and stability. Using a bivariate analysis and factoring in region, the data shows that there is a strong and significant correlation between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and higher levels of democracy and state stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Michael Burgess

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INTRODUCTION

The Sub-Saharan region of Africa is arguably one of the most divided and conflict-prone regions in the world. The region is home to more than a thousand languages, and in the past twenty years most Sub-Saharan countries have experienced violence ranging from ethnic rebellions to genocide. The chronic instability and deep cleavages of the states in this region present comparative political scientists and institution crafters with a unique challenge: how to implement a democratic system that is truly representative and stable. This challenge is heightened by the question of how to set up a system that is not susceptible to failure and gives all parties involved an incentive to see it succeed. Power-sharing, it is theorized, can provide solutions to both of these problems. The ability for power-sharing institutions to include all major parties in the decision-making process would appear to make them ideal candidates for alleviating the tensions that exist between competing groups in Sub-Saharan states. For the aforementioned reasons, power-sharing institutions are considered especially relevant not just to the divided societies of Africa, but those across the globe.

Sub-Saharan Africa provides a hard test for determining how effective power-sharing institutions can be in states that are often extremely divided and have experienced violence relatively recently. Disputed elections have produced violence, and tension between ethnic groups has often resulted in conflict, exemplified most shockingly by Rwanda. The resurgence of violence is often a concern to both policy makers within these states and the international community, as violence in one state can destabilize the surrounding region. Successful power-sharing is theorized to prevent the outbreak of violence by bringing all major stakeholders to the table. Evidence of this can be found in Burundi, where in 2009 the last rebel group, the National Liberation Forces, laid down their arms and were recognized as a legal political party. 

1 Oppong 2006; Global Report 2009.
2 Freedom House 2010: Burundi.
Such instances seem to provide evidence that power-sharing can promote peace and successfully integrate opposing groups into the political process. However, power-sharing is not without its critics. The formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may only serve to institutionalize differences and exacerbate existing tensions. Granting groups considerable levels of autonomy may only serve to weaken the state, as it can potentially lead to secession as in the case of Southern Sudan. Because of the controversial nature of power-sharing institutions, both its proponents and critics must be considered.

This study will approach the topic of power-sharing first by taking a step back to consider the arguments and evidence of supporters and detractors of power-sharing institutions. The purpose of this study is not to consider why states adopt power-sharing institutions. Instead, it is to examine whether those Sub-Saharan states that have adopted institutions allowing for higher levels of power-sharing have experienced higher levels of democracy and stability. This study seeks to answer that question by comparing the institutional levels of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan states to their measured levels of democracy and stability. While power-sharing institutions are often cited as solutions for mitigating conflict and consolidating democracy in cleaved states, surprisingly enough, their influence as yet has not been tested in Sub-Saharan Africa.

THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST POWER-SHARING

The importance of determining whether or not power-sharing institutions improve democracy and reduce conflict cannot be overstated. Establishing systematic evidence to evaluate the impact of power-sharing institutions is both theoretically and politically important for determining if these arrangements promote long-term peace, manage conflict, and consolidate democracy in ethnically divided societies. There exists an extensive literature dedicated to these very issues, which has been developed over the past several decades. This paper draws substantially from the seminal work by Pippa Norris in 2008 in which the theories of power-sharing are tested in a large number of cases across the globe. These power-sharing regimes are characterized by formal institutional rules that give multiple political elites a stake in the decision making process. Power-sharing constitutions share common characteristics that include the following: executive power-sharing among a grand coalition of political leaders drawn from all significant groups, proportional representation of major groups in elected and appointed offices, and cultural autonomy for groups.

It is argued that in post-conflict or ethnically cleaved states the only viable types of settlements capable of attracting agreement from all factions are power-sharing regimes that avoid winner-takes-all electoral outcomes. The more inclusive these power-sharing arrangements are the more likely they will develop stronger support from stakeholders and therefore ensure stability. While other methods of resolving conflict in ethnically divided societies have been attempted in the past, such as partition, these are often costly and end in

3 Norris 2008, 22.
failure. Street indicates that power-sharing addresses the key issues that have caused ethnic tension and hostility, and thus is ideal as a remedy to such problems. Institutions that allow for the horizontal and vertical dispersal of power are most relevant to heterogeneous societies that have a history of conflict and are in the process of democratizing. In Africa there is a tendency for elites to concentrate power at the center and use repressive means as a way of asserting control. Avoiding such circumstances is necessary if there is to be any substantial consolidation of democracy. The use of power-sharing in these segmented societies guarantees all significant stakeholders a place in the national or regional governments and provides a strong incentive for politicians to accept the legitimacy of the rules of game, moderate their views, and collaborate with rivals. Norris suggests that power-sharing institutions also encourage support for democracy by avoiding winner-take-all elections and guaranteeing minorities a voice in the government. With assurances that they will not be excluded from government, minorities are also less likely to take actions that might undermine the stability of the state.

While power-sharing institutions are often cited as being the best option for highly divided societies, there are still those who challenge the claims that power-sharing institutions are best for promoting democracy and mitigating conflict. Power-sharing regimes may in fact serve to institutionalize ethnic cleavages and deepen rather than alleviate them. Explicitly recognizing the rights of ethnic groups can make it more difficult to generate cross-cutting cooperation in society by reducing electoral incentive for compromise. The formal recognition of ethnic or linguistic groups may magnify the political importance of these identities. Solutions to ethnic conflict that take pre-democratic factions as fixed and grant each group rights and autonomy may in fact reinforce sub-national identities. By de-emphasizing such identities it may be possible to turn citizens towards a concept of society that is more inclusive and tolerant of other groups.

In addition to reinforcing societal divisions, Spears argues that power-sharing institutions lead to a surprisingly unstable form of government that at best only provides a short reprieve from violent conflict. Power-sharing arrangements are difficult to achieve and even more difficult to put into practice, and do not stand the test of time or resolve conflict. At the same time power-sharing regimes in post-conflict societies have an extremely difficult task ahead of them; they must bridge the cleavages of groups in conflict. Power-sharing is not about forming a grand coalition of friends, but reconciling groups that are enemies. Including warring parties and excluding moderates can have negative consequences for divided societies using power-sharing. Using Rwanda as an example, Spears suggests that it is as difficult to forge an alliance with a member of the opposition as it is to form an alliance with someone who is

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4 Street 2004.
5 Bratton and Rothchild 1992.
7 Spears 2002.
8 Ibid.
9 Jarstad 2006.
considered a murderer. For many of these ethnically divided or post-conflict societies, power-sharing can be equated to making a deal with the devil and is therefore unlikely to last.

**THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: PR OR MAJORITARIAN?**

Of the factors considered in this study, the type of electoral system a state institutes is arguably the most important. Electoral system design is a crucial variable in democratic stability because it provides the means by which political parties or minorities are either included in or excluded from government. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems typically employ open or closed party lists or the use of a single transferable vote. In a study of several Sub-Saharan states, Reynolds finds that those states using proportional representation were more successful and stable democracies.\(^\text{10}\) Lijphart (2004) notes that the type of electoral system is crucial because it is significantly related to the development of the party system, type of executive, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive.\(^\text{11}\) States using plurality methods are more likely to have a two-party system and a one party state with a more dominant executive. PR, on the other hand, is likely to be associated with a multi-party state, coalitions, and a more equal legislative-executive relationship. These characteristics define the consensus model of democracy that relies on separation, instead of concentration of power.\(^\text{12}\) The former two characteristics are significant for the representation of a diverse number of groups in divided societies, while the later prevents an executive take over. Like Reynolds, Norris also finds that states making use of PR are more successful at democratic consolidation, as opposed to those using majority or plurality electoral rules.\(^\text{13}\)

However, proportional representation has several shortcomings, often cited by its critics. To begin with, the low voting thresholds that are characteristic in many proportional representation electoral systems give small minority group representatives little incentive to appeal to people outside their own ethnic group, while moderate political leaders may be branded as traitors for attempting to appeal to a wider base. Proportional representation also may serve to institutionalize and reinforce ethnic tensions in society by failing to provide political leaders with incentives for cross-group cooperation. As Lardeyret (1991) argues, PR systems are inherently more unstable since coalition governments cannot cope with serious disagreements. This leads to instability as the executive is left vacant and time is needed to construct a new coalition and government. These small minority parties tend to wield an undue amount of power as they are often the swing votes in coalitions. PR’s tendency to allow even extremist parties into government is also problematic as they often are anti-state. Lardeyret’s most important criticism is that PR is the worst system to adopt for ethnically divided states in Africa.\(^\text{14}\) Elections often degenerate into a competition between ethnic groups over public office

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\(^{10}\) Reynolds 2009.

\(^{11}\) Lijphart 2004.


\(^{13}\) Norris 2008, 130.

\(^{14}\) Lardeyret 1991.
and the best way to counteract this is to encourage members of each group to run against one another on trans-ethnic issues in single member districts.

Majoritarian electoral systems, in contrast to PR, are characterized by the use of either a majority or plurality system. Majority systems usually employ a second ballot, while plurality systems typically use a first-past-the-post method and both types of systems also make use of single member districts (SMD). These majoritarian systems are thought to encourage bridging strategies and force political leaders to appeal to a wider base of voters. It is theorized that more moderate electoral appeals should therefore foster social tolerance and cooperation. Parties must combine the differing interests of as many voters as possible and offer their electors a coherent program that they will govern by. A moderation of parties also comes from this, as most of the votes parties receive are from undecided voters in the middle.\textsuperscript{15} As Barkan suggests, in agrarian societies - common in Sub-Saharan Africa - PR often does not produce electoral results that are much more inclusive than majoritarian systems with SMD.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, majoritarian systems make elected members directly responsible to constituent concerns and provide each district with a representative at the national level.\textsuperscript{17} Conversely, PR tends to weaken the links between voter and representative as each region has no definitive representative. This in turn reduces the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation.\textsuperscript{18}

Majoritarianism, like PR, has a number of shortcomings. Critics of majoritarian systems argue that winner-takes-all elections often fail to produce stability in post-conflict or divided societies\textsuperscript{19}. According to Lijphart, in ethnically divided societies “majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy.”\textsuperscript{20} Majoritarian regimes often fail to incorporate minorities into the government and encourage excluded groups to resort to alternative methods to express their demands. These can range from violent protests to civil war, and even state failure. Majoritarian systems are also capable of producing vagaries, such as the exclusion of substantially supported third parties and a parliamentary majority being won with fewer total votes than the opposition. Established democracies may be able to tolerate such representational anomalies, but these could prove catastrophic for fledgling African democracies.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{PRESIDENTS AND PARLIAMENTS}

The concept of a parliamentary executive, or using the legislature as a source for the executive, lends itself well to power-sharing and is advantageous for a number of reasons. The prime minister and cabinet can only continue to hold power so long as they have the support of the majority of the legislature. There is then a stronger incentive for the executive and

\textsuperscript{15} Lardeyret 1991.
\textsuperscript{16} Barkan 1995.
\textsuperscript{17} Norris 2004.
\textsuperscript{18} Barkan 1998.
\textsuperscript{19} Binningsbo 2006.
\textsuperscript{20} Norris 2008, 25.
\textsuperscript{21} Reynolds 1995; 1999.
legislature to collaborate, which increases inter-electoral flexibility and acts as a safeguard against unpopular prime ministers.\textsuperscript{22} Prime ministers also tend to lead more collegial cabinets, as opposed to the hierarchical cabinets found in presidential systems. This creates more collective accountability, as the ministers must present a united agenda. Overall, parliamentary executives offer more forms of accountability and come closest to exemplifying power-sharing.

Opposed to a parliamentary system, the decision to use a presidential system poses several risks. To begin with, both the president and the legislature have a rival source of power, the people, which can make it difficult to resolve deadlocks and disputes.\textsuperscript{23} The fixed term lengths of a presidential system are less flexible, whereas an unpopular prime minister can be much more easily removed from power and replaced without destabilizing the entire government. Presidential executives can also be a slippery slope for fledgling democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, which have led to authoritarianism in the past.\textsuperscript{24} Additionally, presidential systems are more unstable and thus more susceptible to regime collapse, while the winner-takes-all outcomes of presidential elections simultaneously raise the stakes and make it less likely that the loser will accept the outcome. To add to this, the combination of the roles of both the head of state and head of government reduces the checks and balances on the executive.\textsuperscript{25} Presidential systems also lack in representativeness and legitimacy, both of which are crucial to democracy.

Presidential systems are often criticized and seldom defended. However, Shugart and Carey offer four areas in which presidential systems are superior to parliamentary systems. These areas are accountability, identifiability, mutual checks, and an arbiter.\textsuperscript{26} Presidential systems are superior when it comes to the principle of maximizing direct accountability between voters and elected officials. Presidents, being directly elected by voters, cannot be removed due to shifting coalitions or unpopularity in the assembly. Voters can also more easily identify who they are voting for in a presidential race. Under parliamentary systems, especially those using PR, voting on party lists might be the only way voters can influence the executive. The mutual checks created by presidential systems also ensure that the executive can check the legislature and vice versa. In parliamentary systems the executive is not in a position to resist or check assembly initiative.\textsuperscript{27} Finally, the distance between the president and the assembly means the president cannot threaten the legislature by declaring a measure before the assembly a vote of confidence. Instead, a president can act as an arbiter or moderator of disputes to secure legislative agreement.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Norris 2008, 141.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 132.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Shugart and Carey 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Lijphart 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Shugart and Carey 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION

The choice of electoral system and executive type influences the horizontal checks and balances of power in the central institutions of the state. On the other hand, decentralization determines vertical power-sharing among multiple layers of the government. Political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization are arguably constitutional solutions to help mitigate conflict, consolidate peace, and protect minority communities. Decentralized governance has several advantages. First, it generates more democratic participation, representation, and accountability. Democratically elected local and regional bodies give voters more opportunities to participate in the democratic process increasing the accountability and responsiveness of local officials. Next, fiscal decentralization reduces corruption by increasing the transparency and accountability of elected officials. This point should be noted in regards to Sub-Sahara Africa, as many of the states in the region are some of the most corrupt in the world. Another advantage is the strengthening of public policy by allowing local governments to create and implement region specific policies. This is an important point for Sub-Saharan states, as the large size and diversity of the groups and regions within these states likely leads to issues pertinent to only a particular constituency. The flexibility of decentralization is also typically associated with better administrative efficiency in regards to public services and regulations, as these are molded to fit each community. The advantages of decentralization are of great relevance to highly divided societies, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they can assist in accommodating multiple interests. While there are many different ways to achieve decentralization, a study conducted by Nicholas Charron found that accommodationist forms of vertical power-sharing, such as ethno-federalism, outperform integrationist forms of vertical power-sharing in heterogeneous societies, in regards to quality of government. This suggests that accommodating interests, as theories of power-sharing argue, is more successful.

It is worth noting that with regards to plural societies, common in Sub-Sahara Africa and defined as states that contain multiple groups identified by ethnicity, religion, language, and a multitude of other characteristics, federalism and decentralization are important strategies for protecting the interests of spatially concentrated groups, especially if the administrative boundaries reflect the distribution of these groups. As Norris and Lijphart indicate, if the boundaries of sub-national governments are based on real social boundaries, the plural communities within these boundaries can become homogeneous within their region and thereby reduce communal violence and accommodate a multitude of interests within a single state. Even in plural societies where ethnic groups are dispersed, decentralization can be used to facilitate the representation of local minorities. Locally elected officials and local decision making can assist in managing conflict by including leaders drawn from minorities and manage sensitive cultural or educational matters. Decentralization as a means of power-sharing allows the diverse groups within plural societies to protect their rights and defend their interests.

29 Charron 2009.
While the case for decentralization is strong, critics often charge that decentralized governance is overly complex and leads to slow response times. By adding another layer of government bureaucracy, decentralization may increase costs, decrease efficiency, and result in poor services.31 The proponents of centralized governance argue centralization enhances integration, leads to more decisive action, and is more cost effective. The claim that decentralization increases representation and accountability has also met criticism. With numerous levels of government it may be unclear as to who to appeal to, and the responsibilities of representatives at different levels may overlap. The existence of multiple levels of government can also lead to the rise in regional parties, which in turn may fragment the party system at the national level. Decentralized governance also increases the possibility of clientelistic relationships forming between politicians and private citizens. Under such circumstances corruption may actually expand, not contract. The persistent conflict in Nigeria and Sudan indicates that federalism has had a less than perfect record in Africa. There are critics, as Norris indicates, that argue when multiethnic communities are intermingled, territorial autonomy is ineffective at managing conflict.32 The creation of sub-national structures may break up the state, while increased demands for autonomy may lead to conflict and even secession. In decentralized states where boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines it may lead to the rise in ethnically based parties or encourage politicians to use the ‘ethnic card’ as a means of attracting votes. This reinforces ethnic identities, generates competition and conflict among groups, and destabilizes democratic institutions.33 Institutional arrangements that facilitate territorial autonomy may also provide ethnic leaders with access to the media and legislature where they can promote an agenda of intolerance and discrimination.

TO SHARE OR NOT TO SHARE?

Substantial evidence exists for both supporting or decrying power-sharing. Since power-sharing draws on both electoral and federal institutions as well as a system’s executive structure, it is unlikely that there will soon be a consensus on the effects of power-sharing. Either power-sharing institutions do as theorized or they are flawed, but this question must not be understudied. Previous studies have either drawn on a broader sample or an altogether different part of the world. With supporters of power-sharing designating it a source of democracy and peace, the obvious place it needs to be tested is where democracy and peace are often absent: Sub-Saharan Africa. With the preceding literature in mind and the focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, this leads to two hypotheses.

32 Norris 2008, 164.
33 Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999.
These two hypotheses suggest that power-sharing institutions do provide more democracy and stability, and this study attempts to either support or disprove them.

H1: Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater levels of democracy.

H2: Greater degrees of institutional power-sharing will be associated with greater state instability.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Sub-Saharan African is a region where attempts at democratic rule have resulted in mixed success. The states within this region have implemented a variety of institutions, some with greater degrees of power-sharing than others. The wide variety of cases in Sub-Saharan Africa allows for the examination of levels of democracy and state stability from cases with relatively little or no power-sharing, to those states with relatively high levels of power-sharing. This study will use a most similar case design for the Sub-Saharan region. Using this design is intuitive because it will determine whether power-sharing can explain the increased presence of democracy and stability. Since the study is examining only Sub-Saharan Africa there are a number of variables that need to be controlled. These factors include low levels of development, recent transitions to democracy, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, and former colonization.

In order to study the effects of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study will examine all 48 states that comprise this region, according to the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs. The institutions and measures of democracy and stability will only be examined as to where they stand as of 2010. While studying the changes in democracy and stability over a period of time would be insightful, this study does not attempt to accomplish this due to the relatively fluid and dynamic nature of political institutions in Africa. Determining a time frame in which a majority of the Sub-Saharan states’ political institutions remained stable would be near impossible. To assess the relationship between the variables, a bivariate analysis will be used to determine correlation between three variables: Power-Sharing Index Score, Freedom House Score, and Failed States Index Score.

The four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa – Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern – will also be included as control variables. The regions are defined using the UN’s definitions of regions with three exceptions. First, Sudan is considered part of Sub-Saharan Africa, yet under the UN’s classification is part of Northern Africa. For this study Sudan is grouped with Eastern Africa because of its location and proximity to other East African states. The next two exceptions are Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Both of these states are defined as being part of Eastern Africa. However, upon further review and consultation these states were included as part of Southern Africa. This is due to their geographic location and because without these two cases Southern Africa would have been comprised of a mere five states.

34 See appendix for full list of states and their scores.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The independent variable in this study is institutional power-sharing. It is measured by the extent to which the formal institutions of a country allow for the inclusion of all major political actors in the decision-making process. In determining the levels of institutional power-sharing, I will look at the three major institutions related to power-sharing: the electoral system, type of executive, and state decentralization. Decentralization in this study refers to political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. These three institutions are the most critical to power-sharing and ensuring the consolidation of democracy.

Those states that use PR, a parliamentary executive, and federalism have higher levels of power-sharing. States that utilize a majoritarian electoral system, presidential executive, and are highly centralized constitute systems, according to the literature, allow for very little power-sharing. To quantify levels of power-sharing, I have developed a 10-point index ranging from 0-9 that rates countries' levels of power-sharing based on the aforementioned factors: electoral system type, executive type, and degree of decentralization. All three factors will be based on a 4-point scale, from 0-3, with higher scores indicating more power-sharing.

For the electoral system, the scale goes as follows: Proportional representation = 3pts; Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) = 2pts; SMD or Plurality = 1 pt; appointed legislature or non-existence of the national legislature = 0pts. For the electoral system variable, only the type of electoral system used for the lower house is considered in this index. The use of PR is associated with higher levels of power-sharing due to the low barriers it presents to parties trying to gain representation in the legislature. Such low barriers allow a multitude of parties to attain seats in the national legislature. MMP is a compromise in that it is neither PR nor majoritarian, but represents a middle ground between the two. While not as inclusive as PR, it is a step above majoritarian systems in terms of power-sharing. The problem with MMP is that often the threshold for the PR part of the system is as high as 5% or more. This means that groups dispersed throughout the country may not be able to attain representation. Majoritarian systems using SMD are seen as the least conducive to power-sharing as it is often much more difficult for minor parties to gain representation. The United States and United Kingdom are commonly cited examples of how such systems often lead to either a two-party state or a one-party system. There are cases in which the national legislature is either wholly appointed or non-existent. As this runs contrary to the purpose of power-sharing, which is to promote democracy, such institutions are regarded as allowing no degree of power-sharing.

The next institution considered is the executive branch, coded as follows: Parliamentary system = 3pts; Semi-Presidential = 2pts; Presidential = 1pt; appointed executive or monarchy = 0pts. A parliamentary executive is associated with higher levels of power-sharing because the executive is often drawn from a coalition of parties that make up the majority in the lower house. Parliamentary systems also allow for the changing of the executive in a much more stable manner without the need for another national election. Systems that divide executive power, typically between a president and prime minister, are referred to as semi-presidential. While such systems do allow for the election of a prime minister and president these two
officials typically come from the same party. Semi-presidentialism can also be dangerous if the prime minister and president are from different political parties as this can result in executive deadlock and competition for power. Established democracies like France might be able to survive these situations, but in less stable states this could be a catalyst for conflict. Presidential systems invest all executive power into a single person and in addition to being less representative, elections to this position can be seen as a zero-sum game in highly divided societies. This gives the losing parties less incentive to accept defeat, as recent elections in Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire have shown. The appointment of the executive, such as by an occupying force, or a monarchy like Swaziland represent an executive in which no power-sharing can take place as the institution is utterly undemocratic. It should be noted that in this index those countries that have a president and prime minister are only considered semi-presidential or parliamentary if the prime minister is chosen from the lower house or directly elected. If the president appoints the prime minister as part of his cabinet the system is considered presidential because the president is still effectively considered the head of state and head of government.

The final factor, decentralization, can be broken down into three categories and goes as follows: Federations = 3pts; Decentralized Unions = 2pts; Unitary States = 1pt. States with no central government or little to no control over territory =0pts. Federal institutions create another level of democratic representation in which minor or local parties can gain representation. This additional level of government also grants a degree of autonomy to these locales and allows them manage local affairs. Decentralized hybrids, similar to Tanzania, have devolved powers down to local levels of government and represent a step in the right direction in terms of power-sharing. However in these systems nearly all important decision making and real power still rests with the central government, especially in fiscal matters. A majority of Sub-Saharan states represent a highly centralized unitary structure. Under such systems, there is little, if any, devolution of power and nearly all decisions come from the central authority. If a state is failed, like Somalia, any form of devolution of powers is impossible. The state cannot even consider local or regional issues, let alone address them. With no place for representation from the local to national level, it is impossible for groups to share power.

Not all states will fit perfectly within these definitions. Even two states that are presidential republics may have nuanced differences that set them apart. Levels of centralization and electoral systems can be especially complicated. States are often simply identified as federal or unitary. For others though decentralization may be viewed as much more subtle process that involves incremental steps. The study of electoral systems usually involves identifying the rules of the system in place. For example, it is often important to distinguish between open and closed list PR. The inability of the index to include such detail is a limitation. However, nearly all state institutions can be classified under one of the three sub-

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35 Norris 2008, 173.
36 See Appendix for Power-sharing Index (PSI) Table.
37 Lijphart 1999.
38 Norris 2008, 170.
categories. The index considers the most relevant institutions and system types, which allows it to accurately rank states based on their levels of institutional power-sharing.

**DEPENDENT VARIABLES**

The first dependent variable is democracy. Democracy will be measured using the composite score of a country on the Freedom House Liberal Democracy Index. Freedom House uses the Gastil Index, a 7-point scale for measuring political rights and civil liberties. While other measures of democracy were considered, Freedom House was the only one with scores for the year 2010. Changes in a states’ ranking are also explained along with any relevant political changes that took place. The index also does not favor any particular type of democratic institution. In other words, by default it does not consider a parliamentary executive any more democratic than a presidential executive.

Freedom House, an independent think tank based in the United States began assessing political trends in the 1950s. In 1972 it switched to the Gastil Index which assigns ratings of the political rights and civil liberties for each state and then categorizes them as free, partially free, or not free. The index tracks the existence of political rights by looking at the electoral processes, political pluralism, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties are measured in terms of the existence of freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights. The classifications are based on a checklist of questions, which includes ten separate items that relate to the existence of political rights and fifteen items concerning civil liberties. These items assess the institutional checks and balances of power on the executive by the legislature, an independent judiciary, and the existence of political rights and civil liberties. These also include self-determination and participation by minorities, and free and fair elections laws. Each item is given a score from 0-4 and all are equal when combined. The raw scores of a country are then converted into a 7-point scale of political rights and a 7-point scale of civil liberties. These two scores are then combined to determine the average rating of a state and whether it is free, partly free, or not free.39

Although it provides scores for nearly all states and independent territories as well as being a long running time-series of observations, there are several flaws and biases. First the process used by Freedom House suffers from lack of transparency, so it is impossible to check the reliability and consistency of coding decisions. The items used to measure political rights and civil liberties also cover a wide range of issues, some of which might not necessarily be indicative of democracy. Since no breakdown of the composite scores is made available it is impossible to test which of the items correlate most with democracy. While it is biased in the sense that it measures only liberal democracy, it is widely used and trusted as providing an accurate representation of a states’ level of democracy.40

The second dependent variable is state stability. To measure this I utilized the Failed States Index from ForeignPolicy.com and the Fund for Peace. The Failed State Index defines a

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39 Freedom House.
40 Norris 2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; See Appendix for Freedom House Scores.
state as failing when it loses physical control over its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The erosion of legitimate authority, inability to provide public services, and inability interact with other states are also characteristics. The index includes 177 states and the Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an original methodology developed over the past decade. The CAST model employs a four step trend-line analysis, (1) consisting of rating twelve social, economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) identifying idiosyncratic variables or factors; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that shows the conflict history of the states being analyzed. The twelve indicators used are: Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.41

The ranking a state receives is based on the total combined scores of these twelve indicators. Each indicator is measured on a scale from 0-10, with zero being the most stable and ten being the most unstable. These indicators are then combined to form a scale from 0-120 in which higher scores indicate more instability. The CAST methodology has been peer-reviewed over the past decade by independent scholars, educational, government, and private institutions (Fund for Peace). Since the ratings are meant to measure the vulnerability of a state they cannot predict when a state might collapse or experience violence. Although the trend lines that these scores produce may be used as a means of determining the future direction of a state. Unfortunately the raw data used in creating these rankings is not readily available due to it being drawn from millions of news articles and reports. However the index values are readily available to the public.42

REGION

Region is factored in due to the potential effects it may have on stability and democracy. As has happened before in Africa, a result of civil war is often human flight. A massive influx of refugees can place a great strain on the recipient country. The violence that drove these refugees might not only follow them, but their sudden presence in a foreign state has the possibility of inciting a xenophobic backlash among the native population. Another dangerous possibility is the chance rebel groups may use neighboring states as a launching point for attacks. Regional conflict has the potential to destabilize all surrounding states and maintaining stability is undoubtedly easier if neighboring states are not imploding due to civil war. Region is also important when considering democracy because of the idea of regional diffusion. In other words, democracy in one state has the potential to influence and spread to surrounding states. The ideas and institutions adopted by one state can impact those of another. If all states within a particular region had adopted democratic institutions, while states outside of this region had failed to do so, one could conclude that regional factors played a role in spreading democracy.

41 Foreign Policy.
42 See Appendix for Failed States Index Scores.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As the data test the two competing bodies of literature on power-sharing institutions and the possible effects of region, there are several expected outcomes. If the data support the hypotheses that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing have higher levels of democracy and stability, then there should be a positive correlation between the Power-Sharing Index Score (PSI) and Freedom House Score (FH). There should also be a negative relationship between the PSI Score and Failed States Index Score (FSI). If the data do not support the hypotheses, the opposite will be seen in the results. A third outcome in this case is possible. The results may support none of the stated hypotheses and there simply might not be a significant relationship in either direction. This would truly be disappointing as it would imply that no set of institutions is likely to be any more effective in Sub-Saharan Africa.

If region does have any significant affect on democracy and stability we should see this in the form of significant positive correlations between the individual regions and FH Scores and FSI Scores. The absence of such significant correlations means we can rule out region as having any meaningful impact on a state’s measured level of democracy or stability. However, the presence of any significant findings would indicate that there are regional factors that are influencing how stable and democratic a state is. The number of cases used in this study, 48, while relatively large for a comparative study, also means each individual case can have a larger effect on the overall results. While this small number may justify the use of a ninety percent confidence level, statistical significance will only be given to results achieving a ninety-five percent confidence level.

Table 1 shows the results of the bivariate correlation between the FSI Score, PSI Score, FH Score, and region. The first notable result can be seen in the strength and significance of the correlation between democracy and stability. While this association may seem obvious, it indicates that these two characteristics are not simply two random and unrelated concepts. Instead, it points to the fact that these are two characteristics of a state that are strongly associated with each other. Since power-sharing institutions are theorized to improve these two aspects of a state, it is crucial they actually be related. The next significant result is the strong correlation between institutional power-sharing and democracy. This indicates that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing also have correspondingly higher levels of democracy. This supports the hypothesis that a higher level of institutional power-sharing is associated with more democracy. The correlation between power-sharing and stability also turns out to be significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence and moderately strong. The negative correlation is expected here as it shows that higher levels of power-sharing correlate negatively with instability. This supports the second hypothesis that higher levels of institutional power-sharing will be associated with more stability. As we see with these results, region has no significant relationship to either of the dependent variables. Thus the findings exclude region as being strongly associated with stability or democratization.
Table 1: Correlation between power-sharing (PSI), stability (FSI), democracy (FH) and Region
Dependent Variables: FSI Score and FH Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FH Score</th>
<th>FSI Score</th>
<th>PSI Score</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Central</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>FH Score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSI Score</td>
<td>.703**</td>
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<td>PSI Score</td>
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<td>-.318*</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
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<td>.028</td>
<td>-.233</td>
<td>(.438)</td>
<td>(.852)</td>
<td>(.111)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.574**</td>
<td>(.257)</td>
<td>(.427)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.181</td>
<td>-.090</td>
<td>.316*</td>
<td>.331*</td>
<td>.331*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>-.213</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.292*</td>
<td>.306*</td>
<td>.185</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
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</table>

**p<0.01, *p<0.05

The other significant findings reveal that the regions correlate with each other, in all but one instance, because they all share the similar characteristics of high instability and lower levels of democracy. The one instance in which the regions do not correlate with each other is in the case of Central and Southern Africa. This is most likely because Southern Africa is arguably the most stable and democratic region of Sub-Saharan Africa, while Central Africa is the worst in these regards. 43

CONCLUSIONS

Theories of power-sharing suggest that institutions that allow for the inclusion of all major actors will produce more democracy and greater stability. These consociational systems have been studied extensively over the past several decades by scholars such as Norris and

43 If Zimbabwe and Mozambique are grouped in with Eastern Africa the results of the correlation differ greatly for Southern Africa and alter the conclusions that can be drawn. When this is done, Southern Africa has a correlation with stability of -.319 that is significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. This is almost exactly the same strength of the correlation between power-sharing and stability. This indicates that the stability of a region plays a role in state stability. The relationship between democracy and Southern Africa also improves to .261 with a significance of .073. The correlation with power-sharing also increases to .277 with a significance of .056. What these alternate results point towards is that Southern Africa has adopted institutions with more power-sharing. In doing so the result has been higher levels of democracy and stability.
Lipjhart, producing a debate about their effects. This study has attempted to contribute to that debate by testing the relationship between higher levels of institutional power-sharing and democracy and conflict in the tumultuous region of Sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that those states with higher levels of institutional power-sharing are associated with greater democracy and stability. While these findings by no means conclude the debate, the results clearly support proponents of power-sharing. There has been very little work done to study the effects of power-sharing institutions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The theoretical literature predicts two sets of competing hypotheses on the expected outcomes of increased power-sharing. However, previous studies have not focused on the part of the world where these institutions may be needed most. This study takes the first step in determining whether or not power-sharing institutions do work Sub-Saharan Africa.

With many African states deeply divided and under duress, studies of this kind can assist policymakers in determining the correct institutions to implement. Looking to cases like South Africa, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, other states can see how power-sharing institutions have assisted in creating free and stable states. This study should not be viewed as the final word on power-sharing institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Examples exist within Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ethiopia and Niger, where states have moved to institutions allowing for greater degrees of power-sharing and yet their levels of democracy and stability remain dangerously low. It is important for scholars to continue studying the precise reasons as to why power-sharing has been more effective in some states than others.

The aforementioned cases of failure point towards factors affecting power-sharing not covered in this study. It is possible that corruption or lack of funds has prevented such institutions from functioning as they are theoretically designed to function. The literature also makes an important distinction between those states that are highly divided or post-conflict. This difference is important because past conflict can make it more difficult to bring all major actors to the table, while cleaved societies may simply be seeking a means of fairer representation. Deeply divided societies with a high degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization may also affect the duration of such institutions as the possibility of conflict can be greater. As mentioned in the design section of this study, institutional duration was something that unfortunately had to be omitted for logistical reasons. However, examining the duration of power-sharing institutions would go far in disproving the critics that power-sharing institutions do not last, or vindicate their theories about the fragility of such institutions.

The purpose of this study was not to try and account for every possible factor influencing the success or failure of power-sharing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, it was meant to act as a starting point for future research. To gain a better perspective on what conditions are conducive to the success of these institutions and what may lead to their failure requires a more in depth look into the regions and individual cases. In doing so it can also be more fully understood how power-sharing institutions affect regime change and the formation of political parties. With that being said it is critical that we determine which set of institutions are most likely to provide democracy and stability for the states of Sub-Saharan Africa.
## Appendix

List of Sub-Saharan States, Scores, System Type, and Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FH Score</th>
<th>FSI Score</th>
<th>PSI Score</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Decentralization</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Pres.</td>
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<td>Central</td>
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## Power-sharing Index Table (PSI)

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<td>Appointed or non-existent</td>
<td>Monarchy or Appointed</td>
<td>Failed State</td>
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WORKS CITED


Fund for peace. www.fundforpeace.org (November 2, 2010).


