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Res Publica XVII

Abstract

Complete copy of the 2012 volume of *Res Publica*.

RES PUBLICA

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Res Publica is a publication of Pi Sigma Alpha, the Political Science Honor Society. It is funded by the Illinois Wesleyan University Student Senate.

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Associate Editors:

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LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR

It is entirely fitting that the cover of *Res Publica* Volume XVII features a portrait of Marcus Tullius Cicero. After all, Illinois Wesleyan University is a liberal arts college, and Cicero was the quintessential citizen scholar.

Indeed, there was a time when every American liberal arts graduate would read Cicero as part of their general education program. Most learned Latin by reading Cicero's letters to his friend Atticus. But they learned far more in the process. The letters document Cicero's personal and public life, especially his heroic battles to save the republic and the Roman Constitution from the Cataline conspiracy and Caesar. Many students would have gone on to read his philippics against Cataline, his dialogues *De Oratore* and *Tusculanae Disputationes*, and his masterpiece *De Re Publica*. Through these readings, they would have encountered the precepts of the Stoics and Cicero's natural law philosophy, which revised Aristotle by forcefully arguing for the existence of a universal human law grounded in natural equality. Above all, they would have learned about the civic commitments of a cosmopolitan patriot who sacrificed his life to the cause of maintaining *res publica*, the public good.

Editors Lauren Contorno and Laura Gaffey have been faithful to Cicero's ideals in preparing the 2012 edition of *Res Publica*. They have acted as exemplary citizen scholars. They have sacrificed by spending many hours in the research lab producing this undergraduate journal of original political science research. They and their co-editors, TJ Luby and Sarah Latshaw, have selected papers seeking answers to pressing public-spirited questions, such as: How do negative campaigns impact voter turnout? How will the Supreme Court's *Citizens United* opinion change elections? Are cosmopolitans or patriots more likely to support green policies? Where is Waldo? What determinants drive legislators' votes on environmental issues? Is ideology related to personality type? Can the "security dilemma" delineated by international relations scholars explain nonviolent ethnic conflict?

The faculty in the department of political science applaud the efforts these students have put forth and the results they have achieved. Each of these papers was first drafted in the fall semester senior seminar class. Each has since undergone multiple drafts and revisions. Like Cicero, the authors have sacrificed for something larger than themselves, and like Cicero they deserve our appreciation. They did not have to die for the cause, but because of their efforts our world is a little more understandable and a little more tractable for us as citizens.

James Simeone

EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

This spring we had the privilege of reviewing many scholarly submissions to this year's publication of *Res Publica*. The articles we have chosen for publication reflect Illinois Wesleyan students' commitment to academic excellence and outstanding intellectual curiosity. From an international study of the ethnic security dilemma to an analysis of the correlation between personality and policy preferences of students here on our campus, *Res Publica XVII* covers a diverse range of topics, utilizing various research techniques. It has truly been a rewarding learning experience working with this year's authors. Their research offers unique insight into a number of highly pertinent issues and has made substantive contributions to the discipline of political science.

Res Publica is one of the few undergraduate political science journals in the country. Since its inception in 1995, political science students at Illinois Wesleyan University have been using their research and analytical skills developed through our program's rigorous coursework to produce original and intriguing pieces of literature. In past years, the journal has been distributed solely on our campus; however, thanks to a generous grant provided by Pi Sigma Alpha, this year we are proud to announce that we are able to share this journal with colleges and universities across the country. We hope that the expansion of our publication will foster lively academic discussion on campuses nationwide concerning the research topics presented.

We would like to thank both Sarah Latshaw and Timothy Luby for their tireless work as associate editors in ensuring the quality of this edition of the journal. We truly appreciate their dedication and intelligent contributions throughout this process. We are also grateful to Lindsay Starr, an IWU student, for her creativity and talent in designing this year's cover. In addition, we would like to thank each professor of the Political Science Department here at IWU, not only for their support as we developed this journal, but also for the years of excellent instruction and caring mentoring.

We hope you enjoy this year's edition of *Res Publica*.

Laura Gaffey and Lauren Contorno

AUTHORS' BIOGRAPHIES

Hannah Griffin is a senior Political Science major and Hispanic Studies minor. On campus she is a staff member of the student newspaper, *The Argus*. She served as the 2011 news editor. She is a member of the media honor society, Gamma Upsilon, as well as a member of the political science honor society, Pi Sigma Alpha. She has held internships with the St. Clair County State's Attorney's Office in Belleville, IL and The National Head Start Association in Washington, D.C. She worked on the IWU Communications Office staff for two years, and now works at Country Financial Insurance as a media relations intern. She recently received the Boyd F. Goldsworthy academic scholarship for Illinois Wesleyan students and will be attending law school at the University of Notre Dame in the fall.

Lauren Contorno is a senior Political Science major with a minor in Environmental Studies. Throughout her four years at Illinois Wesleyan, she has been an active member of Kappa Delta Sorority and was vice president of Pi Sigma Alpha, political science honor society. She also interned with several non-profits, including the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Chicago, Marcfirst of Normal, IL, and the Illinois Stewardship Alliance. Lauren also spent a semester abroad in Perugia, Italy. This past fall, she was Illinois Wesleyan University's recipient of the 2011 Lincoln Academy of Illinois Student Laureate Award. After graduation, she hopes to land a career in the field of environmental justice and eventually return to school to earn a Ph.D.

Laura Gaffey is a senior at Illinois Wesleyan University with majors in Political Science and Hispanic Studies and a minor in French and Francophone Studies. She is the president of College Democrats and Pi Sigma Alpha political science honor society and a member of Phi Beta Kappa. She spent a semester interning in Washington D.C. and studying at Georgetown University, as well as a semester studying in Madrid, Spain. Laura has interned at a homelessness advocacy organization, in the U.S. Senate, and on political campaigns. After graduation, she hopes to work in politics and eventually attend graduate school.

Jiaying (Jason) Xu is a senior at Illinois Wesleyan University with majors in Political Science and Accounting. He is a member of both Pi Sigma Alpha political science honor society and Phi Kappa Phi. He currently supervises IWU's student transportation program (Titan Transport) and is a political science research assistant. During the first two years in college, his primary interest was in accounting. He volunteered at a local tax center, preparing tax returns for low-income, disadvantaged people, and interned in the finance department of a large corporation in Shanghai for a summer. He later found himself truly interested in the legal system and jurisprudence. After graduation, he will be attending law school at the University of Pennsylvania. With his background, he hopes to practice in corporate law or transnational transactional law at a global law firm.

Timothy Luby is a senior Political Science major and Economics minor. He works as a Political Science research assistant, and is a member of the Order of Titans honorary. His research interests focus on environmental politics as well as state and local government. He is the captain of Illinois Wesleyan's cross country and track teams as well as the school record holder in the 3 and 5 Kilometers. After graduation, Timothy hopes to gain employment in either a federal or local law enforcement agency, along with possibly pursuing a graduate degree in Criminal Justice.

Tracy Lytwyn is a senior Political Science major with minors in Business Administration and Religion. Throughout her four years at Illinois Wesleyan, she was involved in a variety of activities, including acting as president of College Republicans, historian for business fraternity Alpha Kappa Psi, a writer for The Argus, and a DJ for WESN Radio. She also made time for her first love, the saxophone, by playing in three campus ensembles. Tracy served as an intern for two local politicians, for IWU's Action Research Center, and as the communications specialist for the Hart Career Center. Additionally, she had the opportunity to volunteer with Adopt a U.S. Soldier, Crossroads Global Handcrafts, Alternative Spring Break, and her home church in Naperville, IL. She is truly grateful for the political science department's encouragement and support over the past four years of her life.

KEEP IT CLEAN? HOW NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNS AFFECT VOTER TURNOUT

Hannah Griffin

Abstract: *This study examines the effects of negative political campaigns on voter turnout over the last 10 years. Voter turnout in the United States is extremely low in comparison to other advanced industrialized nations, and the negativity that surrounds our elections may be the key to understanding why. The study is also a response to recent scholarship with conflicting conclusions on how the tone of campaigns affects the electorate. The independent variable in this study is the degree of campaign negativity, as perceived by voters. It is measured by state exit poll responses over the past 10 years, and its effect on voter turnout is analyzed using multiple regression. The analysis reveals that when neither candidate is perceived to be “going negative,” voter turnout goes up; however, when the Republican candidate is perceived to be negative in a campaign, voter turnout also goes up. The implications of these findings are discussed.*

INTRODUCTION

Amongst pollsters and campaign consultants, a debate continues over the advantages and disadvantages of “going negative.” Negative campaigns are characterized by an attacking tone in political debates and by political messages that focus on the character flaws or shortcomings of the opposing candidate. Some argue that Americans do not respond to politicians who attack their opponents.¹ Given the tone of recent campaigns, however, it seems that many campaign teams believe it is a winning strategy to play on the emotions of voters. This ground-level debate is mirrored in voting behavior scholarship. While there seems to be consensus amongst political psychologists that the tone of campaigns plays a role in voting behavior, studies analyzing the effect of negativity and attack messaging in political campaigns on voters have reached mixed conclusions.

Understanding this relationship has important implications for politicians and for voters. For the former, it informs campaign strategy. For voters, it could help make them vigilant of emotional manipulation. With this in mind, this project addresses the existing debate within voting behavior scholarship which, on one side, suggests that the anxiety emotion caused by negative campaigns leads to increased political attention and

¹ Maslansky, et al 2010.

voter turnout, and alternatively, that negativity in the political sphere causes people to tune out campaigns and stay home on Election Day.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The affective intelligence theory posited by Marcus and MacKuen suggests that when a voter experiences the anxiety emotion about a political situation, it causes the voter to pay closer attention to politics and to be able to “bring more information to task” during the judgment process.² The emotional cue warns the voter about changes in the political landscape and urges him or her to pay closer attention. This means that the voter will take the time to process all the information needed to make a fully informed political decision, and as a result, the voter will be better able to make the decision that will optimize his or her own self-interest.³ The affective intelligence theory, then, suggests that anxious citizens are more likely to vote and, possibly, to vote more rationally.

On the other hand, the absence of anxiety is also a cognitive cue to the voter signaling that there has been no major change and the voter can get by making decisions and judgments through the use of heuristics, such as source expertise.⁴ If the affective intelligence theory is valid, then electoral candidates who wish to generate interest in a campaign have an incentive to adopt a negative or attacking attitude toward the opposing candidate in hopes of generating a sense of anxiety about the consequences of the election.

The affective intelligence theory builds on previous research that suggests that all information received by a voter is not processed in the same way. Dual process models, such as Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model, offer two “routes” through which information can be processed by voters: central or peripheral.⁵ While peripheral processing relies on the use of heuristics, central processing occurs when an individual “elaborates” on a piece of new information to fully understand it and its potential impact on the individual’s interests. Petty and Cacioppo suggest that because

² Cassino and Lodge 2007, 105.

³ Marcus, et al 2007.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Petty and Cacioppo 1996.

voters come into contact with too much information during the course of a campaign to be able to think carefully about each piece, peripheral processing becomes a voter's default setting. Only when motivation is high, meaning when the information is personally relevant, will information be processed centrally.⁶ The affective intelligence theory essentially argues that motivation and personal relevance become high when the anxiety emotion is triggered. Some research has provided evidence that negative campaign advertising has a positive effect on voter turnout. A study by Niven found that voter turnout increased in a mayoral election among those who received negative campaign mail.⁷ In their study of the 1998 senatorial elections, Jackson and Carsey also attributed increased voter turnout to negative television advertisements and found that positive advertisements have no significant effect on turnout.⁸ For candidates who want voters to reevaluate their political decisions, or to take voters off their default mode, this side of the scholarly debate suggests this can be accomplished by fostering an emotional response in voters. Negative or attack advertisements and messages are one obvious manifestation of this goal.

On the other side of the scholarly debate is the argument found in Ansolabhere and Iyengar's *Going Negative*. The authors present evidence which suggests that rather than encouraging voters to pay more attention to campaigns, negative political advertisements diminish voter turnout by reducing voters' faith in the electoral process and their sense of efficacy.⁹ In their experiments, viewers were shown a political advertisement about a real candidate during an actual campaign. The ad was either negative or positive in tone, meaning it was either anti-candidate B or pro-candidate A. The study examined presidential, senatorial, gubernatorial and mayoral elections. Depending on the race, the advertisement was either created by the authors or chosen from existing ads used by the candidates. After seeing an ad, the viewers were asked to describe their intent to vote. Whether those who expressed intention to vote actually voted in the coming election is unknown.¹⁰

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Niven 2006.

⁸ Jackson and Carsey 2007.

⁹ Ansolabhere and Iyengar 1997.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Ansolabehere and Iyengar found that while self-identified Republicans and Independents find negative advertisements more persuasive, negative advertisements decrease turnout among all partisan groups. Notably, negative advertisements had a significantly greater demobilizing effect on Independents than on Democrats and Republicans. They attributed this to the fact that independents, being less partisan, are already unlikely to vote. Their evidence suggests that negative campaigns have the effect of polarizing the electorate by demobilizing those not thoroughly rooted in the Democratic and Republican camps, thereby chasing off the Independent vote.¹¹ Their findings challenge the affective intelligence theory. While negative campaigns were persuasive for Republicans and did not have as great a demobilizing effect on partisans, negative advertisements did have a negative effect on overall voter turnout, with the greatest demobilizing effect on Independents.¹² The study also found that viewers who saw positive ads were better able to recall information about the candidate than the viewers who received the same information in a negative ad.¹³ This contradicts the affective intelligence theory tenet that the anxiety emotion causes voters to have a better understanding of political information. Finally, Ansolabehere and Iyengar found that positive messages “in which the candidates promote their own ideas, successes, and abilities,” can increase overall voter turnout by bringing back non-partisans.¹⁴ This challenges principles of the affective intelligence theory, which suggest that a sense of anxiety can engage voters. Other voting behavior scholarship has also found that negative campaigns decrease voter turnout.¹⁵

Assuming that an increase in strength of opinion will lead to increased likelihood to vote, other findings offer an alternative to the affective intelligence theory’s explanation of how political information affects voters. Taber and Lodge found that people with strong beliefs become attitudinally more extreme after receiving both pro and con arguments because they “assimilate congruent evidence uncritically but vigorously counter incongruent evidence.”¹⁶ Their findings suggest that both positive

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid, 111.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid, 113.

¹⁵ Krupnikov 2011.

¹⁶ Taber and Lodge 2006, 756.

and negative advertisements will increase voter turnout among those already likely to vote. The *Going Negative* studies also found that the effect of advertisements varies based on degree of partisanship. However, they found that negative advertisements decrease overall voter turnout by demobilizing all voters and especially nonpartisans, while positive advertisements increase voter turnout regardless of affiliation, or lack of.¹⁷ The existing scholarship, then, is divided over the effect of negative advertisements on voter turnout, as well as how this effect varies by party affiliation.

RESEARCH QUESTION & HYPOTHESIS

My experiment addresses the main debate over the effects of negativity in campaign messaging on voter turnout. Do negative campaign messages have an effect on voter turnout? Is this effect positive or negative?

Contrary to claims made by the affective intelligence theory, I expect that anxiety caused by negative, attacking statements in a political campaign will not increase voter attention, or turnout as applied to this experiment. Ansolabehere and Iyengar have offered substantial evidence that isolated exposure to negative advertisements lowers intent to participate in elections overall and specifically amongst Democrats and those who were already unlikely to vote. However, their experiments did not capture the voters' perception of campaign negativity on Election Day. Additionally, the experiment measured only intent to vote as expressed by subjects; it did not measure actual voter turnout. Expanding upon the experiments of Ansolabehere and Iyengar, I will analyze how the voters' perception of negativity in a given campaign affects voter turnout in that election.

Hypothesis: The higher the campaign negativity for a given election is perceived to be by the electorate, the lower the voter turnout will be in that election.

¹⁷ Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997.

METHODS & OPERATIONALIZATION

The experiment designed to test this hypothesis includes 41 cases, in which the unit of analysis is the state. The cases are taken from state exit poll data for presidential, senatorial or gubernatorial elections in the years 2000-2010.¹⁸ The sample includes 6 states from the 2000 presidential election, the 2000 North Carolina gubernatorial election, 3 states from the 2006 senatorial election, 20 states from the 2008 presidential election, 7 states from the 2010 senatorial election, and the 2010 California gubernatorial election.

In order to analyze the effects of campaign negativity on voter turnout, voter perception of negativity is used as the independent variable. This is measured by state-level exit poll responses to the following question: Which candidate attacked unfairly? Voters were given the following response options: The Democratic Candidate, The Republican Candidate, Both, or Neither. Since it is the voter's own perception of negativity that affects the individual's choice to vote or not, in this experiment, negativity is measured as reported by voters. Measuring negativity as reported by the voter is arguably a more accurate measurement of negativity than used by the *Going Negative* experiments, in which proctors determined the level of negativity. Voter perception of candidate negativity is operationalized by state exit poll response data, which is taken to be representative of the state electorate as a whole. The cases included in the sample are the only cases from all 50 states where the above question was asked in an exit poll in the election years from 2000-2010, as reported by CNN. For example, the exit poll prompt for the 2008 presidential election would read: Which candidate attacked unfairly? Obama, McCain, Both or Neither?

The experiment controlled for several additional variables that may affect voter turnout. These variables include education level, measured by state percentage of college degree-holders; region, where non-Southern states are coded as 0 and Southern states are coded as 1; competitiveness of election, which is measured by the winning candidate's margin of victory in percentage points; and racial composition of state electorate, which is measured by the percentage of the state population which is white.

¹⁸ Elections from 2002 were not included in experiment due to data irregularity.

Additionally, party identification is also included. It is measured by percentage of the state population that identifies as Democrat, Republican, and Independent.¹⁹

The dependent variable, voter turnout, is based on Census data and is reported as a percentage of the state's voting age population. Each voter turnout figure corresponds to the particular turnout rate for each of the 41 cases, so the state turnout for one race in one year. This operationalization of voter turnout is arguably more accurate than the method employed in the *Going Negative* experiments, which measured voter turnout by the participant's self-reported intention to vote. Their method is less valid because there is no way to confirm that those who reported intentions to vote actually voted. This experiment's measurement of voter turnout represents actual voter turnout for all states in the years included in the experiment.

¹⁹ All control variable data is taken from *The Almanac of American Politics*, with the exception of data from 2010. This information was retrieved from the U.S. Census Report Online.

DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1: The Effect of Campaign Negativity on Voter Turnout

Dependent Variable: State Voter Turnout

Independent Variables	B value	Std. Error	Beta weight	T-value	Sig.
Democratic Candidate Attacked Unfairly	.976	.654	.562	1.494	.146
Republican Candidate Attacked Unfairly	1.583	.554	.954	2.857	.008**
Both Candidates Attacked Unfairly	.982	.626	.629	1.568	.128
Neither Candidate Attacked Unfairly	2.204	.662	.912	3.329	.002**
Region	-3.160	3.232	-.111	-.978	.336
Competitiveness	.055	.113	.071	.484	.632
Racial Composition	.248	.094	.338	2.630	.014*
ID as Democrat	-.712	1.996	-.275	-.357	.724
ID as GOP	-.380	1.977	-.160	-.192	.849
ID as Independent	-.239	2.041	-.108	-.117	.907
Income	.000	.000	-.216	-1.552	.132
N=41 R Square= .732					

*p \leq .05, **p \leq .01

Table 1 shows the results of a multiple regression measuring the predictive power of voter perception of campaign negativity on voter turnout. The independent variables account for about 73% of the variance in voter turnout. The perception that neither candidate attacked unfairly, meaning the campaign was clean, is a significant predictor of voter turnout. There is a strong positive relationship between electorate perception that the campaign was clean and voter turnout in that election. This relationship is significant at the .01 level with a beta weight of .912. This is strong evidence that as perception of campaign positivity increases, voter turnout also increases. The B value for this variable is 2.204. This means that for every 1% increase in

exit respondents who felt the campaign was positive, there was a corresponding 2.204% increase in voter turnout in that election. These findings confirm Ansolabehere and Iyengar's proposition that positive messages increase turnout across the electorate.

However, the data also reveals that in states where voters perceived the Republican candidate to be negative during a campaign, voter turnout increased in that election. The positive relationship between perception of a negative Republican candidate and voter turnout is significant at the .01 level with a beta weight of .954. The B value for this variable is 1.583. This means that for every 1% increase in exit poll respondents who felt that only the Republican attacked unfairly, there was a corresponding 1.583% increase in voter turnout in that election. This suggests that negative campaign messages do not always decrease voter turnout as hypothesized. In fact, the beta weight data reveals that negative or attacking campaign behavior by a Republican candidate increases voter turnout at a greater rate than positive campaign behavior by both candidates. However, the beta weights are quite close, which reveals that the variables' impacts on voter turnout are relatively equal.

With beta weights of .954 and .912, respectively, these two variables have a stronger relationship than the only significant control variable, racial composition of the state. There is a positive relationship between percent of population that is white and voter turnout. The relationship is significant at the .05 level with a beta weight of .338. While I found that when campaign behavior by both candidates was positive, voter turnout increased, I did not find that voter turnout decreased when both candidates were perceived to be negative, so the relationship is not a perfect dichotomy.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings partly confirm my hypothesis that higher campaign negativity causes lower voter turnout. The results of the multiple regression reveal that the absence of negativity in a campaign, as perceived by voters, increases voter turnout. This offers some support for the assertions of scholars, such as Ansolabehere and Iyengar, that Americans are responsive to clean campaigns and that politicians do not have to resort to attack messaging to foster interest in elections. However, I did not find the relationship between campaign message tone and voter turnout to be a perfect

dichotomy. While this study shows that positive or clean campaigns increase voter turnout, when both candidates were perceived to be negative, voter turnout did not decrease.

This study also found a positive relationship between perception of campaign negativity and voter turnout. The existence of a significant, positive relationship between voter perception that the Republican campaign was negative and voter turnout does not support my hypothesis. It instead it offers support for the affective intelligence theory. The beta weight data from my analysis demonstrates that the perception of Republican candidate negativity explains slightly more of the increase in voter turnout than non-negative campaigns do. This evidence is contrary to my hypothesis. Still, the relative impact of the variables was very similar in strength.

As such, the results of this study do not offer conclusive evidence for one side or the other of this academic debate, but rather provide evidence for both. But how can the perception of negative campaigning and positive campaigning both increase election turnout? The most powerful variable in driving up voter turnout in this study is the perception that the Republican candidate was negative or aggressive. This may suggest that the voter response to negativity is contingent upon which candidate is doing the attacking. In their studies, Ansolabehere and Iyengar suggest that messages from candidates are better received by voters when the topic of the message is something the candidate's party is perceived to be better at. For example, Republicans' messages about defense get a better reaction from voters than Democratic messages about defense, and the opposite is true for a topic that the Democratic party is thought to "own," like employment.²⁰ It may be possible, based on the results of this study, that Republicans had "ownership" of the topics included in the attacking or negative messages during these campaigns, and that these messages encouraged political attention in voters across partisan groups. This is one possible route for further study.

Another possible explanation may lie in the different ways partisan groups respond to negativity. As previously noted, Ansolabehere and Iyengar suggest that Republicans reported higher intentions to vote after seeing negative political advertisements, regardless of the sponsor of the ad. The opposite was true of Democratic

²⁰ Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997, 64.

voters, who only responded to positive ads.²¹ It could be that positive campaigns make voters from both parties turn out to vote, and that negative campaigns make only Republicans turn out to vote. The increase in voter turnout when the voting population perceives the Republican candidate to be negative may be explained by increased turnout among Republican voters. My model controls for party identification within the state, however, because of data limitations, I was not able to analyze the effect of negative campaign messaging on voter turnout within partisan groups. This is another avenue for further study.

Further research to analyze the effect of negativity in political campaigns on voter turnout within partisan groups is necessary to fully understand this relationship due to limits in this study's data. Determining how party identification affects response to negative advertisements may clear up the contradiction about campaign tone that exists in scholarship and in campaign practice. The answer may be, as the results of this study suggest, that each theory is partially right. Still, the underlying reasons for the success of positive and negative campaigns within partisan groups should be separately addressed in further study.

APPENDIX

Included elections:

- 2000 Presidential: Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Kentucky, and Florida
- 2000 Gubernatorial: North Carolina
- 2000 Senatorial: New York, Virginia and Minnesota
- 2006 Senatorial: New Jersey, Tennessee and Minnesota
- 2008 Presidential: California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin
- 2010 Senatorial: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri and Nevada
- 2010 Gubernatorial: California

²¹ Ibid.

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THE INFLUENCE OF COSMOPOLITAN VALUES ON ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

Lauren Contorno

Abstract: *Many recent environmental politics and environmental behavior studies have attempted to explain the variation in individuals' environmental attitudes by means of their personal values. This piece enters into the recent debate that has developed around the dichotomous ideologies of cosmopolitanism and patriotism and their relationship to environmentalism, arguing that individuals with cosmopolitan values are more likely to exhibit concern for environmental issues than those with patriotic values. Through an analysis of regression models for seven Western industrialized nations, this study confirms a positive correlation between cosmopolitan values and environmentalism. The explanatory power of cosmopolitanism was greater than that of social demographic variables and political ideology, as well two other popularly examined ideologies, postmaterialism and egalitarianism.*

INTRODUCTION

One of the central questions guiding recent research in environmental politics is: "What factors help shape an individual's opinions on environmental issues?" Studies concerning environmental public opinion have attempted to explain the variance in individuals' environmental attitudes from several different approaches. Though many have explored the influence of various social demographic variables, as well as political ideology and party identification, results have varied and none of these variables have had sufficient explanatory power to adequately explain the variance in individuals' environmental attitudes. Consequently, recent research has shifted its focus to exploring how personal values and cultural worldviews may influence environmental consciousness.

In this new line of research, social scientists have frequently studied the influence of egalitarian and postmaterialist values. While these values are logical choices to explore in explaining environmentalism, results from such studies have been equivocal or have lacked strong explanatory power. Therefore, this research will introduce a new explanatory personal value by entering the recent debate that has emerged concerning the question of whether a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship leads to a higher degree of environmental concern than a patriotic conception of citizenship. Cosmopolitanism may be defined as an ideology which holds that one's primary allegiance should be to humanity as a whole and not necessarily to those with whom one shares a national identity. A cosmopolitan favors intensity of needs over

proximity of needs. Conversely, patriotism may be defined as an ideology which holds that one's primary allegiance should be to one's country and its citizens' needs. A patriot favors proximity of needs over intensity. While patriots primarily see themselves as citizens of their own locality/nation, cosmopolitans see themselves (in addition to their national citizenship) as citizens of the world.¹ Though many studies have explored the influence of egalitarian and postmaterialist values on environmental consciousness, very few have empirically researched the possible influence of cosmopolitan values, and none have directly tested all three of these value theories against each other. This research takes on this task. Specifically, this study will attempt to answer the following questions: Do individuals with cosmopolitan values or those with patriotic values exhibit more concern for environmental degradation? Do cosmopolitan or patriotic values have more explanatory power than egalitarian or postmaterialist values? Does the influence of these values differ across nations? Because environmental degradation is an international phenomenon with transnational externalities, I argue that individuals with cosmopolitan values are likely to show a greater concern for environmental issues than those with patriotic values.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Defining Values and Environmentalism

Several recent studies have examined the relationship between values and environmental concern, and the correlation between the two seems well established.² Values may be defined as "relatively stable principles that help us make decisions when our preferences are in conflict and thus convey some sense of what we consider good."³ The values-beliefs-norms (VBN) theory, as it relates to environmentalism, states that "values influence our worldview about the environment (general beliefs), which in turn influences our beliefs about the consequences of environmental change on things we value, which in turn influence our perceptions of our ability to reduce threats to things we value."⁴ Previous research addressing the relationship between values and environmentalism has included, but is not limited to, the

¹ Nussbaum 1996.

² Dietz, Fitzgerald and Shwom 2005.

³ Ibid, 335.

⁴ Ibid, 356.

following value clusters: self-interest vs. altruism, traditionalism vs. openness to change, postmaterialism vs. materialism, and egalitarianism vs. individualism.⁵

While “environmental concern” or “environmental consciousness” can be defined in a variety of ways, for the purposes of this research, environmental concern will be indicated not only by an individual’s assertion that he or she is concerned about environmental degradation, but also by his or her willingness to sacrifice economic income (by means of higher taxes, etc.) in order to eradicate environmental problems.

Postmaterialist vs. Materialist Values

The theorized relationship between postmaterialist values and environmentalism stems primarily from Ronald Inglehart’s sociological theory of postmaterialism. Inglehart posited that the industrialization of a nation leads its citizens to undergo a fundamental value shift, resulting in several attitudinal changes, including acquisition of pro-environmental attitudes. This value shift refers to the transition from a materialist to a postmaterialist mindset. While materialist values emphasize economic growth and consumption, postmaterialist values emphasize quality of life (e.g. a clean and healthy environment). Inglehart also believed mass support for environmental protection would be found in countries with severe, objective environmental problems, even in the absence of postmaterialist values. Following this reasoning, Inglehart hypothesized that the greatest support for environmental protection could be found in countries that have relatively severe environmental problems and in countries whose populace holds postmaterialist values. His study using data from the World Values Survey confirmed this hypothesis.⁶ Alexander Grob’s study of Swiss citizens concluded that out of all of the variables tested (including environmental awareness, perceived control over environmental issues, and emotions), the most important predictors of environmental behaviors were open/creative thinking and postmaterialistic value orientations, also confirming Inglehart’s hypothesis.⁷

However, many social scientists have successfully challenged this theory, disproving the suspected correlation between postmaterialist values and environmental concern. Brechin and Kempton (1994) found no statistically significant difference in perceived seriousness of

⁵ Carlisle and Smith 2005; Ellis and Thompson 1997; Franzen 2003; Grob 1995.

⁶ Inglehart 1995.

⁷ Grob 1995.

environmental problems between low income and industrialized countries, suggesting that environmental concern is a global phenomenon, independent of postmaterialist values.⁸ Studies by Grendstad and Selle and Kemmelmeir *et al.* also found no relationship between postmaterialism and environmentalism, casting doubt on whether there is a true correlation between postmaterialist values and environmental concern.⁹

As one can see, overall, cross-national research has found inconclusive evidence for a link between postmaterialist values and environmental concern. This opens the door to new research exploring alternative values which may influence environmentalism, as well as research that directly compares competing value theories.

Egalitarian vs. Individualistic Values

The literature concerning egalitarian values and environmentalism is less extensive than that concerning the postmaterialism vs. materialism debate, yet significant research contributions have been made. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's cultural theory divides cultures into four types of societies: egalitarian, individualist, hierarchical, and fatalist. Egalitarian societies are "communities in which members interact with one another frequently, and treat one another with equality, [and] have egalitarian worldviews."¹⁰ Individualist societies, by contrast "are characterized by infrequent, but relatively equal, interactions. Individualists believe that people should be on their own and not rely on others for material assistance."¹¹ Egalitarians see competition as harmful to society and favor measures which seek to give citizens equal opportunities to succeed, whereas individualists favor competition and inequalities as means of incentives for success.

According to Douglas and Wildavsky, these two groups have characteristic responses to hazards and threats. "Individualists tend to see lower risks than others see, and individualists are far more likely than others to accept risks in exchange for economic returns. Egalitarians are especially concerned with risks caused by what they see as inequalitarian institutions —

⁸ Dietz, Fitzgerald and Shwom 2005 (citing Brechin and Kempton 1994).

⁹ Dietz, Fitzgerald and Shwom 2005.

¹⁰ Carlisle and Smith, 529.

¹¹ Ibid.

big government and large corporations. They are also more likely to favour policies that reduce risks at the expense of economic growth.”¹² According to the tenets of this theory, egalitarians should be more likely to show concern for the environment, and studies by Ellis and Thompson, Grendstad and Selle, and Marris *et al.* have confirmed this hypothesis.¹³ Most pertinent to this research is Carlisle and Smith’s study which directly tested the postmaterialist and egalitarian values hypotheses against each other and found that among a representative sample of Californians, individualism and egalitarianism performed better than party identification, political ideology, and postmaterialism as predictors of environmental concern.¹⁴ The correlations between egalitarianism and individualism were in the expected directions.

Unlike the postmaterialism theory, the correlation between egalitarian values and environmental concern seems to be well established. However, the strength of the correlation between egalitarian values and environmentalism remains unclear, for in previous studies, the relative strength of the relationship has differed greatly between samples. This uncertainty warrants the need for additional research concerning the relationship between personal values and environmentalism.

Cosmopolitan vs. Patriotic Values

While egalitarian and postmaterialist values are logical choices to explore in explaining eco-consciousness, cosmopolitanism is an ideology that warrants more analysis concerning its possible influence on environmental attitudes. Because externalities of environmental degradation, e.g. air pollution, often cannot be internalized, environmental problems are global issues which require a global consciousness and multilateral effort in order to eradicate. Therefore, some scholars argue that a global conception of citizenship is required in order to foster a sense of obligation to environmental issues. “A framework of citizenship based on an evolution of rights (civil to political to social) within a national context provides a categorization and typology that are too limited for contemporary realities.”¹⁵ As Gabrielson notes, “The transnational character of environmental degradation, globalization, the logic of neo-liberalism, and widespread migration are some of the most prominent factors altering the contexts of

¹² Ibid, 530.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Gabrielson 2008, 437 (quoting Gilbert and Phillips 2003).

contemporary citizenship.”¹⁶ According to this logic, it seems likely that those individuals who already see themselves as global citizens and favor intensity of need over proximity (cosmopolitans) will show greater concern for environmental issues than those whose primary allegiance is to national issues (patriots).

To elaborate, the argument in favor of a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship as a means to environmentalism is as follows: citizens who view themselves as “citizens of the world” rather than only citizens of their own nation-state are more likely to show concern for the environment, for not only do they feel an obligation to preserve the integrity of their own local environment, but also to preserve the integrity of ecosystems around the world for their fellow global citizens. While patriots are primarily concerned about citizens of their own nation, cosmopolitans have equally as strong moral obligations to citizens around the world. Therefore, while a cosmopolitan’s own immediate environment may not be suffering the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation, a cosmopolitan will feel obligated to take steps to prevent environmental damage due to its current detrimental effects in other regions around the world. For example, although there may not be a severe shortage of freshwater in the United States, cosmopolitan U.S. citizens may take steps to conserve water because they know that freshwater depletion is an environmental issue affecting citizens in other nations. Patriots may not have this same consciousness, for they are primarily concerned about issues affecting their own nation. While there is a growing body of literature promoting the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship as a means to gain support for the global environmental movement, there have been very few studies that have attempted to empirically establish a correlation between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern.

Andrew Dobson advocates for a “post-cosmopolitan” conception of citizenship in his book *Citizenship and the Environment* (2003). Post-cosmopolitan citizenship entails a transnational conception of citizenship in which political obligation stems from “the material production and reproduction of daily life in an unequal and asymmetrically globalizing world.”¹⁷ This non-contractual theory of obligation is based upon the grounds that harm reaches “beyond national boundaries and both backwards and forwards in time,” creating a duty which extends beyond the nation-state.¹⁸ Dobson advocates for post-cosmopolitan

¹⁶ Gabrielson 2008, 437.

¹⁷ Ibid, 439 (quoting Dobson).

¹⁸ Ibid.

citizenship due to the nature of climate change and its global consequences. "Some people contribute more to this phenomenon than others, and...some people suffer more from the unpredictability this brings in its train than others."¹⁹ From a cosmopolitan worldview, this situation is a violation of justice and elicits a sense of moral duty to fellow citizens around the globe who are suffering as a result of environmental degradation.²⁰ "To the extent that people in developed nations draw more than their fair share of the Earth's biological productivity, they owe a duty of equity to individuals across the globe whose share of the planet's productivity is diminished. To the extent that people in developed nations do not bear the external costs of their consumption practices, they owe a duty of compensation to individuals across the globe on whom those costs are imposed."²¹ Similarly, Aaron Maltais recognizes environmental degradation as an international collective action problem and argues that the current political conception of justice has cosmopolitan implications. Maltais advocates for new global institutional arrangements to address anthropogenic climate change.²²

In contrast to the idea of cosmopolitanism evoking environmentalism, others have argued that patriotic values would serve as an effective basis for the environmental movement. Phillip Cafaro argues that patriotism is a virtue, and "environmentalism is one of its most important manifestations."²³ Cafaro defines patriotism as "love, devotion, and a strong differential concern for one's own locality, state, region, or country, shown both in thought and action."²⁴ Instead of advocating for a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship, Cafaro charges that it is an attachment to one's own nation that leads to environmental concern. He bolsters his argument by noting how patriotism has been an important influence in several environmental conservation movements throughout U.S. history. "In the campaigns to create Yellowstone, Yosemite, Grand Canyon, and other national parks in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, patriotic rhetoric often figured prominently."²⁵ Convincingly, Cafaro argues that "environmentalism can only be a life-affirming and personally enriching activity if it involves connection to the land and communities around you."²⁶ In other words, it may be difficult for

¹⁹ Trachtenberg 2010, 342 (quoting Dobson).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Maltais 2008.

²³ Cafaro 2010, 185.

²⁴ Ibid, 186.

²⁵ Ibid, 193.

²⁶ Ibid, 194.

the everyday citizen to form an attachment and moral obligation to ecosystems around the world, because a connection with landscapes often only materializes when one has meaningful, first-hand interactions with it. His overarching defense for patriotic values' place in the environmental movement is summarized when he says "dividing the world up into smaller units called nations is one way to facilitate real, effective citizenship in an immense world of 6.7 billion people. In the same way, knowledge and devotion to particular landscapes makes environmentalism possible."²⁷

Very few studies have attempted to definitively reconcile the debate between these two competing conceptions of green citizenship and determine whether cosmopolitan or patriotic values lead to a greater concern for environmental degradation. One project conducted in the early nineties by Swenson and Wells found a positive correlation between cosmopolitan values and pro-environmental behavior (.19 in 1992 and .25 in 1993). Work by Anderson and Cunningham (1992) and Anderson, Henion, and Cox (1974) also found positive relationships between these two variables.²⁸ However, it is debatable whether the index used in the study by Swenson and Wells truly measured cosmopolitanism effectively. Questions that were used to operationalize cosmopolitanism included "I am interested in the cultures of other countries" and "I have taken an airplane trip for personal reasons" and "I stayed at an upper-priced hotel on a personal trip."²⁹ Certainly one could be *interested* in the culture of other countries or even travel to them without extending a *moral obligation* to the citizens in those countries, and it is unclear how hotel choice can be a defensible measure of cosmopolitanism at all. In order to accurately capture and measure the concept of cosmopolitanism, one must survey an individual with questions that are directly related to the core of cosmopolitanism--having a primary allegiance to humanity as a whole and favoring intensity of need over proximity. Given this gap in empirical research, further research into the possible correlation between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern is clearly warranted; my research attempts to bridge this gap.

THEORY

While the arguments advanced for both the cosmopolitan and patriotic conceptions of citizenship have strong support, I predict that individuals with cosmopolitan values will show a

²⁷ Ibid, 201.

²⁸ Swenson and Wells 1997.

²⁹ Ibid, 104-105.

greater level of concern for environmental issues than those with patriotic values. Though both sentiments could lead to environmental concern, patriotism may only lead an individual to be eco-conscious if his or her immediate environment is currently showing signs of deterioration. Because some countries are not yet experiencing tangible effects of environmental degradation and climate change, patriotic sentiments in those countries would not necessarily lead to environmentalism. However, if one were a cosmopolitan, one would not need to witness environmental degradation in one's immediate surroundings in order to form pro-environmental attitudes, for the advanced environmental damage in other countries would illicit an obligation to be concerned about environmental issues. Given the nature of environmental problems today, where externalities cannot be internalized, it seems that a global conception of citizenship is needed in order for one to fully appreciate the effects of anthropogenic environmental damage and become concerned about environmental issues.

Because environmental values are most likely somewhat independent of other cultural and personal values, I predict that the relationship between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern will be weaker in countries with a relatively greater percentage of eco-conscious citizens. In other words, some countries may simply have a more environmentally-oriented culture, resulting in a greater aggregate concern for environmental issues, independent of other cultural and personal values. In less environmentally-oriented countries, however, personal values (such as cosmopolitanism) may be a necessary condition for eco-consciousness. For example, given this reasoning, one would expect cosmopolitanism to have a stronger relationship with environmentalism in the United States, where a relatively smaller percentage of the overall population shows concern for environmental issues, as opposed to Canada, where a relatively high percentage of citizens are eco-conscious.³⁰

DESIGN AND STRATEGY

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Individuals with cosmopolitan values will exhibit greater concern for environmental issues than those with patriotic values.

³⁰ This statement concerning the United States and Canada is based off of general trends in responses to survey questions concerning the environment on the 2005 World Values Survey. For example, when this description of a person was posed on the 2005 World Values Survey: "Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature," 11.1% of Americans responded that this person was "very much like me," while 31.6% of Canadians answered "very much like me."

Hypothesis 2: The relationship between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern will be stronger in countries that have lower overall public concern for environmental issues than in countries that have a relatively higher amount of overall concern for environmental issues.

Research Design

The research method I employ to test these hypotheses is a large-N statistical analysis comparing survey studies from seven Western, industrialized nations: the United States, Canada, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Spain, and Switzerland. All data are drawn from the 2005 World Values Survey (WVS). The unit of analysis is the individual respondents from each of these countries. The study is limited to Western industrialized nations so as to control for large variations in other cultural values that would come into play in a comparison between nations from all over the world. These particular Western nations were chosen so as to represent a variety of combinations of the two main concepts being examined in this study. In general, citizens in the United States and Germany have a relatively low amount of environmental concern as a whole compared to other countries in this study, based on questions concerning the environment from the WVS. In general, the United States and Germany also have a lower percentage of citizens who exhibit cosmopolitan values, based on WVS questions. By contrast, Sweden and Canada both have a relatively large percentage of citizens who exhibit environmental concern as well as cosmopolitan attitudes. The other countries included in this study have combinations of these values that lie somewhere in between these two extremes.³¹

Operationalizing the Independent Variables

The primary variable being examined in this study is the dichotomy of cosmopolitan and patriotic values. In order to operationalize this ideological dichotomy, six questions were selected from the WVS and combined to create an index, measuring whether an individual holds more cosmopolitan or patriotic values. Most questions had multiple responses ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, and each response was coded numerically. Therefore, all questions were manipulated to have equal weight in the index and so that numerically higher responses correspond to a cosmopolitan attitude, while lower responses correspond with a patriotic attitude. Based off this index, an individual’s aggregate score for

³¹ These statements are based off of general trends in responses to survey questions concerning the environment and cosmopolitanism on the 2005 World Values Survey. They do not hold true for every survey question relating to these subjects.

cosmopolitanism may range from 6-360, with lower scores indicating patriotic values and higher scores indicating cosmopolitan values. The index questions are listed in the appendix.

In addition to cosmopolitan and patriotic values, egalitarian and postmaterialist values are also included as independent variables, so as to examine whether cosmopolitan or patriotic values have greater explanatory power than egalitarian or postmaterialist values. The WVS already included a 12-item index for measuring postmaterialist values; therefore, that pre-existing index was utilized to operationalize postmaterialist values. In order to operationalize egalitarian values, an index was created consisting of five questions from the WVS. Again, most questions had multiple responses ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. All questions were manipulated to have equal weight and so that numerically higher answers correspond with egalitarian values, while lower answers indicate individualistic values. Overall, an individual’s aggregate score on the egalitarian index may range from 5-50, with higher scores indicating egalitarian values and lower scores indicating individualistic values. The questions included in the index are listed in the appendix.

Operationalizing the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this study is environmental concern. In order to operationalize an individual’s level of concern for environmental issues, seven questions from the WVS were selected to create an index. About half of the questions simply gauge an individual’s concern for various environmental issues, while the other half of the questions gauge how willing that individual is to sacrifice economic gains for environmental problems. All questions relate to environmental problems on a global scale, for environmental problems at the local level differ greatly in severity for any given individual. Like the other indices, all questions were manipulated to have equal weight and so that numerically higher responses correspond to a greater concern for the environment, while lower responses correspond with less environmental concern. On a scale 7-168, lower aggregate scores indicate low environmental concern and higher scores indicate high environmental concern. The index questions are listed in the appendix.

In measuring all of these concepts, the social demographics of age, sex, income, and education are controlled for. Political ideology is also controlled for.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Table 1. Multiple Regression Models: Personal Values and Environmental Attitudes

Dependent Variable: Environmental Concern

	U.S.	Canada	Germany	Finland	Sweden	Spain	Switzerland
Cosmopolitanism	.104*** (.013) <i>.235</i>	.072*** (.019) <i>.198</i>	.141*** (.011) <i>.389</i>	.103*** (.014) <i>.294</i>	.094*** (.014) <i>.256</i>	.115*** (.015) <i>.357</i>	.078*** (.014) <i>.227</i>
Egalitarianism	.594*** (.136) <i>.137</i>	.336* (.157) <i>.108</i>	-.048 (.117) <i>-.012</i>	.204 (.162) <i>.048</i>	.268* (.131) <i>.090</i>	.308* (.138) <i>.098</i>	.252 (.140) <i>.068</i>
Postmaterialism	2.675*** (.712) <i>.113</i>	1.818 (.964) <i>.102</i>	2.126** (.711) <i>.086</i>	1.669* (.810) <i>.076</i>	.889 (.718) <i>.047</i>	.321 (.713) <i>.019</i>	2.758*** (.697) <i>.152</i>
Income	-.374 (.468) <i>-.023</i>	-.070 (.379) <i>-.010</i>	.921* (.431) <i>.064</i>	.059 (.360) <i>.006</i>	-.477 (.273) <i>-.062</i>	-1.503* (.606) <i>-.114</i>	.368 (.466) <i>.029</i>
Education	1.385* (.664) <i>.062</i>	1.545** (.599) <i>.140</i>	1.363*** (.367) <i>.115</i>	1.123* (.438) <i>.103</i>	.151 (.417) <i>.014</i>	.480 (.474) <i>.049</i>	.371 (.409) <i>.033</i>
Age	.238*** (.050) <i>.134</i>	.030 (.064) <i>.022</i>	.086* (.043) <i>.056</i>	.080 (.051) <i>.056</i>	.152** (.048) <i>.113</i>	-.056 (.056) <i>-.044</i>	-.013 (.048) <i>-.009</i>
Sex	2.900 (1.643) <i>.049</i>	-.515 (2.030) <i>-.012</i>	5.160*** (1.459) <i>.096</i>	4.597* (1.654) <i>.094</i>	3.205* (1.507) <i>.072</i>	3.741* (1.749) <i>.088</i>	2.773 (1.548) <i>.062</i>
Political Ideology	-3.027*** (.514) <i>-.183</i>	-1.067 (.547) <i>-.100</i>	-1.749*** (.425) <i>-.121</i>	-1.123* (.474) <i>-.090</i>	-1.525*** (.436) <i>-.152</i>	-1.270** (.487) <i>-.118</i>	-1.491*** (.453) <i>-.131</i>
Adjusted RSquare	.215	.160	.284	.167	.178	.222	.187
F-test	36.566	10.579	50.005	19.615	21.151	17.809	21.790
Model Significance	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
N	1040	403	988	741	748	470	724

Note: Standard errors in parentheses and beta weights italicized; ***p<.001<**p <.01<*p<.05

Hypothesis 1

The multiple regression analyses for each of the seven countries show a positive correlation between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern. This relationship is significant at the .001 level in all seven countries. No other independent variable is statistically significant across all seven nations. Furthermore, in all seven cases, cosmopolitan values have the highest beta weight and thus have more explanatory power than all other independent variables. However, the relationship between cosmopolitanism and environmentalism is very weak; unstandardized partial regression coefficients range from .072 (Canada) to .141 (Germany) with the scale of possible environmentalism scores ranging between 7 and 168. This means that even in Germany, where cosmopolitan values have the strongest correlation with environmentalism, a one unit increase in cosmopolitanism only results in a .141 unit increase in environmentalism, which is negligible on such a large scale.

Political ideology is a statistically significant predictor of environmental attitudes in all seven nations except Canada. This variable also has the second highest beta weight, after cosmopolitanism, in four out of the seven nations: the United States, Sweden, Germany, and Spain. In all cases, conservatism is negatively correlated with environmental concern. Egalitarian and postmaterialist values are both statistically significant predictors of environmental attitudes in four out of the seven nations. In the countries where egalitarianism and postmaterialism are significant, the relationships are in the expected directions. Postmaterialist values and egalitarian values are positively correlated with environmental concern. However, their explanatory power varies greatly across the seven models. The social demographics of age, sex, income, and education are also inconsistent predictors of environmental concern. For example, age has the third highest beta weight in the United States, yet it is not even a statistically significant variable in four out of the seven nations.

Because the model explains a relatively low amount of the variance in all countries (adjusted R square values ranged between .160 and .284), a correlation matrix was created to test for multicollinearity between all independent variables. However, there was no strong correlation between any variables, eliminating the possibility of multicollinearity. Therefore, the data support hypothesis one, confirming a positive, but weak relationship between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern.

Hypothesis 2

The two countries that have a relatively lower percentage of citizens who exhibit concern for environmental degradation are the United States and Germany. Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada all have relatively higher percentages, with Spain falling somewhere in the middle. Spain has a relatively high percentage of citizens who show concern for environmental degradation, but have a relatively low percentage of citizens who are willing to sacrifice income for more environmental protection.³² Following hypothesis two, one would expect cosmopolitan values to have a stronger relationship with environmentalism in the United States, Germany, and Spain than in the other four countries. In what country did a one unit increase in cosmopolitanism result in the greatest unit increase in environmental concern?

Directly comparing the B values of cosmopolitanism across the seven regression models, the ranking of the countries in which cosmopolitanism has the greatest impact on environmental concern is as follows: 1) Germany 2) Spain 3) USA 4) Finland 5) Sweden 6) Switzerland 7) Canada. Therefore, according to the data, hypothesis two is confirmed, for the United States, Germany, and Spain are the countries in which cosmopolitanism has the greatest impact on environmental concern. However, because the correlation between cosmopolitanism and environmentalism is weak in all cases, and all of the partial regression coefficients are within a few hundredths of each other, hypothesis two is confirmed with somewhat equivocal data.

DISCUSSION

Cosmopolitanism and Environmentalism: Is there a true relationship?

There are a number of possible explanations as to why the results of this research exhibit such a weak correlation between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern. First, it is possible that cosmopolitan values have no substantive influence on an individual's likelihood to be concerned about environmental degradation. In other words, it does not matter whether an individual has patriotic values or cosmopolitan values, for environmental concern is independent of these worldviews. Second, cosmopolitanism and patriotism could be pulling almost equally in opposite directions and *both* value sets are influencing an individual to be

³² These statements are based off of general trends in responses to survey questions concerning the environment on the 2005 World Values Survey. They do not hold true for every survey question relating to this subject.

concerned about environmental issues. However, given the limited amount of studies in this area of research, it is not possible to determine which of these scenarios, if either, may be true.

A third explanation for the weak correlation between cosmopolitanism and environmentalism is a measurement flaw. Because the creation of the cosmopolitan index was limited to the pre-existing questions included on the 2005 World Values Survey, the operationalization of cosmopolitanism and patriotism was a limitation of this study. Though careful thought was given as to which questions should be included in the index, and each could be defended as measuring the dichotomy of cosmopolitanism and patriotism, further analysis reveals that the cosmopolitan index was imperfect. When bivariate correlation matrices were created and analyzed, only weak to moderate correlations existed between any two given question responses in the cosmopolitan index. Weak internal correlations may indicate one of two things: 1) the individuals surveyed answered inconsistently on questions relating to cosmopolitanism, or 2) not all of the questions in the index were precisely measuring the same concept (cosmopolitanism).

Although there is no way to avoid individuals answering inconsistently to survey questions, it would be possible to refine the operationalization of cosmopolitanism. If original survey questions were to be utilized in future studies, the cosmopolitan index could be refined in order to measure cosmopolitan and patriotic values more accurately. By introducing new survey questions, the core of cosmopolitanism--favoring intensity of need over proximity--could be captured more fully. For example, future surveys should include questions such as "Is your primary moral allegiance to humanity as a whole, or to those with whom you share a national identity?" or "Are you more likely to donate money to charities which focus on developing third-world countries or to those with a domestic focus?" More finely-tailored questions would also likely result in better internal correlation between index questions. Had cosmopolitan and patriotic values been captured more accurately in this study, with greater internal correlation between index questions, stronger relationships between cosmopolitanism and environmental concern may have emerged.

Explaining the Variance across Nations: The Naturalization of the Nation

One possible explanation for the variation in cosmopolitanism's effect upon environmental concern across nations stems from the confirmation of this study's second

hypothesis – the impact of cosmopolitanism is greatest in countries that have lower overall public concern for environmental issues than in countries that have a relatively higher amount of concern. From this result, one could theorize that some countries simply have more environmentally-oriented cultures than others, and environmental values in these countries are independent of other personal values individuals may have, such as cosmopolitanism. However, if this were the case, one would expect to find that egalitarian values and postmaterialist values also have lesser independent impacts upon environmental concern in countries such as Canada and Switzerland and a stronger impact in the United States, Spain, and Germany. The data, however, shows otherwise. The relative impact of postmaterialism and egalitarianism appears inconsistent. Therefore, the theory that stems from the confirmation of hypothesis two does not seem to be a fully supported explanation for the variance in the effect of cosmopolitan values across the seven nations, according to the data this study provides. Though it may be true that some countries have more environmentally-oriented cultures than others, it is not clear whether this eco-consciousness arises independently of other personal values. This would be an important focus point for future research.

An alternative explanation for the variance in cosmopolitanism's effect upon environmental concern is that patriotic values may lead to environmentalism in some nations, but not others, depending upon the extent to which nature is incorporated into that country's national identity. In other words, if a country's landscape is a central part of its established national identity, then strong patriotic attitudes in that nation would lead to concern towards environmental degradation, regardless of whether or not environmental problems had yet been manifested in that nation or not. The patriotic obligation to preserve and prevent deterioration of an integral part of the nation's identity (its natural landscape) would necessitate this dedication to environmental issues. Following this theory, one would expect to find that in countries where cosmopolitanism has a weaker impact on environmentalism (Canada and Switzerland), nature is a central part of national identity. By contrast, in nations where cosmopolitanism has a stronger independent effect (Germany, Spain, and the United States), nature is *not* a large part of national identity. A growing body of literature concerning the emphasis of nature in both Canadian and Swiss national identity supports this hypothesis.³³

³³ Kaufmann and Zimmer 1998; Zimmer 1998.

Social scientists have distinguished two types of geographical national identities. One, the “nationalization of nature,” portrays geographical features as manifestations of a nation’s cultural identity. “...popular historical myths, memories and supposed national virtues are projected onto a significant landscape in an attempt to lend more continuity and distinctiveness to it. In this way, an image of national authenticity is developed in which a nation’s distinctiveness is seen to be reflected in a particular landscape.”³⁴ The second type of geographical national identity is the ‘naturalization of the nation,’ “which rests upon a notion of geographical determinism that depicts specific landscapes as forces capable of determining national identity.”³⁵ While nature is seen as expressive of certain national virtues and characteristics in the nationalization of nature, nature is seen as capable of determining and shaping a nation’s culture in the naturalization of the nation. I posit that this second type of geographical nationalism, the naturalization of the nation, may likely lead citizens to show concern for environmental problems, for nature is seen as the *source* of their national identity, not simply reflective of a national identity shaped by exogenous forces. This could lead to a special appreciation or reverence towards that nation’s natural landscape. The naturalization of the nation is thought to have played a role in the formation of Swiss and Canadian national identities.

The Swiss Alps have been important in both economic and political terms throughout Switzerland’s history and thus have played a long-standing role in Switzerland’s national identity. As early as the sixteenth century, the Alps were portrayed as the manifestation of Swiss cultural characteristics. By the end of the century, “a cult-like enthusiasm was formed around the Swiss Alps.”³⁶ The popularization of the Alpine mythology was made possible by contributions from philosophers and poets such as Wordsworth, Rousseau, and Schiller.³⁷ Often, the Alps were depicted as responsible for the creation of the Swiss character. In a 1909 essay titled *Nationalite*, Swiss intellectual Ernest Bovet expressed this notion of geographical determinism:

³⁴ Kaufmann and Zimmer 1998, 486.

³⁵ Ibid, 483.

³⁶ Ibid, 489.

³⁷ Ibid.

“A mysterious force has kept us together for 600 years and has given to us our democratic institutions...A spirit that fills our souls, directs our actions and creates a hymn on the one ideal out of our different languages. It is the spirit that blows from the summits, the genius of the Alps and glaciers.”³⁸

The Alpine myth was incorporated into history books and other texts books utilized in secondary education throughout Switzerland, further strengthening the notion of the Alps as the source of Swiss national identity. The incorporation of the Alpine myth into folk-songs also was responsible for the widespread inculcation of geographical determinism into the hearts and minds of many Swiss.³⁹

Like Switzerland, nature and wilderness is an integral theme of Canadian culture. It is present in Canadian cinema, conservation, history, literature, music, painting, and recreation.⁴⁰ This sense of a naturalized national identity was present in Canada even during colonial times, when Canadians made use of Canada’s landscape “for the purpose of elevating Canadians to the status of superior Britons – whose contact with nature would rejuvenate the imperial blood.”⁴¹ After the formation of an official Confederation in 1867, Canadians utilized their unique landscape to distinguish themselves from their southern neighbors, the Americans. During Canada’s first inaugural address, William Alexander Foster utilized this northern imagery, saying “The old Norse mythology, with its Thor hammers...appeals to us – for we are a Northern people – a true out-crop of human nature, more manly, more real, than the weak marrow-bones superstition of an effeminate South.”⁴² In the World War I era, this determination to distinguish themselves as a unique nation continued, and a sense of nationalism, rooted in Canada’s northern nature, began to permeate popular culture through literature, art, and political movements. In 1914, famous Canadian painter A.Y. Jackson stated, “The Canadian who does not love keen bracing air, sunlight making shadows that vie with the sky, the wooden hills and the frozen lakes. Well, he must be a poor patriot.”⁴³ It was the work of these artists,

³⁸ Ibid, 500 (quoting Bovet).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Atkinson 2003.

⁴¹ Kaufmann and Zimmer 1998, 492.

⁴² Ibid, 493.

⁴³ Ibid, 495 (quoting Jackson).

political groups, and writers that embedded a strong northern/wilderness component in Canadian national identity, a component that is still powerful today.⁴⁴

Given the large role nature played in the formation of Canadian and Swiss national identity, it is logical to assume that Canadian and Swiss citizens with strong patriotic attitudes would feel a sense of obligation towards environmental issues. Consequently, cosmopolitanism would have a weaker relationship with environmental concern in those nations. Though one may argue that nature played a role in forming national identity in countries such as Germany and the United States (for example, an argument may be made about the American frontier myth), there does not seem to be substantial evidence that the “naturalization of the nation” narrative is embedded into the German or American consciousness in the modern era like it is in Switzerland and Canada. Therefore, patriotic values would not necessarily illicit concern for environmental degradation in Germany and the United States; as a result, cosmopolitanism would affect environmental attitudes more strongly in those countries. Crosstabs examining the proportion of patriots in Canada and Switzerland (those people who had aggregate scores on the lower half of the cosmopolitan index) who also exhibit strong concern for environmental issues (with an aggregate score on the upper half the environmental index) partially confirm this theory.

Tables 2 and 3 show a crosstab analysis for Canada, where cosmopolitanism had the smallest B value, and Germany, where cosmopolitanism had greatest B value. The data shows that of 621 Canadians who exhibit more patriotic values, 95% of them still exhibited strong concern for environmental issues. However, in Germany, only 61% of those citizens with patriotic values exhibited strong concern for environmental problems. This pattern also holds true when comparing the United States and Switzerland. In the United States, 80% of patriots exhibited strong environmentalism, whereas in Switzerland, 92% of patriots did. Admittedly, there is not as great of a contrast between the United States and Switzerland as there is between Germany and Canada. Nevertheless, this pattern may suggest that patriotic sentiments may be more likely to lead to environmentalism in some countries than others, thereby resulting in a variation in cosmopolitanism’s power across nations. The naturalization of the nation is one way to explain this phenomenon.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Table 2. Environmental Concern * Cosmopolitanism Crosstabulation
(Canada)

	Patriot	Cosmopolitan	Total
Weak Environmentalism	29 4.7%	33 3.0%	62 3.6%
Strong Environmentalism	592 95.3%	1049 97.0%	1641 96.4%
Total	621 100%	1082 100%	1703 100%

Table 3. Environmental Concern * Cosmopolitanism Crosstabulation
(Germany)

	Patriot	Cosmopolitan	Total
Weak Environmentalism	263 38.8%	116 18.4%	379 29.0%
Strong Environmentalism	415 61.2%	513 81.6%	928 71%
Total	678 100%	629 100%	1307 100%

While the naturalization of the nation may be a partial explanation as to why cosmopolitanism had less of an impact in Canada and Switzerland, it is imperfect, for there are other countries that do not align with this theory. For example, in Spain, where nature is not an integral part of national identity, 91% of patriots still showed strong concern for environmental problems. Therefore, the theory that the naturalization of the nation may cause patriots in some countries to be eco-conscious is only a partial explanation for the variance in cosmopolitanism's relative strength across nations; it does not hold true for all cases in this study. This theory needs much more exploration and development and would be an intriguing topic for future research.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of this study contribute to the growing body of literature regarding the influence of personal values on an individual's environmental attitudes by confirming a positive correlation between cosmopolitan values and environmentalism. In all seven nations examined, the explanatory power of cosmopolitanism was greater than that of two other popularly studied personal ideologies in this research domain (egalitarianism and postmaterialism), as well as social demographic variables and political ideology. However, the relationship between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern was weak, leaving results open to various interpretations. Because solely utilizing questions included on the 2005 WVS proved to be a limitation of this study, future research examining the relationship between cosmopolitan values and environmentalism would benefit from a more carefully refined cosmopolitan index composed of original questions that capture the essence of cosmopolitanism and patriotism more fully. In addition, further research into possible explanations for the variance in the independent strength of cosmopolitanism across nations would be a significant contribution to this area of research. Though the naturalization of the nation theory holds some weight, it needs further development and fails to be a complete explanation for the variance.

This study tested the three value theories concerning egalitarianism, postmaterialism, and cosmopolitanism against each other. In the future, empirically testing a greater number of competing personal ideologies against one another would fill a significant gap in the literature concerning which personal values have the greatest impact on individuals' environmental attitudes. My findings have established that the variable of cosmopolitanism should not be neglected in future analyses in this realm. Overall, the relationship between cosmopolitanism and environmental attitudes is a promising and intriguing area for future research.

APPENDIXCosmopolitan Index

- 1) V178: Thinking of your own country's problems, should your country's leaders give top priority to help reducing poverty in the world or should they give top priority to solve your own country's problems?
- 2) V175: In 2003, this country's government allocated [insert percent here] of the national income to foreign aid. That is, [insert monetary amount here] per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right?
- 3) V45: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [NATION] people over immigrants.
- 4) V210: People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? I see myself as a world citizen.
- 5) V217: In your opinion, how important should the following be as requirements for somebody seeking citizenship of your country? Having ancestors from my country:
- 6) V177: Would you be willing to pay higher taxes in order to increase your country's foreign aid to poor countries?

Egalitarian Index

- 1) V116: Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Incomes should be made more equal vs. We need larger income differences as incentives:
- 2) V117: Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between,

you can choose any number in between. Private ownership of business should be increased vs. Government ownership of business should be increased:

3) V118: Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for:

4) V119: Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas vs. Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people:

5) V152: Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means not at all an essential characteristic of democracy and 10 means it definitely is an essential characteristic of democracy? Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor:

Environmental Concern Index

1) V88: Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature:

2) V105: I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? Would give part of my income for the environment:

3) V106: I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?) I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution:

4) V104: Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? A. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs B. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.

5) V111: Now let's consider environmental problems in the world as a whole. Please, tell me how serious you consider each of the following to be for the world as a whole. Is it very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious or not serious at all? Global warming or the greenhouse effect:

6) V112: Now let's consider environmental problems in the world as a whole. Please, tell me how serious you consider each of the following to be for the world as a whole. Is it very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious or not serious at all? Loss of plant or animal species or biodiversity:

7) V113: Now let's consider environmental problems in the world as a whole. Please, tell me how serious you consider each of the following to be for the world as a whole. Is it very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious or not serious at all? Pollution of rivers, lakes and oceans:

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UNITED STATES HOUSE ELECTIONS POST-CITIZENS UNITED: THE INFLUENCE OF UNBRIDLED SPENDING

Laura Gaffey

Abstract: *After the Citizens United decision in 2010 allowed corporations and unions to spend freely in elections, much media attention was given to the influence of unlimited and undisclosed donations during the 2010 midterm elections. This research attempts to determine the impact of increased outside spending by super PACs and other groups post-Citizens United by comparing United States House races in 2006 and 2010. The analysis controls for other factors that influence election outcomes in order to determine the influence of outside spending, confirming that outside money did have a small measurable effect in both elections when spent to support challengers. This study reveals the difficulties of compiling precise data on outside spending in elections, especially for spending that is not express advocacy. Additionally, the findings demonstrate that challengers see a greater measurable effect of outside expenditures, a finding consistent with previous research.*

INTRODUCTION

Political scientists have studied the influence of campaign spending on election outcomes throughout the years, with a consensus that campaign spending does impact results by increasing the spender's likelihood of victory. However, campaign finance law has evolved greatly in the last decade, and many studies have yet to be repeated in this changed environment. The landmark Supreme Court decision in the case of *Citizens United v. FEC* in 2010 altered the landscape of campaign finance, allowing corporations and unions to spend unlimited amounts in political campaigns. This decision, along with several others, has transformed campaign finance and given much more freedom and influence to outside groups who spend on behalf of an issue, party, or candidate. The influence of this influx of outside spending in political campaigns has yet to be studied empirically, despite a media focus on the power of new outside groups' spending in the 2010 midterm election.

This study will focus on the impact of outside group independent expenditures in the 2006 and 2010 midterm elections, in an effort to assess the influence of increasing levels of outside spending in United States House of Representatives elections. Have these changes in campaign finance law impacted how money works in House elections? Does increased outside spending in House races affect election outcomes? Does the impact of outside spending vary between challengers and incumbents? Media reports focusing on the impact of *Citizens United*

have made many claims about the influence of powerful outside groups on the 2010 midterm elections, but has the impact of outside spending been overstated?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Many studies have examined the effect of campaign expenditures on election results throughout the years, with varying results. Though scholars agree that campaign expenditures do influence election results, they debate to what degree and for what types of candidates. A broad theme within the literature has focused on the different effects of campaign expenditures for challengers and incumbents in U.S. House races.¹ Gary Jacobson found that challenger spending has a more substantial impact on results. For challengers, campaign spending has a bigger impact because they have more to gain; for instance, they are buying name recognition that the incumbent already has.² Incumbents spend at higher levels when they are more seriously challenged. For this reason, incumbent spending can even have a negative relationship with election results. However, Green and Krasno argue that the impact of incumbent spending was understated by Jacobson, so their study included a variable measuring challenger's political quality in an attempt to equalize the effect of incumbent spending. They found that incumbent spending was more influential than Jacobson demonstrated and that the challenger's political quality influenced the share of the vote received by the challenger.³

Various scholars have attempted to refine the model for assessing the impact of expenditures in elections. Different methods include measuring challenger political quality, controlling for diminishing marginal utility by squaring expenditures, and measuring the varying impact of spending at different times in the election cycle.⁴ These authors address the difficulty of measuring the true impact of campaign spending due to the interactions between variables. Because other variables included in these models all impact the ability of candidates, and especially challengers, to raise money, it is more difficult to measure the impact of candidate expenditures.⁵ Challengers are not well equipped to raise money to counter increased spending by incumbents, which also skews the impact of spending.⁶ While these authors concede that it is difficult to accurately measure the impact of campaign expenditures, they

¹ Green and Krasno 1988; Jacobson 1978; Jacobson 1990; Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994.

² Jacobson 1978.

³ Green and Krasno 1988.

⁴ Abramowitz 1991; Green and Krasno 1988; Grier 1989; Jacobson 1990; Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994.

⁵ Abramowitz 1991; Grier 1989.

⁶ Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994.

agree that spending does effect election outcomes by increasing the vote share of the spender and that the strength of its impact varies between challengers and incumbents.

Campaign Finance Law

In order to understand the evolution of campaign finance law, several definitions are necessary. The two different types of outside expenditures regulated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) are independent expenditures and electioneering communications. Independent expenditures include a variety of forms of campaign activity that explicitly call for election or defeat of a political candidate (known as express advocacy ads) and must be uncoordinated with official campaigns. However, electioneering communications only include broadcast advertisements that are aired during a specific pre-election window (within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary). Electioneering communications may discuss candidates, but do not explicitly call for election or defeat. They also include issue advertisements.⁷

Since the aforementioned studies were completed, campaign finance law has changed drastically. The 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), often referred to as the McCain-Feingold Act, banned national parties, federal candidates, and officeholders from raising soft money or unlimited contributions to party committees for “party-building” activities, increased most contribution limits, and attempted to restrict issue advertising by more narrowly defining electioneering communications. Since BCRA restructured campaign finance, several court cases have reinterpreted the law. In 2007, *Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC* removed the restrictions that prohibited 501(c)4 advocacy organizations from sponsoring electioneering communications.⁸ Then, in 2010, the decision in *SpeechNow.org v. FEC* said that contributions made to groups that make only independent expenditures and do not contribute directly to candidates or parties cannot be limited.⁹ This change allowed major donors to fund independent expenditures in unlimited amounts through certain groups.

Outside Spending

Despite changes in campaign finance laws, outside spending has remained present in elections, taking different forms and being sponsored by different types of groups. Before

⁷ U.S. Congress 2011.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Briffault 2010; U.S Congress 2011.

BCRA, most outside money took the form of unlimited contributions to political parties, or soft money.¹⁰ Despite this ban, party fundraising has continued to increase in the form of hard money contributions.¹¹ In elections post-BCRA, 527 groups, a type of advocacy group that focuses on issue advocacy and voter mobilization, spent actively; the primary purpose of these groups is to influence elections, and they are subject to donor disclosure requirements.¹² An examination of the 2004 elections, the first post-BCRA, reveals that corporations gave less money than they had in the past, but 527 groups gradually became more active and did spend on behalf of candidates.¹³ In the 2006 elections, 527 groups still spent actively, but at a reduced level from 2004. Due to changing FEC regulations, new groups such as 501(c) organizations became more active in 2006.¹⁴ 501(c) organizations do not have the primary purpose of influencing elections, but their purpose can be another form of political action such as lobbying. They are not subject to donor disclosure requirements, unless a donor specifically allocates their contribution for electioneering.¹⁵ In the 2008 elections, 501(c) organizations spent three times the amount they had in 2004 or 2006. In 2004, the majority of outside spending came from 527 groups, who spent only half of what they spent in 2004 in 2008.¹⁶ As campaign finance laws and regulations evolve, the methods used by outside groups to influence elections also continue to change.

In 2010, the widely publicized decision in *Citizens United v. FEC* removed the BCRA prohibition on corporate and union funding of independent expenditures and electioneering communications from general treasury funds.¹⁷ This decision, along with the decision in *SpeechNow.org v. FEC*, led to the formation of a new type of outside group – Super PACs. Super PACs are political action committees (PACs) that make only independent expenditures and no direct contributions to political committees. These groups can accept unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations, and unions.¹⁸ While *Citizens United* did remove spending restrictions, the decision upheld much of the disclosure laws included in BCRA, due to the

¹⁰ U.S. Congress 2011.

¹¹ Franz 2008; U.S. Congress 2011.

¹² Briffault 2010.

¹³ Johnston 2006.

¹⁴ Weissman and Ryan 2007.

¹⁵ Briffault 2010.

¹⁶ Weissman 2009.

¹⁷ U.S. Congress 2011.

¹⁸ Toner and Trainer 2011; U.S. Congress 2011.

importance placed on transparency, accountability, and voter information.¹⁹ Registered Super PACs are required to disclose to the FEC both their contributions and expenditures, but 527s and 501(c) organizations must only disclose their independent expenditures and electioneering communications. Because many corporation and union funds are given through an intermediary, such as a 510(c) organization, their contributions are not disclosed.²⁰

2010 Midterm Elections

The 2010 midterm elections were the first post-*Citizens United*, and the initial analyses examine the raw numbers of outside spending. In 2010, non-party independent expenditures and electioneering communications increased by 130% from 2008 to \$280 million, and 70 new Super PACs were formed and spent \$84.6 million.²¹ Initially, these numbers would seem to indicate a new importance of outside spending after several court decisions deregulated campaign finance. In 2010, the advertisement totals for U.S. House races increased 26%, but interest groups still only sponsored 12% of ads.²²

However, all the new spending in the 2010 midterms may not be due to just outside spending.²³ Candidate, party, and outside spending all increased in 2010, but party spending became less significant. In spite of this, not all of the biggest spenders won their elections, indicating that the impact of campaign expenditures is limited.²⁴ On the other hand, an analysis by political scientist Michael Cornfield asserts that while party and candidate spending was relatively balanced between the two parties, outside spending contributions heavily favored Republican candidates. Therefore, he claims that because Republicans won more seats than forecasted, outside spending significantly helped Republicans win races in 2010.²⁵ Another analysis found that while there was an increase in express advocacy ads sponsored by outside groups, their influence has been overstated in the media, as the majority of spending is still by candidates and parties.²⁶ Yet none of these analyses includes a full study of the impact of outside spending in 2010 that controls for other factors that influence elections. Therefore,

¹⁹ Briffault 2010.

²⁰ Briffault 2010, U.S. Congress 2011.

²¹ U.S. Congress 2011.

²² Franz 2010.

²³ U.S. Congress 2011.

²⁴ Toner and Trainer 2011.

²⁵ Cornfield 2011.

²⁶ Franz 2010.

further research is needed to fully understand the impact of post-*Citizens United* spending by outside groups.

THEORY

Many scholars have reached a consensus that campaign expenditures do affect election results.²⁷ No political campaign could be run without the funds needed to pay staff, purchase advertisements, run a field operation, or send out mailings. All of these things are necessary in a basic political campaign and would not be possible without fundraising and expenditures. Political campaigns attempt to increase recognition of their candidate among the electorate and increase favorability. The efforts made by political campaigns through media or field operations increase voter awareness of the candidate's positions, which would theoretically increase vote share for that candidate. Because expenditures allow for these crucial aspects of political campaigns, increased campaign expenditures are generally correlated with increased vote share.

Outside group spending follows the same logic as candidate campaign expenditures – outside spending can be used to purchase advertisements, mailings, etc., which will increase vote share for the candidate favored by the outside group. Because outside groups can raise money in unlimited amounts, it is much easier for them to raise money quickly, for instance in response to big expenditures by the opposition. Outside groups, due to their ability to accept unlimited contributions, are also better equipped to make bigger media buys in targeted House races. Only the most competitive House races will attract outside spending, because outside groups strategically spend in races in which they have the most to gain – a competitive race in which the candidate they favor has a good chance of winning. Outside spending comes in a variety of forms, including voter mobilization operations, but generally takes the form of broadcast advertisements. After *Citizens United*, fundraising is even easier for outside groups with the support of corporation and union spending, and this increases their ability to influence election results. In the 2010 midterms, spending by outside groups increased, and one would expect to find that their spending did have an impact on election results in the races targeted by these groups.

²⁷ Abramowitz 1991; Green and Krasno 1988; Grier 1989; Jacobson 1978; Jacobson 1990; Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994.

H₁: As the amount of outside spending that favors a candidate increases, the percentage of the vote received by that candidate will also increase.

While I hypothesize that outside group spending will have an impact in U.S. House races, this impact will differ between incumbents and challengers. Based on theories developed by Gary Jacobson, I expect that challengers will see a greater benefit from outside group spending because challengers have more to gain from expenditures. Expenditures by and on behalf of challengers have a greater impact because they are ‘purchasing’ name recognition and visibility, which incumbents already have to some degree. Challengers see a greater marginal utility from their expenditures than do incumbents. Because challengers start out at a disadvantage, they have more to gain from expenditures just to catch up to the benefits of incumbency. Incumbents’ expenditures can even have a negative relationship with votes received because incumbents spend more when they are more seriously challenged.²⁸ I believe the same logic will apply to outside group spending on behalf of incumbents.

H₂: Outside spending on behalf of challengers will have a bigger impact on two-party vote than outside spending on behalf of incumbents.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

This paper will examine U.S. House midterm elections in 2006 and 2010 in an attempt to assess the impact of outside group expenditures, while also controlling for other factors that influence House election results. Unopposed races will be excluded, and races with an incumbent and open seats are analyzed separately. The dynamics of open seat elections differ greatly from races with incumbents, as neither candidate has the incumbency advantages of name recognition and experience. The dependent variable is the two-party vote received by the incumbent, or for open seats, the two-party vote received by the Democratic candidate.

The central independent variables are the outside spending in a district on behalf of both the challenger and the incumbent. This includes spending that both supports a candidate and opposes their opponent. However, the available data on outside spending is limited and incomplete. The available data includes only independent expenditures electioneering communications that specifically name a candidate as a beneficiary of the spending. Some expenditures name multiple candidate beneficiaries or are purely issue advocacy, so it is

²⁸ Jacobson 1978.

difficult to know how to divide these expenditures between the candidates. The aggregated numbers by district are available from both the Center for Responsive Politics (Open Secrets) and the Campaign Finance Institute, but the numbers from these two sources drastically differ for many districts.²⁹ I used the larger number from either of the two sources for each district. For the 2006 midterm elections, outside expenditures for a single candidate range from \$0 to \$1,254,902. For 2010, outside expenditures range from no money spent in a race to \$3,153,517. This data does not capture issue advocacy advertisements or any spending that is not “express advocacy,” which are advertisements that specifically call for election or defeat of a specified candidate. Although issue advocacy advertisements do not necessarily name candidate beneficiaries, it is possible that they also indirectly affect election results. Therefore, my study offers an incomplete assessment of the levels of outside spending in House races for both years, and the data flaws are therefore a clear limitation.

Other types of spending in each district are also included as independent variables – both spending by the candidate’s campaign committees and independent expenditures made by political parties and their campaign committees in the district. For races with an incumbent, all of the spending variables represent the incumbent’s and the challenger’s expenditures in the district, covering the entire election cycle. For open seats, each type of spending is divided by Democrat or Republican. This only captures money actually spent by the candidates, not their fundraising totals. Candidate expenditures come from contributions to the candidates’ campaign committees that are regulated by the FEC.³⁰

Political party independent expenditures in the district are included for challengers and incumbents, and these include independent expenditures made by the national parties and their campaign committees (DCCC, NRCC), commonly in the form of broadcast advertisements or field operations. Party involvement will likely only be at a meaningful level in the most competitive and targeted U.S. House races, and therefore this variable also captures some of the competitiveness of the race. However, the data readily available for this variable is also limited. For the 2006 election, the data includes national party committee independent and coordinated

²⁹ Campaign Finance Institute 2010; Center for Responsive Politics 2006; Center for Responsive Politics 2010.

³⁰ Federal Election Commission 2006; Federal Election Commission 2010.

expenditures and direct contributions for every House race.³¹ For the 2010 elections, the data includes only races in which there was over \$50,000 of combined outside and party spending.³² The data includes national party committee independent and coordinated expenditures and direct contributions. Party expenditures for 2010 range from \$0 to \$2,923,930, and therefore races in which party committees contributed less than \$50,000 were likely to not be very highly competitive. While this is a limitation of the study, this data likely captures most of the relevant party expenditures because expenditures under \$50,000 are less important compared to the total level of expenditures and likely not drastically affecting election results. All spending variables are entered in units of \$10,000.

Variables included to control for factors other than expenditures that affect election outcomes include party, the two-party vote percentage from the previous House election, the presidential vote in the district, the percent of the district that is urban, and the median household income of the district. The party variable represents the party of the incumbent (Democrats are coded as 1 and Republicans as 0) and is excluded from open seat cases. This variable captures the national political tides of each election year that affect races around the country.³³ The previous election results control for the incumbent's personal vote in the district. This variable is coded as the two-party vote percentage won by the incumbent in the previous election. However, some argue that this variable is less effective in predicting outcomes because it also captures a variety of factors from the past election, including national tide, traits of the specific candidates, and expenditures.³⁴ This variable is also excluded from open seat cases, as it represents a different candidate as well as many other factors from the previous election. The presidential vote in the district controls for the baseline partisanship of the district and the characteristics of the district that influence partisanship. For races with an incumbent, the two-party vote received by the previous presidential candidate of the incumbent's party is used. In the separate model for open seat races, the percentage of votes received by the previous Democratic presidential candidate is used, as the dependent variable in this model is the percentage of the vote received by the Democratic candidate. The percentage of the district that

³¹ Federal Election Commission 2007.

³² Campaign Finance Institute 2010.

³³ Jacobson 1978.

³⁴ Levitt 1994.

is urban and the median income of the district, according to the 2000 Census,³⁵ are included to control for demographic characteristics of the district that may affect political decisions. Both variables are also intended to capture variations in the expense of the media market of the district.

³⁵ Barone 2007.

DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1: 2006 & 2010 Incumbent/Challenger Races

Dependent Variable: Two-party vote percentage received by the incumbent

Independent Variable	All 2006 Incumbent Races	2006 Incumbent Races (with outside money)	All 2010 Incumbent Races	2010 Incumbent Races (with outside money)
Constant	31.479 (2.350)	33.093 (5.116)	24.509 (2.037)	30.940 (3.518)
Challenger Outside Spending	-.034* (.018) <i>-.063</i>	-.028 (.021) <i>-.090</i>	-.016* (.009) <i>-.055</i>	-.021** (.010) <i>-.133</i>
Incumbent Outside Spending	.054 (.037) <i>.048</i>	.036 (.044) <i>.058</i>	-.007 (.008) <i>-.026</i>	-.002 (.008) <i>-.016</i>
Challenger Campaign Spending	-.040*** (.007) <i>-.324</i>	-.036*** (.009) <i>-.431</i>	-.017*** (.004) <i>-.136</i>	-.013** (.005) <i>-.172</i>
Incumbent Campaign Spending	.002 (.004) <i>.020</i>	.001 (.006) <i>.019</i>	-.006** (.003) <i>-.058</i>	-.004 (.003) <i>-.077</i>
Challenger Party Spending	-.013 (.017) <i>-.065</i>	-.007 (.019) <i>-.063</i>	-.013 (.011) <i>-.037</i>	-.024** (.012) <i>-.139</i>
Incumbent Party Spending	.014 (.014) <i>.083</i>	.006 (.016) <i>.061</i>	.010 (.011) <i>.029</i>	.002 (.012) <i>.009</i>
Party	10.195*** (.610) <i>.509</i>	9.901*** (1.369) <i>.487</i>	-11.092*** (.625) <i>-.471</i>	-7.776*** (1.333) <i>-.346</i>
Previous TPV%	.109*** (.023) <i>.148</i>	.075 (.057) <i>.086</i>	.147*** (.023) <i>.181</i>	.106** (.038) <i>.166</i>
Presidential Vote	.397*** (.034) <i>.396</i>	.263*** (.073) <i>.267</i>	.618*** (.030) <i>.628</i>	.501*** (.055) <i>.567</i>
Urban	.000 (.017) <i>-.001</i>	.050 (.040) <i>.099</i>	-.009 (.015) <i>-.015</i>	-.042 (.026) <i>-.107</i>
Income	-8.462E-6 (.000) <i>-.013</i>	4.945E-5 (.000) <i>.077</i>	1.025E-5 (.000) <i>.014</i>	3.593E-5 (.000) <i>.059</i>
N	346	108	374	133
Adj. R-square	.756	.661	.847	.683
Model Significance	.000	.000	.000	.000
F-test	98.230	19.948	188.487	26.871
Durbin-Watson	1.862	1.633	1.871	2.170

Note: Standard error in parentheses and beta weights italicized; ***p≤.1, **p≤.05, *p≤.001

2006 Incumbent/Challenger Races

The variables in the 2006 Incumbent/Challenger races model explain about 75% of the variance in the percentage of the vote received by the incumbent. The significant variables are outside spending on behalf of the challenger, the challenger's campaign expenditures, the party of the incumbent, the previous vote percentage won by the incumbent, and the presidential vote in the district. The party of the incumbent has the biggest impact on the results and has a positive relationship with the incumbent's two-party vote, demonstrating that Democrats (coded as 1) had more electoral success in 2006. This relationship reveals the national political tide observed in 2006, when many Democrats swept into office in President Bush's second midterm election. Presidential vote for the candidate of the incumbent's party and the incumbent's previous election percentage both have a significant positive relationship with the incumbent's vote share. The results demonstrate that party and the presidential vote in the district are the most important variables driving election results, with greater impacts than any of the spending variables.

Outside expenditures that favor the challenger have a statistically significant, but weak negative relationship with the incumbent's vote share (beta weight of $-.063$), showing that these types of expenditures are having their intended effect of boosting the challenger. The unstandardized partial regression coefficient of $-.034$ (units of \$10,000) shows that when a challenger receives \$100,000 of outside spending, the incumbent's share of the vote is reduced by .34%. When the amount of outside money increases to \$1,000,000, the incumbent's vote is reduced by 3.4%. A margin of 3% could make a crucial difference in highly competitive elections, which demonstrates that outside money spent on behalf of the challenger can have an important impact on election results. However, outside expenditures on behalf of the incumbent are not significant. The expenditures of the challenger's campaign committee have a significant and moderately strong negative relationship with incumbent's vote share (beta weight of $-.324$), demonstrating that as challengers spend more, their percentage of the vote received increases. With a B value of $-.040$, expenditures of \$1,000,000 by the challenger's campaign would decrease the incumbent's vote share by 4%, a considerable impact. The challengers' campaign expenditures are having a significant negative impact, whereas the incumbent spending of all types is not significant. This finding is consistent with the expectation of this study and previous research that challengers will see greater benefit from

spending because they have more to gain from initial spending through increased name recognition and other advantages the incumbent already has.³⁶ Hypothesis 1 is supported because outside spending that favors the challenger is increasing the challenger's share of the vote. Hypothesis 2 is also supported by this data because challengers are benefiting from outside expenditures, whereas incumbents do not see any statistically significant benefit from outside spending in this model.

In an effort to focus more clearly on independent expenditures in these races, I ran the same regression again using only cases that had a substantial level of outside or party spending. I included races with at least \$10,000 of outside or party spending for at least one candidate and in which a challenger's campaign made expenditures, in an effort to include only races competitive enough to draw non-candidate spending. This operational decision left 108 cases.

In this model, outside spending for the challenger is not significant. Challenger campaign spending (beta weight of $-.431$) is the second most powerful variable in the second model, whereas in the overall model, it is the third most powerful. The unstandardized partial regression coefficient for challenger campaign spending is $-.036$ when including only races where outside money was present, compared to $-.040$ in the overall model. The previous election vote percentage won by the incumbent is not significant, while party and presidential vote in the district are significant, but with lower relative strength compared to the aggregate model (beta weights of $.487$ and $.267$ respectively). The second model, which includes only races in which outside or party spending was a factor, maintains the findings of the model including all races, except that outside spending that favors challengers is not significant. The first model includes many cases in which challengers were not viable candidates and therefore did not raise much money of any type. Consequently, it is not surprising that receiving money from outside groups is a more substantial predictor of electoral success in this model. In the second model, only competitive races in which outside money was present were included; considering just these limited cases, the independent impact of outside money is not statistically significant.

³⁶ Jacobson 1978.

2010 Incumbent/Challenger Races

The U.S. House races analyzed in 2010 not only have higher levels of spending overall than 2006, but also would be expected to demonstrate the effect of the *Citizens United* decision and the impact of new Super PACs formed in this cycle. I expect these increased spending levels in 2010 to result in a greater impact on election results, as outside money played a bigger role in the most recent midterm. Much media attention was given to the impact of the dramatic increase in the amount of independent expenditures in 2010, and this analysis attempts to determine if this spending really did influence the election results.

In the 2010 analysis, the variables explain about 85% of the variance in the election results for all races with an incumbent and challenger. The outside expenditures that favor the challenger are significant, although they have a comparatively low beta weight of -.055 (the lowest of the significant variables). The slight negative relationship shows that outside spending that either opposes the incumbent or supports the challenger is decreasing the incumbent's vote share. In this model, the B value for challenger outside spending (-.016) indicates that if a challenger received \$1,000,000 from outside groups, they would gain 1.6% of the vote. In comparison to 2006, the unstandardized partial regression coefficient for challenger outside expenditures decreases from -.034 to -.016 in 2010. This finding contrasts the expectation of this study that the impact of outside spending would be greater in the first election post-*Citizens United*. This demonstrates that post-*Citizens United*, outside spending on behalf of the challenger maintains a significant impact on election results, whereas outside expenditures on behalf of the incumbent do not have a statistically significant relationship with vote share.

Challenger candidate campaign expenditures had the biggest impact of the spending variables (beta weight of -.136). In the most recent midterm, expenditures by the incumbent's campaign also have a statistically significant and slight negative relationship with the incumbent's two-party vote (beta weight of -.058). This finding is consistent with previous research. Because incumbents spend at higher levels when they are more seriously challenged (when their challenger is spending a meaningful amount of money), their expenditures can have a negative relationship with their votes received. For every \$1,000,000 incumbents spend, their own percentage of the vote decreases by 0.6%. Overall, the most important result of this

model is that outside spending that favors the challenger is significant with a relationship in the expected direction. However, the unstandardized partial regression coefficient for outside spending on behalf of challengers is smaller in 2010 than in 2006, showing that in the models including all races, challengers' outside expenditures had a greater impact in 2006.

In addition, party of the incumbent, previous vote received by the incumbent, and presidential vote in the district are all significant. The presidential vote for the candidate of the same party as the incumbent has the biggest impact on vote received by the incumbent, with a beta weight of .628. In 2010, the party variable had a strong negative relationship with the incumbent's vote (beta weight of -.471); the opposite relationship is observed in the 2006 data. This was expected given the strong Republican national tide observed in 2010. In 2006, the B value for incumbent races was 10.195, and in 2010, the B value was -11.092. This demonstrates that not only did the direction of the relationship change, but the strength of the party variable also increased in 2010, indicating that the Republican wave of 2010 was more powerful than the Democratic wave of 2006.

Overall, the data supports Hypothesis 1, that post-*Citizens United* outside spending will increase the vote share of the candidate favored by the groups, because challenger outside spending has a statistically significant negative relationship with the incumbent's votes. However, this hypothesis is not entirely supported by the data, as outside expenditures supporting the incumbent do not have a significant relationship with votes received. For this reason, outside money is not uniformly impacting election results in the favor of the candidates supported by the expenditures. In the 2010 model, campaign spending by the incumbent is significant and the unstandardized partial regression coefficients for challenger's outside and campaign spending are lower than in 2006, when no type of incumbent spending had a significant relationship with results. Hypothesis 2 is also supported, as only challengers are benefiting from the impact of outside spending on their behalf, demonstrated by the statistically significant relationships with the incumbent's votes. Incumbents see no statistically significant benefit from outside expenditures on their behalf in either 2006 or 2010, whereas challengers do receive a statistically significant impact from outside money in the model including all races in both years.

Table 1 presents the data after excluding any races in 2010 that did not have over \$10,000 of outside or party spending, nor spending by the challenger candidate. The strong relationships between the incumbent's vote and party, previous vote, and presidential vote persist in this equation, demonstrating the importance of these variables in predicting election outcomes. While presidential vote and party are the two most powerful variables in the model, expenditures are also impacting election results. After eliminating races without substantial levels of outside spending or party spending, all types of spending on behalf of challengers are significant. Incumbent spending of any type is not significant, but party spending on behalf of the challenger is significant for the first time in any model ($p \leq .05$). The unstandardized partial regression coefficient for challenger outside spending is $-.021$ ($p \leq .05$) when only races where outside spending is a factor are included, whereas in the aggregate model for 2010, the partial regression coefficient is $-.016$ ($p \leq .1$). In the second model, \$1,000,000 spent by outside groups on behalf of the challenger reduces the incumbent's vote share by about 2%. Challenger expenditures and both outside and party expenditures on behalf of the challenger have statistically significant negative relationships with votes received by the incumbent. While in the 2006 model of only races with outside spending, challenger outside spending is not significant, it is significant in the same model in 2010. This reveals a change post-*Citizens United*; outside money impacted election results when only the most competitive races that drew non-candidate spending were included only in 2010.

2006 & 2010 Open Seat Races

In the analysis of open seat races for both years, the variable for presidential vote is measured as the percentage of the vote received by the previous Democratic presidential candidate. Each of the expenditure variables were entered as the amount spent by Democrats and Republicans. The regression analyses for open seats show some different variables having an impact than the incumbent/challenger models.

Table 2: 2006 & 2010 Open Seat Races

Dependent Variable: Two-party vote percentage won by the Democratic candidate

Independent Variable	2006 Open Seat Races	2010 Open Seat Races
Constant	20.046 (8.465)	18.607 (5.762)
Democratic Outside Spending	-.121 (.080) <i>-.163</i>	.027 (.048) <i>.055</i>
Republican Outside Spending	.093 (.073) <i>.109</i>	.010 (.019) <i>.044</i>
Democrat Campaign Spending	.044** (.017) <i>.362</i>	.016 (.016) <i>.097</i>
Republican Campaign Spending	-.020* (.011) <i>-.220</i>	-.007 (.016) <i>-.037</i>
Democratic Party Spending	-.006 (.030) <i>-.037</i>	.022 (.026) <i>.098</i>
Republican Party Spending	.006 (.025) <i>.042</i>	.005 (.038) <i>.017</i>
Democratic Presidential Vote	.841*** (.094) <i>.843</i>	.706*** (.108) <i>.702</i>
Urban	.045 (.068) <i>.068</i>	.190** (.085) <i>.264</i>
Income	.000 (.000) <i>-.170</i>	-.001*** (.000) <i>-.425</i>
N	32	43
Adj. R-square	.848	.861
Model Significance	.000	.000
F-test	20.196	29.847
Durbin-Watson	2.117	1.819

Note: Standard error in parentheses and beta weights italicized; *p≤.1, **p≤.05, ***p≤.001

In an analysis of the open seat races in 2006, both the spending by the Democrat and the Republican candidate are significant, and each has a relationship in the expected direction. The equation for open seats explains about 85% of the variance in the Democratic vote, with the biggest impact coming from the presidential vote in the district for the Democratic candidate, followed by the Democratic candidate's expenditures. Both expenditures by the Democratic and Republican candidates have a statistically significant relationship with the Democratic two-

party vote in the district in their expected directions. Expenditures by Democratic candidates (B value of .044) have a stronger effect upon votes than does spending by Republican candidates (B value of .020), which could be due to the national political tide favoring Democratic candidates in 2006. It is also possible that there are differences between how effectively candidates of the two parties spend their money in the district. The expenditures made by both candidates are significant in this open seat equation, whereas only challengers' expenditures are significant in analysis of incumbent/challenger races. This could be due to the distinct dynamics of open seat races; both candidates receive the same (and more immediate) types of benefits from spending that challengers do because they need to gain name recognition and voter awareness.

For both the 2006 and 2010 open seat races, results were analyzed separately with the same operational decision used for incumbent/challenger races – using only races with more than \$10,000 of outside or party spending and in which both candidates made expenditures. However, this did not eliminate as many cases for open seats as it did for incumbent/challenger races. Because open seat races are generally more competitive than races with an incumbent, they are more likely to have outside or party spending. Both the R square values and coefficient values were very similar to the initial equation, and therefore results are not included here.

The results for 2010 open seat races indicate similar results to 2006 open seats, with the variables explaining about 86% of the variance in the Democratic vote in the district. The significant variables are the presidential vote in the district for the Democratic candidate, the percent of the district that is urban, and the median income. Once again, presidential vote is having the biggest impact on election results, with a beta weight of .702. However, the urban variable and median income also have statistically significant relationships with Democratic vote (beta weights of .264 and -.425 respectively). It is unclear why these variables are only having a statistically significant impact on election results for open seats. The percent of the district that is urban has a statistically significant relationship ($p \leq .05$) with Democratic vote in the district, demonstrating that more urban districts are more likely to vote for Democrats. The median income in the district has a statistically significant negative relationship, showing that as income increases, votes received by Democratic candidates decrease. Demographic characteristics of the districts are having a substantial impact on election results in the analysis

of open seat races only, and it is unclear why they are having such an impact. Neither hypothesis is supported by the open seat data, as outside spending is not significant in either year.

Comparisons between 2006 & 2010

In analyzing the differences between the results for the 2006 and 2010 midterm elections, it is evident which variables consistently affect election results: presidential vote in the district, party of the incumbent, the incumbent's previous vote, and the challenger's spending. Presidential vote has a larger impact on election results in 2010, demonstrated by the increase in B values. However, challenger candidate spending has a lower unstandardized partial regression coefficient in 2010 compared to 2006. The change in the direction of the relationship for the party variable between the years clearly demonstrates the change in the national political tides — in 2006, for Democrats, and in 2010, for Republicans.

Outside spending that favors the challenger is significant in both years when including all races. However, in the model including only races with non-candidate spending, challenger outside spending is only significant in 2010. This demonstrates a greater impact of outside spending for challengers only following *Citizens United*, as it continued to impact results in races that were competitive enough to draw substantial outside spending. Outside spending favoring incumbent candidates is not significant in any model, a finding consistent with previous research. The data for all incumbent/challenger races in both 2006 and 2010 supports Hypothesis 1 and 2, as does the model for competitive races with an incumbent in 2010. In each of these models, outside spending on behalf of the challenger has a statistically significant negative relationship with the incumbent's vote share, showing that challengers saw a greater benefit from outside spending than did incumbents.

The results for open seat elections did not support my hypotheses, and candidate campaign spending variables are only significant in 2006. Outside spending is not significant in either year, but expenditures by both Democratic and Republican candidates are statistically significant with relationships in the expected directions in 2006. The R square values remain high for open seats, but the presidential vote variable is having the greatest impact on the election results, which fits both expectations and previous research. The demographic variables in open seat races are having statistically significant impacts on the election results in 2010,

which was not true for elections with an incumbent. The reasons behind the explanatory power of these variables for open seats are unclear and could be an avenue for future research.

CONCLUSION

The results of this analysis do not conclusively determine the impact of the *Citizens United* decision on the relationship between outside expenditures and election outcomes but begin to fill a gap in the research. The first hypothesis (as the amount of outside spending that favors a candidate increases, the percentage of the vote received by the candidate will also increase) is supported by three of the six models in this study. While outside spending did have a small impact on election results for challengers in both years, the results do not fully demonstrate the influence of outside money. Challenger outside money is significant in the model of only races with a substantial level of outside spending in 2010 but not in 2006, revealing that outside money was more influential post-*Citizens United*. However, the relatively small impact of outside spending could also reveal that the journalists and political activists have overstated the impact of *Citizens United* on our electoral process. The impact of an increase in outside money and an increase in any type of spending for a candidate appear to affect election results in the same way. For example, in the 2006 model of all races, \$1,000,000 of outside spending in support of the challenger and \$1,000,000 spent by the challenger's campaign reduce the incumbent's vote share by 3.4% and 4.0% respectively. In the same model in 2010, \$1,000,000 of outside spending in support of the challenger and \$1,000,000 spent by the challenger's campaign reduce the incumbent's vote share by 1.6% and 1.7% respectively. For this reason, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of each type of spending in House races. Hypothesis 2 is supported by the results of this experiment, showing that challengers saw greater benefit from their expenditures and incumbents received no statistically significant effect from expenditures on their behalf.

Limitations

The most obvious limitation of this study is the lack of accurate and complete data on both outside expenditures and party independent expenditures. Different sources of campaign finance data report different amounts for these types of expenditures, both because of the difficulty of compiling and counting these types of expenditures and the limitations of the data

collected by the FEC. Both sources acknowledge the limitations of their data, with a staff member of the Campaign Finance Institute, Brendan Glavin, saying via personal correspondence, “It is also important to note that this only represents the reported spending of outside groups, and there is much additional spending that goes on that cannot be quantified through reports.” In addition to incomplete data on express advocacy independent expenditures, no data is available on issue advocacy advertisements sponsored by outside groups, even though these types of advertisements frequently indirectly impact election results. It is possible that the data used in this study greatly understates the amount of outside spending for both years, but especially for 2010. This lack of complete data would certainly impact the results, as they would not fully demonstrate the impact of the *Citizens United* decision.

Because the only election post-*Citizens United* was an unusually strong election for Republican candidates, it is possible that the data is not typical or representative of the impact of outside spending. The national political tide for Republicans was clearly the most important factor in the 2010 midterm elections, and this may have mitigated the impact of expenditures. In addition, the 2006 midterm was another unusually strong wave election, but for Democrats. It is possible that the strength of the national party tides each year affected the dynamics of the elections in this study. Other limitations of this study include the difficulty of isolating the impact of variables related to campaign expenditures. Many of the spending variables would be highly affected by the competitiveness of the race — a determinant of not only how much money is spent but also candidates’ ability to raise money. Because most of the variables included in this study, especially the partisanship of the district, national political tides, and the previous election results, all affect how easily both candidates can raise money, the results may not accurately describe the relationship between expenditures and vote share. Many cases in the study had extremely low levels of spending by challenger candidates, indicating that the race was essentially noncompetitive, which would skew regression results. The impact of expenditures on election results is a relationship generally agreed upon by political scientists, but one that is difficult to measure precisely.

Implications

This study begins to fill a gap in the literature on campaign finance by specifically examining the impact of independent expenditures. This study is among the first to attempt to

determine the impact of the changes in campaign finance law and practice after the *Citizens United* decision, while also controlling for other factors that impact election results.³⁷ More recent studies of post-*Citizens United* spending have only analyzed aggregate spending levels in all races, rather than analyzing the impact relative to other factors influencing elections. The findings of this study are consistent with the body of previous research on the impact of money on Congressional elections, finding that spending of any type that supports challengers has a greater impact than spending supporting incumbents. Spending by challengers is expected to have a greater impact on election results, and most studies find that incumbent spending actually negatively impacts votes received because incumbent spending increases when they are more seriously challenged.³⁸ This study finds that these same relationships hold true when applied to new forms of outside spending unleashed by *Citizens United*. Outside spending favoring the challenger is impacting vote share more than outside spending on behalf of the incumbent.

Future research could design a similar study with a nonrecursive model in order to further examine the relationship between outside spending and election results. Because both raising and spending money in Congressional races is a dynamic process, it is possible that money spent by the challenger earlier in the election process is influencing the amount of money the challenger receives from both the party and outside groups. This study views the election as a snapshot, taken at the end of the campaign, by looking at the final amounts of each type of spending. But because challengers generally need to demonstrate their viability by reaching a certain fundraising threshold, it is a possibility that expenditures by the challenger's campaign are affecting both the party and outside expenditures they receive. Because this study is a static model of expenditures, it would not capture this possibility. Future research could address the possibility of a nonrecursive model and design a dynamic model that would capture variance in the impact of expenditures throughout the election cycle. Another avenue for future research would be repeating this experiment with more elections under the same campaign finance regulations and with more accurate data in order to further illustrate the impact of outside spending.

³⁷ Cornfield 2011; Franz 2010; Toner and Trainer 2011.

³⁸ Abramowitz 1991; Green and Krasno 1988; Grier 1989; Jacobson 1978; Jacobson 1990; Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994.

The limitations of this research demonstrate the importance of more accurate data collection and aggregation in the future of independent expenditures and electioneering communications, especially those that are not express advocacy. This is important information not only for public awareness of outside group involvement in elections, but also to determine the real impact of these expenditures on outcomes. This study and continued research on independent expenditures have important implications for political campaigns' spending strategies and also for campaign finance law. The results show that challengers' expenditures are consistently having more of an impact on election results than those of incumbents. The extremely high rates of reelection for incumbent candidates show the difficulty challengers face. In order to ensure an effective competitive democracy, experienced and viable challengers are necessary. On a normative level, it is troubling that expenditures by the challenger are such a clear indicator of electoral success because true democratic competition in House races seems unlikely and difficult without a well-funded challenger. This study begins to determine the impact of new types of outside expenditures in U.S. House elections after *Citizens United*, but further research is necessary in order to determine the extent of this impact and if the media has overstated the importance of outside group expenditures on election outcomes.

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**THE ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE:
AN ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ITS EXPLANATORY POWER**

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Abstract: *Beginning in the 1990s, a trend of using the security dilemma to explain ethnic violence has emerged. However, previous research mainly focuses on individual cases with large-scale violence; whether ethnic security dilemma theory is a sound approach to explain less violent ethnic conflict remains unclear. This paper employs a large-N design and tests the hypothesis that the ethnic security dilemma causes ethnic conflicts, without discriminating between differences in severity and scale of conflict. The paper also conducts a longitudinal comparison with a previous quantitative model using the latest data available. The empirical results do not support the hypothesis and suggest that the explanatory power of the ethnic security dilemma has declined over time. Although there is no definite conclusion that the ethnic security dilemma is not a useful explanation for less violent ethnic conflicts, given the limitations of this research, I conclude with a theoretical discussion questioning the applicability of the theory. Supplemented with this qualitative assessment, I conclude that a quantitative study of the ethnic security dilemma used to explain ethnic violence may not be a viable option for future research in this field.*

INTRODUCTION

The growing interest in the study of ethnic violence is partly the result of the sweeping wave of bloody violence occurring after the Cold War, which left weakened Weberian states extremely susceptible to a variety of violence, including ethnic violence.¹ The study of ethnic conflicts is a relatively new subfield within social science. Ethnic conflicts closely associate with studies of ethnicity and nationalism on the one hand, and studies of political violence on the other.² Efforts have been made to foster disciplinary debates between those non-intersecting literatures in the past decades, and, as a result, the domain of the study and key research questions are more clearly formulated, with a central focus on the causes of ethnic violence.

Scholars have given various explanations, ranging from instrumentalists' view of relative deprivation to constructivists' view of threatened identity. A trend of using the international relations concept of the security dilemma to explain ethnic violence emerged in the 1990s. Various case studies affirm that this causal mechanism provides an explanation for

¹ Desjarlais and Kleinman 1994.

² Brubaker and Laitin 1998.

large-scale ethnic violence in particular countries, but only a few studies have attempted to quantify this concept and empirically measure the explanatory power of this framework. Thus, several critical questions remain unanswered or answered unsatisfactorily:

Is the ethnic security dilemma a coherent explanation of some lesser violent ethnic conflicts? Is the ethnic security dilemma suitable for a mass application, or only to specific cases? How should one approach a quantitative study aiming to operationalize this rather complex concept? Has the explanatory power of ethnic security dilemma changed over time?

These questions are important because it must be determined whether the ethnic security dilemma yields any fruitful results in a large-N study; the answer of which will direct future research efforts. Only if such a study provides a promising outlook will a broader application of this theoretical framework be justified. Otherwise, the use of the ethnic security dilemma theory will be restricted to specific conflict dyads on a case-by-case analysis.

This research paper will attempt to address these problems and fill in the gap existing in the current literature. Therefore, the central question of this research is: does the security dilemma cause ethnic violence in a statistically significant way, regardless of the case's scale and severity? If so, to what extent does the effect the security dilemma explain the occurrence and intensity of recent ethnic violence? If not, what are some problems with the theory in its broader application, and is there any inherent limitation of this theory?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Ethnicity, Ethnic groups, and Ethnic Conflict

Ethnicity lacks a universally acknowledged definition, but I chose to base my paper on Horowitz's brief discussion of ethnicity and ethnic groups because of its well-balanced nature and Horowitz's recognized intellectual authority in the field.

He first quotes Enid Schidkroun's formulation: "the minimal definition of an ethnic unit [...] is the idea of common provenance, recruitment primarily through kinship, and a notion of distinctiveness whether or not this consists of a unique inventory of cultural traits."³ The core definition of ethnicity, according to Horowitz, "embraces groups differentiated by color,

³ Horowitz 1986, 53.

language, and religion; it covers 'tribes,' 'races,' 'nationalities,' and castes"⁴ and the membership is typically not chosen but given."⁵ Conflict is yet another fuzzy concept. This paper does not attempt to clearly distinguish between conflict and violence, but rather to treat ethnic violence as a violent and more severe variation of conflict. Simply put, "conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals."⁶

The combination of "ethnic" and conflict creates another interesting definitional problem. Ethnicity may be at work in certain cases of violence, but they can hardly be said to be ethnic conflicts if other factors primarily account for their occurrences. As Brubaker and Laitin argue, how "ethnic" modifies "conflicts" or "violence" remains unclear and largely unexamined.⁷ But several defining characteristics of ethnic conflicts can be summarized as follows. First, ethnic conflicts are inter-communal, meaning two groups in a given conflict are strictly identified by their kinship and ethnic identities. Second, two parties cannot both be states or representatives of states.⁸ Third, motives of the conflicts are usually ethnically related and common goals include to gain more political autonomy or to establish a separate state.

Theories of Ethnic Conflicts

Three general theoretical approaches that almost encompass all research of ethnic conflicts are primordial, instrumental, and constructive. The primordial approach views ethnic conflicts as unavoidable, because the problems root in the inherent differences between ethnic groups. In other words, ethnic identity itself is the determinant of ethnic conflicts. In contrast, the instrumentalist approach "understands ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups, or elites to obtain some larger, typically material end."⁹ Constructivists, on the other hand, see ethnic identity as a social construction and thus each conflict has its special social origin.

Ethnic conflicts, in many respects, resemble political violence that takes place at the interstate level. It is a natural progression for scholars to go beyond the realm of ethnic relations and political violence and to ponder the possibilities of taking an interdisciplinary approach to examine the cause of ethnic conflict.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Horowitz 1986, 56.

⁶ Horowitz 1986, 95.

⁷ Brubaker and Laitin 1998.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Lake and Rothchild 1998, 5.

Security Dilemma as an International Relations Theory Concept

“The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm to the world but with two actors each desperately anxious to avoid conflict of any sort.”¹⁰

The security dilemma concept was first used by John Herz in 1951.¹¹ The tragedy of security dilemma becomes possible due to the anarchic nature of the international system and inherent uncertainty and fear of states for their own security. Some important developments in political psychology, especially Robert Jervis’ *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, open the door for a new way of thinking about international conflicts. The argument that intentions of one party may be misperceived is a critical premise of the security dilemma. Several other scholars outline the central theoretical framework of security dilemma as follows: States are rational actors and self-help is the only way to guarantee the survival of the states in an anarchic international society. Decision makers have to constantly perceive others’ intentions but benign intentions of one party’s action (defensive, or merely aiming at increasing one’s own security) can be misperceived as malign (offensive). Thus this misperception triggers a counteraction which is not necessarily offensive but may be misperceived as well. Thus confrontation escalates and securities of both actors decline. “The unique analytic core of the security dilemma lies in situations in which one or more disputing parties have incentives to resort to preemptive uses of force.”¹²

The Ethnic Security Dilemma: an Alternative Use

Recent studies have proven that the conceptual frame of the security dilemma is useful when thinking about ethnic conflicts at the intrastate level, although its relevance may be difficult to see at first sight. The application of the security dilemma was first popularized by Barry Posen¹³. Posen articulates some interesting parallels between an international system and ethnic relations within a state from a realist’s perspective. First, the collapse of imperial regimes produces the problem of “emerging anarchy.” Second, ethnic groups behave as if they are states without the assurance of their security by the state and thus “the security dilemma affects the

¹⁰ Butterfield 1952, 21.

¹¹ Roe 1999.

¹² Lake and Rothchild 1998; Leuprecht 2010; Roe 2002.

¹³ Roe 1999.

relations among these groups, just as it affects relations among states.” Third, “the indistinguishability of offence and defense” favors the worst-case analysis and preemptive action.¹⁴ All these conditions will similarly generate a spiral of action and reaction that is typically found in an international conflict. The most popular examples of the security dilemma include the former Yugoslavia¹⁵, Moldova’s civil war¹⁶, and Croatia.¹⁷

Later development of this paradigm concerns what constitutes the security of an ethnic group. Societal security, a dimension of state security that by itself can be a referent object¹⁸, is viewed as very important for ethnic minorities. Societal security broadly captures traits relating to the preservation of group identity, including language, customs, and religious practices. Waver gives a formal definition of societal security:

“The ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.”¹⁹

Survival of an ethnic group in this sense is less dependent on the economic power or military strength, but on a sense of group cohesion and a guarantee of continual practice or expression of its tradition. In addition, the ethnic security dilemma is “closer to a ‘perceptual security dilemma’ rather than a ‘structural security dilemma.’”²⁰ So actual conditions of the security dilemma do not matter as much as whether the ethnic groups perceive such conditions.

The literature on security dilemma theory is largely comprised of qualitative analyses, with a vast majority focusing on single or comparative case studies. Several prominent uses of the concept include Kaufman’s *Spiraling to Ethnic War* (1996), in which he analyses Moldova’s path to civil war. In this article, Kaufman reasoned that one condition of the ethnic security dilemma is de facto anarchy. Paul Roe elaborates on the security dilemma by tracking the roots

¹⁴ Posen 1991, 27-33.

¹⁵ Dulic and Kostic 2010; Posen 1991.

¹⁶ Kaufman 1996.

¹⁷ Roe 2004.

¹⁸ Roe 1999.

¹⁹ Waver 1993; Roe 1999.

²⁰ Kaufman 1996, 112.

of several concepts involved and uses them to analyze the Hungarian-Romanian struggle---“the Transylvania’s societal security dilemma.”²¹ One should notice that the security dilemma theory is mostly used to explain large-scale ethnic conflicts that ultimately result in civil wars or ethnic cleansings. Subsequent development of this strand of literature produces many variations. Some scholars use the theory in a much limited sense, only explaining a single aspect of a case. One example of this variation is the demographic security dilemma. The author shows that how an economic project causes security dilemma between Hans and minorities in west borders.²² Although those researchers use the core causal explanation provided by security dilemma, these less rigid uses of the concept make their true applicability and its explanatory power questionable.

Few attempts have been made to operationalize the security dilemma into a quantitative analysis, or at least provide some statistical guidance on how powerful the paradigm is in explaining ethnic violence. Unlike other approaches in which causes often have identifiable indicators suitable for both qualitative accounts and statistical manipulations, the security dilemma involves a causal chain and some not easily quantifiable concepts.

But in his book *Anarchy Within*, Erik Melander makes a breakthrough. He painstakingly constructs a game theory model to capture the dynamics of the ethnic security dilemma. Melander’s first step enables him to identify the dependent variable, “restraint breakdown”, which is defined as the “preemptive resort to large-scale ethnic warfare.” He then derives three empirical indicators, namely, status quo utility, fear, and first strike advantages, from his previous game theory analysis. He further operationalized them into measurable independent variables as separatist grievance, democracy, and ethnoterritorial dominance respectively. It is expected that lower status quo utility, more fear, and high first strike advantage will lead to a severe security dilemma and thus cause ethnic violence manifested in the form of warfare or mass guerilla activity. His results provide “strong support for the notion that the Security Dilemma is a sound causal mechanism of high relevance for explaining the outbreak of large-scale ethnic warfare and cleansing in a context of political transition.”²³

²¹ Roe 2002, 67.

²² Clarke 2007.

²³ Melander 1999, 109.

This is a sound and logically coherent application of the security dilemma concept. But several limitations are obvious. First, the scope of the study is limited. The ethnic security dilemma may only provide explanations to severe ethnic conflicts. By setting a high threshold in coding only cases with severe outbreaks of violence, Melander loses the opportunity to investigate whether or not the theory can provide meaningful insight into ethnic violence in a full spectrum. Second, as Melander himself admits, the indicators are somewhat crude. All variables are dummy variables, while available data allows more accurate representation of the concepts.

I will try to develop an alternative quantitative model, using Minorities at Risk (MaR)²⁴ dataset, to test the soundness of security dilemma as a causal explanation of ethnic violence.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Does the security dilemma cause ethnic violence in a statistically significant way, given all cases available? And if so, to what extent does the security dilemma affect the occurrence and intensity of ethnic violence? If not, what are the implications of the results? My hypothesis is straightforward: the more severe the security dilemma, the more severe the ethnic violence. This hypothesis has been used or implied in many studies, but what differentiates this research is the methodology.

Turning this hypothesis into a working one remains daunting because the ethnic security dilemma, like many other complex theoretical concepts, lacks direct quantifiable potential. Some scholars take an indirect approach to test this hypothesis in their studies, one of which is to deliberately introduce intervening variables that are the logical consequences of the ethnic security dilemma, and test the relationship between the intervening variables and the dependent variables. This is problematic because intervening variables by themselves may explain the ethnic violence without any reference to the security dilemma theory-an indirect causation problem. Many more have chosen to give anecdotal accounts in their case studies to make a qualitative assessment of the hypothesis. Another approach is to test variables that are strongly indicative of, or that will cause an ethnic security dilemma. Melander takes a similar path in his study.

²⁴ Minorities at Risk Project 2009.

I will try to justify my selection of several variables that constitute the ethnic security dilemma and develop a testable model in a large-N design.

Components of the Security Dilemma

ANARCHY: In his work, Posen recognized that “emerging anarchy” is a precondition of ethnic security dilemma.²⁵ Anarchy, in an intrastate context, may not only refer to a lack of central authority, but also to a lack of public services and various social programs that produces a perception of a quasi-anarchic environment. It will lead to a security dilemma because when groups perceive their governments as being unable to take action to protect their identities and address their cultural concerns, they will increasingly rely on self-help. Lack of rule enforcement provides motivation to resort to violence rather than an incapable superior authority.

FEAR. Fear is an essential dimension of the security dilemma because any uncertainty of the future will make members of ethnic groups feel vulnerable, and thus an action of the opposed party will be more likely to trigger violent reactions. Different kinds of fear will contribute to the ethnic security dilemma mechanism. I categorize fear into three variations: 1) fear of loss of group identity; 2) fear of repression of ethnic tradition; 3) fear of physical survival (ethnic cleansings) or prosperity of the community. Notice that the source of the fear does not need to be specified, meaning that fear imposed on an ethnic group, regardless of whether it comes from another group that is directly in conflict with or not, will have similar effects because reaction is not necessarily targeted to the source of the fear. In other words, when A group (or government) makes B group feel vulnerable, C group’s provoking action might lead to B group’s violence.

MISPERCEPTION. The likelihood of misperception, according to the inner logic of the security dilemma, should strongly correlate with the severity of the security dilemma, because if information flows freely without any distortion, ethnic groups can easily recognize opposing parties’ true intentions and seek peaceful solutions, rather than resorting to means that are conducive to violence, such as building arms.

FIRST STRIKE ADVANTAGE. Melander gives a convincing argument why first strike advantage is important to the operation of the security dilemma. “The argument goes that when

²⁵ Posen 1991.

different ethnic groups are interspersed in the same territory each side becomes extremely vulnerable to attacks from the other,” and thus in ethnically diverse areas, advantage will be gained if one group strikes first.²⁶ The underlying logic is that ethnic groups will be more likely to use preemptive strike to secure its regional position; otherwise, its power will be undermined if other ethnic groups strike first. I decided to include the same indicator used by Melander for first strike advantage, which is ethnoterritorial dominance.

Variable Operationalization

The work to transform variables into measurable indicators can be difficult because they all have multiple theoretical dimensions with substantial abstractions. I admit that my operationalization of the variables cannot fully capture what those concepts represent, but there is some significant improvement from previous models. Minority at Risk project has collected and compiled quantitative data for a variety of variables related to the characteristics and activities of ethnic groups, which I use for most variables in this study.

Independent Variables

Anarchy: The World Bank has developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators to measure governance and institutional quality. Among those indicators, Government Effectiveness (“capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies”) and Regulatory Quality (“capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development”) are the best available quantitative indicators of anarchy in an ethnic security dilemma context.²⁷ In addition, they are perception-based instead of objective evaluation of governments and therefore are more compatible with a constructivist view of anarchy. I recode these two indicators into one variable, and a lower score indicates higher anarchy.

²⁶ Melander 1999, 81.

²⁷ Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo 2010, 4.

Fear: Melander argues that institutionalized democracy will produce less fear during periods of political transition and therefore he uses democracy as an indicator of fear (measured in the polity3d dataset).²⁸ In addition, democracy may well measure the importance of political institutions rather than fear. Political institutions play an important role in group conflict within a state, so its mitigating effect is expected. Therefore, a more coherent indicator for fear must be found, which, by itself, has no apparent explanatory power of ethnic violence. While restrictions on language or religion are very good indicators of fear, they have the same problem as “democracy.” Shifting focus from the external factors that might produce fear, I believe cultural grievances, which are a clear indication of the cultural fear that ethnic groups have experienced, represent the first two kinds of fear. On the other hand, I will use urbanity to measure the third kind. William Rose examines Monica Toft’s work of the interesting link between settlement patterns and rebellion. Rose derives an important observation from Toft’s finding that “with stronger ties to the land and concomitant decision to remain, rural residents will likely react to possible threats with more fear than urbanities.”²⁹ Thus, the higher the proportion of urban population, the less fear of physical survival within a given geological area. Both cultural grievance and urbanities can be easily operationalized with “cultural grievance” and “urban-rural distribution” variables in the Minority at Risk dataset.

Misperception: While there is no perfect measure of what degree to which ethnic groups will misperceive another party’s intentions, a distinctiveness index best serves this function. If one ethnic group is sufficiently different from another one in terms of language, customs, tradition, it will be difficult to understand the other party’s intentions. Channels of obstructed information or actual occurrences of misperceptions are not measured here, rather the likelihood of their occurrences. Misperception is operationalized by combining two indicators in MaR dataset: “language” and “custom” variable, where higher scores indicate more distinct languages spoken and customs held between ethnic groups.

First Strike Advantage: This variable will be operationalized into “the proportion of group members in regional base” in MaR.

Dependent Variables

²⁸ Melander 1999.

²⁹ Rose 2011, 14.

Two different types of ethnic violence are separately measured. Intercommunal conflict is conflict with other ethnic groups that are not state representatives or dominant groups exercising power. Rebellion, in contrast, requires the opposing ethnic group to be the dominant group in power. My main dependent variable will be Violence, which is the combined score of “intercommunal conflict” and “rebellion”, although the two will be run as dependent variables in separate models for comparative purposes.

Control Variables

Several control variables will be used in various models, including “index of lost political autonomy” (AUTLOST), “separatism index” (SEPX), “political discrimination index” (POLDIS), “economic discrimination index” (ECDIS), “group organization for joint political action” (GOJPA). These variables (all from MaR) are selected such that they can capture a wide range of possible explanations of ethnic violence.

Regression Models

The following are the regression models used to test my hypothesis.

Model 1:

Violence(“intercommunal”+ “rebellion”) =Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception index+Proportion of members in regional base
+AUTLOST+SEPX+POLDIS+ECDIS+GOJPA

Model 1 includes the four main variables and all control variables. My main focus on this model will be the significance of each variable and the overall validity of this model.

Model 2:

Violence =Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception index+Proportion of member in regional base

Model 2 is designed to measure the explanatory power of the ethnic security dilemma by examining the R square.

Model 3:

Intercommunal conflict=Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception index+Proportion of members in regional base

Model 4:

Rebellion=Anarchy+Urban Rural Distribution+ Cultural Grivance+Misperception index+Proportion of member in regional base

Only the dependent variable in Model 3 and 4 differs from Model 2. I break down violence into two distinct types of ethnic violence to see how an anarchic situation will act differently upon them. Intercommunal conflict should be more prevailing than rebellion given any anarchic level since rebellion factors into government control. It is also a way to test the internal validity of the anarchy variable.

Model 5:

Restraint Breakdown=Ethnoterritorial Dominance+Democracy+Political Grievance

In this model, I mimic Melander's research model as much as possible, except that all the data I use is from 2005 (including the use of Polity IV dataset³⁰), while Melander's data is from 1990 to 1994.³¹ This regression model will not only provide a longitudinal study comparison, but also put my model in a comparative context. Several noticeable differences exist in my operationalization: 1) Melander uses 70% as the threshold for ethnoterritorial dominance, while I use 75% due to coding changes in the MaR dataset. However, the difference is negligible and should have minimal impact on my analysis. 2) I substitute separatist grievance for political grievance, which is the closest variable available. According to the new code book, a level of political grievance at three or four represents grievances focused on "creating or strengthening autonomous status" and "creating a separate state for group or revanchist change in borders," respectively.³² It is comparable to the original indicator of Status Quo Utility. 3) Coding for

³⁰ Polity IV Project 2010.

³¹ Melander 1999.

³² Minority at Risk 2009, 14.

restraint breakdown should have only included cases of intercommunal conflict with a score of 5 and that have at least 500 casualties. However, a case by case determination of restraint breakdown by examining each conflict's casualty numbers is impossible for this research, and this information is not readily available in any database. Therefore I suppose a limited number of cases may be inappropriately coded.

DATA ANALYSIS

Results

Table 1: Regression Results for Model 1 to 4
Dependent Variable: Ethnic Violence

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	-0.212 (0.913)	2.504*** (0.795)	1.937*** (0.509)	0.76* (0.429)
Anarchy	-.98 (.100)	-0.152 (0.102)	(-0.088) 0.066	-0.067 (0.057)
Misperception	-0.017 -0.205	0.132 (0.216)	0.028 (0.138)	0.062 (0.118)
Urban rural distribution	-.050 (.133)	-0.131 (0.141)	-0.096 (0.091)	-0.062 (0.079)
Cultural grievance	-.345 (.243)	-0.263 (0.244)	-0.086 (0.156)	-0.156 (0.137)
Regional base--proportion of group members	0.071 (.144)	0.157 (0.137)	-0.085 (0.088)	0.21*** (0.076)
Index of lost political autonomy	-0.05 (.215)			
Separatism index	-0.108 (0.192)			
Political grievance	0.237 (.185)			
Political discrimination index	0.093 (.164)			
Economic discrimination index	0.112 (.178)			
Group organization for joint political action	0.881*** (.187)			
R-squared	0.207	0.051	0.022	0.08
Adjusted R-squared	0.167	0.03	0.001	0.06
Significance	.000	0.037	0.399	0.001

Note: standard errors in parentheses; * $p \leq .1$, ** $p \leq .05$, *** $p \leq .01$

Since ethnic conflict is a complex phenomenon, it is not surprising that even though ten different variables are included in the first model, they only explain twenty one percent of the variance. None of the variables are significant except group organization for joint political action, which is not only significant at a 0.001 level, but also has the strongest effect on violence in the equation. All four main variables intended to operationalize the security dilemma are far from any significance level and thus cannot yield any meaningful interpretations.

Model 2 is significant at .05 level, however, the individual variables are not significant. In addition, the R^2 value is very low, meaning that the equation has little predictive or explanatory power for ethnic violence. Standardized coefficients of all variables have expected signs, indicating that my theoretical expectations are correct. A closer observation reveals that anarchy carries the most weight in the regression.

Model 3 is not significant, and intercommunal violence is hardly explained by the model. Model 4 explains eight percent of the variance in rebellion, which is mostly contributed by the proportion of group members in regional bases (first strike advantage). This variable is significant at the .01 level. A regionally dispersed ethnic group is more likely to have ethnic conflict with a central authority that represents another ethnic group.

The insignificance of my main variables is not a result of multicollinearity. According to the correlation matrix (Table 2), none of variables strongly associate with each other.

Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Main Variables

	Anarchy	Misperception	Cultural grievance	Proportion of group members	Urban rural distribution
Anarchy	1	-0.082	.261**	-.253**	.346**
Misperception	-0.082	1	0.067	0.042	-.248**
Cultural grievance	.261**	0.067	1	-.148*	0.08
Proportion of group members	-.253**	0.042	-.148*	1	-.382**
Urban rural distribution	.346**	-.248**	0.08	-.382**	1

Note: ** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$ (2-tailed).

Table three shows Melander's model using comparable data from different times. In terms of R square, Melander's model does not have any better results. The R square is 5.6%, very close to that of model 2. Political grievance has the most substantial effect on the dependent variable, as it did in 1994 model. In addition, it is significant at 0.001 level. This data suggests that the security dilemma theory has declined in explanatory power.

Table 3: Regression Results for Melander's Original Model and Model 5
Dependent Variable: Restraint Breakdown

Independent Variable	Original	Model 5
Constant	-.652 (0.653)	0.054 (0.034)
Democracy	-2.8*** (1.075)	-0.006 (0.03)
Ethnoterritorial Dom.	-3.249*** (1.191)	0.024 (0.039)
Separatist (Political) Grievances	.9511*** (.836)	0.148*** (0.044)
R-squared	.507	.056
Significance	.000	.002
N	85	284

Note: standard errors in parentheses; * $p \leq .1$, ** $p \leq .05$, *** $p \leq .01$ ³³

Research limitations

As discussed previously, I encountered many difficulties when trying to operationalize the ethnic security dilemma concept. Thus, one must take into account limitations of my research design when interpreting the results. A salient problem is partial measurement, as indicators cannot fully capture the ethnic security dilemma phenomenon in its entirety. As a result, R square values may be underestimated. In addition, a better time series analysis should also retrospectively apply my regression model to the 1990-1994 data. In addition, although MaR is a very inclusive database to study ethnic conflicts, it has its own case selection criteria that might exclude some important cases.

³³ Results of original research model compiled from Melander 1999.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Preliminary analysis of the data allows me to derive several observations. First, my data does not support the hypothesis that the greater the presence of ethnic security dilemma conditions, the more severe the ethnic violence. The research model, based on my ways of operationalizing the ethnic security dilemma, suggests that ethnic violence is hardly explained by the theory. Furthermore, ethnic security dilemma's explanatory power has substantially dropped from the previous research.

Do these observations imply that the ethnic security dilemma approach to studying ethnic conflict is unlikely to produce fruitful results in the future? Given the limitations of this research, I am hesitant to give a positive answer. However, if I supplement the quantitative results with a normative analysis, the answer becomes clearer. The two questions I will try to answer in the following analysis are: why is the ethnic security dilemma's explanatory power likely limited to case studies of large scale violence, and what might be the reasons that the theory has become a less compelling explanation of ethnic violence in recent years?

To answer the first question, we need to revisit how the ethnic security dilemma works. The entire causal mechanism is about perception and misperception. It is possible that in some cases, even given the preconditions of the ethnic security dilemma, they will not ultimately fall into a vicious cycle of action and reaction. In other words, the security dilemma can be measured in a continuous scale, but there is a threshold beyond which ethnic violence is triggered. Putting this theoretical explanation at a variable level, we can expect that only if anarchy, fear, and first strike advantage are large enough that they will have substantial impact on ethnic group behaviors. Thus the relationship between ethnic security dilemma and ethnic violence is non-linear.

In addition, the security dilemma is a broad conceptual frame used to think about the inner dynamics of how conflict arises and its path to some larger violence. A case study or content analysis that fit relevant factual information into this theory framework may give a better holistic picture of what happens for a given conflict dyad.

The research design of Melander incorporates the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the ethnic security dilemma and ethnic violence by making specific cutoffs in coding

independent variables and dependent variables and transforming them into dummy variables. So naturally we have to ask, given that model 5 only examines ethnic violence on a discrete scale, why has the explanatory power of the ethnic security dilemma is still remained very low, and in fact, has decreased significantly from previous years of study?


To answer this question, we need to examine the theory in a larger context. As a matter of fact, the number of ethnic wars (large-scale violence) in the new century dramatically dropped compared to that of the early 1990s. As Ted Gurr points out:

“...Many new multiethnic democracies have been consolidated, international doctrine and practices for containing deadly ethnic conflict have been evolved. The UN, regional organizations in Europe and Africa, and major powers have become more proactive in answering ethnic quarrels. The net effect has been not to put an end to ethnic conflict but rather to contain some of its worst consequences and to channel the political energies of mobilized ethnic groups into conventional politics.”³⁴

The ethnic security dilemma theory was originally used to examine ethnic violence in post-imperial and post-Cold War periods. However, unlike 20 years ago, the political environment of both states and international society are less likely to produce a security dilemma because mechanisms in place will not allow situations of a minor anarchic situation to materialize into a major ethnic security dilemma.


Figure 1 is a linear regression model consistent with our research approach. But as discussed earlier, the relationship might be better represented in the graph 2 and 3 discrete models where less severe ethnic security dilemma does not cause ethnic violence but when the severity of our independent variable passes certain point, it becomes strongly correlated with ethnic violence.

³⁴ Minority at Risk 2009, 14.

Figure 1: Linear model

The differences in preconditions of the security dilemma and the occurrence of ethnic violence between two different times is demonstrated. In Graph 2, data is evenly spread along combinations of mild ethnic security dilemma- ethnic violence and severe ethnic security dilemma-severe ethnic violence where our lines lie. Therefore, Melander's model is valid in explaining a large part of the variance. However, in more recent years, conflicts clustered mainly around the lower ends of both spectrums of ethnic violence and security dilemma where the model has little explanatory power.

Figure 2: 1994 Discrete Model (Melander original) **Figure 3:** 2005 Discrete Model (Model 5)



Note: the graphs do not use any actual cases to plot the data points. They are hypothetical situations used for theoretical illustration purpose only.

This qualitative analysis provides possible explanations for my observations of the quantitative data as well as strengthens the conclusion of this study. Therefore, future research should cautiously analyze the case at hand in order to make a sound decision about the methodology that will be used in a study. As I point out, changes in a variety of factors may have rendered the ethnic security dilemma theory, to some extent, obsolete. Thus, a mass quantitative application is unlikely to provide meaningful insight in the future.

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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: FACTORS AND FACTIONS

Timothy Luby

Abstract: *In recent years the environment has become an increasingly salient issue, with many citizens calling for higher environmental protection and precautions within the United States. However, it seems that congressmen have become unresponsive to these demands as partisanship progressively becomes the determining factor in environmental voting. This study attempts to discover what factors, along with party, determine a representative's voting decisions on environmental legislation. By collecting data on United States House members in 2006, 2007, and 2010 and running linear regressions, the most significant factors in predicting House members' voting patterns are identified; however, party and ideology seem to have increasingly become the most crucial factors in determining environmental voting decisions.*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years we have witnessed an unprecedented increase in partisanship, especially at the national level.¹ More and more often, legislators vote with their parties, with liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats quickly becoming extinct.² As this trend of party voting continues, it is important to understand what other key factors, along with party, are influencing a legislator's voting decisions. Additionally, within the past decade the environment has become an increasingly salient issue, with many citizens calling for higher environmental protection and precautions within the United States.³ In a recent study done by Davis and Wurth, it was found that the environment is an issue that has a significant impact on citizens' evaluations of candidates and is also a factor that cuts across constituency party inclinations.⁴ That being said, the voting patterns of legislators on environmental issues in a partisan congress, with a constituency that is not divided in clear party terms, needs further investigation. What factors have the greatest effect on representatives' environmental voting decisions? Measuring the factors that influence House members' voting decisions on a matter where constituencies do not always fall into the clear party divide is important because a cleaner and more sustainable environment is something all constituents want for their districts.

¹ Grose et al. 2003.

² Bond and Fleisher 1996.

³ Dalton 2005.

⁴ Davis and Wurth 2003.

Therefore, finding out what factors can increase the legislation passed for such an outcome is an essential issue.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing research shows that at the national level, partisanship within the United States Congress has dramatically increased within the past decade and party is one of the most important factors in congressional voting. In a study by Richard Fleisher, it was found that by the start of President Reagan's second term in 1985, the House had become overwhelmingly partisan. By defining presidents as either minority (when the president does not have a majority of party members in Congress) or majority presidents (when the president has a majority in Congress), evidence showed that increased partisanship affected presidential-congressional relations. As Congress became more partisan, presidential support from factions within the president's party increased, while support from factions of the opposition decreased.⁵ In other words, as partisanship increased, liberal Republicans were less likely to vote in accordance with a Democratic president, and conservative Democrats were less likely to vote with a Republican president. Moreover, it has been found that parties have become so strong in Congress that the majority party can control the agenda in the legislature, screening out bills that divide their party and devoting more floor time to bills in its favor.⁶

Party has also become a chief predictor in national elections when constituency preferences are controlled for.⁷ However, this phenomenon is contrary to the theoretical design of representation, in that congressmen are supposed to take the position at the median of their respective constituency. Yet, with most Americans failing to act on their preferences at the polls, it is no surprise that they are not represented by their legislator, but rather the party's preferences.⁸ Trying to establish where the demand for environmental legislation works into the House now can prove to be difficult. While the environment is important to many Americans, establishing how legislators address the environment is the question we are posed with.⁹ Nonetheless, it has been shown that as a demand for environmental amenities increases, (as measured by environmental group membership within a district) pro-environmental voting behavior also increases in the legislature; however, more often than not, environmental

⁵ Bond and Fleisher 1996.

⁶ Cox et al. 2010.

⁷ Grose et al. 2003.

⁸ Akhmetkarimov and Bulat 2008.

⁹ Davis and Wurth 2003.

legislation is only passed when the costs are not borne by individuals within the legislator's political jurisdiction.¹⁰ Findings such as this are reassuring, in that maybe representatives do indeed take note of their constituents' demands, even if they only respond when it is monetarily convenient.

Discovering the types of people who are willing to pay more for environmental programs within their communities is very important. In a 1999 study examining the household value of a curbside recycling program, it was found that many different factors will increase or decrease a person's likelihood to pay more for pro-environmental programs. Through contingent valuation techniques and the use of phone surveys, the research found the variables that have the greatest effect on an individual's willingness to pay for the environment. Women, people with higher incomes, young people, and people with a higher education all value the environment more than their counterparts.¹¹ This research shows that individuals value the environment differently, and by the same logic, different districts that vary in social demographics should also value the environment differently.

This paper explores how factors, such as the ones above, affect representatives' voting decisions on environmental issues. While there is a wealth of literature demonstrating that party is the key predictor of a legislator's voting behavior, little research has been done on what variables other than party can predict single issue voting on the environment, and this research will attempt to fill that gap.

DESIGN

This research examines the environmental voting behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives and the extent to which it varies with characteristics of the representatives themselves and their districts. The years 2006, 2007, and 2010 will be used to compare the changes in predictive variables over time. These three years were selected for this study because they include presidents of different parties in both the minority and majority. That is to say, George Bush in 2006 as a Republican majority president, Bush in 2007 as a minority president, and Barack Obama in 2010, as a Democratic majority president. For each of the three years, a separate equation will be run with the same independent variables to control for the changes in

¹⁰ Anderson 2011; Hussain and Laband 2004.

¹¹ Aadland and Caplan 1999.

presidency and time. The data were collected from the *Almanac of American Politics* by Michael Barone and the League of Conservation Voters' website. All 435 districts and representatives were used within the study, with a few cases missing when a representative was newly elected and did not have group ratings, or in the rare case when the seat was vacant. The sum of the number of cases for the three years included in the study is 1,210.

The dependent variable in this research will be the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) score a representative receives. This LCV score encompasses what the League of Conservation Voters deems the most important environmental bills that made it into Congress, and the resulting score a legislator receives is a direct correlation to how he or she voted on the bills. The more often a representative voted in favor of the environment, the higher the LCV score the representative received. The best possible score is 100, and the worst is zero.

Eleven independent variables are included in this study. These include the House member's party and gender, the average age and income of the district, the percentage of people with a college education in the district, percent vote for John Kerry in 2004 in the district, the percentage of people that live in rural areas within the district, and the percent of people that hold blue collar jobs within the district. Lastly, dummy variables for the region of the district include: South and non-south, and the political culture of a state using Daniel Elazar's political culture categorization. States can be categorized as moralistic, individualistic, or traditionalistic using Elazar's model. Moralistic states see politics as a means to help the well-being of everyone within a society, individualistic states see politics as a business, and traditionalistic states rely on the customs of the upper-class elites to keep the control they have always had in politics.¹²

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1: The party of the House members will have the greatest effect on the LCV score, regardless of the year, with Republicans being more likely to have lower LVC scores than Democrats.

As much of the existing literature shows, party is one of, if not the most important, predictors of a legislator's vote. This is especially true within the recent years this study examines, as Congress has become increasingly more partisan with time.

¹² Elazar 1999.

Hypothesis 2: Female representatives will be more likely to have higher LCV scores than males.

This expectation is in accordance with the existing literature that women are often more sympathetic to environmental issues than males.¹³

Hypothesis 3: House members within districts that have higher incomes will be more likely to have higher LCV scores than members in lower income districts.

Studies have shown that as an individual's income rises, demand for a better environment rises with it.¹⁴ This is because when individuals need not worry about their immediate needs such as food and rent, they are more willing to spend money on the environment.¹⁵

Hypothesis 4: House members with lower median ages within their districts will be more likely to have higher LCV scores than members in districts with higher median ages.

This expectation is consistent with the literature that states that young people (people between the ages of 18 and 34) will on average have a higher demand for environmental protection than older generations.¹⁶

Hypothesis 5: As the percentage of people holding college degrees in a district increases, the LCV score of its House member will also increase.

Past research has shown that as education increases, an individual's demand for environmental protection increases.¹⁷

Hypothesis 6: As the percentage of "blue collar" workers in a district increases, the LCV score of its House member will decrease.

As stated earlier, when the environment is viewed in terms of economic trade-offs and not in the sense of "buying the environment" the importance of the environment is muted. The rationale behind this expectation is that blue collar workers will more often think of environmental programs in terms of an economic trade-off and will not demand environmental policies within their districts.

¹³ Aadland and Caplan 1999.

¹⁴ McConnell 1997; Morse 2008.

¹⁵ Aadland and Caplan 1999.

¹⁶ Arnold et al. 2009.

¹⁷ Quimby and Angelique 2011.

Hypothesis 7: As the percent vote for Kerry in the district increases, the LCV score of the House member will also increase.

Districts with a higher percent vote for Kerry will be more ideologically left than districts with a lower percent vote for Kerry. This in turn would mean that districts with a greater Kerry vote are also more likely to have a representative who is a Democrat and votes in favor of environmental legislation; this justification is consistent with hypothesis one.

Hypothesis 8: House members in states with moralistic political cultures will be more likely to have higher LCV scores than members who are in traditionalistic and individualistic states.

As mentioned earlier, the moralistic political culture views politics as a way to benefit everyone in a society. One of the ways a society can receive altruistic benefits is through increasing the environmental welfare of a district. That being said, according to Elazar, the House of Representatives members within the moralistic states should be more likely vote in favor of the environment.

Hypothesis 9: Party will have a more substantial effect on LCV vote when a majority president is in power compared to when a minority president is in power.

When the president has a majority within the house, he has the ability to get more of his bills passed. With this advantageous ability, I expect that the minority party will coalesce together and maintain party unity to try and stop the majority from passing bills. In response, the majority party will also band together to ensure the passing of bills.

DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1: Liner Regression for 2006, 2007, and 2010

Dependent Variable: LCV score

Independent Variable	2006	2007	2010
Constant	-40.572** (.042)	23.342*** (.070)	70.462* .000
Representative Party	-54.442* (.000) -.667	-58.077* (.000) -.743	-69.411* (.000) -.843
Representative Gender	4.710* (.087) .042	.425 (.852) .425	-.842 (.496) -.012
Age of District	.987** (.010) -.74	.023 (.610) .011	.036 (.373) .015
Percent College Grad	.305 (.175) .074	.196 (.297) .050	-.018 (.914) -.004
South	-7.487 (.147) -.086	-8.089*** (.064) -.098	3.824 .044 .284
Income	.000** (.001) .148	.000** (.002) .123	.000 (.698) .013
Percent Vote Kerry	.713* (.000) .255	.595* (.000) .226	.333* (.000) .117
Percent Rural	-.075 (.328) -.037	.047 (.412) .025	-0.62 (.209) -.031
Percent Blue Collar	.737** (.028) .106	.213 (.429) .033	-.315 (.184) -.045
Moralistic Political Culture	3.488 (.158) .039	1.908 (.348) .023	.862 (.681) .010
Individualistic Political Culture	.585 (.912) -.007	-1.713 (.698) -.021	.5235 (.150) .062

Note: Significance in parenthesis and beta weights italicized; ***p≤.1, **p≤.05, *p≤.001

In 2006, the adjusted R square is .787 and the standard error of the estimate is 18.850 percent. First and foremost, representative party is unquestionably having the greatest effect of all the variables in the equation. Party is the strongest predicting variable (beta weight of -.667) and was statistically significant at the .001 level. The B value indicates the per unit change in party (moving from a value of 0 for Democrats to a value of 1 for Republicans) has a -54.442 effect on LCV scores. Representative gender is also a significant predictor of LCV scores. Women are more likely to have higher LCV scores by almost 5 points, holding all other variables constant. Average age of the constituents in a district also has a positive effect on LCV scores. This relationship shows that as a district grows older, the amount of environmental legislation passed by its House member increases. Average income also has a positive effect on LCV scores. The incomes of the districts were at such wide ranges that the unstandardized coefficient did not capture the effect of per unit change in income on LCV scores. However, looking at the beta weight (.148), there is a positive relationship between the average income of a district and the corresponding House member's LCV score. The percentage vote for Kerry has the strongest effect on LCV scores after party, and is also the only other variable in the model significant at past the .001 level. Representatives of districts with a higher percent Kerry vote are also more likely to have higher LCV scores. Lastly, the percentage of workers holding a blue collar job in a district has a positive statistically significant relationship with LCV score. The region, percent of the rural population, and political culture variables are not statistically significant in this model.

In 2007, the adjusted R square is .841 and the standard error of the estimate is 15.404 percent. In the model for this year, fewer of the independent variables are statistically significant. However, the model still explains about 84% of the variance in the equation. Of the eleven variables, only 4 are statistically significant: party ($p < .000$), income ($p < .002$), percent vote for Kerry ($p < .000$), and South ($p < .064$). Once again, party is the strongest variable with a beta of -.743 and a B value of -58.077. Note that in this model, party is having an even greater effect on LCV scores than in the previous model. Average income of a district, again, has a positive effect on LCV scores. Percent Kerry vote for the second time had a positive relationship with the LCV scores, having a B value of .595, and the second greatest a beta weight of .226. The final variable, South, has a B value of -8.089, showing a negative relationship; House Representatives that are in the south (1) are more likely to have lower LCV scores than Representatives in the north (0).

In 2006, the gender, age, and blue collar variables are all statistically significant, but are no longer in 2007. That being said, of the three variables in 2007 that are also statistically significant in 2006, only the party variable increased its relative impact while the others diminished.

In 2010, the adjusted R square is .878 and the standard error of the estimate is 14.185 percent. However, even though the model is explaining almost 90% of the variance, only two variables are statistically significant in 2010: party and percent vote for Kerry, both at the .001 level. Party became an even stronger predictor than in 2007, with a B value of -69.411. Furthermore, the percent vote for Kerry, again, has the second highest a beta weight of .117 and a B value of .333. In this 2010 model, income is statistically insignificant, whereas in the previous two models it is a strong predictor. Looking at the significance of the variables in this 2010 model, all of the variables that were significant in the previous years, aside from party and Kerry vote, now are insignificant. For example, age in the 2006 model was significant at the .01 level, yet in 2010 the p-value grew to .373. While all the variables but party and Kerry vote were statistically insignificant in 2010, the degree to which this insignificance increased is to be noted.

DISCUSSION

There is a clear trend as the study progresses through the three years, showing that party becomes gradually more important, with an increase in B values of 14.969 between 2006 and 2010. Moreover, the effects of once statistically significant variables are muted by the increasing effect of party in the equation. Even the B value of percent vote for Kerry progressively decreases as the years advance. This suggests that ideologically diverse constituencies, for example those where Kerry or Bush had marginal victories, are being underrepresented because their House members are voting solely along party lines more and more often. As factors that once played a role in the decision process of House members' environmental voting scores are phased out for party preferences, the diverse demands of constituencies throughout the country are being ignored. By 2010 we are left with only party and the percent vote for Kerry as the sole statistically significant variables in predicting a House member's LCV score.

CONCLUSION

The results from this investigative analysis of LCV voting scores within the House of Representatives show the increasing amount of partisanship within Congress in recent years. This finding is consistent with hypothesis one and the previous literature; however, the fact that the relative impact of party is consistently increasing disproves hypothesis nine, in that party did not have the greatest effect when majority presidents were in office (2006 and 2010). Hypotheses two, three, and four were confirmed in the year 2006, and in 2007 for hypothesis three, but failed to make a significant impact in 2010. This was likely due to the immense increase in partisanship that was found in 2010. Inconsistent with conventional wisdom, the education level of the constituency- did not have a significant impact on LCV scores. In all three years, the percentage of people holding a college degree in a district did not influence House members' decisions, thus disproving hypothesis five. Hypothesis six was not verified, because increases in blue collar workers had a positive effect on LCV scores in 2006, working in the opposite direction than predicted; however, it was not statistically significant in 2007 or 2010. Hypothesis seven, the percent vote for Kerry will have a positive relationship with LCV scores, was confirmed in all three regression analyses; however, as stated earlier, its effect on LCV scores diminished gradually as the years progressed. Lastly, Hypothesis eight was unconfirmed in this study, showing that political culture did not have an effect on LCV scores.

From this study, the conventional wisdom that party is the greatest predictor of a legislator's vote can be further reinforced. The regression models show that between the years of 2006-2010, the House of Representatives has become increasingly partisan. These findings suggest that House members will typically not take into account the diversity of their constituents, and instead will vote solely with their respective party. If the trend found in this research continues, valuable differences in districts will not be represented.

To further investigate the partisanship trend in Congress, more years could be included in future studies. Additionally, looking at other group ratings aside from LCV scores (for example National Tax Payer Union, American Conservative Union , etc.) and the relationship they have with the same independent variables would investigate if the increased partisanship is also being displayed in other policy areas other than the environment.

The House of Representatives plays a vital role in representing diverse groups of people within the states. Nevertheless, the recent trends of extreme partisanship show a decline in the representation of diverse districts, reflecting almost a dichotomous system where once a House member is elected, solely the values of his or her party will be represented in Washington.

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THE PERSONALITY OF POLICY PREFERENCES: ANALYZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MYERS-BRIGGS PERSONALITY TYPES AND POLITICAL VIEWS

Tracy Lytwyn

Abstract: *For political scientists and politicians alike, much research has been devoted to understanding the American citizen. Comprehension is the key to capturing votes, pushing forward new ideas, and retaining support in the years to come. This project centers on the theory that people structure their political opinions around problem-solving tendencies that they apply to everyday situations and are particular to their personalities. To evaluate this idea, this study uses the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (1962) in addition to several questions regarding personal policy preferences to determine whether there is a significant correlation between certain elements of one's personality type and political ideas. Controlling for Intolerance of Ambiguity (Budner 1962), sociodemographic variables, and religiosity, it was found that an individual exhibits clear political preferences based on certain parts of personal characteristics. The results of this study imply a further fusion of psychology and politics for policymakers and voters.*

INTRODUCTION

In the discussion of what influences political beliefs, many factors are believed to cause variances. Oftentimes, this conversation points to personal aspects such as socioeconomic status, education level, and religious beliefs. But what often is neglected in this debate is the role of personality in determining how one observes certain ideas as desirable or displeasing. If personality is believed to be a significant cause of differences in how a person acts, what hobbies or interests he or she has, or how an individual responds to a situation, would it be reasonable to believe that personality also plays a role in forming political beliefs? Could it be said that people with specific types of personalities display inclinations toward certain political ideas? This study seeks to capture whether an individual's character traits and personality serve integral roles in the political realm.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Previous research has already laid groundwork on the discussion of personality and political opinions. Not only has it been emphasized that personality is a worthwhile part of the political discussion,¹ but there have been recorded differences between liberals and

¹ Greenstein 1992.

conservatives in various parts of their lives² and in personality assessments, such as the “Big Five” personality study³. On the other side of the debate, scholars have pointed to sociodemographic variables⁴, family influence⁵, and religious values⁶ as reasons for variation in political ideas.

Fred Cutler (2003) examined how a candidate’s sociodemographic characteristics (gender, language, region of residency) are transferred into voters’ political decision-making. This centered on the idea that voters employ certain heuristics revolving around their individual traits to the political arena. Cutler argued that those who feel a certain “social distance” from a particular candidate or party will be less likely to vote for that candidate, meaning that candidates who share a similar sociodemographic background with the voter are more likely to win his or her support. To test this, he used survey data from the 1993 and 1997 Canadian general elections, controlling for voters’ opinions on particular issues that lined up with each of the four major parties. Cutler found that shared gender, region, and language were decisive factors in these two elections, while shared religion was not as important to voters in choosing a candidate. However, the voters’ need to choose candidates who are similar to them was clearly important across the board, illustrating that one’s sociodemographic status served a fundamental role in making political decisions.⁷

Beck and Jennings (1991) studied how family influences contribute to one’s political affiliation. To analyze this, they drew from a panel study of young Americans between 1965 and 1982 involving interviews with high school seniors and their parents to see whether or not parents’ political influence stays with a child as he or she matures. Up until this study, the family had been identified as a social identity and location in a social structure for a child, which, in turn, affected political affiliation. Beck and Jennings departed from traditional views by recognizing that parents’ political influence is a broad concept, rather than a one-on-one interaction. Additionally, they recognized that instead of directly passing down political beliefs, family traditions typically generate predispositions toward ideas, which affect views. The study chose to assess family political structure by analyzing parents’ political involvement and their

² Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008.

³ Hirsh et al. 2010.

⁴ Cutler 2003.

⁵ Beck and Jennings 1991.

⁶ Layman 1997.

⁷ Cutler 2003.

party affiliation. This research found that for the post-1965 generation, parents' political involvement (i.e. protests, marches, rallies, etc.) did not transmit directly to their children. Overall, it was noted that as the subjects in this study matured, the authority of their parents' party alignment became less important, although it still created predispositions for their own personal beliefs.⁸

This study will seek to fuse these two ideas together to see if the sociodemographic environment an individual is brought up in will affect his or her political predispositions. If Cutler recognized that voters connect their gender, region, and language with a candidate's, it may be the case that other personal characteristics will serve as a heuristic for political decisions.⁹ Additionally, if parents' political influence creates predispositions to their child's beliefs, a family's sociodemographic background may generate its own predispositions.¹⁰ To test this theory, this study includes family income level and parents' education level as independent variables.

Geoffrey Layman (1997) studied how one's commitment to a religion influences party affiliation, presidential vote choice, and other political decisions. He discovered that the relationship between party identification and religiosity was statistically significant. Those who considered themselves to be highly committed to a religion were more likely than less religious respondents to vote Republican. While most of Layman's study focused on the political tensions within a religion, in regards to doctrinal orthodoxy and political choices, he noted that there was an equally considerable tension between religious and nonreligious populations' voting decisions at the time. Even in controlling for attitudes toward specific policy opinions and sociodemographic characteristics, this significance remained.¹¹ Therefore, it is clear that one's self-identified commitment to a religion influences political beliefs. This study will control for religion in order to assess whether or not it is driving policy preferences more strongly than personality. Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008) examined the relationship between political ideology, personal lifestyles, and implicit preferences. To determine any connection between implicit preferences and political beliefs, they constructed a study to observe participants'

⁸ Beck and Jennings 1991.

⁹ Cutler 2003.

¹⁰ Beck and Jennings, 1991.

¹¹ Layman 1997.

partiality for the values of “tradition versus progress, conformity versus rebelliousness, order versus chaos, stability versus flexibility, and traditional values versus feminism” in comparison to their self-reported conservatism or liberalism.¹² The study found that “respondents’ cognitive systems are more ideologically structured than previous generations of sociologists and political scientists have assumed.”¹³ In all five values, preferences clearly predicted political orientation. Those who identified as conservative exhibited strong preferences for order over chaos and conforming over rebellion, while those who said they were liberal displayed inclination toward flexibility over stability and progress over tradition. In other words, this exemplified that while liberals possess the system-justification motive, conservatives are much more likely to enthusiastically support system-justifying attitudes. The study continued by analyzing college students’ lifestyles in correlation to their political orientation. Items that the authors connected with openness (atheism, tattoos, studying abroad, etc.) were pitted against those that reflect traditionalism and resistance to change (Christianity, marriage, fraternities/sororities, etc.). The results signified that political ideology strongly constrained attitudes toward other variables. Liberalism was tied to an appreciation of “novel and different experiences” while conservative preferences were more “conventional” and “mainstream.”¹⁴ In addition to expanding upon political psychology’s understanding of personality, the study provided a clear example of how personality can be systematically and structurally examined to yield significant, useful results.

Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, and Peterson (2010) took a different approach to the idea of personality and political affiliation. Through their studies, they discovered a strong correlation between one’s ideological leaning and moral values. In the first example, a measure of the Big Five personality traits (openness-intellect, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) was utilized to record any particular connections between the two divisions of agreeableness (compassion and politeness) and political values.¹⁵ The results illustrated that those who tended toward liberalism displayed a strong inclination toward compassion while those who appeared to be conservative exhibited strong politeness. The researchers explained this by connecting compassion to a liberal’s desire for egalitarianism and politeness to a

¹² Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008, 126.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Hirsh et al. 2010.

conservative's want to maintain the status quo.¹⁶ By discovering another way to prove this theory, they further acknowledged the usefulness of personality studies in political science and political psychology.

With these studies in mind, it becomes clear that personality is a segment of political psychology that has yet to be fully explored and understood. Indeed, even the basic framework of this field incites a need to look at this subject in order to fully comprehend what goes into a person's ideological preferences, particular actions, and overall perceptions of politics as a whole. This study steps away from previous research by focusing on the relationship between an individual's personality, as determined by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and his or her political opinions. It asks the question of if the problem-solving tactics people use in daily situations, which the MBTI assessment draws from, are also applied to the political realm. If this is the case, are certain types of people predisposed to specific policy opinions over other individuals?

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test the relationship between personality and political opinions, I constructed a survey that was administered at Illinois Wesleyan University in Bloomington, Illinois. Respondents were asked to participate in this voluntary, completely anonymous study. The test was divided into four parts, which are detailed below:

Independent Variable: The Myers-Briggs Typology Indicator

Published in 1962, the MBTI sought to test the idea that personality can be easily classified into defined, predictable measures. This was done by evaluating how a person views the world and comes to decisions about it.¹⁷ To categorize these characteristics, the MBTI sorts personality into four variables. These variables are mutually exclusive so that subjects will only score on one side of the spectrum or the other. In all, there are sixteen possible personality types assigned to individuals, expressed in sets of letters (e.g. ENFJ, ISTP, etc.) The letters are explained as follows:

Extraversion (E) vs. Introversion (I): Those who show a preference for Extraversion tend to feel comfortable around large groups of people, becoming engaged in social situations and moving

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Myers & Briggs Foundation 2003.

to decisions quickly. On the other hand, individuals with an inclination toward Introversion enjoy spending time alone and usually think about what they will say or do before they actually do it. This is easily summarized as one's approach to the world.¹⁸

Sensing (S) vs. Intuition (N): This dichotomy analyzes the way information is absorbed. Sensing reflects a type of personality in which an individual notices details that are physically present and relevant to the "bottom line." People who display features of Intuition tend to enjoy thinking about theories and broad concepts, remembering big events instead of details, and focusing on the "big idea."¹⁹

Feeling (F) vs. Thinking (T): This is the primary decision-making aspect, evaluating what types of principles an individual relies on when making choices. "Feelers" usually weigh what other people think and how a decision may affect other people. They aim for the choice that will keep or establish harmony and want the best for everyone involved. "Thinkers," however, look at situations along more rational, logic-based lines. They prefer to be objective and believe that what is good for the whole is the most ideal outcome.²⁰

Judging (J) vs. Perceiving (P): The fourth section assesses how one structures his or her outer world and how vital of a factor time is in decision-making. For those who express a Judging personality, time is a strict, inflexible concept, making them highly resistant to change and desiring careful planning over spontaneous choices. "Perceivers" are much more open to change and flexibility, and in most cases, they prefer it over scheduled activities, waiting to make a decision until the last minute so all new information can come to them first.²¹

The Test: The MBTI is a forced-choice instrument, meaning that individuals must answer every question on the assessment and choose between the options of "yes" or "no." In this variation of the test, 72 personality traits are presented in the form of statements, featuring ones such as "You are almost never late for appointments" and "You tend to sympathize with other people."²² After the results have been scored, participants receive their personality type. Each variable is given a "strength of preference," signified by a numerical value on a scale of 1 to 100

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Humanmetrics 2011.

and a nominal value of either a slight, moderate, distinct, or very expressed preference. (See Appendix I)

Dependent Variable: Policy Preferences

To determine political preferences, respondents were given a series of perspectives they may have about certain political issues. The assessment, developed by Illinois Wesleyan University's Dr. Greg Shaw, included ten viewpoints, six liberal and four conservative. In the assessment, participants were asked to rank their agreement with each on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 being "strongly agree" and 7 being "strongly disagree." A "neither agree nor disagree" option was available for every position. Although unpublished, the analysis yielded a Cronbach's Alpha score of .886, meaning it is a reliable test of political views.²³ (Appendix I)

Control Variable: Intolerance of Ambiguity

In 1962, Stanley Budner theorized that individuals typically look at ambiguous situations in one of two ways: either as a threat or as desirable. These included situations where cues are absent or vague, where there are too many cues, or where cues are not consistent with each other.²⁴ In these instances, those with a high tolerance of ambiguity will exhibit risk-taking behaviors, facing these occasions with resiliency and approaching them in an adaptive manner. Conversely, those with a low tolerance for ambiguity will show discomfort and anxiety in these situations, assessing them along stereotypes and in "black and white" manners.²⁵ Because intolerance of ambiguity is a different personality variable about decision-making and has been tied to influencing political beliefs, it has been included in this survey as a control variable.²⁶

The Test: To assess this phenomena, Budner developed a 16-point test, structured with a series of statements that one may encounter in their daily lives, such as "An expert who cannot come up with a definitive answer probably doesn't know much," "What we know is always preferable to what we are not sure of," etc. Participants were asked to rank their agreement with each one on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 being "strongly agree" and 7 being "strongly disagree." A "neither agree nor disagree" option was available. (Appendix I)

²³ Shaw, unpublished.

²⁴ Owen and Sweeney 2002.

²⁵ Kajs and McCollum 2010.

²⁶ Jost et al. 2003.

Control Variable: Demographic Questions

To ensure that respondents were representing the demographics of the university properly, as well as to test for several other hypotheses, the survey asked participants to respond to several additional questions about themselves.

Gender: To guarantee that the correct proportion of men and women were surveyed in this study, respondents were asked to identify their gender.

Sociodemographics: Some scholars have suggested that one's sociodemographic background is a reference point for political beliefs.²⁷ For the purposes of testing this claim, respondents were asked to record their family's income level and their parents' education level.

Religiosity: In addition, religiosity is generally believed to have a significant impact on one's political beliefs.²⁸ Therefore, participants were asked to answer the question "Do you consider yourself to be a religious person?" with "yes," "no," or "not sure."

HYPOTHESES

H1: "Thinkers" will have more conservative policy preferences while "Feelers" will have more liberal ones.

Because of Thinkers' tendency to process issues through a series of practical, cause-and-effect patterns, they typically make decisions that, in their opinion, "make sense" for every individual involved. They do not feel a need to address one's particular, personal concerns. This leads to the idea that they may be less interested in humanitarian, service-oriented causes that focus on caring for an individual than would a Feeler. Feelers are profoundly impacted by others' situations and keep them in mind when making choices that could potentially affect another person. Oftentimes, the sentiments of "the whole versus the individual" are connected with liberalism and conservatism, respectively. However, conservatives emphasize individual rights, and their policies reflect the notion that every person is responsible for himself or herself, illustrating a Thinker's objective, rational mindset. On the other hand, liberals are typically focused on policies that benefit everyone, and this stems from the desire to help each individual's personal situation. That concept is connected to Feelers' thought processes.

²⁷ Cutler 2003.

²⁸ Layman 1997.

H2: Sensing/Intuition will interact with Thinking/Feeling and influence policy preferences. Sensing-Thinkers and Sensing-Feelers will have more conservative policy preferences, while Intuitive-Thinkers and Intuitive-Feelers will have more liberal beliefs.

Since the Sensing/Intuition component of the MBTI affects how individuals take in information from the world around them, it is likely that this will play a pivotal role in policy opinions. In each MBTI type, the Feeling/Thinking and Sensing/Intuition factors together serve as “functions,” meaning that they are responsible for directly processing information and coming to conclusions about it.²⁹ As they interact, they tend to elicit certain responses over others when merged in one of four ways. While Sensing-Thinkers approach their world in an objective, black-and-white style, Intuitive-Thinkers, although still objective and logical, are more open to possibilities and undiscovered applications. Sensing-Feelers operate in a warm, people-oriented manner that cultivates deep sympathy and care for those around them. While Intuitive-Feelers interact similarly, they are more communicative, open, and adaptive than their counterpart.³⁰ Because of that, it appears as though Sensing-Thinkers represent one end of the spectrum with Intuitive-Feelers on the other. I predict that Sensing-Thinkers will be more strongly conservative than Intuitive-Thinkers, while Intuitive-Feelers will be more strongly liberal than Sensing-Feelers. The inflexible, unyielding nature of Sensing-Thinkers reflects the resistance to change that is often typical of conservatives while the flexible, open nature of Intuitive-Feelers connects to liberals’ adaptability to change.

H3: Judgers will be more conservative while Perceivers will be more liberal.

Perceivers tend to be more open to general change than Judgers.³¹ Because of that, it is likely that Perceivers will apply that flexibility to their political views, being more receptive to ideas that encourage an embracing of change and modifications. On the other hand, Judgers will be resistant to these types of policies, turning instead to ones that verify their preconceived notions about how the world around them ought to be. Therefore, I predict that the Judging/Perceiving function will be the most influential in political opinions. Again, this relates to the general resistance to change that many believe to be connected with conservative ideals as opposed to liberal ones.

²⁹ McCauley 1990.

³⁰ Myers & Briggs Foundation 2003.

³¹ McCauley 1990.

H4: Extraversion and Introversion will have no effect on policy opinions.

As a structure for people's attitudes about the world around them, the Extraversion/Introversion factor sets the stage for most of the initial decisions a person makes. This sets these two types apart from each other in their initial views of the settings around them. But because it impacts an initial reaction with not much critical thinking, rather than the decision-making that follows, I predict that this spectrum will have little to do with political opinions.

H5: Personality type will influence policy preferences more strongly than any control variable (intolerance of ambiguity, sociodemographic variables, religiosity).

It may be likely that the way one makes political decisions revolves around assessing ambiguity, rather than the judgment and choice patterns that are a part of personality. However, I predict that intolerance of ambiguity will not be as significant of an influence as personality. In fact, it might be the case that personality affects tolerance of ambiguity, which then affects policy opinions. If that is true, this provides another way of examining the relationship between political beliefs and personal characteristics. Additionally, it has been suggested that sociodemographic factors play a role in political decision-making.³² The education level of participants' parents and their household income may predetermine what they believe about different political policies. In the continuous overlap between religion and politics, it is typically thought that religion serves as a guiding influence in forming opinions and choices regarding candidates, platforms, and specific issues.³³ Participants' religiosity may be more influential than the personality factors being tested. However, I predict that personality will still prove to be the most significant factor in making political choices.

LIMITATIONS

The aforementioned survey and its related hypotheses face several limitations that are imperative to keep in mind while reviewing data results. Because this study is exploratory research, it does not have the same depth that a more refined study would. Most of these findings and conclusions only scratch at the surface of a connection between the MBTI and

³² Cutler 2003.

³³ Sigel 1965.

political beliefs. Therefore, while this research does not tell the entire story, it illustrates a significant relationship and opens up the possibility of a more concrete correlation.

Noticeably, this study revolves around common stereotypes about certain types of people, especially when it comes to their political beliefs. For example, not all liberals fit the “bleeding heart liberal” label, and not all conservatives are resistant to changes in the world around them. The research here seeks to challenge that idea, analyzing whether or not the personalities one would expect to correspond with different political views actually do connect.

Additionally, it has been found that individuals do not always act on the characteristics the MBTI suggests they possess. While people may believe their answer to a question is how they would truly respond, others close to them may understand that individual’s actual behavior differently. It also is the case that certain traits do not function in the ways one would assume. For example, those who show a preference for Thinking are not always proficient in logical activities, such as mathematics.³⁴ This may partially be due to the fact that, as stated earlier in this study, the MBTI is a forced choice instrument, meaning that individuals are asked to summarize their behavior into one answer. In limiting responses, it is unclear how strong this person’s preference for the opposite function is. For example, one may behave as a Judger in some instances and a Perceiver in others.³⁵

This study is also limited in its pool of participants. Because the survey was only conducted at one university, the variety of respondents’ demographic characteristics was restricted to who attends the institution. It might be argued that surveying students from the same education environment could skew variables being tested. This limits the generalizability of these results. The small sample size and narrow assortment of characteristics in this study do not capture individuals outside of the university who may possess other traits. Therefore, it is difficult to say any of these findings apply across the board.

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Respondents’ Demographics

In this study, 88 students were surveyed. The mean Liberal-Conservative Index score was approximately 3.5. Again, being that 1.0 signified a “perfect liberal” and 7.0 a “perfect

³⁴ Coe 1992.

³⁵ Ibid.

conservative,” the respondents in this study leaned slightly liberal. In comparison with self-identified political ideology, 29.5% of participants said they were conservative, 44.3% labeled themselves as liberal, 21.6% identified themselves as moderate, and 4.5% chose the “Other” option, which included written-in responses such as “libertarian,” “apathetic,” and “communist.” 44.3% of respondents were male, and 55.7% were female. When compared to reported values for this university, the distribution was similar. At Illinois Wesleyan University, 42% of the student body is male, and 58% is female.³⁶ In this regard, these participants are representative of the institution as a whole.

H1: “Thinkers” will have more conservative policy preferences while “Feelers” will have more liberal ones.

Prior to generating results, I hypothesized that Thinking and Feeling would correlate with distinctly different political preferences. An interest in particular, personal concerns versus an objective desire for equal treatment was the decisive factor that influenced this hypothesis. However, after testing this via a bivariate correlation, there is no statistically significant relationship. Hypothesis 1 was not confirmed.

A possible explanation for this is that since the MBTI is not assessing personal values, Feeling and Thinking condenses to simple decision-making without regard for the motivations behind that process. Indeed, a conservative could have the same rationales as a liberal, but express them differently when it comes to political opinions. A Feeling conservative could be deeply interested in humanitarian and charitable causes but not be concerned with the same ones a Feeling liberal might. Moreover, a Thinking liberal could believe his or her ideas are good for the whole, but a Thinking conservative may have a different concept of what “good” means. Because there is no significant relationship, it is clear that this part of decision-making is not affecting policy preferences.

H2: Sensing/Intuition will interact with Thinking/Feeling and influence policy preferences. Sensing-Thinkers and Sensing-Feelers will have more conservative policy preferences, while Intuitive-Thinkers and Intuitive-Feelers will have more liberal beliefs.

³⁶ Illinois Wesleyan University 2011.

To test this theory, the Sensing/Intuition variable was multiplied by the Thinking/Feeling one to analyze whether the resulting interaction significantly affected the Liberal-Conservative Index. It was expected that Sensing-Thinkers would be more strongly conservative than Intuitive-Thinkers, and that Intuitive-Feelers would be more strongly liberal than Sensing-Feelers. However, the bivariate correlation shows there is no significant relationship. For the interaction variable of Sensing and the Feeling/Thinking component, a p-value of 0.118 resulted in its test against the Liberal-Conservative Index, ruling out a possible connection. The Intuitive Feeling/Thinking variable also does not yield a significant relationship, with a p-value of .611 recorded. This leads to the conclusion that when the way one takes in information and the way one processes that information are brought together, there is not a straight-forward way it connects to specific political opinions. Hypothesis 2 was not confirmed.

H3: Judgers will be more conservative while Perceivers will be more liberal.

Judging and Perceiving revolve around the concepts of change and sensitivity to time. While Judging is stricter in these regards, Perceiving is much more open, possibly reflecting similar patterns in liberalism and conservatism. To assess this in relation with policy preferences, a bivariate correlation was computed.

The relationship between the Liberal-Conservative Index and the Judging/Perceiving variable is significant at the 0.05 level ($p = 0.027$), illustrating that there is a connection between one's preference for Judging or Perceiving and his or her political ideologies. The Pearson correlation (0.236) shows that as one's inclination toward Judging increases, partiality for conservatism also increases. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.

H4: Extraversion and Introversion will have little effect on policy opinions.

Because Extraversion and Introversion capture a surface-level assessment of a situation, this hypothesis holds that it will not elicit much of an impact on political beliefs. Since this simply focuses on absorbing and analyzing circumstances at a first glance, this phase of the decision-making process involves little critical thinking and therefore is not likely to be influential in forming policy opinions. However, the bivariate correlation suggests a different theory.

The relationship here is significant at the 0.1 level ($p = .079$), showing that there is a correlation occurring between these two variables. The Pearson correlation of .188 illustrates that as one exhibits a stronger preference for Extraversion, he or she also shows a partiality for conservative beliefs. If any relationship were to exist here, one would think it would be in the opposite direction because Extraversion is characteristic of being open to new occurrences. With that, it is not surprising that the relationship, even if significant, is weak. However, given that I hypothesized that this variable would have no significant influence, Hypothesis 4 was not confirmed.

H5: Personality type will influence policy preferences more strongly than any control variable (intolerance of ambiguity, sociodemographic variables, religiosity).

Table 1: The MBTI Personality Types and all control variables
Dependent Variable: Liberal-Conservative Index

Independent Variable	Liberal-Conservative Index
Constant	9.428 (1.076)
Extraversion-Introversion	.005* (.002) .164
Sensing-Intuition	.002 (.003) .050
Feeling-Thinking	2.513E-5 (.003) .001
Judging-Perceiving	.001 (.003) .031
Intolerance of Ambiguity	-.075*** (.014) -.482
Parents' Education Level	.024 (.082) .025
Family Income	-.024 (.086) -.024
Religiosity	-.744*** (.159) -.383
N	88
Adj. R-square	.457
Model Significance	.000
F-test	10.061

Note: Standard error in parentheses and beta weights italicized; *p≤.1, **p≤.05, ***p≤.001

This model explains 45.7% of the variance in the dependent variable. With all control variables taken into account, the only significant MBTI personality variable is the Extraversion/Introversion factor. As one exhibits an inclination toward Extraversion, he or she is more likely to hold conservative beliefs. As previous research concluded, as one's tolerance of ambiguity increases, he or she is more likely to support liberal ideologies.³⁷ To further examine

³⁷ Jost 2003.

this, I chose to assess whether or not Intolerance of Ambiguity relates directly with specific areas of an individual's personality. Table 2 presents the bivariate correlations between MBTI personality variables and Intolerance of Ambiguity scores.

Table 2: All personality variables and Intolerance of Ambiguity

	Extraversion and Introversion	Sensing and Intuition	Thinking and Feeling	Judging and Perceiving
Pearson Correlation	.005	-.271	.134	-.335
Significance (2-tailed)	.966	.011	.214	.001
N	88	88	88	88

Budner's Intolerance of Ambiguity scale shares a significant relationship with the MBTI dichotomies of Sensing/Intuition and Judging/Perceiving. This raises the possibility that personality is directing Intolerance of Ambiguity which, in turn, affects policy preferences, measured by the Liberal-Conservative Index. For the purposes of assessing this, an interaction variable was coded, multiplying Sensing/Intuition values by individual Intolerance of Ambiguity scores and doing the same with Judging/Perceiving. A bivariate correlation was then computed for each separate interaction variable and compared with the Liberal-Conservative Index.

For the first bivariate correlation, the Sensing/Intuition variable interacting with Intolerance of Ambiguity shows a significant relationship with the Liberal-Conservative Index. With a p-value of .063, it is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. When added into the regression model with all control variables, it remains significant (.10 level) with a p-value of .057. It is therefore possible that personality, in this area, is affecting Intolerance of Ambiguity values, which is leading to penchants for certain political views over others.

In the second correlation, the Judging/Perceiving interaction variable did not have a significant relationship with political opinions. In this case, the p-value was recorded at .123. It is clear, then, that the Judging/Perceiving aspect is not swaying tolerance of ambiguity scores.

Religiosity is significant at the 0.001 level, influencing the Liberal-Conservative Index (beta weight = -.383). The B-value of -.744 illustrates that those committed to a particular religion are more likely to hold conservative viewpoints. This is consistent with Layman's own conclusions about religiosity.³⁸ The sociodemographic characteristics of parents' education level and family income were both insignificant in determining political views. This goes against previous research that suggested these factors may be influential, but is consistent with my expectations.³⁹

Through multiple regression, it is illustrated that Budner's Intolerance of Ambiguity scale and religiosity are having more of an overall effect on policy opinions than is personality. While Extraversion/Introversion still holds some influence, the recorded beta weights suggest it is not as impactful as these control variables. Additionally, the previously significant correlation between Judging/Perceiving and policy preferences is not significant in the regression model. There is a significant interaction between Intolerance of Ambiguity and Sensing/Intuition, which holds a significant relationship with policy preferences. This suggests that the way one analyzes information affects how he or she assesses ambiguous situations. Consequently, this affects policy preferences. But the initial belief that personality would be the most dominant factor in one's political opinions does not hold true, and Hypothesis 5 can be rejected.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Personality is not having as significant of an effect on political views as expected. When looking solely at personality factors' bivariate relationships with policy opinions, the Judging/Perceiving dichotomy has the strongest correlation with policy preferences, illustrating that the way in which one understands time and flexibility affects his or her political ideas. After running a multiple regression with all control variables taken into account, only Extraversion/Introversion remains a significant predictor of policy preferences. Since this study cannot fully explain the implication of the Extraversion/Introversion scale, it suggests further research is warranted for this particular variable.

Furthermore, the interaction between personality and Intolerance of Ambiguity was only significant in regard to the Sensing/Intuition variable, suggesting that as an individual takes in information, this affects Intolerance of Ambiguity which, in turn, affects political views.

³⁸ Layman 1997.

³⁹ Cutler 2003.

On its own, Intolerance of Ambiguity had a stronger relationship with political preferences than did all MBTI personality variables. Religiosity also accounted for more impact on political beliefs than did any other factor aside from Intolerance of Ambiguity, including the sociodemographic traits of family income and parents' education level – both of which were not significant. Because of this, it would be useful to look at both Intolerance of Ambiguity and religiosity more closely. Are there other, undiscovered ways in which these relationships act? For religiosity, are different types of people predisposed to religious beliefs?

After reviewing the limitations of this study and the data that resulted from it, several suggestions for further analysis come about. It would be useful to look at the family environment factor more closely, examining parents' political party in addition to economic background and education level. Moreover, I believe that similar findings will exist in other settings outside of this university, but this has not yet been explored. As this study can only be generalized to the student population at Illinois Wesleyan University, expanding the survey to different locations, age groups, and personal backgrounds would be valuable in looking at Myers-Briggs personality type and political ideas together.

This study goes beyond previous research by connecting daily decision-making tactics via the MBTI with the political realm and assessing whether or not they coincide. By observing this, it opens a new arena in which policymakers and candidates can use newfound ideas to market their positions toward certain types of people. If a legislator is aware that his or her stances, proposals, and ideas are more likely to be well received by a certain type of person over another, it would be wise to shape discussion and construct information about these things in a way that this voter will understand and connect with. In the event these findings become more significant with additional research or point to new relationships between personality and political views, this could indicate a new way to fuse psychology and politics more actively than has been done in the past for the benefit of all participants in these fields.

APPENDIX*Procedure and Coding***The Myers-Briggs Typology Indicator**

For the purposes of capturing the breadth of personality, each dichotomy is scored on a scale of -100 to +100, determined by the numerical value related to strength of preference for each individual respondent. The first term in each set is the positive value, and the second is the negative.

Policy Opinions

Responses to those statements regarded to be conservative standpoints had their numerical values reversed (7=1, 6=2, etc.). These were then added to the scores of the liberal positions and divided by the number of statements, the final result being labeled and referred to here on as the Liberal-Conservative Index. In this, a respondent who scores a 1.00 would be considered a “perfect liberal” and a 7.00, a “perfect conservative.”

Intolerance of Ambiguity

Included with the test, Budner constructed a method of calculating one’s tolerance of ambiguity from these responses. This involved flipping the answers to certain questions (7=1, 6=2, etc.) and adding them together for a total Tolerance of Ambiguity Score. After each participant turned in the survey, their responses were calculated through this design and coded as is.

In the 88 cases involved in this study, the lowest Intolerance of Ambiguity score was 44.0 and the highest was 91.0, with a mean of 73.52 and a standard deviation of 8.56. The possible values for this factor range from 16.0 and to 112.0. According to Budner’s own research, respondents tend to fall within the 44.0 to 48.0 range, meaning that subjects in this study had a higher than average tolerance of ambiguity.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Budner 1962.

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