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
Res Publica XVIII

Abstract

Complete copy of the 2013 volume of *Res Publica*.

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~ 2013 ~



XVIII

RES PUBLICA

Volume XVIII
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Res Publica is a publication of Pi Sigma Alpha, the Political Science Honor Society. It is funded by the Illinois Wesleyan University Student Senate.

Editors:

Zoe Gross

Yelei Kong

Associate Editors:

Abby Carter

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LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR

Welcome to *Res Publica* Volume XVIII!

This year's editors Zoe Gross and Yelei Kong use the trope of the chess game to draw attention to the competitive, strategic and rule-bound aspects of the study of politics. The papers collected here each in their own way show just how apt the metaphor is.

Politics is about power, Abby Carter and Nick Desideri remind us, and the powerful compete mightily for control over government and resources. Multicultural states, divided into national majorities and national minorities, often succumb to the temptation of partition when the option of sharing power appears either unthinkable or inconvenient. Abby's paper argues that the partition strategy yields diminishing democratic returns, while Nick argues that the South Koreans are playing the international reputation game more effectively than the Japanese.

One rule of the political chessboard is that trust in government and civic worth vary inversely. When trust is low, elites are tempted to use policy-based or identity-based appeals strategically as instruments to solidify their authority. In the process they can feed nationalistic and authoritarian conceptions of worth. Ted Delicath shows how policy entrepreneurs build their careers around specific programs; he maps the skewed pattern of overall trust in government which results. Ryan Winter delineates the ways authoritarians build images of worth around fear.

The two final papers, written by the co-editors, focus precisely on the degree of institutionalization in the competitive political game played between parties and ethnic groups. They highlight that the game of politics is not always routinized in a rule-bound way. Zoe emphasizes that while party systems can lend stability to democracy, elite leaders are faced with difficult trade-offs when deciding to enter any particular set of rules. Yelei develops his own indice of ethnic conflict to determine what prompts linguistic minorities to adopt a strategy of mobilizing a movement calling for more group autonomy.

All in all, the papers offer strong corroboration of the department's pride in its students' capacities as knowledge producers. If obtaining a political science degree can be framed as a kind of chess game, these students have obtained a checkmate.

Jim Simeone

EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

“I therefore call any Republic a State ruled by laws, under whatever kind of administration there might be, because only then does the public interest govern, and is *res publica* a reality”
– Rousseau, *Of the Social Contract*

It has been a great privilege and honor to serve as the editors of *Res Publica XVIII*. Over the past semester, we have reviewed outstanding submissions from many of our peers and classmates. Although the selection process was difficult, we feel as the selected papers show that commitment to academia is shared between all members of the political science department. This year's journal is unique in that it showcases works from not only senior seminars, but also from other classes, which demonstrate the breadth of political science research. We believe that publication in *Res Publica* is the final piece in the research puzzle. *Res Publica* features work from students who strive to take the next step in the scholarly cycle, to go beyond due dates and course grades, and to share their work with the political science community.

Res Publica is something to be proud of. As one of the very few undergraduate political science journals in the country, *Res Publica* represents 18 years of tradition and hard work from Illinois Wesleyan students. It demonstrates both the intellectual capabilities of its authors, and the quality of instruction and guidance from faculty members of the department. Thanks to continued support from Pi Sigma Alpha, we are again able to share *Res Publica* with graduate programs and law schools across the country.

Creation of such a publication would not have been possible without the hard work of Abby Carter and Ryan Winter, associate editors of *Res Publica*. Their time, patience, and ideas were invaluable contributions. A special thanks to Karl Winter, a freshman IWU art minor, for his design of this year's cover. Furthermore, we would like to thank all of the professors in the Political Science Department. Without their support and guidance during the *Res Publica* process and over the past four years, we would not be able to deliver this journal to your hands.

Thank you for reading! We hope you enjoy *Res Publica*.

Zoe Gross and Yelei Kong

AUTHORS' BIOGRAPHIES

Ryan Winter is a junior at Illinois Wesleyan University with majors in Political Science and History. In his time at IWU, Ryan has been a mentor for the Engaging Diversity program, a political science research assistant, and has spent two years as a long and triple jumper on the track and field team. Ryan spent the spring semester of 2013 volunteering as an intern for Tari Renner's mayoral campaign in Bloomington. As a recipient of Illinois Wesleyan University's Eckley Summer Fellowship, Ryan looks forward to spending the summer conducting research on the role of religion in European radical right populist parties, under the guidance of Professor Kathleen Montgomery.

Yelei Kong is a senior Political Science major with a minor in International Studies, Western European Studies. He is the 2012-13 John and Erma Stutzman Peace Fellow, a member of Pi Sigma Alpha, the political science honor society, and has been involved with the student organization Scholars at Risk. He spent his sophomore year in Milan, Italy. After returning to IWU, he has interned with the Bloomington City Government and Ronda Glenn law offices. He also spent his summers working with NGOs and consulting firms. He will be attending law school at Columbia University in the fall.

Zoe Gross is a senior Political Science major. She is a research assistant for the Political Science department and the president of Mortar Board and Pi Sigma Alpha honor societies. Throughout her four years at Illinois Wesleyan University, she served as president of her sorority, Sigma Kappa, and has also been a member of College Democrats, Phi Beta Kappa, and served on the steering committee of the Central Illinois ACLU. Zoe's most influential experience at IWU was serving as the assistant coordinator for the Action Research Center during the summer of 2012, where she studied Bloomington's food deserts and became more entrenched in the community. After graduation, she will be attending Washington University School of Law.

Nick Desideri is a junior Political Science and International Studies double major. He spent spring semester 2012 at Georgetown University interning for the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and is currently spending his spring semester 2013 abroad at the Tecnológico de Monterrey in Mexico City. An avid pop culture and pop music nerd, he enjoys researching how culture impacts international relations. He hopes to parlay his experience as an editor of *The Argus* and his love of writing into a career in government or media. Though he would eventually like to attend graduate school in the States, he plans on spending time in China after graduation to continue working on his Chinese language skills.

Abigail Carter is a senior with majors in Political Science and History. She is co-president of Phi Alpha Theta, vice-president of Best Buddies, a research assistant for the Political Science department, and a member of Kappa Kappa Gamma Fraternity. Abby has interned at the McLean County State's Attorney's office and Bloomington Legal Services. She spent a semester abroad in Dublin, Ireland, where she interned at a political party's headquarters. After graduation, Abby hopes to work for the federal government and eventually attend graduate school.

Ted Delicath is a senior political science major. Throughout his four years at IWU, he has been involved in a wide variety of activities. Ted is a proud member of the Action Research Center (ARC), was the Vice-President for Student Senate, is the current President of the Class of 2013 and is Co-President of Pi Sigma Alpha. This semester, Ted helped manage Professor Tari Renner's campaign for Bloomington's mayor. After graduation, Ted will lobby in Springfield/Washington D.C. during the summer and in September take part in the CORO Fellowship in St. Louis. Most importantly, Ted loves his mother (Momma D); without her none of this would be possible.

POWER AND FEAR: EXPLAINING THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

Ryan Winter

As the ghost of Franklin Delano Roosevelt once said, “There is nothing to fear but fear itself. And also me.” Truer words were never spoken. Actually, these words were never spoken, but were lifted from an article in *The Onion*, in which the deceased Roosevelt advises Americans to lay aside all other fears and come together in mutual terror of his haunting specter.¹ Sadly, many Americans pay no heed to this sage advice, and continue to be scared stiff by gays, foreigners, taxes, global climate change, and anything else that threatens to interrupt the flow of their life. Bob Altemeyer’s article, “The Other Authoritarian Personality,” describes these fears as part of a larger personality predisposition, which he calls right-wing authoritarianism. Most of the time, authoritarians blend in with society; they do not usually go about expressing their extreme level of respect for authority or their intolerance of individuality. However, as Karen Stenner relates in “The Authoritarian Dynamic,” when authoritarians feel anxious or threatened, their true beliefs emerge. From there, Jack Levy’s explanation of prospect theory and Redlawsk, Civettini, and Lau’s discussion on ‘affect’ contribute to an understanding of why authoritarians cannot tolerate change and why they feel especially threatened by information contrary to their established beliefs. Each of these four works separately speaks to important components of attitude and behavior, but synthesized they reveal that the essential emotional ingredient of the authoritarian personality is fear.

In his essay “The Other Authoritarian Personality,” Bob Altemeyer relates his findings from multiple survey research projects he designed to study common beliefs of right-wing authoritarians (RWAs). Altemeyer wished to discover exactly what makes RWAs unquestioningly obey authorities but abuse those considered inferior. At first, his tests found no significant results. Baffled by his lack of findings, Altemeyer tried adding a new personality type, social dominance, to the mix. The results astounded him. Social dominators (SDOs) had confused his original scales because, like RWAs, they value a rigid social hierarchy, but unlike RWAs, SDOs did not defer to authority. In other words, they kicked down at those below them, but did not bow to their superiors.²

Now that the two personalities were differentiated, Altemeyer separated the groups and re-evaluated their responses. He found that RWAs are unusually religious and self-righteous, and they place a higher value on tradition, conformity, and obedience.³ They often contradict their stated beliefs, delude themselves, and engage in doublespeak. For example, high-scoring RWAs proclaim their patriotism loudly, but do not seem to realize that many of the policies they advocate so

¹ The Onion 2009.

² Altemeyer 1998, 88-9.

³ Ibid., 91.

vehemently actually violate the Bill of Rights.⁴ They feel that the world is being taken over by the morally weak and that society is crumbling into anarchy. Thus, for RWAs, the world is a dangerous place.⁵ SDOs, on the other hand, usually share none of these opinions. They are more willing than RWAs to hurt others to get power, and unlike the self-righteous RWAs, SDOs are aware of and unapologetic about their prejudices.⁶ Interestingly, SDOs do not consider the world to be a dangerous place any more than the average person does, and while the RWAs are equally spread across gender, a much higher percentage of SDOs are male. Although some RWAs score high on the SDO scale as well, the correlation between the two groups was a modest .22, meaning most RWAs are not SDOs and vice versa.⁷ Through his brilliant survey research, Altemeyer was able to define the characteristics of authoritarians and distinguish them from others who value power but do not share other authoritarian traits.

It is well-known that religious fundamentalism, obedience, self-righteousness, and an extreme level of conformity are major components of the authoritarian personality. However, as stated above, these values are usually dormant and require a specific type of situation to elicit their expression. “In *The Authoritarian Dynamic*,” Karen Stenner makes the case that those who are predisposed to authoritarianism spend most of their lives thinking and acting like everyone else. It is only under conditions of normative threat that authoritarian predispositions emerge and affect their behavior.⁸ Similarly, libertarians, who value individuality, tolerance, and autonomy, also express these beliefs most when threatened. Therefore, libertarian predispositions are activated when a group tries to suppress individual freedom and diversity.⁹ Although at first it seems counterintuitive that people only express their personalities part of the time, Stenner’s evaluation helps explain real-world phenomena. For example, many authoritarians are nationalistic and oppose immigration. However, if this prejudice does not affect their everyday lives, their beliefs are not often expressed. It is only when their job, or the jobs of others in the in-group, are perceived to be threatened by cheap immigrant labor that an individual will begin bringing up anti-foreigner sentiments. Fear also explains why religious fundamentalists become so enraged when atheist groups attempt to remove public Christmas decorations or displays of the Ten Commandments in courthouses. Their beliefs are being challenged, so they respond according to their authoritarian predispositions.

Because authoritarian action is triggered by normative threat, a study of how humans act under situations of anxiety and fear can be useful to the topic at hand. In the context of voting

⁴ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 96-7.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁸ Stenner 2005, 58.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 63.

behavior, Redlawsk, Civettini, and Lau describe how people respond to candidates that evoke enthusiasm, anger, or anxiety. They claim that every piece of information humans receive is processed in one of two ways. The dispositional system monitors habits and everyday activities we do unconsciously, while the surveillance system is activated to deal with new and unexpected situations.¹⁰ When new information is inconsistent with our expectations, it is consciously processed by the surveillance system. Therefore, when we are *aware* of our emotions, they are more likely to be anxiety-inducing and negative.¹¹ However, a voter who receives unexpected negative information about a candidate they support will not always change their preferences. In order to consciously reject the candidate, the new information must make the voter feel threatened; otherwise, they will put the information out of their mind and rely on their already-formed positive attitude towards that candidate.¹² Although not intended to explain authoritarian behavior, this study gives some interesting insights on how threat affects cognition. As described above, authoritarians act just like everyone else in their everyday life—at these times they are using the dispositional system. However, confronted with an unfamiliar situation that triggers insecurity and anxiety, authoritarians rely instead on the surveillance system. By applying this theory of voting behavior to the analysis of the authoritarian personality, many behaviors such as adherence to tradition, conformity, deference to authority, and the belief that the world is a dark and dangerous place can be more easily understood.

One final reading that presents compelling parallels to the study of authoritarianism is Jack Levy's "Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science." His article largely deals with how people behave differently depending on their perceived position in relation to the status quo. Prospect theory, a fascinating alternative to expected-utility theory, predicts that people will work harder to prevent losses than to win comparable gains. Because people overweigh losses and cannot let go of what they once had, they are slow to adjust to the new status quo after losing. However, when they win, the status quo is quickly adjusted upwards.¹³ One implication of loss aversion in prospect theory is that people are much more likely to choose a status quo option over an uncertain future. In fact, a slight wording change can cause people to choose an option that seems to preserve the status quo, even when they would not have done so otherwise.¹⁴ Even if the two choices have an identical expected value, people choose the one that sounds less risky. Unless, that is, they feel that the status quo has already been lost. In this case, people will intentionally seek out risk to restore whatever they feel they have lost. Unlike expected-utility theory, in which people rationally weigh the pros and cons of each option, Levy argues that humans allow their judgment to become clouded by

¹⁰ Redlawsk, Civettini, and Lau (2007), 153.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 154.

¹² *Ibid.*, 155.

¹³ Levy (2003).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 222.

losses and engage in increasingly risky behavior to restore the status quo, often acting against their best interests in the end. Levy's explanations of when people seek or avoid risk can be employed to better understand the authoritarian personality. As Altemeyer has established, authoritarians overwhelmingly favor conservative policies, and should therefore be even more biased towards the status quo. When their worldview is challenged, rather than balancing costs and benefits, authoritarians seek out risk to return to the way things used to be.

Doubtless, these authors would find some issues with being lumped together as one block of research to validate a theory of authoritarianism. Redlawsk, Civettini, and Lau would probably say that the theory of authoritarianism's relationship with fear ignores most of the conclusions towards the end of their paper. As they found in their studies, anxiety about a political candidate actually results in increased information search, which would seem to contradict the premise that authoritarians avoid information that confuses or threatens them.¹⁵ However, Stenner and Altemeyer would respond that this study was of a representative sample of the population, not a sample of RWAs, so of course their conclusions would not support a theory about a small segment of the population. Stenner actually references Altemeyer's work, calling it a valiant attempt but of limited utility; she says that his arguments are tautological, and that they confound conservatism with authoritarianism. By determining if a person is a RWA by their answers to survey questions and then using those same responses to claim he has found the primary characteristics of authoritarians, Altemeyer leaves himself vulnerable to the charge of circular logic.

In the end, these writers would probably agree that parts of their work fit together and help to reveal that it is fear which underlies and motivates authoritarian action. An example that illustrates this synthesis is the issue of gay marriage. Altemeyer found that right-wing authoritarianism correlates strongly with opposition to homosexuality. Stenner picks up from there, explaining that in their everyday life authoritarians act just like everyone else, but are only radically anti-gay when they feel that their beliefs about marriage and family are being threatened. Redlawsk, Civettini, and Lau describe the initial mental processing that occurs when people first hear something new and unexpected. The surveillance system is activated, which means the issue is new and uncomfortable and anxiety is the most likely result. Finally, Levy's work explains the stubbornness to concede to gay rights. Although it would not affect their own lives at all if same-sex marriage were legalized, authoritarians will fight harder to preserve the status quo of keeping gay marriage illegal than they would to win similar gains. Taken together, these four disparate ideas on psychology and political behavior say something more than any of them alone, and indicate the true nature of authoritarianism.

¹⁵ Redlawsk, Civettini, and Lau (2007), 174.

The real motivation behind anti-gay movements is not hatred, but fear. Only when the enemy is seen as a threat to traditional values can they be dehumanized and hated in the abstract. People who treat gays in this way are called homophobes—and the stem *phobe* is no coincidence. The world is a dangerous place for authoritarians, and with so many forces threatening the status quo, fear underlies almost every belief they hold. The word xenophobia is used to describe their fear of foreigners, and many authoritarians call themselves “God-fearing,” meaning their fundamentalist religious beliefs are held out of terror of divine retribution. Through this combination of four diverse ideas on cognition, personality, and behavior expression, the authoritarian personality can be understood as being motivated primarily by fear.

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WHY THEY RISE UP, OR NOT: A STUDY OF LINGUISTIC MINORITIES AND ETHNIC-NATIONAL MOBILIZATION

Yelei Kong

***Abstract:** Most theories of nationalism focus on majority nationalism and do not provide an adequate explanation of the inaction of most ethnic minorities. This paper adopts the political process model from social movement theory to study the factors that prompt linguistic minorities to mobilization on ethno-national grounds. Using a large-N statistical model with data drawn from the Minority at Risk database, the results indicate that the higher capacity, the more opportunity for action, and the better the issue is framed, the more likely linguistic minorities would mobilize.*

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the French revolution in the 18th century, scholars have recognized nationalism as a global phenomenon. Nevertheless, the origin and development of nationalism remain subjects of heated theoretical debate and empirical dispute. Although historians have fairly documented the path of the most visible nationalist movements, the inaction of many others has gone unnoticed.

This paper examines the factors that influence ethno-national mobilization among linguistic minorities. Language and religion are among the most salient factors that can trigger a nationalist movement. This is not surprising, since nationalism is a movement based on cultural claims. Compared to economic wellbeing or political status, linguistic traits and religious choices are essential to one's identity.¹ Because of the inherent link between language and ethnicity,² this research focuses on minority groups defined by language. The emphasis is on minority nationalism, a sub-field of nationalism studies that can be best understood from cross-disciplinary studies.

If each linguistic group is considered as a distinctive nation, then there are too few spaces in the world today to accommodate each nation with a state.³ According to Gellner's calculation, there are 8,000 different languages on earth and currently 200 states. If we "pretend that we have four times that number of reasonably effective nationalism on earth, in other words, 800 of them," this will still "give us only one effective nationalism for ten potential ones!"⁴ Thus, the question arises: why do some resort to a nationalist movement, while others do not.

To answer this question, a preliminary review of the current theories is required. The following discussion combines the mainstream theories on ethnic nationalism with social movement theory models to analyze the dynamics of ethno-national mobilization of linguistic minorities.

¹ Kymlicka 1996

² Gellner 1983; Argenter 2002

³ Gellner 1983

⁴ Gellner 1983, 45

LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM

Theorists tend to view nationalism as either a cultural phenomenon rooted in history or a constructed product during the modern era.⁵ Benedict Anderson is the leading representative of the second view and arguably the founder of constructivism. His landmark 1983 work *Imagined Communities* challenged the first belief that national myth was ancient and cultural. He revealed how the concept was manufactured by the literate class and refined through the interaction between the elite and the people. In fact, the modern nation could only be imagined since the stretched territory and sheer size of populations made intragroup intimacy and recognition impossible.

Another important camp of nationalism studies is the modernists, headed by Ernest Gellner. They argue that the process of modernization brought nationalism into existence both in the interest of the state and as a political principle. Nationalism is simply not a Sleeping Beauty awaiting the kiss of modernism.⁶ Despite theoretical disagreements, most scholars agree on the essential role language plays in ethnic identity formation.⁷ Whereas Anderson focuses on the uniform use of literary language as the foundation for an imagined community, Gellner stresses the congruence between political and cultural boundaries in a monolingual state. It is “through that language, encountered at mother’s knee and parted with only at the grave [that], pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed.”⁸

It is a consensus among theorists that language defines group boundaries, whether literal or imagined; however, they seldom address the issue of minority nationalism. Majority nationalism is usually either a revolution against a dominant class (e.g. the French middle class against the aristocrats) or a movement against a foreign power (e.g. the post colonialist movement in Africa). In both cases, the nationalists have a relative majority base that challenges the ruling class or foreign power. However, in the case of minority nationalism, the disadvantaged language group is pitted against the majority. Although some linguistic minorities can also argue for the principle of the congruence of political and ethnic boundaries, they are inherently in a weaker position to do so. In fact, most ethno-national minorities never rise up; they never assert their linguistic identities as a foundation for political independence or autonomy within the majority nation-states. The existing literature is therefore inadequate to address the question of what drives ethno-national mobilization among language minorities.

Part of the problem lies in the inherent difficulty in studying non-actions. Political scientists, like scientists in general, are studying the casual relationships in the world. Where X happened, they search for what factors cause X and how they produce X. But, when X does not happen, the absence

⁵ Motyl 2002

⁶ Beiner 1999

⁷ Gellner 1983; Argenter 2002; Anderson 1983; Jung 1987

⁸ Anderson 1983

of the X-causing factor may not be sufficient to establish causality. With a large-N statistical study, it is possible to approach the question in a different way. Instead of asking what prevents some minorities from mobilizing, the focus should be on what factors influence their decision to mobilize on nationalist ground, and if they do, how their level of movement is affected by various independent factors. In the end, although the question cannot be answered definitively, evidence can be shown that the degree and quality of certain factors can make a linguistic minority either more or less likely to develop an ethno-national movement.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES

Ethno-national mobilization represents a form of social movement. As social movements tend to involve a special sector of the society, their participants are usually only a minority of the population. Therefore, social movement theories are particularly suited for the study of minority nationalism.

Behind most social movement theories today is the rational choice theory. It assumes that individuals are rational actors who weigh benefits and cost before taking an action.⁹ People join a movement in the hope of gaining something more than they would potentially lose. The utilitarianism assumption is simple, yet very influential in the thinking of most social scientists. In a field study done in Ghana, Laitin used game theory to illustrate individual choices in language selection.¹⁰ The local Ghanaian parents could choose to send their children to either a school taught in the indigenous language or a school taught in English. Laitin finds that the choices were not entirely based on economic gain. Local honor and external acceptance were equally influential as economic pay-offs.¹¹

Besides rational choice theory, there are three other major theories on social movement: relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and consciousness construction. The first two stress the structural aspects to explain social movement, whereas the last one takes a cultural approach.

Relative deprivation focuses on “situations producing individual-level stress or discontent as a major cause of social movement development.”¹² These unsatisfying conditions are usually the result of social stratification or injustice. The “frustration-aggression hypothesis” predicts that as discontent increases, the possibility of social movement increases as well. Shifting the focus from the underlying motivation to the necessary resources for mobilization, social scientists have developed resource mobilization theory. This current mainstream theory emphasizes the ability of the starters to motivate individuals, gain access to power, mobilize social resources and utilize political and

⁹ Hechter 1996

¹⁰ Laitin 1993

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Kerbo 1982, 646

economic structures to promote certain objectives.¹³ In essence, resource mobilization theorists consider “structure as relatively stable features of a movement’s environment that influence action by shaping opportunities,”¹⁴ and “attempt to demonstrate empirically that individual behaviors are channeled by a series of structural constraints.”¹⁵

In recent years, scholars have started to rely on the “cultural formations” in social movement theory. This “consciousness construction” theory focuses on “how social movements generate and are affected by the construction of meaning, consciousness raising, the manipulation of symbols, and collective identities.”¹⁶ However, not all theorists take a diametrical view between structural and cultural approaches. Myra Marx Ferree suggests that “individuals should be regarded as members of a community whose interests reflect their structural locations.”¹⁷ As scholars have explained, it is not just the particular issue that is important, but also how it is framed.¹⁸

The four theories described above provide useful lenses through which to examine social movements, but critics have pointed out theoretical flaws and empirical difficulties in applying them. As implied by rational choice theory, blocked social mobility would lead to nationalist movement. For example, education is a universal channel for upward social mobility, and people with higher education can expect more financial rewards than others. Thus, when college graduates find their career paths blocked for ethnic reasons, they should be more likely to mobilize. In fact, “this emphasis on the cultural elements of nationalism places intellectuals, in effect those most able to revive, stimulate and diffuse cultural artifacts, at the forefront of any national movement.”¹⁹ However, data has shown otherwise. Although decreased opportunities among the intellectuals have been believed to be the causes of Irish nationalism in the early twentieth century and the Canadian nationalism in the 1970s, the data has shown that job markets for them were actually expanding, not shrinking.²⁰

Besides empirical invalidity, rational choice theory also failed to explain extreme acts of ethnic violence, like suicide bombers, when the benefits were little and the costs were too high. Thus it was viewed as ineffective to explain non-economic activities.²¹ In order to reconcile this conflict, Varshney introduced the distinction between instrumental rationality and value rationality. Whereas the former is a “strict cost-benefit analysis,”²² the latter relies on the conscience and perception of

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Giugni 1998, 372

¹⁵ Ibid., 367

¹⁶ Giugni 1998

¹⁷ Ibid., 365-375

¹⁸ Giugni 1998; Cormier 2003; Cederman and Girardin 2007

¹⁹ Cormier 2003, 529

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Hechter 1996

²² Varshney 2003, 86

the good of the people, independent of the prospect of material or immediate gain. By expanding the definition of rationality, the rational choice theory was able to explain a broader scope of movement.

Critics have also found two problems with relative deprivation theory. The first one is its inability to identify the specific conditions that cause grievance.²³ Another problem is that since discontents are behind all movements, relative deprivation theory cannot explain why a lower level of frustration may cause mobilization and where a higher one does not.²⁴ Cormier's study of blocked mobility is such an example. Although the deprivation model is intuitively reasonable, empirically it has led to few discoveries.

By using the resource mobilization model, theorists have been able to locate the fundamental causes of many social movements. However, they faced serious challenges as well. The first is the free-rider problem. When one could benefit from a movement without joining it, one might choose not to participate at all.²⁵ Therefore, resource mobilization fails to address how people are dissuaded from free-riding. The second problem is essentially the strength of relative deprivation theory. Historically, many social movements occurred without significant structural changes in society and typically they were the result of mass grievance.²⁶ Thus, a movement could gain momentum before resources became available.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and consciousness construction theories all view social movement formation from different perspectives: grievance-driven action, resource-utilization, and issue formation, respectively. By extracting the central element from each of these theories, some scholars have proposed a more comprehensive theory: the political process model.²⁷ Its three components are mobilizing structure, political opportunity structure, and cultural framing. Mobilizing structure is an internal resource that includes "informal networks, preexisting institutional structures, and formal organization."²⁸ Political opportunity structure refers to the outside political environment that provides incentive for action. And cultural framing refers to the bridge connecting the internal and external structure, or "the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation."²⁹

In a sense, the political process theory is a combination of capacity, opportunity, and constructed ideas. In the past, nationalist theorists have also addressed similar issues of existing

²³ Kerbo 1982

²⁴ Cederman and Girardin 2007

²⁵ Kerbo 1982

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Morris 2000

²⁸ Ibid., 446

²⁹ Ibid.

network, current situation, and issue formation.³⁰ Existing network refers to the strength of minority group vis-à-vis the majority, the institutional structure of community, and formal organizations within the ethnic group. Current situation is their political status within the state they reside, treatment by the majority, and incentives for action. Issue formation explains how the elites construct the meaning of their situation, frame collective identities, and manipulate symbols. Table 1 below summarizes the application of political process model to the study of minority nationalist movement.

Table 1: Applying Political Process Model to Minority Nationalist Movement

Political Process Model		
Mobilizing Structure	Opportunity Structure	Cultural Framing

↓

Minority Nationalist Movement		
<p style="text-align: center;">Internal Capacity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strength of the minority group • Institutional structure • Formal organization 	<p style="text-align: center;">External Opportunity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political status in the state • Treatment by majority • International environment 	<p style="text-align: center;">Issue Formation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Construction of meanings • Collective identities • Manipulation of symbols

This model allows for a better study of minority nationalist movements because it gives a more inclusive analysis of the mobilization process. It incorporates both the internal and the external structure, without leaving aside the cultural perspective of nationalism. However, its critics point to the limited assumption of the prior occurrence of political opportunity for movement.³¹ By stressing structural necessity, it neglects the importance of agency and how action could create favorable conditions for movement. While the criticism is well-grounded, the problem of the alternative is still empirical validation. It is easy to recognize how individual initiatives influence the movement, but difficult to prove the causal link. Thus, albeit its limitations, the political process model offers the best means available to study minority nationalism. According to this model, the following hypotheses are proposed:

- H1) The more internal capacity the minority possesses, the more likely they will mobilize on ethno-national grounds.

³⁰ Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983

³¹ Morris 2000

H2) The more external opportunity the minority has, the more likely they will mobilize on ethno-national grounds.

H3) The better the issue is framed, the more likely the linguistic minorities will mobilize on ethno-national grounds.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to test these hypotheses in the broadest possible perspective, this research employs a large-N statistical model using the latest data (2006) from the Minority at Risk (MAR) database. MAR contains standardized data on the status and conflict of more than 283 ethnic groups with a population of at least 500,000. It is the most exhaustive and most commonly cited database on ethnic mobilization among scholars. Apart from the fact that it is the most comprehensive database available, it is selected for another important reason. The MAR also codes language, custom, religion, and other distinctive characteristics of each minority group. This is extremely helpful, because often language and religion intertwine and their cleavages overlap each other. In cases where linguistic and religious cleavages overlap, it would be difficult to empirically testify which one is the major cause of nationalism and by what degree. Luckily, MAR allows one to choose only linguistic minorities for more control and thus adds validity to the examination. In the dataset, LANG is the measure for different language group and it is coded from 0-2. 0 represents linguistic assimilation with the plurality group, 1 that a group speaks multiple languages and at least one different from the plurality group, and 2 that a group speaks primarily one language different from the plurality group. Only cases with a LANG score of 2 are selected, ruling out all but 48 cases. Bivariate correlation and OLS regression models are both used to test the hypotheses.

While the LANG measurement allows one to distinguish linguistic minorities from other minorities, some scholars have criticized its measures as inadequate.³² In MAR, language difference is measured by language distance – “the genetic relationship of languages that share a common ancestor” – without considering the actual difficulty of learning the language and concrete social impact of such difference.³³ Mabry argued that “the most important political characteristic of any language community in contact with another is the relative social and political status of their two (or more) languages.”³⁴ While this paper does not consider the linguistic difference as a *cause* of ethnic conflict, it is worth addressing Mabry’s criticism. Although LANG may not be a measure of actual difference, it is a good indication that there is a significant difference. A value of 2 in LANG means that the minority language is not intelligible to the majority and vice versa. Therefore, it is safe to assume there is a linguistic barrier and to a great extent, a cultural division between the two. Since

³² Cederman and Girardin 2007; Mabry 2011

³³ Mabry 2011

³⁴ Ibid., 203

language occupies a central position in the formation of ethnicity as it is the essential medium of communication and preservation of national culture,³⁵ linguistic difference almost always leads to cultural difference. Because of the strong link between language and culture, the selection based on LANG produces a set of cases where minorities are *actually* different from the majority in terms of culture. Therefore, other factors³⁶ that might affect the ethnic mobilization of minorities can be eliminated and one can focus on how factors in the political process model affect ethnic mobilization of linguistic minorities.

OPERATIONALIZING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variable for this study is ethnic mobilization. In MAR, there are a few measures that are directly related to this: protest (0-5), rebellion (0-7), and separatism index (0-3). They are recoded into an index of ethnic mobilization (IEM). $IEM = (\text{Protest} / 5) * 20\% + (\text{Rebellion} / 7) * 35\% + (\text{Separatism} / 3) * 45\%$. Since IEM is a continuum, from non-violent protest at one end and separation at the other, each measure is assigned different weight. First, each measure is divided by its scale in order to make them comparable to each other. Then, separatism is weighted the heaviest here because it is the most extreme form of political nationalism. Protest is weighted the least due to its non-violent nature. In the end, rebellion is weighted higher than protest due to its use of violence and lower than separatism since the measure does not necessarily specify the ultimate level of political demand for the rebels. In total, IEM ranges from 0 to 1.

OPERATIONALIZING THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The three independent variables are internal capacity, external opportunity, and issue formation. To operationalize them, five proxy measures are chosen from MAR, group spatial distribution (GROUPCON) for capacity, political autonomy (AUTLOST) for opportunity and political (POLGR), economic (ECGR) and cultural (CULGR) grievance for issue formation.

Group Spatial Distribution as a Proxy for Capacity

According to political process theory, capacity includes networks, institutions and organizations within an ethnic community. While their strength is difficult to measure and compare across communities, the spatial distribution of population might be a good indication of their efficacy. The concentration of the population matters because only with a large share and concentrated population can a minority be able to construct a self-sustainable political system – “sufficiently large and institutionally complete.”³⁷ Generally, the more concentrated a minority is, the stronger ties they would have, since it is easier to communicate and establish relationships. Although

³⁵ Argenter 2002

³⁶ For example, in the MAR database, BELIEF measures the religious differences between the minority group and the majority. Among the cases selected here, Pearson’s correlation result show no significant correlation (.696 level) between BELIEF and the EMI, the measure for dependent variable here.

³⁷ Kymlicka 2003, 40

technology has made long-distance connection relatively easy and affordable, when it comes to action, a concentrated group is inherently better suited than a dispersed one. Since the question which concerns us is the relationship between capacity and mobilization, not capacity itself per se, spatial distribution is a good proxy measure for group capacity. In MAR, group spatial distribution is coded under GOUPCON from 0 to 3, 0 for widely dispersed, 1 for primarily urban or minority in one region, 2 for majority in one region, others dispersed, and 3 for concentrated in one region.

Political Autonomy as a Proxy for Opportunity

Opportunity refers to the external “political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action.”³⁸ In MAR, one measure is the index of lost political autonomy based on year of autonomy loss, magnitude of change and group status prior to loss of autonomy. The score ranges from 0 to 6, and the higher the score, the greater autonomy the minority has enjoyed in the past and the more recent such power has been taken away from them. Scholars have found that path dependence is a strong factor in ethnic conflict.³⁹ If a minority has been involved in an ethnic conflict, it is more likely to have more ethnic violence in the future than those who did not have such experience. Similarly, if a minority had enjoyed relative autonomy in the past, they would be more inclined to rise up than those who had never had such privileges. Also, because of their previous independence or autonomy, the external environment or the majorities would be more sympathetic and acceptive to their demand. Therefore, the index of lost political autonomy can be a good measure for external political opportunity.

Grievance as a Proxy for Issue Formation

Among the three variables, issue formation is the most troublesome to measure. The efficacy of issue formation not only depends on how the issue is interpreted by the leader, but also how it is accepted by the masses. Both are subjective standards. In MAR, political, economic and cultural grievances are measured by the *highest* level articulated by group leaders or observed by third parties. In fact, the codebook explicitly states that if the majority of the people demonstrate lower levels of grievance and radicals expressed higher levels, the higher score will be coded for this ethnic group. Although this measure is not an exact estimation of grievances, this touches on some elements of issue framing. One important aspect of issue framing is that how it is framed is more important than the actual grievance. Naturally, the leader has an incentive to exaggerate the issue in order to incite popular sentiment. In this perspective, the higher grievance coded by MAR, the more likely the populace will take action. Even though it does not address all features of issue formation, the grievance measure indicates one way issue formation could affect ethnic mobilization. In this paper,

³⁸ Morris 2000, 446

³⁹ Cederman and Girardin 2007

the political, economic and cultural grievances are recoded into an index of grievance which is an aggregate score of the three, ranging from 0 to 8.

ANALYSIS

The Significance of EMI Index

In the Minority at Risk database, 282 ethnic groups are recorded. Only minorities with a LANG score of two⁴⁰ are selected for this study, yielding 48 cases across 36 countries.⁴¹ Table 2 summarizes the distribution of dependent variable measures.

Table 2: Distribution of Dependent Variables


	Protest (0-5)	Separatism (0-3)	Rebellion (0-7)	EMI Index (0-1)
Average	0.92	1.69	0.51	0.32
Standard Deviation	1.22	1.34	1.57	0.25
Min	0	0	0	0
Max	4	3	7	0.84
Mode (number)	0 (26)	3 (23)	0 (41)	0.15 (8)

N=48 for Protest and Separatism, N=47 for Rebellion and EMI Index

It is apparent from the table that separatism is the most significant among the three measures from MAR with an average score of 1.69. Nearly half of the cases have the highest score of 3. On the other side, average scores for protest and rebellion are relatively low, 0.92 and 0.51 respectively. Also, their modes are both 0, indicating that inactivity is common. Based on these three, the EMI index has a score range from 0 to 0.84 and an average score of 0.32. As EMI index reflects the continuum of the nationalist movement, its strength can be shown as its correlation with the rest of the measures and this relationship is graphically represented in Figure 1.

⁴⁰ In the MAR codebook, LANG score means that “group speaks primarily one language, different from plurality group: Plurality of group speaks the same language AND it is different from plurality group language (e.g., Kurds in Turkey or Iraq).”

⁴¹ Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burma, Croatia, Cyprus, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Guinea, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia (Serbia), Zimbabwe.

Figure 1: Relationship between Protest, Separatism, Rebellion, EMI index

N=47

The increase of EMI accompanies the increasing scores of separatism and rebellion. In cases where only protest score is high, EMI is relatively low, reflecting the non-violent and less intensive nationalist movement. Whereas all three measures are high towards the end of the cases, EMI increases significantly as well, representing the violent and intensive mobilization of minorities. Therefore, EMI index is a reliable measure of ethno-nationalist mobilization as its distribution follows the theoretical assumption.

Correlation Check on Independent variables

Before examining the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables, it worth making sure that there is no internal correlation between the independent variables. Table 3 below shows the correlations between the three, and none of them have any significant relationship with each other.

Table 3: Pearson's Correlations for independent variables

		Group Spatial Distribution	Political Autonomy	Total Grievance
Group Spatial Distribution	Pearson Correlation	1	.096	.215
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.257	.071
Political Autonomy	Pearson Correlation	.096	1	.158
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.257		.142
Total Grievance	Pearson Correlation	.215	.158	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.071	.142	

N=48

Testing Hypotheses

In order to test the bivariate relationships between each independent variable with ethno-national mobilization, Table 4 reposts the results of Pearson's bivariate correlations.

Table 4: Pearson's Correlations for Ethno-national Mobilization Index (EMI)

	Ethno-nationalist Mobilization Index	
H1. Group spatial distribution	Pearson Correlation	.386**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.004
H2. Political Autonomy	Pearson Correlation	.274*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.031
H3. Total Grievance	Pearson Correlation	.758**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.000

N=47

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

According to the hypothesis, the higher capacity the minority possesses, the more likely they would mobilize on ethno-national ground. With group spatial distribution as a proxy measure for higher capacity, Table 3 validates the existence of such correlation. Nearly 40% of data confirmed this relationship.

For the second hypothesis, that the more external opportunity the minority has, the more likely they would mobilize on ethno-national grounds, the correlation is weaker. Its value is only .274 and is significant at the .031 level. Part of the reason for this weak relationship probably lies in the skewed value distribution of political autonomy since two-thirds of the cases have a relatively low score, either 0 or 1 on a scale of 0 to 5. With so many cases on the lower end, the relatively insignificant result is understandable. The strongest evidence is for the third hypothesis: the better the issue is framed, the more likely linguistic minorities will mobilize. The proxy measure, total grievance, has a .758 correlation value with the EMI index and is significant at the .000 level. Although such a high value is surprising, the strong relationship is anticipated. After all, ethno-national mobilization is a political movement and political grievance is particularly influential among the minorities examined here. Therefore, the initial correlations confirm all three hypotheses.

Table 5: OLS Regression for Ethno-national Mobilization Index (EMI)

	Standardized Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	Significance
Group Spatial Distribution	.022	.197	.043
Political Autonomy	.018	.159	.093
Total Grievance	.011	.688	.000

N=47

From Table 5, it is obvious that total grievance is still the most influential. Explaining nearly 70% of the variance in EMI, it remains significant at the .000 level. Group spatial distribution comes second, with a beta score of .197 and significance at the .05 level. Political autonomy is the least significant, explaining only 15.9% of the cases and is significant only at the .1 level. However, political autonomy nearly became irrelevant when group spatial distribution and total grievance are held constant. As demonstrated above, the majority of the variance in ethno-national mobilization can be accounted for by the framing of grievances. The more political grievances are articulated within a linguistic minority, the more likely they will move along the mobilization scale towards manifested nationalist movement and even violence.

Clearly, the third hypothesis is supported most strongly by the data. This finding also ties back to and confirms the strength of classic relative deprivation theory which emphasizes grievances experienced by the minority as the single most important motivation for mobilization. Thus, the intuitive assumption of the relationship is verified here. But this proxy measure only covers a small portion of issue framing. Future studies should address the empirical difficulty of measuring idea construction to validate the hypothesis more comprehensively. Group spatial distribution is also significant in the result, and this indicates that concentrated minority groups do have a higher tendency to mobilize, again reflecting the importance of capacity. Further, capacity probably directly links to issue framing: the higher the capacity, the better the minority will be able to frame their grievances. Comparatively, political autonomy is the least influential factor here, although skewed data accounts for some of its result as two-thirds of the cases scored either a 0 or 1 on the political autonomy scale. Most importantly, past political autonomy only captures one part of the opportunity structure. Other aspects, such as international relief or sudden political change, are not incorporated in this measure.

CONCLUSION

By using a statistical model with data drawn from the Minority at Risk database, the overall results of this study support the political process theory, which states that capacity, opportunity, and constructed ideas together influence the ethnic mobilization of minorities. The positive relationship between spatial distribution and nationalist movement is not surprising. After all, the most visible separatist movements in the world today are found among regionally concentrated minorities, such as the Canadian Quebecois, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Kurdish people in Iraq. Political opportunity is a weaker factor because of the inherent limitation of the proxy measure used here. Empirically, there are many examples showing that the lifting of political pressure does lead to an upsurge of nationalist movement. On the eve of the Soviet dissolution, many republics began to manifest their nationalist claims as soon as Gorbachev gave them the option of political autonomy. However, the difficulties lie in how to measure outside political opportunities. Similar problems also challenge the most

significant findings here: the more exaggerated the grievance, the more likely linguistic minorities are to mobilize. Hence the next step would be how to measure issue formation and compare one manipulation to another. Also, a closer examination of how the three factors influence the process of mobilization should be carried out in a structured, focused case comparison. Therefore, both a study of refined measurement and a detailed examination of a few of the cases selected here will be the primary goals of future study.

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IT'S MY PARTY SYSTEM AND I'LL INSTITUTIONALIZE IF I WANT TO: PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN YOUNG DEMOCRACIES

Zoe Gross

***Abstract:** Scholars today mostly agree that party system institutionalization (PSI) is a key ingredient in the transition to a functioning democracy. The question of whether PSI matters is more or less resolved. What is less clear is a general theory of what can help new democracies reach a high level of PSI. The aim of this research is to discover the pre-conditions and elite choices that enhance the level of PSI in new democracies. This research uses two Most Different System designs to explore the results of ten hypotheses that test the relationship between the level of PSI and an array of independent variables in country cases across the globe. Analyses reveal that there is no single magic variable or even a single set of factors that reliably lead to PSI across cases. What does emerge is the importance of elite behavior and choices during the initial regime change.*

INTRODUCTION

The transition to a functioning democracy can be a long and delicate process. The theoretical literature on democratization and democratic consolidation makes it clear that some factors matter more for strengthening new governments than others. Scholars today mostly agree that party system institutionalization (PSI) is a key ingredient in, and an indicator of, democratic consolidation. Although there is no universally agreed upon definition, PSI is generally believed to occur when a system becomes well established, trusted, predictable, and stable over a period of time. High PSI can help new democracies attain legitimacy and handle the surge of new voters entering the political realm.¹ However, the time it takes for a party system to become institutionalized and how thoroughly the party system institutionalizes varies from one democratic transition to the next. Are there central pre-conditions necessary or choices that transitional elites can make to ensure timely and thorough PSI? It is the aim of this research to determine what matters most to enhance the level of PSI in a new democracy.


The level of party system institutionalization is an important enhancement to democratic growth, stability, and democratic consolidation. The existence of institutionalized party systems can provide stability between party competition, embed democracy in society, and produce political actors who are committed to the democratic system. On the other hand, states with weak PSI may experience increased uncertainty within elections for voters and elites, hamper citizen involvement, and lessen electoral accountability.² The question of whether PSI matters is more or less resolved. What is less clear is a general theory of what can help new democracies reach a higher level of party system institutionalization.

¹ Mainwaring 1999; Casal Bértoa 2011; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005a; Wolinetz 2006

² Mainwaring and Torcal 2005a; Thames and Robbins 2007

LITERATURE REVIEW

While countless scholars agree that party system institutionalization is crucial to the process of democratic consolidation, there are competing viewpoints on the forces behind PSI. There is no widely agreed upon cause of PSI, but rather an array of possible factors and situations in which party systems will flourish.³ Most of these dynamics can be separated between two camps: preconditions and choices. Preconditions are established influences on PSI that cannot be changed easily, but rather are long-term system effects or forces. Choices refer to decisions made by key actors that can have an effect on the institutionalization. Figure 1 situates PSI in a pathway to democratic consolidation and traces a framework for organizing and understanding what drives PSI. In this model there are three broad categories of explanation: path dependent factors (modernization, transition, and history), socio-demographic factors, and institutional design. Some of these factors are clearly beyond the control of political actors. Political culture, level of socio-economic modernization, social cleavages, and history form the context which political actors inherit. Within that context, actors may choose the rules of the game. Different inherited pre-conditions and different choices may lead to very different prospects for party system institutionalization.

*Path-Dependent Factors*

There are several inherited pre-conditions that may influence the success of institutionalization. Economic development is considered a crucial determinant of PSI in emerging democracies. Insufficient economic growth in a new democracy can hinder the success of the party in power. Economic hardship is in turn linked to electoral volatility and system instability, as parties

³ Casal Bértoa 2011

and the electorate hold incumbents responsible for the current economic distress. An alternative vote choice is found either in an oppositional party or at the opposite side of the political spectrum.⁴

Evidence also suggests that access to modern communications resources can help improve political competition in new democracies that have a history of single party dominance. Tkacheva (2009), for example, finds that Internet access is strongly correlated with votes won by the opposition party. Increased access can provide voters with the tools necessary to gather information about their political options. With greater party competition, real vote choice, and informed voters should come a more institutionalized party system.

There is also reason to believe that if a party system is established before the imposition of an authoritarian regime, there will be an increase in the stabilization of the re-democratized system. Remmer (1985) argues that the amount of PSI after a democratic transition coincides with the age of the party system before authoritarianism sets in, because the parties have had the opportunity to place roots in society prior to authoritarian control. Others suggest that the length of authoritarian rule has an effect on the continuity of the party system, thereby affecting its institutionalization, as previous political history can “set incentive parameters, which, in turn, affect institutional performance and levels of democracy.”⁵ Mainwaring and Zoco further argue that the electoral volatility within a party system diminishes over time, suggesting that the older a party system is, the more stable it will be. This phenomenon is credited to the increased amount of time that voters have to identify with parties, with the effect lessening after 30 years.⁶

Finally, the type of transition from pre-democratic rule to democracy can affect democratic consolidation and, by extension, PSI. Pacted transitions, where political elites allow for the creation of democracy in their state in a peaceful manner, provide much more stability than other forms of transition (e.g. government overthrow, tyrannicide). Pacts are beneficial because they help lay the foundation of democracy and erode the strength of the authoritarian regime, while at the same time creating a select group of elites to lead the country through transition and the early stages of democracy.⁷ The groups that sit down at a roundtable negotiation to end authoritarian rule may emerge as proto-parties, and later as established parties in the democracy that ensues.

Sociological and Cultural Factors

Sociological factors also appear to influence party system institutionalization. Social cleavages, the division within a community into specific groups with political differences, are thought to be one of the biggest sociological influences on PSI. Cleavages can be divided into three types of groups: descriptive, attitudinal, and behavioral. They require social stratification, shared group

⁴ Tavits 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Casal Bértoa 2011

⁵ Malbrough 2008

⁶ Mainwaring and Zoco 2007

⁷ O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986

interests, and group consciousness. Some argue that party systems institutionalize when voters develop party attachments based on religion, socioeconomic status, residence (urban/rural), and culture. These group attachments can lay the foundations of strong party identification and unity.⁸ Traditionally, cleavages have been explained in terms of their number, type, and strength. In his recent work, Fernando Casal Bértoa argues that none of those factors really matter for PSI, rather that weak PSI is correlated with ‘cross-cutting’ cleavages. These cleavages impede the ability of parties to find ideologically similar partners and create lower partisan attachments due to the different ideological pulls. On the other hand, when cleavages coincide with one another, parties and voters can be combined into two or more easily distinguished blocs.⁹

Cleavages can also matter in a number of additional situations. Some believe that the early political mobilization of cleavages by elites will cause a higher level of institutionalization, but whether this applies across a wide range of countries is up for debate. Others speculate that social class cleavages matter more during economic downturns, while racial cleavages have no effect on volatility or PSI. Additionally, the level of PSI is believed to be higher in societies with a higher percentage of unionized labor because unions serve as a sharply defined group to which members identify. Without the support of the organization in the workplace, workers are less likely to create partisan linkages.¹⁰

Other theories of cultural influence on PSI include personalistic voting. In most weakly institutionalized countries, voters make choices based less on ideology and more on the personality of the individual candidate. With weaker parties and party systems, there is less of an incentive for elites to seek the support of parties. When voters cannot rely on party identification as a cue, they will make choices based on the individual and personality. While this allows for more independent candidates to attain office, it limits the importance of parties and weakens parties as institutions.¹¹ Although they can make a huge impact, sociological, cultural, and historical factors are just part of the PSI puzzle. They may be crucial pre-conditions, but are there choices that can be made by elites to further PSI?

Institutional Factors

Arguably, the primary scholarly explanation of PSI today is institutional design. Scholars agree that the institutional framework under which a party system develops can either promote or hinder development. Some believe that proportional representation systems, which are created to have the closest vote-to-seats-won ratio, strengthen the party system more than majoritarian systems do. Proportional representation systems reinforce parties, because party gatekeepers exclusively

⁸ Tavits 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Casal Bértoa 2012

⁹ Casal Bértoa 2011; 2012

¹⁰ Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Casal Bértoa 2012; Croissant and Völkel 2012

¹¹ Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005b; Casal Bértoa 2011

control candidate recruitment and parties have total control over who appears on their lists. Party systems with proportional representation strengthen both the voter and parties, and are more conducive for institutionalization.¹² On the other hand, PR systems allow for a lower party threshold and thus a greater number of parties entering and exiting the system, while majoritarian systems tend to produce stable majorities and two-party dominance.

Party fractionalization is an additional factor related to electoral system that some believe influences PSI. A high degree of fractionalization (or too many parties in a system) has been shown to prevent a multi-party system from functioning efficiently. With too many parties in the system, the ideological differences between the parties will be slim, making it easier to transfer a vote from one party to another. In countries where new election laws have decreased fractionalization, party system strength has increased.¹³

Many scholars emphasize the effect that the “rules of the game” have on party system institutionalization. These rules are made for various reasons, but most signs point to a correlation between political elites who desire loose party rules and weak PSI. Either because of the nature of the rules or the lack of desire by the political elite for change, once electoral rules are in place they are rather difficult to change. The “rules of the game” that affect PSI include: plurality voting for the presidency, short-term limits for the presidency, and some types of plurality voting (SNTV, block voting, or adding additional party lists). In addition to electoral rules, some institutional rules also have an influence on PSI, including incentives for politicians to seek reelection, decentralization of candidate selection, and the protection of a politician’s autonomy.¹⁴

The territorial distribution of power in a state can also have an effect on the institutionalization of party systems. Research has shown that partisan predictability and competition is affected when federalism decentralizes parties. The separation between federal, state, and local powers can have a negative impact on PSI that may be avoided in centralized states.¹⁵

Additionally, scholars argue that the type of regime (parliamentary/ presidential) can influence broad coalitions and provide more power to blocs of voters. Some argue that because presidential candidates, unlike those running in parliamentary elections, cannot afford to ignore any segment of the population and must pull together a range of popular support, helping to increase the strength of a system and the level of PSI. Others argue that the personalization that is typical of presidential elections hurts PSI. The incentives to build party organizations and create ties between the candidates and voters are weaker, leading to increased volatility.¹⁶

¹² (Croissant and Völkel 2012)

¹³ Tavits 2005; Lane and Ersson 2007; Gwiazda 2009

¹⁴ Mainwaring 1999

¹⁵ Mainwaring 1999; Casal Bérota 2011

¹⁶ Mainwaring, 1999; Casal Bérota 2011; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Croissant and Völkel 2012

Combining such a wide variety of influences from path-dependent, sociological, cultural, and institutional factors and the nature of PSI causes a widespread theoretical speculation because one particular element does not stand out above the rest. Rather, PSI is a puzzle created by many factors, some inherited and some chosen, that influences the speed and extent to which party systems are able to institutionalize. Table 1 provides a list of hypotheses clustered according to the previous broad schools or approaches.

Table 1: Hypotheses

<p><u>Path-Dependency: Socio-economic and Historical Factors</u></p> <p>H1: Greater economic growth and development lead to a more institutionalized party system.</p> <p>H2: The greater the access to information resources, such as the Internet, the higher the level of party system institutionalization.</p> <p>H3: The longer a nation has been a democracy, the more institutionalized its party system.</p> <p>*H4: A pacted transition to democracy will lead to higher levels of party system institutionalization.</p> <p><u>Sociological & Cultural factors</u></p> <p>H5: The fewer the number of cross-cutting cleavages in society, the higher the level of party system institutionalization.</p> <p>H6: As the percentage of the workforce in unionized labor increases, the level of party system institutionalization increases.</p> <p><u>Institutional Factors</u></p> <p>H7: Higher levels of proportionality of the vote-to-seat translation in the electoral rules will lead to higher party system institutionalization</p> <p>H8: The lower the party system fragmentation, the higher the level of party system institutionalization.</p> <p>H9: Parliamentary forms of government are more likely than presidential to have a high level of party system institutionalization.</p> <p>H10: Federalism reduces party system institutionalization.</p> <p>*H4 is both a pre-condition and an elite choice.</p>
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

Research Design

This research is based on a small-N comparative cases design. The unit of analysis of this study is the country, and all data, when necessary, is aggregated up to the macro (country) level. Sixteen cases have been separated into two Most Different Systems Designs, based on their dependent variable score from the party system institutionalization index.

The purpose of using the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) is to uncover the similarities between various countries that contribute to the observed political outcome. To maximize the benefits of this design, I divided cases into two separate groups of 'high PSI' and 'low PSI' based on my dependent variable index. I will compare the cases within each grouping to one another, in search of the independent variables they share. If my theories are correct, certain factors will be found to be common in the high PSI countries that are not found in those with low PSI.

Case Selection

When selecting cases for a Most Different Systems Design, it is important to select from a wide array of geographical areas, political histories, and cultures. A MDSD has the ability to reduce the number of variables by focusing on what has been hypothesized as explaining the dependent variable. Countries should be very different and share as few common features on the independent variable side as possible, because differences between cases cannot explain a similar outcome, in this case either very low PSI or very high PSI. All new democracies formed since 1978 were considered, yielding approximately 65 cases.¹⁸ From there, cases were eliminated on the basis of data availability and MDSD criteria. The final case selection includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and Ukraine.

The selected cases provide the most control over the biases the MDSD seeks to avoid. They come from five continents across the globe and an from a wide span of political backgrounds. They have been established within the last 32 years, and fit under the classification of ‘new’ democracies. Dividing the countries into groups of high PSI and low PSI increases control over them even more, allowing comparison between states that have been successful at institutionalizing and those that have not. The selected high PSI cases are Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, the Philippines, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan. The low PSI cases include Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, and Ukraine. The current research on PSI is primarily on a case-by-case or regional basis, limiting the widespread applicability of theories to all institutionalizing democracies. It is for these reasons that it is important to use cases from all over the world and form a variety of prior authoritarian regimes (right-wing, communist, personal dictatorship, party-state, et. cetera). This strategy improves generalizability and helps to test hypotheses and build theory. There are practical implications, too. If we can identify pathways to PSI, as social scientist we may be able to offer advice to regimes in transition from authoritarianism and to consolidated democracy.

Measurement: Dependent Variable

The dominant literature on party system institutionalization focuses on the theory created by Scott Mainwaring and his colleagues, which include four separate dimensions of PSI: the stability of party competition, strong roots in society, the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of elites, and the independence of party leaders. Although Mainwaring argues that all are important to institutionalization, he disregards the other factors and uses the stability of interparty competition, measured by electoral volatility, as the only measurement of PSI.¹⁷

¹⁷ Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring & Torcal 2005(a); Mainwaring & Torcal 2005(b); Mainwaring & Zoco 2007; Thames & Robbins 2007; Malbrough 2008

Instead of focusing solely on electoral volatility as the measure of PSI, this research utilizes a dependent variable index that has been adapted from Croissant & Völkel (2012). Table 2 lists the results of the five factors of the dependent variable index; electoral volatility, party identification, trust in political parties, corruption level, and voter turnout. By employing a wide range of indicators of the level of PSI, this approach provides the most thorough way to systematically measure institutionalization.¹⁸

Table 2: Dependent Variable Index

Country	Electoral Volatility ¹	Party Identification ²	Trust in Political Parties ³	Corruption Level ⁴	Voter Turnout ⁵
Argentina	24.9	19.45%	14.7%	3	74.43%
Brazil	24.1	31.45%	21.73%	3.8	80.19%
Chile	16.7	11.06%	29.79%	7.2	87.21%
Czech Republic	25.7	37.1%	21.1%	4.4	62.55%
Hungary	25.1	53.7%	29.9%	4.6	49.53%
Mexico	22.7	28.5%	24.67%	3	47.83%
Peru	46.6	31.3%	13.71%	3.4	83.71%
Philippines	37.3	61.5%	71.2%	2.6	76.25%
Poland	46.6	31.3%	21%	5.5	55.11%
Romania	53	62.65%	15%	3.6	56.2%
Slovenia	38.2	28.5%	16.8%	5.9	65.6%
South Africa	26.5	60%	41%	4.1	77.3%
South Korea	24.6	28%	23.9%	5.4	54.23%
Spain	16.5	42.9%	26.5%	6.2	68.94%
Taiwan	18.7	34.4%	17.4%	6.1	76.33%
Ukraine	59.2	40.3%	16.8%	2.3	66.84%
Median	25.4	32.93%	21.5%	4.25	68.89%

Sources & measurement details:

¹⁸ Croissant & Völkel 2012

¹Electoral volatility scores for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and Ukraine from Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005. Scores for South Africa found at the website of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Scores for the Philippines are found in Allen Hicken's paper on PSI in the Philippines. All scores are measured on a scale from 1-100, where 1 is the lowest and 100 is the highest.

²Party identification scores are the percentage of the population that possesses some form of identification with a particular political party. They are measured on a scale from 1-100, where 1 is the lowest and 100 is the highest. Scores for Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru) found in surveys conducted by the Latin America Public Opinion Project. Scores for South Africa from a survey conducted by the Afrobarometer in 2008. Data for Asian countries Taiwan (2006), South Korea (2003), and the Philippines (2005) found from the World Values Survey Values Survey Databank. Data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain from the European Social Survey (2010). Data for Romania is from the EU Eurobarometer (2012).

³Trust in political parties comes from a variety of public opinion databanks. It is measured by the percentage of the population that trusts political parties as institutions. They are measured on a scale from 1-100, where 1 is the lowest and 100 is the highest. Scores for Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru) found in surveys conducted by the Latin America Public Opinion Project. Scores for South Africa from a survey conducted by the Afrobarometer in 2008. Data for Asian countries Taiwan (2006), South Korea (2003), and the Philippines (2005) found from the World Values Survey Values Survey Databank. Data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain from the European Social Survey (2010). Data for Romania from the EU Eurobarometer (2012).

⁴Scores of corruption level from Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.

⁵Voter turnout is measured by the percent of voter turnout in the most recent election from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems Election Guide.

The first factor of the dependent variable index is electoral volatility. This is measured by the cumulative turnover from one party to the next, from one election to the next. This measures the stability of the party system and the pattern of competition between the parties. This traditional measurement of PSI is followed by the percentage of the population that self-identifies with a particular party and the percent that trust political parties as institutions, both of which are collected from public opinion survey data. Strong party identification is a measure of the strength of party roots in society, while trust in parties, along with low corruption levels and electoral volatility, are signs of the legitimacy of parties and elections.

After collecting the data, the median was calculated for each individual factor and was used to divide the cases into 'high' and 'low' groupings. Then to create an overall index for dividing countries into 'high' and 'low' PSI cases, cases were assigned a star for each factor that has been predicted as positive for PSI. Cases with one or two stars were considered 'low,' while three, four, and the five-star cases were classified as 'high' PSI. The exception to this classification is South Africa, which received three stars but was placed into the 'low' PSI grouping because of extenuating circumstances in the government, culture, and party system. See Table 3 for a complete listing of the classification for each country in each category.

Table 3: High/Low Dependent Variable Index

Country	Electoral Volatility	Party Identification	Trust in Political Parties	Corruption Level	Voter turn out	
Argentina	Low	Low	Low	High	High	★★★
Brazil	Low	Low	High	High	High	★★★
Chile	Low	Low	High	Low	High	★★★★
Czech Republic	High	High	Low	Low	High	★★★
Hungary	Low	High	High	Low	Low	★★★★
Mexico	Low	Low	High	High	Low	★★
Peru	High	Low	Low	High	High	★
Philippines	High	High	High	High	High	★★★
Poland	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	★
Romania	High	High	Low	High	Low	★
Slovenia	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	★
South Africa	High	High	High	High	High	★★★
South Korea	Low	Low	High	Low	Low	★★★
Spain	Low	High	High	Low	High	★★★★★
Taiwan	Low	High	Low	Low	High	★★★★
Ukraine	High	High	Low	High	Low	★
Star assigned if:	Low	High	High	Low	High	

Measurement: Independent Variables

Table 4 lists the measurements for each of the ten hypotheses associated with this research.

Table 4: Independent Variables

Hypothesis	Independent Variable
H1: Economic Growth and development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GDP⁶ • HDI Classification⁷
H2: Access to Internet Connection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Percentage of individuals using the internet⁸
H3: Age of Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Years as a Democracy⁹
H4: Type of Transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pacted Transition¹⁰
H5: Cross-cutting Cleavages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of racial/religious cross-cutting cleavages in a society¹¹
H6: Unionized Workforce	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Percentage of population in unions¹²
H7: Proportionality of Electoral Rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gallagher's Index (least squares index)¹³
H8: Number of Political Parties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective number of parties at the electoral level¹⁴
H9: Parliamentary Forms of Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Form of government (Parliamentary/Presidential)¹⁵
H10: Division of Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal of Unitary government¹⁶

Sources:

⁶Gross Domestic Product, per capita: From the CIA World Fact Book. Measured in US dollars.

⁷Human Development Index Classification 2011: From the UN Development Report. Classified as "very high," "high," "medium," or "low."

⁸Percentage of individuals using the Internet: from the International Telecommunications Union. Also available from Google Data explorer.

⁹Years as a democracy: From the CIA World Fact Book.

¹⁰Pacted transition: Most taken from the model created Carsten Schneider's book on *The Consolidation of Democracy*.

¹¹From the Cross-national Indices of Multi-dimensional Measures of Social Structure (CIMMSS).

¹²Unionized workforce: percentage of population who identify as belonging to a labor union. All countries excluding Taiwan found through the World Values Survey Values Survey Databank. Taiwan gathered from the Encyclopedia of the Nations.

¹³Gallagher Index: From Gallagher and Mitchell's *The Politics of Electoral Systems*.

¹⁴Effective number of parties: From Gallagher and Mitchell's *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. (Scores for the Phillipines found in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index).

¹⁵Parliamentary/presidential form of government: From the CIA World Factbook

¹⁶Federalism: From the Forum of Federations

The data for such a wide collection of variables comes from a combination of many sources. This is a strength, because it gathers from different forms of measurements and minimize the biases that could come from a single source. All sources are reliable, but not complete for all of the countries in the case selection. Because of the missing data, a combination of multiple sources was used to fulfill the independent measures for each case. There are several different ways to measure the different independent variables listed above, but the chosen measures are the most consistent, reliable, and widely available for the most cases as possible.

Table 6: Independent Variables – Low PSI Cases

	Argentina	Mexico	Peru	Poland	Romania	Slovenia	South Africa	Ukraine
Path Dependent Factors								
GDP	\$17,700	\$14,800	\$10,200	\$20,600	\$12,600	\$29,00	\$11,100	\$7,300
HDI Classification	Very High	High	High	Very High	High	Very High	Medium	High
Percent of Individuals who use the Internet	48%	36%	37%	65%	44%	72%	21%	31%
Years as a democracy	29	12	32	23	23	21	18	21
Pacted transition	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Sociological & Cultural Factors								
Number of cross-cutting cleavages	0.944	0.903	0.923	0.931*	0.906*	0.931*	0.543	0.5
Percent of workforce in unions	2%	4.80%	4.50%	15.90%	14.30%	18.10%	6.50%	20.60%
Institutional Factors								
Gallagher Index	4.99	10.46	8.87	5.95	3.32	3.64	0.3	3.59
Effective number of parties	8.94	3.77	5.71	3.74	3.93	5.57	2.13	3.85
Form of government	Presidential	Presidential	Presidential	Parliamentary	Semi-Presidential	Parliamentary	Presidential	Semi-Presidential
Division of power	Federalist	Federalist	Unitary	Unitary	Unitary	Unitary	Federalist	Unitary
Dependent Variable	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low

Eliminating Possibilities

A review of the tables more effectively explains which theories and independent variables are not related to PSI than pointing out strong causes. Table 5 shows that there are almost no path dependent factors that make a difference in the PSI of the cases studied, and the same can be found in the Low PSI cases, shown by Table 6. There are a wide range of GDP values for both groupings, with both significantly higher values in the low PSI group and lower values in the high PSI group. HDI classification and the percent of individuals who use the Internet can also be eliminated for both the high and low PSI cases as well. Because they are fairly modernized societies, all of the cases fall within the “medium” to “very high” HDI classification, with most scoring “high” or “very high.” Although Table 5 shows that the high PSI cases tend to have higher percentages of individuals who

use the Internet, there is great variance and even some cases where Internet usage is very low. The same occurs with the low PSI cases, with percentages ranging from 21% to 72%. Nor does the number of years as an established democracy affect either the high or low PSI cases. This comes as no surprise, as the variation between the cases is very slim due to their shared status as “new democracies.”

Neither of the independent variables associated with the sociological or cultural factors appear to have an effect on the level of PSI in either the high or low cases. It is hypothesized that as the number of cross-cutting cleavages increases (or as the score gets closer to 1), the PSI will decrease. Although a few of the high PSI cases have lower levels of cross-cutting cleavages, most are high and relatively similar to the low PSI cases. There is not a significant relationship between these variables. The percent of the workforce associated with unions also does little as an explanation of the level of PSI. Both the high and low designs show no clear relationship between an increase in a unionized workforce and an increase in PSI.

Generally, institutional factors also seem to make little difference in the level of PSI. Contrary to the hypothesis, parliamentary forms of government do not dominate the high PSI cases, but rather, more cases have presidential systems. There are also more presidential forms of government in the low PSI cases, but a fair number of parliamentary systems exist, eliminating this as an explanation for the low PSI cases as well.

The division of power within a government, whether federalist or unitary, can also be eliminated as having an effect on both the high and low PSI cases. There are federalist and highly devolved unitary states that have very high levels of PSI (Brazil and Spain), and many low PSI cases with unitary governments. This goes against the predicted hypothesis.

Like other institutional factors, the effective number of parties also appears to have little significance for the high or low PSI cases. The number of effective parties is all over the board for both MSSD tables, and may be attributed to the type of electoral system in each given country. In the end, it does not appear to be a cause of the PSI in the selected cases.

High PSI cases are predicted to have lower scores on the Gallagher Index, but this study seems to show just the opposite. A score of zero on the Gallagher Index indicates an election where the seats won to vote share is perfectly proportional, and 100 would indicate perfect disproportionality. Only Brazil has a fairly low score (2.5), with others reaching a score greater than 10. The low PSI cases, on the other hand, perform better overall on the Gallagher Index, with most cases at or near a score of 5. These results do not help predict why some systems are more institutionalized and can be eliminated as a cause.¹⁹

The most promising relationship in both the high and the low PSI cases is the last path dependent variable. The presence of a pacted transition at the time of democratic transition, although

not perfect, seems to have some relationship with the level of PSI. Table 6 shows that pacted transitions were found in four of the eight cases. This on its own would hardly be enough to warrant a relationship, but Table 6 shows that only two of the low PSI cases had pacted transitions. This data shows that a pacted transition may have a significant effect on the future level of institutionalization and deserves further consideration.

The Significance of Pacted Transitions

It appears as if the only potential explanation of the level of PSI in these cases come from the presence of a pacted transition at the time of democratic transition. To further test this relationship, all sixteen cases were brought back together into a single dataset, and a single-tailed bivariate correlation was found between the level of party system institutionalization and presence of a pacted transition. The results are shown in Table 7.


Table 7: Pearson Correlation of Pacted Transitions

		Pacted Transition
Level of party system institutionalization	Pearson Correlation	.600**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.007
	N	16

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

The table above shows that there is a strong, statistically significant relationship between the level of PSI and the presence of a pacted transition. The relationship is in the predicted direction ('pacted' transition is coded as 1 in the data set, and 'not pacted' is a zero). As the level of party system institutionalization increases, the prevalence of pacted transitions also increases. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the independent and dependent variable in the form of a bar graph. Although the relationship is not perfect, a positive relationship is clear.

Figure 2: The Relationship between PSI and Pacted Transitions



Hypothesis 4 in this research appears to be correct and suggests that the way the transition to democracy is carried out and the elites that emerge to lead the new government can make a difference in the level of PSI. Stable and peaceful transitions will help perpetuate stable party systems in the future. The successes of the party system may be dependent on the circumstances of transition and could actually have little to do with the decisions made by elites thereafter.

For example, the transitions of one-star Romania and five-star Spain show the impact a peaceful, pacted transition can have on the immediate and long-term success of democracy. The Romanian transition included violent demonstrations and a coup that ended with the execution of Communist leader Nicolae Ceaucescu.¹⁹ Spain, on the other hand, featured almost every type of pact, including the elite-driven *Pacte de la Moncloa* of 1977.²⁰ There is no doubt that this peaceful transition had an impact on Spain's immediate success as a democracy. It is understood that "pacts are not always likely or possible, but we are convinced that where they are a feature of the transition, they are desirable—that is, they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy".²¹

CONCLUSION

Almost all of the hypotheses derived from the existing literature on the causes of party system institutionalization have been rejected in this study. Some of them, such as the institutional framework and rules chosen by elites, come as quite a surprise, while the finding of others were more expected. These findings suggests a disparity between the cases and the literature, or in the data gathered for each variable. Although only one independent variable, the use of pacted transitions, has been shown to have an effect on the level of PSI, many other common theories appear to be misguided.

It is entirely possible that there is no single pre-condition or choice that solely affects the level of institutionalization of a party system. It appears as if PSI is a puzzle made up of many different pieces from path-dependent, sociological and cultural, and institutional factors alike. It is also possible that the true relationship between the level of party system institutionalization and its causes was hidden by the dependent variable index used in this study. Although it was created to give a more accurate and holistic reading of the level of PSI, it is possible that electoral volatility, the traditional measure of PSI, may provide more striking results.

It is also worthy to note that some of both the high and low PSI cases appear to be outliers; they do not fit with any of the predictions. In the high PSI cases, for example, the Philippines has results for many independent variables that are not expected in a high PSI case. The opposite is true

¹⁹ Matei 2008

²⁰ Encarnación, 2003

²¹ Ibid, 2003

for Slovenia, a low PSI case that has many of the traits associated with high PSI . Further analysis into these individual cases may uncover different forces at play that contribute to their interesting outcomes. It might also be possible to produce more consistent results on a bivariate correlation or crosstabs on some of the hypothesized variables if those cases are removed.

Many possibilities exist for future research and avenues to continue exploring the causes of party system institutionalization. Although mentioned in the literature review, personalistic voting was not tested for in this research. A standardized measure may be tested to show that personalistic voting matters for PSI. Additionally, a study of the impact of a communist history may yield interesting results. Of the six post-communist states featured in this study, two are in the high PSI group compared to four with low PSI.

These results contribute the discussion of party system institutionalization in new democracies in a different way. They point to some areas that require greater focus, while creating a framework to consider the factors of party system institutionalization. The strong correlation between the level of PSI and the presence of pacted transitions show that choices made by elites really do matter and have lasting consequences. Facilitating negotiations between elites that put in place future leaders and political players can help shape the future of a new democracy. Behavior during the critical moment of regime transition is critical to the success of a new democracy countless years down the road. The results from this research suggest that there is still much to be learned in the area of PSI in new democracies.

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BUBBLE POP: AN ANALYSIS OF ASIAN POP CULTURE AND SOFT POWER POTENTIAL

Nick Desideri

***Abstract:** Despite scholarly work on Northeast Asia's growing economic influence, few authors have adequately addressed the region's increasing cultural clout as well. This paper aims to address this cultural impact in a specific diplomatic context in regards to the South Korea and Japan, and whether their respective pop cultures can be viewed as a source of soft power. An analysis of various academic works and media stories concludes that 1) neither country has been able to turn their soft power resources into actual political leverage, though 2) Japan's mishandling of its national branding puts South Korea in a much more advantageous place to do so, making it a possible regional tastemaker. In essence, this work twists the traditional understanding of Northeast Asian relations by looking at them through a different lens, seeking to bridge the gap between cultural theory and the soft power's idea of "attractiveness."*

INTRODUCTION

The Korean Invasion began not with a bang, but a "Bubble Pop!" In November 2011, influential indie music blog *Pitchfork* published a piece regarding South Korean popular music, or "K-pop," comparing the genre's takeover of the U.S. to the Spice Girls phenomena in the mid-1990s.¹ It is an apt comparison; mega-group SNSD performed at a sold-out Madison Square Garden concert as well as on popular talk shows like "Late Night with David Letterman" and "Live! With Regis and Kelly."² Competing girl group 2NE1's 2011 music video "I Am the Best" has more Youtube views than recent releases from pop juggernauts Lady Gaga, Beyoncé, Rihanna, and Nicki Minaj. The group also performed at a New York City concert after MTV viewers voted them 2011's "Best New International Band." 4Minute and BEAST held the first South American K-pop concert in Brazil last year; the concert garnered 3,500 attendees as well as a TV special.³

The list of K-pop acts trying to break into the West could fill pages, but as Korean artists move towards the West's lucrative markets, it is easy to forget the dominance they have already established in Asia. From fashion to television to music, South Korea has blossomed into a cultural force in the region. Young people in Thailand, China, Vietnam, Malaysia and even Japan view Korea as the new "cool" country.⁴ This "Korean Wave," more commonly called "Hallyu," has become a driving cultural power that is changing traditional relations and perceptions between the two Koreas, the peninsula's neighbors, and the West. Underneath the shiny veneer of rainbows, dancing, melodrama, pop hooks, and compulsory cuteness lies a force that could affect everything from perceptions of nationality to regional beauty standards. Though many authors have praised K-pop's soft power potential, it is important to qualify how such influence could be realized presuming it even exists. A case study of Japan, Asia's tastemaker in the 1990s, can help elucidate the complexities surrounding pop culture and soft diplomacy. An analysis of Japan's experiment with cultural soft

¹ James Brooks, "To Anyone," *Pitchfork*, November 11, 2011

² "What does the United States think of Girls' Generation?" *CNNgo*, 2 February, 2012

³ "South America experiences 'United Cube in Brazil' concert" *Allkpop.com*, 14 December, 2012

⁴ Pongvutham 2008, 42

power as it relates to the Hallyu Wave not only highlights South Korea's potential regional influence, but also demonstrates how popular culture can shape foreign policy and transnational narratives.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF SOFT POWER

Before turning to East Asia, a review of the term “soft power,” as well as its connotations, is necessary. In his 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, neoliberal theorist Joseph Nye argues that the realpolitik life-or-death foreign policy of the Cold War era grew increasingly unwieldy after the fall of the Soviet Union. Hard power, or direct coercion through military force, had become more politically and economically costly. He attributes this change in power to five factors: “economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues.”⁵ Direct action against other states, for example, would undermine the aggressor's own economic security as fearful uncertainty rocks the globalized economy.⁶ Technological advances not only change the nature of state security, but offer transnational terrorist organizations cheap weaponry to thwart military intervention.⁷

As world issues become less tangible, or “hard,” policy solutions need to become less hard as well. Nye's soft power dismisses America's carrot and stick approach to power during the Cold War; instead of a country “...ordering others to do what it wants...” it must convince “...other countries to *want* what it wants.”⁸ Country A may change its policies toward country B due to what Nye deems “...the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.”⁹

Nye's theory immediately gained attention in international relations circles. As Janice Bially Mattern points out, “...the appeal of soft power is that it is relatively cheap and it does not involve sending young citizens off to war.”¹⁰ The idea gained even more traction after September 11th when U.S. policymakers realized the depth of disdain the superpower inspired across the Middle East. While the U.S. military prepared for conventional warfare between opposing states, the 9/11 aggressors were borderless and transnational; this issue, Evelyn Goh notes, represents a “second-tier threat” that has “...considerable potential to undermine the foundation of American power.”¹¹

Until September 11th, Goh argues, the U.S. relied on projecting its dominance through hard power.¹² After witnessing the difficulties the U.S. military encountered in Iraq, political scientists like William C. Banks assert that soft power “...can reduce the attractiveness of terrorism to potential

⁵ Nye 1990, 182

⁶ Ibid. 183

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid. 76

⁹ Nye 2004, 120

¹⁰ Mattern 2005, 589

¹¹ Goh 2002, 3

¹² Ibid.

supporters and operatives” without the economic and human cost.¹³ The soft power discussion also began to move eastward, as scholars applied the concept to China’s growing influence.¹⁴ Recognizing how negative perceptions of American foreign policy earned the superpower such enmity, China has continuously painted its economic ascendancy as a “peaceful rise” in order to placate other regional players.¹⁵ A warehouse could be filled with the deluge of works praising the miraculous effects of soft power. The opinions are not entirely revolutionary; they represent an impulsive interest and a rush to legitimize the application of an unexplored concept after the 9/11 paradigm shift. However, some authors resisted the urge and attempted to deconstruct the theoretical underpinnings of soft power instead of merely advocating its applicability.

The most significant issue regarding the concept is defining what exactly constitutes soft power. In his critique of Nye’s work, Todd Hall attacks soft power for existing simultaneously as a “category of analysis” and a “category of practice.”¹⁶ Since soft power cannot be analyzed by any measure but itself, simply deeming a policy “soft” constitutes soft power in the proper context. For example, when the European Union advocates for multilateral solutions, they are not actually utilizing soft power but merely marketing their current policies and values as universal and attractive.¹⁷ This ambiguity creates confusion among scholars about what exactly constitutes soft power. Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang argue that China has amassed soft power as countries from Africa to Latin America have shown interest in adopting the Beijing model, which implies a level of admiration.¹⁸ In contrast, Hall contends that China’s citation of the Beijing model of development does not constitute true soft power, since the imitation of an economic model does not imply the impersonator has changed its views on China.¹⁹ Turning to Nye offers little clarification. While he acknowledges how “a successful economy is an important source of attraction,” he also emphasizes the difficulty of distinguishing when countries are pushed towards an economic model by market forces or drawn by sincere attraction to a country’s “successful economic or political system.”²⁰ It is difficult to determine where emulation begins and economic self-interest ends.

With this hurdle in mind, many scholars have moved to address the cultural element of soft power. In particular, pop culture has garnered interest for its role facilitating the production of soft power. In their 2009 work *Pop Goes IR? Researching the Popular Culture–World Politics Continuum*, Kyle Grayson, Matt Damies and Simon Philpott argue that popular culture serves as a narrative-building

¹³ Banks 2009, 598

¹⁴ Lo 2012

¹⁵ Garrison 2005, 25

¹⁶ Hall 2010, 192

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 197

¹⁸ Gill and Huang 2006

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Joseph Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, 29 April, 2012

device which guides the way individuals perceive politics. They use the U.S. show *24* as an example; *24* influences the way American citizens visualize counterterrorism, which influences their politicians attitudes towards enhanced interrogation, which results in policies that affect the way other countries perceive the U.S.²¹ However, their analysis only focuses on how pop culture shapes domestic audiences, not foreign ones. John M. Owen bridges this gap by stressing that while culture can reap soft power for a nation, it can only do so at the highest level "...when political elites in B desire for B to adopt more of A's political and social institutions or policies."²² But Owen ignores "...language, literature, art, music, brands, cuisine, and other cultural artifacts," basically almost every integral component of popular culture!²³

Scholars have addressed popular culture as it relates to foreign perception at a domestic level but not at an international one. What remains is a giant gap that neglects the spread of popular culture in an increasingly interconnected and transnational world. Nye argues that "popular culture is often a resource for soft power, but... the effectiveness of any power resource depends on the context."²⁴

THE CASE OF JAPAN

Japan's recent experiment with soft power presents the perfect opportunity to deconstruct this unexplored context and provides guidance on how such context could apply to the South Korean example. Japan's pursuit of soft power first came to the West's attention with *Foreign Policy* contributor Douglas McGray's famous piece, "Japan's Gross National Cool." In the article, McGray illustrates how despite American corporate penetration, Japan retained a distinct cultural flair that other populations found cool.²⁵ From Indonesia to China to the U.S, Japanese products found huge popularity. Fads like Pokémon swept across the globe, and the style editor of the *New York Times* even argued that "Tokyo is the real international capital of fashion."²⁶

How did Japanese products achieve such popularity? Some attribute Japan's lost decade of the 1990s for fueling Japan's "cool" industry. When Japan's economic bubble burst, corporations were left scrambling to regain market share. With economic conditions worsening, the smaller, entrepreneur-focused industries that produced "teen-centric" products like *anime*, *manga*, and video games grew in popularity both domestically and internationally.²⁷ Through innovation, firms like Nintendo shed the stifling "corporate Japan" image and began targeting overseas markets.²⁸ Soon,

²¹ Damies, Grayson, and Philpott 2009

²² Owen 2006, 19

²³ Ibid. 20

²⁴ Nye 2004, 12

²⁵ Douglas McGray, "Japan's Gross National Cool," *Foreign Policy*, 1 May, 2002

²⁶ Douglas McGray, "Japan's Gross National Cool," *Foreign Policy*, 1 May, 2002,

²⁷ Daliot-Bul 2009, 257

²⁸ Ibid.

“Japanese global cultural export value... tripled in the 11 years between 1993 and 2003.”²⁹ Japan had captured 9.5 percent of the global cultural content market, making it the “second largest producer of culture” behind the U.S.³⁰ Despite its prolonged recession, Japan had become an international cultural powerhouse.³¹ It successfully spread its distinct culture across the globe by offering interesting new media and goods. But Japan faced a problem, one endemic with soft power brokers; though it possessed vast quantities of “soft resources,” or immaterial ways to gain and leverage favor, it did not know how to actualize this influence into “...positive outcomes for [its] foreign policy goals.”³² The spread of Japanese cultural products offered the country incredible levels of cultural influence, but it could not to translate its new cultural capital into political power.

To remedy this, Japan bravely declared pop culture an integral component of its foreign policy in 2003 with the creation of the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters. The IPSH was tasked by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro with making Japan an “Intellectual Property Nation”³³ In 2006, Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso announced that cultural exports, specifically *manga*, would form the “Japan brand.”³⁴ Eager to emulate the influence of American icons like Popeye, who to the Japanese symbolized American strength during Japanese postwar reconstruction, Aso noted that by building a positive image of Japan through cultural consumer products, “...the easier it becomes for Japan to get its views across over the long term... Japanese diplomacy is able to keep edging forward, bit by bit, and bring about better and better outcomes as a result”³⁵ As prime minister two years later, Aso allocated an 8.4 percent increase in funds between 2007 and 2008 to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry to promote the content industry through marketing and subsidizing domestic talent.³⁶ What initially started as private cultural enterprises were soon hijacked by the public sphere, which threw money at the industry to churn out more cool. By 2009, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs implemented various pop culture programs, such as *manga* conventions, across the globe to build Japan’s cultural diplomacy.³⁷ Through government endorsement, Japan hoped to make its popular culture more than just a fad. It sought to use pop culture not only as a way to foster a positive image of Japan, but also to make Japan seem unique. As Aso stated, the country needed a brand to tie together its image and culture with its foreign policy.

²⁹ Otmazgin 2008, 79

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ McGray 2002

³² Hall 2010, 200; Lee 2012, 197

³³ Choo 2012, 89

³⁴ Aso, Speech to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid. 2012

³⁷ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Pop-culture Diplomacy,” 2009

This desire to build a national brand is not a new one, argues Wally Olins. Instead, the need has increased due to the sheer number of countries peddling culture as a consumer good.³⁸ Not only has branding become more necessary, but poor planning can unhinge a national brand and cost untold amounts of cultural and financial capital. Olins argues that a perfect mix of private and public participation can successfully implement a national brand.³⁹ By capitalizing on growing trends and promoting domestic talent, Japan definitely made steps in the right direction to sustain its pop culture dominance and turn it into a distinctive brand. But Olins also believes that the national brand must communicate a “core idea” about its values and personality in order to truly be effective.⁴⁰

Mixed Messages

This is where Japan’s brand falls apart, and the futility of its soft power initiatives becomes apparent. Every soft power exchange involves a messenger and a receiver. The messenger codes the message it is sending with a specific meaning; in Japan’s case, the country sought to impart a positive image of Japan through cultural products. By marketing its products as embodying long-held Japanese cultural values like harmony, compassion and coexistence, Japan creates a paradox that highlights the impotence of its soft power policy.⁴¹

Even if a cartoon like Pokémon could prove a vehicle for such values, other Asian countries definitely do not see Japan as harmonious, compassionate, or cooperative. After the fall of the Soviet bloc, newly resurgent Asian nationalism caused many nations to reassess their relationship with Japan.⁴² Most notably, South Korea and China began a period of reflection on the past few decades, particularly on the horrors inflicted upon them by their island neighbor. While anti-Japanese protests in South Korea and China were often transitory, they belied an undercurrent of resentment against Japan.⁴³ China was angered by Japan’s refusal to recognize its atrocities committed against the Chinese people in World War II. A contentious historical relationship and 35 years of brutal colonial rule, from 1910-1945, embittered Koreans.

A pan-Asian poll on opinions of Japanese products revealed this simmering animosity. Residents of Hong Kong and Thailand deemed Japanese products “creative, interesting, funny, and of high quality” by an overwhelming majority, with very few respondents including Japan’s past militarism in their assessment.⁴⁴ A good majority of Seoul residents applied similar adjectives to Japanese products, but 62 percent of them also “...outlined Japan’s wartime responsibilities in their

³⁸ Olins 2005, 172

³⁹ Ibid. 175

⁴⁰ Olins 2005, 178-179

⁴¹ Daliot-Bul 2009. 253

⁴² Park 2008, 191

⁴³ Ibid. 195

⁴⁴ Otmazgin 2008, 94

descriptions.”⁴⁵ South Koreans praised Japanese cultural products, but this appreciation fails to translate to appreciation for Japan’s policies or history; “I like their fashion, music and movies, but sometimes they make me mad because of the way they treat history,” noted one young respondent.⁴⁶ Though professing the importance of Japanese pop culture, Chinese citizens expressed similar disdain. In a 2008 public survey on soft power, Chinese respondents gave Japan a 46 percent on the “positive feelings” scale, the lowest rating of all Asian nations.⁴⁷

The cultural narrative Japan hopes to sell directly conflicts with the cultural narratives that its neighbors have written, forcing them to separate the Japan-ness from the actual product they are consuming.⁴⁸ In essence, Japan’s message of harmony and coexistence fails to dispel preconceived notions of the intended audience. These feelings are reflected in the 2008 survey, where South Korea and China rank Japan the lowest in Asia on “respect for the other sovereignty of other Asian nations.”⁴⁹ Even more damning, 64 percent of Chinese do not believe that China and Japan share similar values.⁵⁰ Japan not only failed to project a peaceful, positive image to these nations, but it could not even persuade transnational consumers to covet the Japanese of life. Individuals may enjoy Japan’s modern pop culture, but this attraction fails to carry over to official Japanese government policies, signifying an inability to actualize soft power. While this does not represent a total failure of governmental policy, it illustrates how even vast amounts of soft resources cannot negate intense historical animosity.

Marketing products such as *manga* as uniquely Japanese also weakened the universal appeal of cultural products. Part of the allure of consuming another country’s cultural products is the ability to immerse oneself in the exoticism of the product while simultaneously feeling like part of a larger cultural movement. A country must balance this universal appeal while also subtly promoting its distinctive cultural flair. Japan upset this equilibrium with the introduction of the International *MANGA* Award in 2007.⁵¹ While the step to create a forum for the discussion and recognition of *manga* from around the world was a smart move, the Japanese government made a major misstep; all of the appointed judges on the *manga* competition award panel were Japanese.⁵² This raised ire among many international *manga* enthusiasts, who felt incensed by the implication that *manga* was only Japanese. One Chinese *manga* buff aptly pointed out, “The world is vast. How can an award that uses

⁴⁵ Ibid. 95

⁴⁶ Ibid. 96

⁴⁷ Whitney 2009, 19

⁴⁸ Berger 2008, 22; Mattern 2005

⁴⁹ Ibid. 2009, 30-32

⁵⁰ Ibid. 2009, 30

⁵¹ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Pop-Culture Diplomacy,” 2009

⁵² Lo 2012, 183

the Japanese aesthetic as its sole criterion serve its multitudes?”⁵³ Suddenly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ boast that it received *manga* submissions from over thirty countries seemed far less significant, considering the lack of true objectivity offered by the judging panel.⁵⁴ By rigidly maintaining *manga*’s Japanese-ness, the MOFA indirectly alienated fans and potential contributors who saw the art form as simultaneously universal and Japanese, resulting in a net loss of soft resources.

Finally, by recognizing the coolness of Japanese products like *manga* and *anime*, the Japanese government accidentally made them uncool. Take the typical American teenager as an example. The product or fad is only cool until the general populace enjoys it, or even worse, his middle-aged parents do. The Japanese government represents the unhip authority figure that is painfully late to the bandwagon.⁵⁵ Official acknowledgement of cultural diplomacy diminishes consumer receptiveness to message as the motives of the sender seem motivated by self-interest.⁵⁶ Worse, consumers might feel discouraged from enjoying officially sanctioned products for fear of “brainwashing.”⁵⁷ While this claim is extreme, it effectively recognizes that eerie sense of foreign pressure *manga* readers may feel if aware of Japan’s official policy.

In order to achieve soft power, Mattern states that the messenger must “...narrate away some precious fundamental truth...” in the reality of the receiver.⁵⁸ Overall, the Japanese narrative has failed to override the accepted historical realities of China and South Korea, its two most important neighbors. Japanese cultural products have fostered a fondness for the country’s cultural exports and entertainment industry, but not for the country itself. Other missteps, like publicly deeming pop culture a diplomatic tool, or pushing a specific “country-ness” to the point of isolating foreign fans, offer warnings to policymakers who wish to capitalize on cultural soft resources.

RIDING THE HALLYU: THE FUTURE OF KOREAN SOFT POWER

A comparative analysis of Japan and South Korea’s potential pop culture power and policies shows that the latter is in a more advantageous position than Japan, indicating that South Korea will benefit greatly from the Korean Wave. Similar to Japan in the 1990s, South Korea disseminated cultural products across Asia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The first Korean drama to gain international acclaim was 1997’s “Star in My Heart,” when its dubbed broadcast earned fantastic ratings in China.⁵⁹ Broadcasting companies in Thailand, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, and Indonesia

⁵³ Ibid. 183

⁵⁴ Ibid. 2009

⁵⁵ Daliot-Bul 2009, 262

⁵⁶ Kroenig, McAdam, and Weber 2010, 426

⁵⁷ Press-Baranthan 2012, 36

⁵⁸ Mattern 2005, 205

⁵⁹ Sang-Yeon 2008, 14

began airing Korean dramas to satisfy enormous demand for the slickly produced shows.⁶⁰ An even bigger coup was the popularity of Korean media in Japan. The K-drama “Winter Sonata” broke records by garnering 15 percent of Japanese audience share and 20 percent with its series finale.⁶¹

The country that started the first Asian Wave became the second largest consumer of K-dramas by 2006.⁶² The incredibly popular soundtracks for K-dramas also helped stimulate an interest in Korean pop music; soon, pop stars like Rain and BoA, as well as idol groups like SNSD and TVXQ, gained massive popularity both domestically and regionally.⁶³ In an effort to break bigger markets, groups like KARA and Orange Caramel have recorded music in Japanese and Mandarin, which helps boost K-pop’s universal appeal. This attraction is apparent when examining Hallyu’s economic impact. The Korean Wave drew 10 million tourists to South Korea in 2011, often to attend concerts or visit the sets of their favorite K-dramas, and industry experts estimate that the Hallyu market has grown to \$300 billion.⁶⁴

Like Japan, South Korea recognized the potential to turn these cultural resources into soft power. To build the Korean brand, South Korea took an all-important step by creating a public agency, the Korean Creative Content Agency (KOCCA), to aid private industry in the effective spread of Hallyu. KOCCA’s tasks include “...the exportation of cultural products, the education of content creation, the development of related technologies,” and “...providing other financial, legal, and policy support for related industries.”⁶⁵ Receiving an annual budget of 100 billion Won (US\$88 million) in 2009,⁶⁶ the South Korean government increased funding by billions of Won in 2012 to “...keep this wave surging.”⁶⁷

The main reason for this shift away from Japanese cultural products to Korean ones was the Asian economic crisis, which made Japanese products too expensive for the average consumer.⁶⁸ Even in 2000, three years after the start of the crisis, Korean dramas cost a only a quarter of what it took to produce their Japanese counterparts.⁶⁹ However, other sources suggest that while economic factors played a large role, other features of the Korean Wave put the South Korea in a more favorable position to capitalize on its cultural resources than Japan.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 13

⁶¹ Mori 2008, 130

⁶² Apron 2008, 30

⁶³ Ryou 2009, 140

⁶⁴ “Korea to expand support for 'hallyu' next year,” *Korea Times*, 29 December, 2011; “Hallyu Boom Triggers Bureaucratic Turf War,” *Korea Times*, 12 March, 2012

⁶⁵ Lee 2012, 129

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ “Korea to expand support for 'hallyu' next year,” *Korea Times*, 29 December, 2011

⁶⁸ Sang-yeon 2008, 14

⁶⁹ Sang-yeon 2008, 15

The first and most important difference between Hallyu and Cool Japan is that South Korea's lack of historical baggage facilitates easier "attraction" between messenger and receiver. The regional image South Korea must change is far less severe than Japan's. Common perceptions associated with South Korea across the region were "feudal," "violent," "poor," and "politically unstable," mostly due historical events such as the Korean War, pre-development poverty, and student protests in the 1980s.⁷⁰ However, most of these negative misconceptions can be (and have been) negated by Korean cultural products. For example, when 2,200 Japanese citizens were polled, "...26 percent of those surveyed admitted their image of Korea had changed due to the consumption of Korean drama."⁷¹ Mori finds that for many consumers in Asia, their fandom of Korean dramas "...made [them] reconsider how [they] should understand history" and visualize South Korea.⁷² Asian consumers find South Korean pop culture far more palatable than its Japanese equivalent, since the tiny peninsular nation lacks the imperialist past so many associate with Japan.⁷³ Receivers of the Korean message do not face the cognitive dissonance they experience with Japanese pop culture; they simply negate their previously held assumptions about South Korea with what they see onscreen. It is far easier to correct misconceptions of economic squalor with flashy music videos than a history of wartime atrocities with Hello Kitty.

In fact, even the imagery of the Korean Wave is more persuasive than that of its Japanese predecessor. In today's rapidly shifting pop culture landscape, Jon Simons argues that cultural capital has shifted from the "graphosphere" (print media) to the "mediasphere" (television mediums), despite the former's ability to more strongly convey a culture's ethos.⁷⁴ However, print media demands much attention, while visual media only requires fleeting concentration to absorb a message. Though K-pop videos and K-drama often contain very little true "Korean-ness," the receiver can quickly consume the product and still recognize its Korean "coolness." Since *manga* is print, it demands far more devotion and active participation from the reader, making it far less accessible, literally and abstractly, than web or television-based visual media. *Manga* and *anime*, which are mostly fantasy, do not sell the Japanese way of life or make the country relatable. While they are Japanese, they do not give the reader any concrete depictions of Japan. Studies of *manga* readers found that they often used the product merely as an escapist tool.⁷⁵ In contrast, Hallyu sells a different type of escapism, but one the viewer could conceptually envision attaining. In essence, this

⁷⁰ Geun 2009, 145; Ryoo 2009, 141

⁷¹ Chua 2012, 70

⁷² Mori 2008, 140; Hirata 2008, 154

⁷³ Armstrong 2008, 156

⁷⁴ Simons 2003, 174

⁷⁵ Bouissou 2012, 58

combination makes the South Korean lifestyle not only seem achievable, but also desirable and attractive.⁷⁶

East Asian consumers also view South Korea as more “Asian” than Japan, putting it in a far more advantageous position from a regional standpoint. Strong Japan-U.S. bilateral relations, fostered by post-World War II reconstruction, pulled Japan westward; despite the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea after the Korean War, the stigma did not stick to the latter as strongly as it did the former. As such, Japan was often seen as “America’s Japan,” with values more aligned with the West than the East.⁷⁷ Though Japanese dramas are well-produced, many Asian consumers complain that the dramas are too liberal and Western, especially concerning sexuality.⁷⁸ In contrast, K-dramas and other Korean Wave media successfully weave modernity with traditional Asian values. K-dramas “...set in Seoul showed a sophisticated urban lifestyle while focusing on family values and relationships,” providing an attractive ideal to a rising Chinese middle class.⁷⁹ K-pop incorporates “...all the latest musical idioms and dance moves borrowed from the United States” but tones down the sexuality to craft a perfect package of “cutting-edge styles and cultural familiarity.”⁸⁰ By melding Western style with Asian sensibilities, South Korean cultural industries have created an irresistibly attractive product. As one Chinese college student noted, “...South Korea and America have similar political systems and economies. But it is easier to accept that lifestyle from South Koreans because they are culturally closer to us. We feel we can live like them in a few years.”⁸¹ Interestingly, the respondent not only recognized South Korea’s economic strength, but its democracy as well, signifying not only an appreciation for Korea’s cultural products but its political system as well. Due to various factors like a less militaristic history, more accessible media content, and an Eastern values system, Hallyu is well-positioned to reap considerable soft power for South Korea. Brand Korea exudes modern “cool” and economic allure in the context of conservative Asian values that other East Asian nations find appealing.

NOW WHAT?

Though South Korea possesses far more soft power potential than Japan, it faces the same problem of translating cultural influence into actual political influence. As Olins noted, brand effectiveness takes a long time to materialize and is very hard to measure.⁸² However, certain trends suggest that South Korea’s cultural plateau gives it immense influence in the region, specifically with regard to North Korea and the development of regional identities and consumer taste.

⁷⁶ Lee 2009, 145

⁷⁷ Daliot-Bul 2009, 254

⁷⁸ Lin and Tong 2008, 115

⁷⁹ Armstrong 2008, 156

⁸⁰ Armstrong 2008, 156-157

⁸¹ Ryo 2009, 145

⁸² Olins 2005, 193

Arguably, the South is already exerting cultural soft power on its unruly northern brother, sparking discussion that Hallyu might even bring down Kim Jong Un's dictatorial regime.⁸³ While these claims are optimistic fantasy, Hallyu is certainly impacting relations between the two Koreas. Since the partition of the peninsula in 1950, the North has always domestically painted the South as a poor, regressive backwater. The fact that South Korea's annual GDP growth is actually larger than the North's entire economy highlights the absurdity of the claim.⁸⁴ Though official statistics do not exist, defectors say that South Korean music is widespread in the North despite an official ban.⁸⁵ The appeal is obvious considering the differences; music videos from the South depict a vibrant, lively society, while North Korean music videos usually consist of static shots of food or sequences of productive workers.⁸⁶ With lyrics like "Socialism defended by our party's red flag is ours," North Korean pop is just dreary.⁸⁷ K-pop, on the other hand, serves as escapism for an impoverished populace, while simultaneously negating ruling party propaganda. The fact that many Northern citizens envy the wealth of their Southern counterparts despite lifetimes of communist indoctrination illustrates the viability of Hallyu as a cultural and political force.

Though Hallyu might facilitate reconciliation, it could also complicate the process. Since North Korean citizens have little to no understanding of capitalism, they often believe that all South Korean citizens live glamorously with little effort. When defectors successfully arrive in Seoul, they usually face overwhelming disillusionment as their preconceived notions fall apart.⁸⁸ Even after years in the South and extensive government-funded adjustment programs, 58 percent of defectors miss life in the North.⁸⁹ The unrealistic expectations fueled by K-pop products might contribute to this feeling.

While this phenomenon remains problematic, Hallyu might also facilitate a transition to reunification. The 50-year North-South partition has already resulted in language variance and different dialects on either side. Language barriers have proven to be a huge hurdle for Northern defectors, especially in the search for employment.⁹⁰ The spread of Hallyu products across the North may help its citizens adjust to the otherwise alien dialect of their southern neighbors. Also, to many young adults in the South, North Korean citizens have already become an othered group. Perhaps the spread of a common culture across the 39th parallel will enable dialogue on pop cultural products, reducing the perceived foreignness between the two groups.

⁸³ Radio Free Asia, "North Korea 'Quietly Opening,'" 10 May, 2012

⁸⁴ Pethokoukus 2011, n.p.

⁸⁵ "South Korean pop culture 'widespread' in North Korea - defector group," *BBC*, 10 December, 2010

⁸⁶ Howard 2006, 163

⁸⁷ Fuqua 2011, 90

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 92

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 93

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 91; Radio Free Asia, "North Korean Teen Defectors Face Huge Challenges," 21 March, 2007

Hallyu could not only give South Korea unprecedented influence in the shaping of a united peninsular culture, but in the production of a pan-regional one as well. Hallyu products are mostly consumed by women across East Asia, especially in China and Japan. Though women have been politically and historically marginalized in the region, Hallyu has economically empowered some of them.⁹¹ Previously, many middle to lower class women in Asia, relegated to the home, left responsibility for major financial transactions to their husbands.⁹² However, Hallyu fandom motivated women to spend money on their own desires. For example, traveling to popular K-drama filming sites, which East Asian women have started doing en masse, represents a form of female financial independence previously unseen in the region.⁹³ By economically empowering women, Hallyu has tapped a market willing to spend money on its products. Women from Japan, China, Thailand, Taiwan, and other countries then form transnational relationships based on these shared consumer tastes.⁹⁴ Hallyu has homogenized regional consumer cultural consumption.

Hallyu also changed the way Asian women perceive the “perfect woman” on a mental and physical level. Though K-dramas still encourage women to act conservatively and put marriage or relationships first, they also display women who make independent decisions and hold jobs. This emphasis on both the modern and traditional has created a hybrid ideal where “...a happy modern woman should be career-minded while dedicated to a man/relationship at the same time.”⁹⁵ While women still see marriage as necessary, they have also begun to see personal and financial fulfillment as a worthy goal. Even more intriguing, Hallyu has the potential to nurture a universal beauty standard across Asia. Thousands of women, mostly from China and Japan, travel to Seoul to receive cosmetic facial surgery.⁹⁶ One Chinese “plastic surgery tourist” told the BBC that since “...all Korean women are beautiful,” she wanted plastic surgery to look just like them.⁹⁷ With their omnipresence across Asia, Hallyu stars have set a new universal beauty standard that transcends stereotypes and culture. A century ago, Japanese imperialists labeled Koreans inferior and ugly; now Japanese women receive plastic surgery to look Korean.⁹⁸

By making East Asians not only desire the South Korean lifestyle, but also emulate the way it looks and buy what it buys, the country has accumulated an unprecedented amount of cultural soft resources. According to the 2008 soft power survey, 79 percent of Chinese, 78 percent of Japanese, and 83 percent of Vietnamese view the spread of South Korean culture as positive, and “have a high

⁹¹ Oh 2009, 431

⁹² Lin and Tong 2008, 109

⁹³ Hirata 2008, 143

⁹⁴ Mori 2008, 141

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ “Cosmetic surgery on the rise due to Hallyu Wave?” *Her World Plus*, 23 April, 2012

⁹⁷ “A Korean nip and tuck to look like a film star,” *BBC*, 11 November, 2011

⁹⁸ Oh 2009, 447

respect for South Korean cultural power.”⁹⁹ This cultural soft power has materialized by influencing regional standards on gender norms and consumer behavior by making them more “Korean.” While this influence may seem insignificant, as Olins mentioned, the impact of branding takes time to develop.

South Korea is on a path to recognizing its soft power as a both a reputational, representational, and regional force. Hall defines a reputational power as a country that has, as Olins advocated, found its international niche. For example, “A reputation for giving aid might dispel suspicions that a state has exploitative intentions.”¹⁰⁰ With its ability to appealingly blend Western sensibilities with Asian values, South Korea could paint itself as a bridge between East and West. A representational power can “...shape beliefs about things other than reputations” by manipulating the subjectivity of target groups, as South Korea has done.¹⁰¹ China represents a good target for this representational power. While China officially supports the Northern regime now, perhaps tomorrow’s Communist Party leaders will recognize the cultural juggernaut of the South. How will their official ally, their impoverished and erratic neighbor, seem in comparison? Finally, South Korea could possibly function as the fulcrum for regional integration. Zhu Majie notes that as cultures become increasingly homogenized, states are more likely to regionalize, which may help foster a multipolar world.¹⁰² With colonial animosities possibly cooling due to cultural exchange, Michael R. Auslin sees Japan and Korea as East Asia’s potential “New Core.”¹⁰³ Bilateral cooperation between the East Asia’s second largest economy and the region’s cultural tastemaker would not only lead to a more secure, democratic East Asia, but also help form a bulwark against China’s ascendancy and foster more regional cooperation.¹⁰⁴ An increasingly homogenized popular culture could help Asia coalesce into a more discernable bloc, giving it more international influence.

Soft power is a slippery term. While the idea of leveraging influence as a negotiating tool is tempting, merely labeling a policy as “soft” does not make it so. Even more difficult than qualifying soft power is actualizing it. A large reserve of soft resources does not always translate into cultural influence. Japan encountered this problem its cultural products went global. The country’s imperial past and clumsy handling of its soft power initiative made converting its cultural influence into political power difficult. With its relatively unblemished historical record, stereotype-smashing products, and ability to blend East and West sensibilities, South Korea is in a far better place to implement soft power than Japan. By homogenizing regional consumer tastes, it already has. Many

⁹⁹ Whitney 2009, 22

¹⁰⁰ Hall 2010, 209; Olins 2005, 178

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 210

¹⁰² Majie 2002, 61

¹⁰³ Auslin 2005, 472

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 474

consumers of Hallyu products not only cite the good itself as appealing, but also the South Korean lifestyle and political system. Whether providing North Korean residents with views of a different life or changing the way Japanese girls perceive beauty, the Hallyu Wave offers South Korea the opportunity to wield a strong representational role in East Asia as a trendsetter. This will most likely lead to increased regional integration by providing a standardized, transnational pop culture supported by the spending habits of middle to upper-middle class women. While Hallyu's potential in the West remains mostly untested outside of the ubiquitous "Gangnam Style," its positive reception in Asia signifies a victory for South Korean foreign policy and a wellspring of future soft power potential.

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PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES: THE BENEFITS OF COMBINING PARTITION AND POWER-SHARING

Abigail Carter

***Abstract:** Recent conflict resolutions have attempted to explain the best route of resolving ethnic conflicts within divided societies. This research attempts to engage in the recent debate surrounding conflict resolution which highlights the effects of partition and power-sharing programs upon democratic consolidation. By using a focused-structured comparison of three cases, partition is found to be insufficient in attaining democracy. A combination of partition and power-sharing leads to more democratic consolidation within divided societies. Further, a society which is affluent and gender equal, neighbors other liberal democracies, and fully develops power-sharing institutions will enjoy significant advantages in securing stable and lasting democratic outcomes.*

INTRODUCTION

Conflicts typically arise from deep-rooted differences between populations within a society. These differences can be ethnic, religious, and racial, among others. Ethnic hatred is regarded as the root of most civil conflict.¹ Ethnic civil wars are characterized by deeply rooted ethnic identities and strong religious overtones.² Much of the fighting is triggered by atrocities on both sides, and revenge tactics are the basis of much of the violence. It has been proven that ethnic differences have led to the most long-lasting and violent forms of intrastate conflict.³ Many divided societies with significant ethnic tension will experience large-scale violence when one or both sides of the conflict feel that there is no alternative strategy.⁴

Tensions between ethnic communities are generally thought to undermine government legitimacy, social tolerance, and interpersonal trust.⁵ Divided societies are widely assumed to face challenges in holding democratic elections, maintaining political stability, and accommodating rival communities. Therefore, it is harder to build lasting and high quality democracy in divided post-conflict societies. It is one thing to settle a conflict but quite another to consolidate democracy afterwards. Some believe peace to be an essential criterion for successful democratic resolutions⁶; however, peace may be necessary but it is not a sufficient criterion for democratic consolidation. Conflict resolutions should establish pathways for divided societies to develop into liberal democracies.

A liberal democracy can be characterized as a system with the existence of political rights in terms of electoral processes, political pluralism, and the functioning of government.⁷ The existence of civil liberties, which include freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights, is also an indicator of liberal democracies. The establishment of a liberal democracy allows all groups in

¹ Norris 2008

² Sambanis 2000, 439

³ Kaufmann 1998

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Norris 2008

⁶ Simonsen 2005, 301

⁷ Norris 2008

society to be on an equal playing field in both politics and society as a whole. Hence, peace may be necessary for democracy, but the establishment of liberal democracy may also be the first step of maintaining peace and stability in multiethnic societies.

Given the importance of building democracy in divided societies, scholars are concerned with identifying strategies for democratic consolidation. Two major approaches are typically prescribed to promote peace and democracy within divided societies. Social scientists and policymakers remain divided on which path better reduces conflict and promotes democratic institutions. While some believe that separating the two or more groups by partition leads to the best prospects for peace and democracy, others believe that implementing power-sharing institutions is necessary to make peace last and give all the major actors a stake in making democracy work. Partitions promote more security for groups since they have their own territory, but this process also uproots people's lives and can lead to more violence. On the other hand, political scientists debate whether power-sharing governments can reduce political instability in societies experiencing conflict, or whether these arrangements may reinforce ethnic hatred or even create a resurgence of communal violence.⁸

Questions about whether to use partitions or power-sharing regimes to establish more democratic regimes in ethnically divided societies do not have a definitive answer, yet it is vital for the international community and domestic reformers to understand which route will be most effective in promoting and sustaining democratic reforms.⁹ The aim of this research is to examine whether partition alone is enough to secure both peace and democracy by analyzing three post-partition societies with differing degrees of power-sharing institutions. These societies have all experienced high degrees of violence which ended in a partition or population transfer between the feuding groups. The hope is that this research will lead to more insight for states experiencing ethnic conflict, so that others concerned with peace and democratic stability understand what works best and what they should adopt in their negotiating process.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Theory of Partition

Many scholars believe that physically separating conflict populations is the best solution to the most intense ethnic conflicts.¹⁰ The theory of partition focuses on the sanction of territorial separation as a means of giving feuding groups autonomy and sovereignty over their territory. Political partitions involve a separation, defined as having at least a partially novel border, cut

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 22

¹⁰ Kaufman 1998

through one or more of the national community's homeland(s).¹¹ The territory is divided into sections marked with borders that may be reinforced by walls, fences, or official posts with security checkpoints. Such structures can be seen in the walls between Belfast communities in Northern Ireland or the partitioned UN buffer zone in Cyprus. Partition is typically a political decision reached by a group from the international community which believes that irreconcilable differences between the feuding groups prevent future cooperation.¹²

The basis of the partition argument is the concept of a security dilemma which will not allow peace between the feuding populations. The dilemma creates a situation in which no group can provide its own security without encroaching on the security of the other group.¹³ It becomes more difficult for the feuding groups to defend their communities without going on the offensive to cleanse their areas of members from the enemy group. This cleansing is undertaken with the goal of creating ethnically reliable and defensible communities for those worried about attack.¹⁴ As long as both sides fear attack from their enemies, neither can trust its security on the hope that the other will practice restraint.¹⁵ If members of the enemy groups come into contact, they will inevitably lash out and violence will ensue.¹⁶ Advocates of partition essentially argue that the international community should work together to partition these societies for at least some conflicts; otherwise, war will separate the divided populations anyway, but at the cost of human lives.¹⁷

Some scholars further argue that partitioning separate ethnic territories secures a group's desire for access to political, economic, and social rights and resources.¹⁸ When groups are separated, the hostility and intolerance among them becomes irrelevant, because each group would gain complete independence and control over rights and access to resources within their territory. The fulfillment of this basic drive for self-determination should lead to more democratic societies in each post-partition state.

¹¹ O'Leary 2007, 886

¹² *Ibid.*, 903

¹³ First outlined by Kaufman in "Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," 122. Later cited by Kuperman, Alan J. 2006. "Power-sharing or Partition? History's Lessons for Keeping the Peace in Bosnia". In *Bosnian Security after Dayton: New Perspectives*. New York: Routledge. Sambanis, Nicholas. 2000. "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature." *World Politics*. 52. no. 4: 437-483.

¹⁴ Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," pp. 108-111. Kaufman, "Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," 121.

¹⁵ Kaufman 1998, 122

¹⁶ First described in Kaufmann, Chaim D. 1998. "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century". *International Security*. 23, no. 2. (Autumn): 121. Later reiterated in Kuperman, Alan J. 2006. "Power-sharing or Partition? History's Lessons for Keeping the Peace in Bosnia". In *Bosnian Security after Dayton: New Perspectives*. New York: Routledge, pg 4.

¹⁷ Kaufman 1998

¹⁸ Blagojevic 2007, 555

Criticism of Partition

Partition critics cite several reasons why partition and population transfer should not be introduced in divided societies. Population transfers can inflict enormous suffering on the divided populations. The loss of homes, livelihoods, and social, religious, and cultural ties is unavoidable.¹⁹ Also, since the dissatisfied minority ceases to be a minority anymore, new minorities can emerge in the new societies.²⁰ The new state often inherits a significant minority from the old majority group. Since successor states are rarely “pure,” the new minorities may reject the newly formed state. In Northern Ireland, for example, partition resulted in an outbreak of more than twenty years of violence.

Indeed, some studies have found that partition may inspire new conflict. They argue that partitions often transform intra-national conflicts to international ones.²¹ Thus, the new states use the new border as the battleground against each other instead of within their old communities. Also, complete separation and independence among ethnic groups is difficult to achieve in many situations due to geographical and demographic dispersion or intermixture of groups.²²

Further, all feuding groups must agree to the partition or it could be seen as an infringement on their rights and ability to access resources from the state. If all groups do not agree, and if partition is imposed from outside, the new state(s) can be seen as illegitimate and undemocratic. Since some partitions create states that are undemocratic and culturally homogeneous, interstate hatred grows and leads to cross-border violence.²³

Power-sharing Regimes

Instead of dividing feuding societies, some scholars find that the best route of democracy building is allowing the enemy groups to share power. Power-sharing regimes are states or societies characterized by formal institutional rules which give multiple political elites a stake in the decision-making process.²⁴ This process is also known as ‘consociational democracy’. The primary idea of implementing power-sharing institutions into multiethnic societies is to turn political enemies into cooperative partners. When a settlement or agreement is put in place to end conflict, the leaders of all significant factions in society are guaranteed a stake in national or regional governments.

Many of the societies that adopt power-sharing institutions have proportional electoral systems with low vote thresholds which usually produce multiparty parliaments, with many minor

¹⁹ Kaufman 1998, 121

²⁰ Tullberg and Tullberg 1997, 240

²¹ Sambanis 2000

²² Blagojevic 2007, 556

²³ Kaufmann 1998, 123

²⁴ Norris 2008, 23

parties each representing distinct segmented communities.²⁵ In these cases, political leaders have an interest in negotiating and cooperating with opposing parties in order to gain a coalition government which could lead to the parties' attainment of high-level government positions. This type of executive power-sharing is believed to temper extreme demands and dampen expressions of ethnic intolerance among elites. The hope in this process is that the feuding groups will accept the legitimacy of the agreement, moderate their demands, and collaborate with their rivals.²⁶

When parties and politicians who represent diverse ethnic communities are included in the decision making process, segmented societies will allow groups to peacefully coexist within the borders of a state.²⁷ Even if a society has a super majority, such as Pakistan after partition, power-sharing would allow for newly segmented groups to have some say in government. The only realistic type of settlement capable of attracting agreement among all factions in post-conflict divided societies is a power-sharing regime which avoids the dangers of winner-take-all outcomes.²⁸ Power-sharing institutions are believed to be valuable for democracy in all states, but vital for containing and managing inter-communal tensions in multiethnic societies emerging from civil conflict, thereby helping to sustain fragile democracies.²⁹

Some scholars further argue that conflict settlements are more stable the more they institutionalize power-sharing and power-dividing across four dimensions of society: political, economic, military, and territorial.³⁰ The more highly institutionalized power-sharing is in society, the lower the risk of a return to civil war and the more likely democratic consolidation³¹. The most salient categories of power-sharing are constitutional design, electoral system design, and decentralization/federalism.³² The range of options for negotiated settlements provides a large number of possibilities of addressing deep divisions within a society. Parliamentary systems have been found to be the most stable choice in post-conflict societies.³³ Proportional representation and federalism are the most preferred systems of the parliamentary choices for divided societies since they will allow minorities to have a stake in the politics.

Advocates of power-sharing contend that arrangements must include certain characteristics in order to promote democracy. The state must not be dominated by a majority group, there should be relative equilibrium between groups, and there should be no significant socio-economic

²⁵ Norris 2008, 24

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 25

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 27

²⁸ Lijphart 1999

²⁹ Norris 2008, 3

³⁰ Wolff 2011, 30

³¹ Hartzell and Hoddie 2003

³² Simonsen 2005, 307

³³ Simonsen 2005, 308

differences between the feuding populations.³⁴ Parties, whether ideologically or ethnically divided, also need to agree on the conditions of the power-sharing arrangements.³⁵ The more agreement on the network of power-sharing institutions, the less likely groups will return to the use of armed violence to settle their disputes. Power-sharing advocates propose that international forces should support rival parties in their attempts to structure power-sharing institutions and encourage them to create a diverse network of power-sharing institutions.

Critics of Power-sharing

Although there are many supporters of power-sharing regimes, there are also critics who challenge the core assumptions and claims surrounding power-sharing solutions. Some claim that power-sharing regimes, which recognize existing community boundaries, assume that ethnic divisions are intractable and persistent.³⁶ Power-sharing regimes then institutionalize ethnic cleavages, which in turn deepen social differences. Some leaders may even exploit and exaggerate these cleavages, and further promote social tensions, ethnic hatred, and politics of fear. By failing to produce leaders who promote cooperation, these tensions generate greater political instability, rather than facilitating toleration of communal differences.³⁷ Power-sharing regimes that are based upon formal recognition of divided groups may provide electoral incentives for politicians and parties to heighten appeals based on distinct ethnic identities. Creating an emphasis on ethnic rights may make it more difficult to generate cooperation in society by reducing incentives for cross-cutting compromises³⁸, thus creating undemocratic policies and an illiberal society.

Other scholars focus on the security claims that bolster the partition argument. The aim to restore multiethnic civil politics and to avoid population transfers, such as power-sharing institution building and identity reconstruction, cannot resolve ethnic civil wars because they do not resolve the security dilemma created by multiethnic societies.³⁹ Since the security dilemma still exists, outbreaks of violence will occur as they have in the past in Cyprus in 1963, Lebanon in 1975, and Northern Ireland in 1974.

Another important issue with power-sharing regimes is how these regimes are created. Some regimes are created by negotiated agreements between all major players in society. Some are created by a definite victory by one party which then takes control of the state following an armed conflict. Others are created from peace settlements which are controlled by the international community and external forces. Regimes set up by the latter arrangement are the least likely to maintain peace and

³⁴ Schneckener 2002, 211

³⁵ Horwitz and Hoddie 2003, 339

³⁶ Norris 2008

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 28

³⁸ Simonsen 2005

³⁹ Kaufmann 1998, 141-145

promote long lasting democracy.⁴⁰ People are unlikely to support an agreement that is forced upon them. Once the outside forces leave, the chances of sustained peace remain low, which does not promote stable democracy. Some scholars estimated that 40% of civil wars will reoccur within a decade after peacekeeping forces leave.⁴¹

Some power-sharing institutions also produce undesirable characteristics that do not promote democracy. There are potential dangers of political stalemate, immobility, and deadlock between the executive and legislature; the lack of an effective opposition holding the government accountable and providing voters with a clear-cut electoral choice; a loss of transparency in government decision-making; and the fragmentation of party competition in the legislature.⁴² Thus, power-sharing arrangements may not promote democracy and can even lead to illiberal and unequal societies.

Three testable hypotheses derive from the theories of partition and power-sharing and the critics of those arrangements.

- H1: Partition may be an adequate way of ending violence by suppressing the security dilemma in a deeply divided society, but it is not sufficient to produce democracy in post-partition societies.
- H2: A combination of partition and power-sharing institutions will allow for the most democratic institutions in post-conflict societies.
- H3: The more articulated and expansive power-sharing institutions in a society, the more democratic a country.

RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

This study employs a focused comparison of three cases in order to test the hypotheses outlined above. This type of comparison maximizes control through the careful selection of countries that are analyzed using a middle level of conceptual abstraction.⁴³ Since this research contains such a small number of countries, an analysis will produce outcomes which are the product of multiple causal factors. The main benefit of this design is that it allows the researcher to compare similarities and differences among the cases rather than analytical relationships between the variables. Researchers can use less abstract ideas that are more grounded in the specific contexts under scrutiny.⁴⁴ This will allow for a greater understanding of the differences between the societies by intensely studying each individual case.

⁴⁰ Norris 2008, 30

⁴¹ Collier and Sambanis 2005

⁴² Norris 2008, 27

⁴³ Landman 2008, 28

⁴⁴ Landman 2008, 25

The level of analysis will be at the macro level and the unit of analysis will be the state. The term “state” should be used flexibly since not all of these societies have full autonomy and sovereignty. The design roughly follows the Most Similar Systems approach outlined by Lijphart, among others. A most similar design seeks to compare political systems that share a host of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others.⁴⁵ The main independent variable, however, will be power-sharing regimes, and that does differ amongst these cases. My dependent variable will be level of liberal democracy. The cases of Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Pakistan all have a varying degree of liberal democracy, as measured by their the Freedom House Score.

Therefore, I will be analyzing the unique differences between the countries which could explain how each country ended up with a varying degree of liberal democracy. The cases I have selected come from a small population of post-ethnic conflict and post-partitioned societies. Each case experienced a conflict between at least two ethnic groups, and the extreme amount of violence during each conflict led to the partitioning of the feuding communities. The cases were also all colonial entities of Great Britain prior to partition, which allows for the control of certain path dependent factors.

In Northern Ireland, years of extreme violence between the Catholic and Protestant communities led to an independence movement for the Irish island. In 1921, the United Kingdom divided the Irish isle between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which was formed in the Ulster province. In Pakistan, the push for independence from Great Britain culminated in a resistance movement that included both Muslim and Hindi Indians. However, the differences between the two groups sparked riots and violence that ultimately led to the partition of British India. In 1947, the land was divided into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. In Cyprus, conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots promoted inter-communal violence between the two groups. In 1974, a de facto partition separated the two groups between the North and South of the island. While the partition did not create two separate states, it enforced population movements of the Turkish to the North and Greeks to the South of the island.

A focused, structured comparison of these cases will allow me to determine whether a combination of power-sharing and partition promotes more democracy in post-conflict societies. Since these countries have similar backgrounds in conflict and violence, they will allow for an analysis of how each country has developed with differing degrees of democratic success. Although I will not attain maximal control in my small-N design, I will be able to generalize my findings to a larger population of countries that have dealt with or are currently dealing with ethnic conflict. The

⁴⁵ Ibid., 70

variables used in this research have been incorporated into Table 1 so that differences between the dependent variable can be explained across the cases.

Table 1: Variables that Affect Democratization

	Northern Ireland	Pakistan	Cyprus
Partition	Yes	Yes	Yes
Former British Colony	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peaceful Partition?	No	No	No
High Violence prior to partition?	Yes	Yes	Yes
International pressure for partition?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Partition	1921	1947	1974
Type of Partition	Full	Full	De Facto
Peace Settlement after Partition?	Two	Three	One
International Violence?	No	Yes, four conflicts with India	No
Current Disputed Territory?	No	Yes, Kashmir	Yes, Northern Cyprus
Type of Government	Devolved Constitutional Monarchy and Commonwealth	Federal Republic	Presidential Republic
Gender Inequality Score	0.209	0.573	0.141
GDP per capita	\$25,302	\$1,194	\$30,670
Current division of ethnic groups	48% Protestant 36% Catholic 16% Other/ None	95% Islam 5% Other	77% Greek Cypriot (Greek Orthodox) 18% Turkish Cypriot (Muslim) 5% Other
Neighboring Countries' Average Liberal Democracy Score	1	5.3	3.6
Power-Sharing Institutions	Yes	No	Incomplete (Turkish Cypriots refuse to take seats)
Liberal Democracy Score	1	4.5 (Disputed =5.5)	1 (Disputed =2)

My dependent variable is level of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy can be defined as a system with the presence of political rights, such as electoral processes and political pluralism; and civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and association. Liberal democracy is measured by the Freedom House score⁴⁶, which ranges from 1 (the most democratic) to 7 (the least democratic). This is a standard measure of democratization. Some scholars, such as Norris, believe that including different measures of democracy provides greater validity and reliability. If data were available for each of my cases, I would have been able to extend the measure to include Polity IV as well. However, this score was not available, so I did not include it in my democratization measure.

Several of the independent variables listed in Table 1 can be eliminated as causal factors. Existence of partition, past control by Britain, peaceful partition, high violence prior to partition, international pressure for partition, and international violence do not vary and therefore cannot account for variations in the dependent variable. Nominal measures of these variables will be explained in the history of each case and can also be found in the CIA Factbook. According to the literature, these variables have an effect upon the dependent variable in some cases. However, since the first five variables are constant, they cannot account for variation on the dependent variable in this research. There are some variables (year of partition, type of partition, number of peace settlements, type of government, and existence of a disputed territory) which differ amongst the cases and could shed some light upon what affects the dependent variable; however, they do not covary with the dependent variable in the predicted ways.⁴⁷

Having analyzed these variables, five factors correlate in expected ways with liberal democracy scores. The existence of power-sharing institutions is the focus of this study. The establishment of a system which allows for power-sharing between ethnic groups is the basis of this variable. This variable is measured by an analysis of the current political system in each case. According to scholars, power-sharing has a vital effect upon democratic consolidation in a society. In-depth case studies attempt to show the role of power-sharing, in conjunction with other variables identified as promoting democracy in Table 1, in explaining democratic consolidation (or lack of it) in post-partition societies.

Two variables that have an effect on liberal democracy can be seen as vital characteristics of advanced democracies. Gender equality is necessary for equal political rights and civil liberties; therefore, this variable should have an effect on the liberal democracy score of each case.⁴⁸ This

⁴⁶ The Freedom in the World score from Freedom House is used in this research. Freedom House scores each country by both political rights and civil liberties. These two scores are then averaged together to get the score represented in the table.

⁴⁷ Source: CIA Factbook

⁴⁸ Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003

factor is measured by the Gender Inequality Index (GII).⁴⁹ The measure is relatively new and was introduced in the 2010 Human Development Report created by the United Nations Development Programme. The scores range from 0 (most equal) to 1 (most unequal). The index analyzes the loss of achievement due to gender inequality by focusing on reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market rights.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in each case also affects the dependent variable and can be associated with the gender empowerment measure. GDP per capita can be defined as the overall economic output per person in a country. It is measured using data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. According to scholars, including Norris, the assumption that wealth sustains democracy has become one of the most widely recognized generalizations in political science. The measure may not be sufficient to produce democracy, but it does not hurt democratic consolidation. Therefore, this measure should have a positive influence on the liberal democracy score of each case.

The current demographics of a society also have a major effect upon the liberal democracy score. A balance of population size between segmented groups is a necessary condition of power-sharing and democracy.⁵⁰ If there is a super-majority group, they may try to dominate the minority group, which would lead to undemocratic institutions. Further, if there are too many ethnic groups, it will be hard to establish democratic institutions, specifically power-sharing ones, which allow for the groups to cooperate. This factor can account for some of the variance upon the liberal democracy scores of divided societies. The demographics of each society are measured by the CIA Factbook.

The neighboring countries' average liberal democracy score is measured by the Freedom House score. Since the area in which a state evolves can have an effect upon its own democratic consolidation, this measure could have an influence on the dependent variable. It is measured by averaging the five closest countries' liberal democracy scores together. Since the same number of countries is used, this allows for the measure to be reliable across the cases. This variable, combined with power-sharing and the other democracy promoting factors, will allow for an extensive analysis of democratic consolidation in these three case studies.

CASE STUDIES

The cases involved in this research each have been partitioned after ethnic violence but contain varying degrees of power-sharing in their society today. Each case can be analyzed to

⁴⁹ The Gender Inequality Index relies on data from major publicly available databases, including the maternal mortality ratio from UNICEF's *The State of the World's Children*; adolescent fertility rates from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs' *World Population Prospects*; educational attainment statistics from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics educational attainment tables and the Barro-Lee data sets; parliamentary representation from the International Parliamentary Union; and labor market participation from the International Labor Organization's LABORSTA database.

⁵⁰ Lijphart 1977

understand the effect that power-sharing and the other variables listed above have upon their current liberal democracy score. Northern Ireland can be seen as the poster child for power-sharing, Pakistan as the perfect example of democratic failure, and Cyprus as a mixed case.

Northern Ireland

The influence of the United Kingdom in Ireland dates back hundreds of years. Tensions between Catholic and Protestant communities plagued the country during British occupation. Catholic communities were predominately republic minded, meaning they believed in an independent Irish isle. Protestant communities were loyal to the crown and believed that being part of the United Kingdom was vital to their identity. A Catholic-sponsored independence movement in the early 1900s led to more strife between the communities. This movement was met with resistance from the Protestant communities in the Ulster province of the country. The northern six counties made up the Ulster province and contained large numbers of the Protestant minority in Ireland. Since the Protestants wanted to remain with the United Kingdom, they fought to create a new nation which would break from Ireland and remain part of Great Britain. During independence, the Irish isle was partitioned into The Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland now contained a new minority of Catholics and a new majority of Protestants within its territory.

The development of a new minority, a critical problem with partitions, led to decades of violence between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland. Therefore, Northern Ireland's partition may have been successful through the 1960s but it failed to consolidate democracy. The Catholic communities felt oppressed by the Protestant majority in terms of representation and civil rights. Peaceful protests were met with violent backlash and the infiltration of British troops resulted in thirty years of violence. The use of paramilitaries, the Irish Republican Army and splinter groups for the Catholics, and the Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defense Force for the Protestants, led to atrocities and revenge tactics on both sides. After a ceasefire in 1994, the Good Friday Agreement was signed in Belfast, which brought thirty years of violence to an end through the implementation of power-sharing and disarmament.

Northern Ireland's current demographics include 48% Protestant, 36% Catholic, and 16% other or do not identify with either group. However, there is a growing Catholic population which could provide the number of votes needed to reunite the island. Since the Good Friday Agreement was put into effect, both communities have voted in a referendum over their autonomy and sovereignty. The majority of Northern Irish people have voted for their own government authority within the state, instead of a full reunion with either Great Britain or the Republic.⁵¹ Since there is not an overwhelming majority, that may be the driving force behind the communities' ability to

⁵¹ Northern Irish Life and Times Survey 2010

cooperate. Since the society cannot function without each of the communities, this may reinforce power-sharing institutions.

Also, Northern Ireland's surroundings promote democracy within its borders. Its average neighboring liberal democracy score is a 1 on the Freedom House scale. Its devolved parliament within the United Kingdom is a defining factor in its democratic consolidation. Further, the connection with the highly liberal democracies in the Republic of Ireland, UK, and Western Europe helps to reinforce democracy.

Northern Ireland upholds characteristics considered to be vital for an advanced democracy, which help its development into an equal and affluent society. The Gender Inequality Index score for Northern Ireland is 0.209. Since the most equal society is a 0, Northern Ireland is a relatively equal society. This equality would be seen as a vital factor in its democratic consolidation.⁵² The GDP per capita of Northern Ireland is \$25,302, placing it among the wealthiest societies in the world. Therefore, its affluence only helps the country to sustain its democratic institutions. These measures most likely benefit from having a devolved parliament within the United Kingdom. Affluence and gender equality show Northern Ireland's progress and ability to transform into a liberal democracy.

These factors contribute to democracy, but critically for this study, Northern Ireland has also established an extensive power-sharing system. The Good Friday Agreement created a power-sharing political system within Northern Ireland, as well as North-South Irish and Irish-British connecting bodies. Today, the Northern Irish Assembly is a unicameral legislature. The legislature is based upon safeguards which ensure that all sections of the community participate and work together successfully.⁵³ The allocation of seats is based on party-list proportional representation. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister are the head of government and have equal power. Therefore, a Protestant and Catholic will have equal power in the head of state position. The allocation of Committee Chairs, Ministers, and Committee membership are filled in proportion to the party strengths within the legislature.⁵⁴ This method is used to ensure equal representation within the legislature.

Although the agreement promotes democracy, there are some scholars who claim that the legislature is in a political stalemate and there is no official opposition to hold the government accountable.⁵⁵ However, the power-sharing institutions are seen as extremely successful in promoting cross-community relations and democratic consolidation. Northern Ireland's power-sharing institutions promote democracy within a society that already fits within the norm of affluent, democratic countries that surround it.

⁵² Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003)

⁵³ Good Friday Agreement, Strand 1

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ruane and Todd, 2007

Cyprus

Cyprus, on the other hand, has reached a partially divided form of democracy. Cyprus has historically been divided between those who identify themselves as Greek Cypriots and those who identify as Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots predominantly identify as Greek Orthodox and would like to be an entity of Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots heavily identify as Muslim and wish to be united with Turkey. The British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 attempted to promote cooperation between the two groups. In 1955, an independence movement began with the support of Greek Cypriots wishing to be reunited with Greece. The movement then pushed Turkish Cypriots to rally for partition, since they did not want to assimilate with Greece. British authorities then allowed Turkish police to end the movement, which created an outbreak of violence.

The ethnic violence was not effectively dealt with by the British powers in the state. The United Kingdom granted Cyprus independence in 1960 without remedying the violent situation. Cypriots created a constitution after independence in the hope of uniting the feuding communities. Power-sharing institutions were established but subsequently failed and large-scale violence broke out in 1963. A temporary partition of Greek and Turkish communities into individual enclaves occurred, but was undermined by the security dilemma. In the early 1970s, many were hopeful for peace between the two communities; however, a Greek coup d'état against the Cypriot government ruined this hope. Military forces invaded Cyprus after the overthrow and took control of the northern part of the state. After failed negotiations, ethnic cleansing began on both sides. Turkish forces held about forty percent of the country and implemented a de facto partition. The Turkish proclaimed the independence of Northern Cyprus which, to this day, is only recognized by Turkey.

The partition of Cyprus is seen as one of the most brutal and atrocious in history because it divided the communities almost completely. Over 250,000 Cypriots became refugees and were forced to move either North or South to their ethnically controlled area. The United Nations did step in after the mass population transfer to establish a buffer zone which would create physical space between the communities. The buffer zone, which doubled as a no crossing zone until 2003, has been the only location of deaths between the communities since partition. The partition succeeded in preventing more violence by dealing with the security dilemma; however, it inflicted mass suffering and agony upon the people of Cyprus and did not lead to unequivocal democracy. The enormity of the partition can be seen in the pictures in Figure 1.

The current make-up of the state is 77% Greek Cypriot, 18% Turkish Cypriot, and 5% other or those who do not identify. It seems that the demographics should have a significant effect upon the dependent variable given that the other two cases show that the higher percentage of the majority ethnicity, the lower a liberal democracy score. However, this relationship does not exist in the case of Cyprus. This unconformity may be explained by the populations being divided and having their own

autonomy and sovereignty over their territory. The existence of these rights might contradict the fact that there is a majority ethnicity within the state. The liberal democracy score of the proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a 2 on the Freedom House scale, which is lower than the Republic's score of 1. Although these scores are slightly different, the make-up of the state does not lead to an undemocratic Northern Cyprus, which would be expected considering its Muslim influence and its Turkish minority within the Republic of Cyprus.

Compared to Pakistan or Northern Ireland, Cyprus's surroundings do not seem to have as large of an effect. Since its neighboring countries' liberal democracy scores average a 3.6, one would assume that Cyprus's score would be less democratic than a 1 on the Freedom House scale. It is an island that stands alone, which may account for the reduced influence of this variable. Cyprus is the only case that does not have a bordering neighbor or direct devolution from other states. The recent integration of Cyprus into the European Union may increase its democratic capabilities. Many believed that EU membership would foster a more pluralistic, democratic, and tolerant Cyprus through the broadening of civil society, a theory which seems to be accurate since Cyprus has been able to maintain a functioning liberal democracy. Therefore, EU membership might be the more relevant "neighbor group" when assessing its location.

Similar to Northern Ireland, Cyprus's affluence and gender equality help to sustain democratic institutions within the society. Its GDP per capita is \$30,670, slightly higher than that of Northern Ireland and much higher than Pakistan's GDP. This variable has a positive effect upon the liberal democracy score when comparing the cases in Table 1. Cyprus further demonstrates how the affluence of a country can reinforce democratic institutions. The gender inequality score is a 0.141 on the Gender Inequality Index, meaning that it has more gender equality than both Northern Ireland and Pakistan. This score can also account for Cyprus's liberal democracy score and reinforces what scholars claim to know about the influence of gender equality upon democratic consolidation.⁵⁶

In the 1960 constitution, power-sharing institutions were established to accommodate Turkish Cypriots in the government and further promote democracy. Since the Turkish Cypriots claim Northern Cyprus as their own territory, they refuse to take seats within the Cyprus parliament. Therefore, power-sharing is not being implemented between the ethnically divided societies. However, there have been several failed attempts at power-sharing between the two communities since partition. In 2002, the UN pushed for an agreement which would bring the communities on the island closer together, and in 2004 the Annan plan was introduced to reconcile the populations on the island. The Plan called for the creation of a United Republic of Cyprus, which would constitute a

⁵⁶ Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003

Greek-Cypriot state and a Turkish-Cypriot state under the power of a federal government.⁵⁷ While the plan was overwhelmingly supported by the Turkish Cypriots, it was admittedly opposed by the Greek Cypriots.⁵⁸ ⁵⁹ The power-sharing institutions created with the constitution promote Cyprus's high liberal democracy score since Greek parties share power. However, the failure to attain power-sharing between the once feuding communities leads to a lower liberal democracy score in the Turkish area of the state.

Pakistan

Unlike the previous cases, Pakistan can be seen as the perfect storm of democratic failure among partitioned states. An independence movement after World War II within British India sparked violence between the Muslim and Hindu populations. Historically, the Muslim populations felt oppressed by the Hindu majority within the state, and when the push for independence came about, they saw a chance to create a 'Muslim homeland' outside of India. In 1947, the land was partitioned into West Pakistan, East Pakistan, and India. West Pakistan would eventually become Pakistan as it is known today. After partition, international violence broke out between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir region. This transfer from intra-national to international violence is another example of a negative effect of partition which leads some to claim that the partition of Pakistan was a failure.

The Kashmir region has been a negative influence upon Pakistan's democratic consolidation and has reinforced the militaristic overtones of its government. Kashmir is located in the Northeast region of Pakistan and Northwest region of India. Both India and Pakistan lay claims to the land since it has a Muslim majority but a Hindu head of state. The people of Pakistan believe that it is their responsibility to liberate the Muslims in this region. The liberal democracy score in Kashmir is a 5.5 on the Freedom House scale, which is lower than that of Pakistan at 4.5. However, absorbing this region could lead to an even lower liberal democracy score unless Pakistan institutes power-sharing into its political system so that it can accommodate both communities that exist within the region.

Pakistan's current demographic breakdown is 95% Islamic and 5% other, mostly Hindus and Christians. The super-majority of the Islamic population can account for the low democracy score within the state. Within the Arab world, Muslim states are known to be virtually undemocratic in all aspects of society.⁶⁰ The Muslim influence does have a highly negative effect upon other variables within this research, but specifically upon power-sharing because a super-majority would not think it

⁵⁷ Ladisch 2007, 92

⁵⁸ The Turkish Cypriots approved the plan with 69.41% in favor, while the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected it with 75.38% being against the plan. The root of this rejection was that the Greeks believed that the Plan was giving into all of the Turkish Cypriots' demands.

⁵⁹ Ladisch 2007, 93

⁶⁰ Pryor 2007

necessary to establish power-sharing institutions with groups that make up less than 5% of the population. If there is a super-majority group, they may try to dominate the minority group through majoritarian rule.⁶¹ Therefore, some of Pakistan's undemocratic institutions may result from a lack of motivation for the Muslim population to include any other religious faction in the decision-making process, which may, in turn, result in the country's lack of power-sharing. After partition, Pakistan's Muslim population further divided into six different subgroups rooted in the linguistic and regional differences among them.⁶² According to the literature, too many segmented population groups are unfavorable since cooperation is extremely difficult between more than four groups.⁶³ Therefore, power-sharing between newly segmented populations is vital for democracy but has not yet been achieved due to ethnic and linguistic differences.

Pakistan's geographic location also has a negative effect upon its liberal democracy score. Pakistan is surrounded by predominately Muslim countries, along with India, which have an average liberal democracy score of 5.3. Since this score is so undemocratic, it hinders Pakistan's potential for democratic growth, especially when compared to cases such as Northern Ireland. The surroundings in which a country develops and the other states it is in constant contact with will affect the democratic consolidation of a state. Pakistan's location is a determining factor in its low democratic development.

The low affluence and gender inequality in Pakistan further undermine its liberal democracy score. The country's GDP is \$2,800, far lower than the other two cases in this research. Pakistan's inability to maintain democracy reinforces the scholarly literature that suggests countries with a GDP lower than \$4,000 have a harder time sustaining democratic institutions.⁶⁴ Along with GDP, the gender inequality within its society promotes undemocratic institutions. Pakistan's inequality score is a 0.573, which is significantly lower than the more democratic cases in this research. This score may also be tied to the religious influence within the country. Inequality has been shown to correlate negatively with the liberal democracy score, and many believe that gender equality is vital to democratic consolidation.⁶⁵ Therefore, Pakistan has not yet attained the necessary characteristics for an advanced democracy

Pakistan's history of political instability has undermined its ability to establish adequate power-sharing institutions within the state. Government overthrows and military elites have thwarted each attempt. The establishment of a presidential republic in 1956 led to a constitution which attempted to promote power-sharing amongst the linguistic and regional factions in the state.

⁶¹ Krienbuehl 2010

⁶² Chakrabarti 2012, 16

⁶³ Lijphart 1977

⁶⁴ Norris, 2008

⁶⁵ Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003

However, the constitution was dissolved by a military coup which proclaimed martial law. Pakistan's first democratic elections came about in 1970 in the hopes of reducing military power and establishing democratic institutions. A power-sharing arrangement was established but subsequently dissolved by another military coup d'état in 1977, which produced another military president.⁶⁶ The parliament was dissolved, political parties were banned, and the 1973 constitution was suspended until 1988. It was not until 1997 that there was substantial hope for power-sharing arrangements. However, that hope was soon eroded by the establishment of authoritarian rule in 1999. In 2008, promising power-sharing institutions were established which were unlike any previous attempt. The parties seemed to overcome their differences and worked together to promote power-sharing institutions; however, this period of cooperation too was short-lived. Pakistan's constant instability was exacerbated by the military elite and the inability of parties to work together. Pakistan will have to revamp its institutions in order to promote future power-sharing institutions within its society.

CONCLUSIONS

Each of the independent variables outlined above has an effect upon democratic consolidation in each of the cases. These variables are in no way the only factors that influence democratic consolidation, but they are the most relevant to this research. It can be concluded that power-sharing institutions are vital to democratic consolidation in post-partitioned states that have faced ethnic conflict. These societies must continue to promote cooperation between the once feuding groups so that they can achieve a full liberal democracy. Although power-sharing has a vital impact upon the liberal democracy score, other factors help to promote democracy within these societies. The ideal criteria for a partitioned state that has experienced ethnic conflict seems to be one in which power-sharing institutions are successfully established. Along with power-sharing, it certainly helps if the country is affluent, post-modern in terms of gender equality, and situated in a democratic neighborhood. These criteria are vital to the development of an ethnically divided state to establish a liberal democracy. Societies concerned with ethnic conflict today should analyze these factors when deciding whether to adopt power-sharing, partition, or a combination of both.

The Future of Palestine?

Palestine is the most prominent case in the power-sharing and partition debate today. With a recent ceasefire and UN recognition of the state of Palestine, the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is questionable. Since it seems that two-state separation will be the solution to the conflict, international powers concerned with the transition from violence to a liberal democracy need to focus on the above factors to promote democracy. Although they are not recognized by many data sources, the West Bank and Gaza Strip have a combined liberal democracy score of 5.75 on the

⁶⁶ Mushtaq, 2011

Freedom House scale. The most democratic nation in the area is Israel with a 1.5 score of the Freedom House scale. Therefore, there could be hope for democratic influence from that country. If these powers can establish power-sharing institutions between the Muslim and Jewish communities, progress toward democratic consolidation may occur.

Poverty, gender inequality, and the general neighborhood make democracy in Palestine an uphill battle, but that only underscores the importance of getting the institutional structure right in order to give significant political power to all the key stakeholders. Since the disputed territory is already deemed not free, much progress needs to be made for there to be full democratization. The country would have to achieve affluence and promote gender equality within its society, something that has been hard to achieve for many Middle Eastern countries. It seems that the establishment of power-sharing institutions between the Jewish and Muslim populations in the area could lead to more democratization, but the other factors could undermine the struggle for democratic consolidation.

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A STEP TOWARD UNDERSTANDING TRUST IN THE GOVERNMENT

Ted Delicath

***Abstract:** Over the last fifty years, trust in government has declined. This paper seeks to further the understanding of trust in government. Using ordinal level survey data from 1998-2012, a crosstabular analysis is used to test governmental trust with broad and specific policy areas. This research challenges part of Popkin and Dimock's (2000) research, which asserts that citizens use trust as a heuristic for both broad and specific questions about the government. The empirical findings suggest that citizens distrust the government broadly but trust a wide range of programs implemented by the very government they distrust.*

INTRODUCTION

In *Bowling Alone*, author Robert Putnam (2000) found that in the 1960s “three in four (Americans) said you *could* ‘trust the government in Washington to do what is right all or most of the time.’”¹ By 1990 “three in four Americans *didn't* trust the government to do what is right most of the time.”² In just thirty years half of Americans surveyed went from trusting the government to not trusting the government.

Governmental trust judgments are riddled with predispositions that frustrate attempts to understand what trust or distrust toward the government means. Previous research investigates how trust functions as a heuristic when individuals are asked to draw upon their predispositions and reason about politics. Posed as a question: When answering different types of governmental questions, how are respondents using governmental trust as a cognitive shortcut? When asked a dichotomous governmental question, logically, those that distrust the government should side against the government and vice-versa. Further research looks at broad and specific questions to assess if specificity affects how trust functions as a heuristic. Using governmental trust and distrust as a cognitive shortcut may be easier with visible and straightforward questions, like desired size of government, which allow for a more simple alignment of trust and distrust sentiments. In comparison, using governmental trust and distrust as a cognitive shortcut may be more difficult with obscure questions, like opinion on ethanol subsidies. This research contends that respondents use governmental trust judgments as a heuristic when reasoning about all types of government questions. The hypothesis challenges Popkin and Dimock's (2000) research, which contends that in areas where they lack knowledge, people advocate for action from the very government they distrust.

Understanding why governmental trust has continued to decline over the last fifty years is a serious matter. As Newton and Norris (2000) stress “an erosion of confidence in the major institutions of society, especially those of representative democracy, is a far more serious threat to

¹ Putnam 2000, 47.

² Ibid 1.

democracy than a loss of trust in other citizens.”³ In the hopes of reversing the ongoing erosion, this research aims to understand how trust functions as a heuristic.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Empirical research on governmental trust began in the early 1960s. Stokes (1962) used the National Election Survey (NES) to gain insight into respondents’ general feelings toward their government. Stokes focuses on ethical judgments of individual political actors, believing that politicians were the main objects of trust. Easton (1965) distinguishes between “diffuse support”—meaning support for institutions or systems—and “specific support”—support for individual political actors or incumbent parties. Since the mid-1960s, trust in the government has declined. While Stokes initially believed that distrust focuses on individual political actors, continual distrust over successive administrations of both parties suggests that diffuse support explains more about trust in government judgments than specific support.⁴

From Easton’s early differentiation, subsequent trust theorists developed two contending conceptualizations of trust: a rational choice approach and a norm-driven approach. Formally “the rational choice conceptualization of trust is based on the logic of consequentiality, while the norm-driven approach sees trust as embedded in the logic of appropriateness.”⁵ Put plainly, the rational choice view of trust places trust in those that the truster knows or has knowledge about. Through frequent interaction, personal relations generate “thick trust.”⁶ In contrast to rational choice, the norm-driven approach to trust refers to trust in strangers on grounds of morality. Similarly, when the object of trust moves out of the personal relationship realm, thin trust replaces thick trust. “Thin trust is even more useful than thick, because it extends the radius of trust beyond the roster of people whom we can know personally.”⁷ Whereas thick trust is “embedded in personal relations”, thin trust places trust in the “generalized other.”⁸

The rational choice approach and the norm-driven approach paint two contrasting conceptions of trust: the former a judgment of conditional calculation and the latter a general relation of trust to all on the basis of morality. Conceptually, these two dichotomous definitions demarcate between opposing understandings of what it means to trust. Often, however, trust does not manifest so dichotomously. Weatherford (1992) views trust as a multilevel concept, which is “useful in organizing research on both individuals and aggregates such as bureaucracies or nations.”⁹ Trust in a specific individual forms a relationship of trust different from that of trust relations with society or

³ Newton & Norris 1999, 2.

⁴ Levi & Stoker 2000.

⁵ Paraskevopoulos 2010, 477.

⁶ Putnam 2000, 136.

⁷ Ibid 6.

⁸ Putnam 2000.

⁹ Levi & Stoker 2000, 477.

institutions. Thus, differentiating what trust in another person means from trust in the government is an essential part of identifying if the latter has an effect on the former.

Researchers dispute whether or not trust in government affects social trust—more commonly referred to as social capital theory—or if any causal relationship actually exists between the two. Social capital theorists contend “there is a virtuous circle of high trust, well-established social institutions, good government and strong popular political support, which then helps to sustain social trust between citizens, foster community and civic participation and encourage collective activity for the common good.”¹⁰ Empirically, Brehm and Rahn (1997) observe that social trust depends upon trust in the institutions governing society.¹¹ To varying degrees these authors share the belief that the government and political associations play a part in creating and/or sustaining social trust.

Recently, researchers dispute social capital theory’s legitimacy and have set about to disprove the supposed causal relationship. Kenneth Newton (2001 & 2006) continually finds a tenuous or nonexistent relationship between social trust and political trust. Thus, he claims a decline in governmental support does not directly lead to a decline in social trust. Newton does concede that democracies with high levels of governmental trust tend to contain high levels social trust, but Newton does not believe this ostensible correspondence signifies a causal relationship. Whether or not social capital theory is correct remains an unresolved matter that will be empirically examined later. What trust theorists are certain of is that governmental trust has declined over the last fifty years. A 2011 graph from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press charts trust from the Eisenhower administration through March 2010 of the Obama Administration.¹² Governmental trust rises to its apex in 1965, when it nearly reaches 80 percent. Trust steadily declines over the next fifteen years reaching 25 percent in 1980. From the 1980s to March 2010—besides surveys taken during and for six months after the events of September 11th, 2001—trust in government never rises above the 50 percent mark. In the wake of the financial crisis, during October 2008, governmental trust falls to 17 percent—a historic low.

No single factor sufficiently explains why governmental trust declined over the last fifty years and failed to rebound to its pre-1965 levels. Continued scholarly support suggests that citizen’s political judgments are based heavily on an amalgamation of their various predispositions. As Popkin and Dimock (2000) contend “recognition of these predispositions is essential if we are to understand

¹⁰ Newton 2006, 848.

¹¹ Levi & Stoker 2000, 493-494.

¹² <http://www.people-press.org/2010/04/18/public-trust-in-government-1958-2010/>

how citizens arrive at political judgments.”¹³ Levi and Stoker (2000) enumerate a number of incumbent-specific and short-term biases affecting trust judgments.

Governmental trust judgments, however, are comprised of more than just short-term and incumbent-specific measures. Numerous scholars believe events such as the Vietnam War, civil rights’ tensions and Watergate caused the initial decline of governmental trust.¹⁴ As the administrations tainted by these events left office, trust failed to rebound. Scholars cite the steady decline as “evidence that trust judgments are not merely an amalgam of reactions to current incumbents but reflect deeper, and less readily reversible, dissatisfaction or concerns.”¹⁵

Trust judgments reflect perceptions predicated on a wide variety of influences. While political trust researchers agree on few aspects of trust, they do agree that “whether citizens express trust or distrust is primarily a reflection of their political lives, not their personalities or even their social characteristics.”¹⁶ Thus, trust judgments about government are based on political perceptions and values, are evaluated through a political prism, and are mostly unaffected by personal and social characteristics.¹⁷

Scholars argue over what makes for a trustworthy government. Thus far, scholarly consensus finds “the capacities to make credible commitments, to design and implement policies non arbitrarily, and to demonstrate competence” as necessary attributes for a government to be viewed as trustworthy.¹⁸ Hardin (1998) contends that even if governments attain such trustworthy attributes citizens may lack sufficient knowledge to accurately judge a government trustworthy or not. Asymmetrical information partly blinds citizens to the intent driving governmental initiatives. The lack of cohesion in governmental trust research is partly attributable to the difficulty of accurately capturing what it means to trust the government.

Popkin and Dimock (2000) contend that the successive governmental shortfalls over the last fifty years have lead to public misgivings about the government’s role in domestic institutions. Unlike domestic issues, Popkin and Dimock postulate that citizens lack knowledge about foreign issues. The uncertainty people hold about international matters, Popkin and Dimock believe, causes them to advocate for foreign initiatives by the government they distrust. This research will test whether Popkin and Dimock’s assertion is empirically defensible.

¹³ Popkin & Dimock 2000, 215

¹⁴ e.g. Citrin 1974; Weatherford 1984; Hetherington 1998.

¹⁵ Levi & Stoker 2000, 480.

¹⁶ Ibid, 481.

¹⁷ Certain minority groups hold a minor aversion toward government. Levis and Stoker (2000) find that African Americans distrusted the government at a higher rate than Caucasians from the 1960s into the 1980s, but note that this trend has continued to lessen over the last thirty years.

¹⁸ Levi & Stoker 2000.

METHOD


To address these questions, this paper examines public survey data from 1998 to 2012. The surveys contain ordinal level data, so crosstabs were used for the analysis. Survey data were compiled from over 40 news sources such as CNN and *The New York Times* and independent research centers like Pew Center for the People and the Press and the Kaiser Family Foundation. All governmental trust questions used in the surveys ask, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right”?

Previous research suggests that high levels of trust in government accompany high levels of general reciprocity and vice versa. To investigate the relationship between social trust and governmental trust the relationship was tested across five surveys spanning from 2000 to 2010. In those surveys, respondents answered the social trust question “Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” In regards to trust in government, respondents were asked “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?” The possible responses to the question were, “just about always,” “most of the time,” and “only some of the time.” Certain surveys provided a fourth option “never” while others recorded “never” only if respondents voluntarily answered something similar to never. Following the dichotomous trust groupings used by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, options, “just about always” and “most of the time,” are considered to reflect trust in the government and the options, “only some of the time” and “never,” are considered to reflect distrust toward the government.

In order to affirm that the governmental trust levels from the data reflect similar governmental trust levels during 1998-2012, the average of the governmental trust data is compared to a three-survey moving average provided by the Pew Research Center for the people and the Press. To determine how the independent variable of trust in government affects broad attitudes toward government, two broad questions—assessment of government and desired size of government—are analyzed with governmental trust. Next more specific policy areas are analyzed with governmental trust to discover if specific and broad areas yield similar results.

Affirming the Distrust

Figure 1: Avg. % of Gov. Trust & Distrust from 1998-2012



In order to affirm that the data used contained trust and distrust levels similar to the time period (1998-2012) in which the data was collected, governmental trust questions from the 48 crosstabs used were averaged. The average level of trust in the government from the Pew Research Center’s three-survey moving average from 1998-2012 is about 35 percent. The average percentage of those that trust the government in the 48 crosstabs used is 31.5 percent. Controlling for an unusually high amount of confidence in the government during and after the events of 9/11, the trust levels from the data used are similar to the average level of governmental trust during 1998-2012.¹⁹

Social Trust & Governmental Trust

Table 1: Social Trust & Governmental Trust

Social Trust (DV)	Governmental Trust (IV)			Total
	Just About Always	Most of the Time	Only Some of the Time	
Most people can be trusted	43.3%	47.7%	39.5%	41.5%
Can't be too Ccareful	56.7%	52.3%	60.5%	58.5%
Pearson Chi-Square Significance: .001		Range: 3.8		
Gamma: .146				

Pew Research Center Poll September 2010

N = 3,004

Independent Variable: Governmental Trust & Dependent Variable: Social Trust

All five crosstabs analyzing social trust with governmental trust displayed modest positive correlations that are statistically significant according to Chi-Square tests. Table one is a typical representation of the other crosstabs. As table one indicates, the relationship between those that trust the government correlate positively and monotonically with social trust. The crosstab achieves a gamma coefficient of .146, displaying a weak relationship. The strength of this relationship is weaker than what social capital theorists postulate. Of the people who trust government all the time, only 43

¹⁹ <http://www.people-press.org/2011/03/03/section-1-attitudes-about-government/>

percent believe that most people can be trusted. Less than half of those that trust the government believe most people can be trusted. Essentially, the findings do not support the belief that those with trust in the government also possess social trust. These findings lend minimal support to social capital theory's contention that governmental support fosters social trust. Instead, the findings provide greater support for researchers like Newton (2000), who contend that the link between social trust and governmental trust is tenuous to non-existent.

Overall, the relatively weak relationship between social trust and governmental trust undermines scholars like Brehm and Rahn (1997) who view social trust as intertwined with governmental trust. My findings, coupled with the robust findings of Newton (2001), illustrate that, "there are only weak and patchy associations between generalized trust and confidence in political institutions."²⁰ Trust in government draws upon a different set of predispositions than trust in society. The results suggest that social trust and governmental trust may be related concepts, but evaluations of either social trust or governmental trust are separate and not one and the same.

Based on the results, this research treats governmental trust and social trust as independent from one another. Next, focus shifts from the broad relationship between social and governmental trust to the heuristic effect of trust in government. Governmental trust is correlated first with broad measures and then with more specific measures to affirm or disprove the hypothesis that respondents use governmental trust as a heuristic across a wide range of government questions.

Broad Measures

As a reminder, governmental trust was combined into two categories, trust and distrust. Two broad measures—assessment of the government and desired size of government—were analyzed with governmental trust.

Table 2: Crosstabular Analysis of Governmental Trust and Governmental Assessment

Example: Grouped Dependent Variable (# of ?s averaged) Specific Year	Difference between those with high & low governmental trust: High Trust/Low Trust (Range)
Favorable Assessment of Gov. (10) 2012 2011 2010	65.2% / 25.4% (39.8%) 75.8% / 19.1% 88 %/ 39.2% 67% / 11%
Want Larger Gov. With More Services (11) 2010 2008 2002 2000 1998	67.7% / 32.1% (35.6%) 70.0% / 22.2% 67.4% / 34.6% 67.1% / 37.7% 50.0% / 32.9% 40.9% / 25.8%

N: (867-16,069)

²⁰ Freitag 2003, 945

Assessment of Government

Assessment of government questions are split into favorable and unfavorable categories and analyzed with trust and distrust. Averaging ten crosstabs, the results show a statistically significant and positively correlated relationship between governmental trust and a favorable assessment of the federal government. The crosstabs achieve an average gamma coefficient of .705, displaying a strong relationship between assessment and trust in government. The results indicate that citizens that trust the government will be more likely to view the government in a positive light. On average 65.2 percent of those with trust have a favorable view of the government in comparison to 25.4 percent of those with distrust that have a favorable view of the government. The distribution between those with trust and a favorable view of the government and those with distrust and a favorable view of the government stretches 39.8 percentage points. The stark contrast indicates those with trust view the government much more favorably than those with distrust.

While a positive correlation exists between trust and favorable assessment of the government, those who view the government in a positive light are in the minority. When the ten governmental assessment questions are averaged, 27.5 percent of respondents view the government positively compared to 72.5 percent of respondents that view the government negatively. As the results in table three, four, and five (Appendix A) indicate, regardless of question wording a majority of respondents view the government in a negative light, they are frustrated or angry, and believe the government is negatively impacting the country.

The next section analyzes governmental trust with desired size of government. In comparison to broad favorable or negative assessment of the government, desired size of government more pointedly inquires about the function of government. If respondents are using trust as a heuristic for broad questions, similar to broad assessment of the government, a large range should separate trust and distrust. As table two indicates, the results suggest that this is the case. The next section will further elaborate on these findings.

Size of Government

Size of government questions are split into the two categories of large government with more services and small government with fewer services and analyzed with trust and distrust. Averaging eleven crosstabs, the results show a statistically significant and positively correlated relationship between governmental trust and desire for larger government. The results are statistically significant and achieve an average gamma coefficient of negative .546, displaying a strong relationship between desired size and trust in government. On average 67.7 percent of those with trust desire a larger government with more services in comparison only 32.1 percent of those who distrust desire a larger government with more services. The distribution between those with trust and that desire a larger government and those that distrust and that desire a larger government stretches

35.6 percentage points. Similar to the assessment of the government, a strong correlation exists between trust and size: trust correlates with favorability towards a larger federal government.

Only one survey finds that a majority of all respondents desire a larger government providing more services. As table six (Appendix B) indicates, nearly sixty percent of respondents desire a smaller government providing fewer services. The percentage of respondents with trust, 32.3, is similar to those with trust in the assessment of government section.

The results did not vary significantly across administrations. The desire for a smaller government that delivers fewer services was consistent regardless of whether a Democratic or Republican administration was in power. The lack of variation across administrations supports the consensus cited among scholars, most recently by Popkin and Dimock (2000), that trust judgments are comprised of more than just reflections of ideology and partisanship.

Subsequent sections explore whether the stark contrast between trust and distrust is sustained when respondents are presented with more specific and obscure questions. Popkin and Dimock (2000) contend that, “distrust in government does not always lead to opposition to government programs”.²¹ Contrary to Popkin and Dimock’s findings, this research predicts that the subsequent sections, distrust in government will lead to opposition to government programs.

SPECIFIC MEASURES

Using available survey data, ten policy areas are analyzed in crosstabular analysis with governmental trust to identify which, if in any, of the policy areas trust functions as a heuristic. Two policy areas—government regulation of business and healthcare—offer comparatively rich data. Government regulation of business and healthcare contain nine crosstabs to average in comparison to the other eight areas that have three or less. Comparatively, government regulation of business and healthcare results are interpreted with greater confidence than the other seven areas. The remaining areas should not be disregarded, but should be interpreted with caution.

Economy

Based on two crosstabs, the results show a statistically significant and positively correlated relationship between governmental trust and desire for government to play a role in the economy. The crosstabs achieve an average gamma coefficient of .577, displaying a strong relationship between governmental trust and government control in the economy.

In table seven (Appendix C), 73 percent of respondents with trust in the government believe a governmental presence in the economy to be a good idea compared to 35.3 percent of those that distrust the government and believe a governmental presence in the economy to be a good idea.²²

²¹ Popkin and Dimock 2000, 229.

²² Recall that trust is the average of “Just about always” and “Most of the time” and distrust is the average of “Only some of the time” and “Never (Vol.)”.

The distribution between those with trust and distrust and that believe a governmental presence in the economy to be a good idea stretches 36.3 percentage points. In terms of policy area specificity, the question refers directly to the economy, which, in comparison to the previous broad questions, redirects the focus from government generally to its role in a particular policy area. With that being said, the question is similar to previous broad questions in that it provides two dichotomous responses. Such polarized responses should easily enable respondents to align their trust or distrust with the logically appropriate response. As the range between trust and distrust indicates, respondents are in fact latching onto the responses that resemble their attitude toward government's presence in the economy.

The results support the hypothesis, but the question in table twelve is straightforward and does not require a more knowledgeable interpretation in order to align governmental trust judgments to the logically appropriate response. Table eight (Appendix D) contains the latter type of question, testing the relationship between governmental trust and view of government's role in job creation. A statistically significant and positive correlation exists between trust and desire for the government to spend money in order to create jobs. The crosstab achieves a gamma coefficient of .484. Of those that trust the government, 65.4 percent believe the government should spend money to create jobs compared to 37.6 percent of those that distrust the government and share the same sentiment. The distribution between those with trust and distrust and that believe the government should spend money to create jobs stretches 31.2 percentage points. The results suggest that even when provided with more specific questions trust strongly affects attitude toward government's role in the economy broadly and specifically. Again however, nearly 60 percent of respondents in table 12 believe greater governmental control in the economy is a bad idea. Similarly, 57.7 percent of respondents believe the government should focus on reducing the deficit instead of spending money to create jobs. These results suggest that the economy broadly is not an area in which the majority of respondents desire the government to play a role.

Regulation of Business

The previous two economic questions inquire about attitudes toward direct government influence in the economy. As the results in table nine (Appendix E) indicate, 61.3 percent of respondents believe the government is inefficient. The relationship is statistically significant and achieves a gamma coefficient of negative .719, suggesting a very strong relationship. To test if attitudes change when the government takes on a less direct role in the economy, government regulation of business was used in crosstabular analysis with governmental trust.

Averaging nine crosstabs that inquire about favorable and unfavorable attitudes toward governmental regulation in business, the results display a statistically significant and positively correlated relationship between trust and desire for government to regulate business. The results

achieve an average gamma coefficient of .437. Again, the crosstabs that provided the greater number of possible responses contained the furthest range between trust and distrust.

Of those who trust in the government, 72.9 percent believe the government should regulate business compared to 46.4 percent of those who distrust. What is different about the regulation relationship compared to the broad economic relationship is that nearly half of those that distrust the government believe government regulation in business is a good idea. Economically speaking, the results suggest that respondents are more accepting of governmental regulation in comparison to more direct governmental control like spending money to create jobs. As table ten indicates (Appendix F), a majority, 51.2 percent, of respondents, from the nine crosstabs analyzed, desired more government regulation. Despite a majority of distrustful respondents, most people actually desired greater regulation from the government. Thus, the results suggest government regulation of business is an area where respondents trust the government and do not rely as heavily on governmental trust as a heuristic.

Using Popkin and Dimock's (2000) logic, the results highlight how uncertainty about business matters causes some, "people to support action by the very government they distrust."²³ If Popkin and Dimock are correct uncertainty and lack of knowledge should cause respondents to place trust in the government. When asked obscure questions a potential flaw arises: Popkin and Dimock focus on how uncertainty affects respondent's views on international issues—an area where the majority of people lack robust knowledge. Business and healthcare are policy areas, which affect respondents on a daily basis. Thus, respondents at least believe they have a better understanding of such areas in comparison to international areas. In line with this logic, respondents should use trust as a heuristic when reasoning about domestic issues like healthcare. That is because if a respondent distrusts the government broadly, the same respondent logically would be opposed to greater governmental presence in the healthcare market. The next section assesses which of the above logic applies to the healthcare results.

Healthcare

Following similar logic used in the economy section, healthcare questions are split into pro-government and anti-government attitudes about government in the healthcare market and analyzed with governmental trust and distrust. Averaging nine crosstabs, the results display a statistically significant and positively correlated relationship between trust and desire for a governmental presence in the healthcare market. The results achieved an average gamma coefficient of .434.

Of those that trust the government, 69.4 percent believe the government should play a role in the healthcare market compared to 48.5 percent of those that do not trust government. The

²³ Popkin and Dimock 2000, 229.

distribution between those with trust and distrust extends 20.9 percentage points. Of the areas analyzed thus far, the healthcare distribution has the smallest range between trust and distrust.

The relationship between governmental trust and governmental presence in the healthcare market is similar to the relationship of governmental regulation of business in that nearly half of distrustful respondents believe governmental presence in the healthcare market is a good idea. As table eleven (Appendix G) indicates, a majority, 57.3 percent, of respondents, from the nine crosstabs analyzed, desire more government in the healthcare market. In the same data set, three quarters of respondents distrust the government. Despite three out of every four respondents reporting distrust of the government, a majority (57.3 percent) of respondents desire greater governmental presence in the healthcare market. The results suggest that the healthcare market is a policy area in which respondents are more accepting of governmental presence.

In the economy section, indirect government control, such as regulation, received greater support than direct control, like spending money to create jobs. To test whether the same trend applies to the healthcare market, the nine crosstabs are split into direct and indirect groups. Six questions make up the direct group and three questions make up the indirect group. The direct and indirect questions were respectively averaged and placed in tables twelve and thirteen (Appendix H). Both table twelve and thirteen are statistically significant and achieve a gamma coefficient over .400. Unlike the economy, the more direct governmental measures received a higher favorability than the indirect. In table eleven, 59.2 percent favored direct governmental control in the healthcare market compared to 53.7 percent that favored indirect control. In both cases, a majority of respondents favored governmental control in the healthcare market with a higher favorability and a stronger gamma coefficient for more direct governmental control.

In both the business and healthcare averages, seven out of every ten respondents distrust the government. A majority of respondents, however, favor action by the distrusted government. It appears those with trust in the government do comparatively trust the government more than those that distrust the government. With that being said, of all the respondents, those that trust the government only make up 30 percent of the total in both averages in which a majority of respondents favor governmental action. Thus, those that distrust the government are not aligning their distrust with an anti-government response and are instead taking a pro-government response.

As the questions continue to gain specificity and obscurity, the gap between trust and distrust decreases. If respondents are using trust as a heuristic when reasoning about broad visible measures, the results suggest that the same respondents may not be using trust as a heuristic when reasoning about more specific and obscure measures. Thus far, the areas analyzed have all been domestic and highly visible. Following Popkin and Dimock's (2000) logic, domestic issues are unlike foreign affairs in which, they contend, citizens lack knowledge. If Popkin and Dimock are correct,

the large gap present in broad measures should sustain in domestic areas, where Popkin and Dimock contend citizens distrust the government. Subsequent sections assess if the decreased range between trust and distrust in specific questions continues; if it does, neither this research's hypothesis nor Popkin and Dimock's logic may accurately capture what is afoot.

OTHER AREAS

Table fourteen compares the independent variable, governmental trust, with the averaged eleven dependent variables. In the left column are the eleven dependent variables analyzed with governmental trust. The number next to them is the number of crosstabs averaged to produce the results in the middle column. The middle column is the spread between those that trust the government and provided a positive response to the question and those that distrust the government and provided a positive response to the question. The number in the brackets to the left is the range between those that trust the government and those that distrust the government. The results are ordered in descending range, with those that have the largest space between trust and distrust at the top and those with the smallest at the bottom. The far right column is the dependent variable results. That is, the percentage of those that provided a positive response compare to the percentage of those that responded negatively. The "+" or "-" symbol next to the results represents whether a majority responded positively or negatively. In the next sections, several of the dependent variables are brought into discussion with the intent of assessing the impact individual results have on the research and ultimately what the results mean as a whole.

Trust Federal Government with Domestic Issues

Of those with trust in the government, 78.9 percent trust the federal government with domestic issues compared to 50.5 percent of those with distrust toward the government. The distribution between those with trust and distrust and that trust the federal government with domestic issues stretches 28.4 percentage points. The distribution suggests that governmental trust affects trust in the federal government to handle domestic issues. With that being said, 50.5 percent of those that distrust the government trust the government with domestic issues.

The results discredit Popkin and Dimock's logic in that 61.7 percent of respondents trust the federal government with domestic issues. In that crosstab, 39 percent have trust in the government in comparison to 61 percent that have distrust in the government. Despite only about 40 percent trusting the government 61.7 percent trust the government with domestic issues. This research's hypothesis and Popkin and Dimock's logic, thus far, fail to explain the discrepancy between a majority distrusting the government broadly and a majority trusting in government to handle issues.

Table 14: Crosstabular Analysis of Governmental Trust (IV) and Various Governmental Assessment Questions (DV)

Example: Dependent Variable (# of ?s Averaged)	Difference between those who trust the Gov. and those that distrust the Gov: Trust - Distrust (Range)	Dependent Variable Results Positive – Negative (+ Majority or – Majority)
Favorable Assessment of Gov. (10)	65.2% - 25.4% (39.8%)	27.5% - 72.5% (-)
Desire for Larger Gov w/ More Services (11)	67.7% - 32.1% (35.6%)	41.0% - 59.0% (-)
Trust Fed with Domestic Issues (1)	78.9% - 50.5 % (28.4%)	61.7% - 38.3% (+)
Spend \$ to Create Jobs (1)	65.4% - 37.6% (27.8%)	42.3% - 57.7% (-)
Desire Gov. Regulation in Biz (9)	72.9% - 46.4% (26.5%)	51.2% - 48.8% (+)
Trust Fed with Foreign Issues (1)	89.4% - 64.5% (24.9%)	73.4% - 26.6% (+)
Find Tax Code Fair (2)	63.2% - 45.7% (17.5%)	51.3% - 41.4% (+)
Desire Gov. in Healthcare (9)	57.3% - 42.7% (14.5%)	57.3% - 42.7% (+)
Willing to Pay for Gov. Services (2)	80.1% - 66.3% (13.8%)	58.6% - 41.4% (+)
Increase Border Spending (1)	81.3% - 71.3% (10%)	78.4% - 21.6% (+)
S.S. Worth Taxes (3)	86.6% - 82.8% (8.9%)	84.1% - 15.9% (+)

Trust Federal Government with Foreign Issues

Of those with trust in the government 89.4 percent trust the federal government with foreign issues compared to 64.5 percent of those with distrust toward the government. The distribution between those with trust and distrust and that trust the federal government with foreign issues stretches 24.9 percentage points. The distribution suggests that governmental trust affects trust in the federal government to handle foreign issues. With that being said, 64.5 percent of those that distrust the government trust the government with foreign issues.

The results show that 73.4 percent of respondents trust the federal government to handle foreign issues compared to only 61.7 percent of people trust the federal government to handle domestic issues. While a majority trusting the government with domestic issues undermines Popkin and Dimock's (2000) reasoning about people's view toward domestic issues, nearly three out of every four respondents trust the government with foreign issues, which strengthens Popkin and Dimock's contention that citizens rely heavily on the government they distrust for international issues.

Looking at the Table as a Whole

The two largest ranges occur in the broadest dependent variables, favorable assessment of government and desire for larger government with more services. Taken as a whole, the results in table thirteen disprove this research's hypothesis. It is apparent that respondents reason differently when asked broad and specific questions. The results suggest respondents do not use trust as a heuristic for both broad and specific questions.

The two foreign measures, “increase border spending” and “trust fed with foreign issues,” support Popkin and Dimock’s (2000) contention that lack of knowledge causes people to advocate for governmental control from a government they distrust. Trust fed with foreign issues and increase border spending are two of the three dependent variables with the most overall pro-government support. The higher rate of pro-government support for foreign issues compared to domestic issues further support Popkin and Dimock’s research.

In terms of domestic issues, however, Popkin and Dimock’s belief that citizens distrust the government for domestic issues is proven false. Of the seven domestic areas analyzed only one finds a majority of respondents don’t desire the government’s presence. In many cases, the government is chosen over a free-market provider. For example, in healthcare a majority of respondents chose the government to provide healthcare instead of a private provider. The results also find a majority of respondents are willing to pay for the services the government provides. In terms of social security, 84.1 percent of respondents—the highest pro-government response rate of all dependent variables—are willing to pay for the services social security provides. The results from questions in business, healthcare, social services, and taxes find that when provided with a pro- or anti-government response a majority of respondents provide a pro-government response.

DISCUSSION

This research took aim at further clarifying a complicated issue: what does it mean to trust the government? As is often the case, answers lead to more questions. In terms of the relationship between social trust and governmental trust, the results support researchers like Newton (2000) that contend that a tenuous relationship exists between the two. Without social trust generating governmental trust or vice versa, where then does governmental trust stem from and what is it comprised of? Focusing on the former question, this research identified a statistically significant and positively correlated relationship between governmental trust and all of the dependent variables used in crosstabular analysis. The repeated concurrence between governmental trust and favorability toward the government suggests that if government can foster a trusting relationship with the citizens it serves, citizens are more likely to approve of the way government operates.

This research hypothesized that respondents will use governmental trust as a heuristic for broad as well as specific questions. The reasoning was based on the idea that only 31.5 percent of respondents in the surveys used have trust in the government. Citizens lack the knowledge to provide an informed response across a wide range of issues. Since the data shows citizens provide an opinion anyway, this research reasoned that when provided with dichotomous responses—one pro-government and one anti-government—those with trust would align with the pro-government response and vice-versa, irrespective of broad or specific questions. Early broad measures ostensibly

supported the hypothesis. As questions gained specificity, however, the results disproved the hypothesis.

In certain respects, the results support and do not support Popkin and Dimock's (2000) research. The select international questions available support Popkin and Dimock's contention that international issues cause, "people to support action by the very government they distrust."²⁴ Of the seven domestic areas analyzed, however, only one finds a majority of respondents do not desire the government's presence. These results are inconsistent with Popkin and Dimock's belief that people have "general misgivings" about governmental presence in domestic institutions.²⁵

The two broadest dependent variables—assessment of government and desired size of government—yield the largest range between trust and distrust and also produce the most negative results. As questions gain specificity, the range between trust and distrust decreases. Moreover, as questions begin to gain specificity and inquire about particular programs, with the exception of one dependent variable, a majority of respondents favor the pro-government response. The results reveal the dissonance of many people's opinions on government. A majority of Americans report trust towards specific government programs while simultaneously distrusting government in the abstract. As Ellis and Stimson note, "scholars of American public opinion have noticed a long-standing paradox: the American public is operationally liberal, but ideologically and symbolically conservative."²⁶ While not directly addressed in this paper, the results suggest that the operational-symbolic paradox may explain more than this research's hypothesis or Popkin and Dimock contend is at play.

Future research should look to see where trust in government stems from, and strive to further clarify what, if any, relationship exists between social trust and governmental trust. In addition, future research should locate datasets that can more confidently identify causal relationships and weed out insignificant variables. Finally, future research should also unpack what trust judgments coded as "just about always" and "some of the time" specifically refers to. Understanding what respondents mean by some of the time provides governments an ability to better understand the source of citizen discontent and distrust and allow for governments to right their perceived wrongs and run more efficiently, effectively, and responsively. Ultimately, this research's hypothesis and Popkin and Dimock's logic fail to fully explain the complexity of what it means to trust the government. The operational-symbolic paradox may better explain the illogical relationship between a majority that distrust the government broadly and a majority that trust the government programmatically.

²⁴ Popkin and Dimock 2000, 229.

²⁵ Ibid 24.

²⁶ Ellis & Stimson 2007, 1.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

<p>Table 3 Comparison of Assessment of Gov. (DV) and Level of Trust (IV) Source: Public Affairs Poll July 2012 (N: 1,683) Question: Is your overall opinion of the federal government in Washington very favorable, somewhat, not too favorable, or not at all favorable?</p>		
<p><i>Gamma:</i> .676</p>	Dependent Variable Comparison	
	Very/Somewhat Favorable	Not too/Not at all Favorable
	39.5%	60.5%
	Independent Variable Comparison	
	Trust	Distrust
	39.5%	60.5%
<p>Table 4 Source: Pew Research Center Poll "Trust in Government" March 2010 (N: 2,099) Question: Some people say they are basically content with the federal government, others say they are frustrated, and others say they are angry. Which of these best describes how you feel?</p>		
<p><i>Gamma:</i> .717</p>	Dependent Variable Comparison	
	Content	Frustrated/Angry
	19.2%	80.8%
	Independent Variable Comparison	
	Trust	Distrust
	24.4%	75.6%

<p>Table 5 Source: Pew Research Center Poll "Trust in Government" March 2010 (N: 980) Question: Is the federal government having a positive or negative effect on the way things are going in the country these days?</p>		
<p><i>Gamma:</i> .832</p>	Dependent Variable Comparison	
	Positive effect on life	Negative effect on life
	29.4%	70.6%
	Independent Variable Comparison	
	Trust	Distrust
	22.7%	77.3%

Appendix B

<p>Table 6 Average Comparison of Size of Gov. (DV) and Level of Trust (IV) Sources: Eleven Polls between 1998-2012 (N: 867-16,069) Question: If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?</p>		
<p><i>Avg. Gamma:</i> -.546</p>	Dependent Variable Comparison	
	Larger/More	Smaller/Less
	41.0%	59.0%
	Independent Variable Comparison	
	Trust	Distrust
	32.3%	77.7%

Appendix C

Table 7				
Source: Pew Research Center Poll "Size of Government" April 2010 Crosstabular Analysis: (N: 902) Question: Is it now a good idea or bad idea for the government to exert more control over the economy than it has in recent years? Independent Variable: Governmental Trust <i>with Optional Never</i> Dependent Variable: Good Idea or Bad Idea				
	Governmental Trust (IV)			
View of Gov Control in Econ (DV)	Just about always	Most of the time	Only some of the time	Total
Good Idea	74.3%	71.6%	35.3%	40.9%
Bad Idea	25.7%	28.4%	64.7%	59.1%
Pearson Chi-Square Significance: .000 Gamma: .670			Range: 36.3%	

Appendix D

Table 8				
Source: CBS News Poll October 2010 Crosstabular Analysis: (N: 1,046) Question: Which comes closer to your own view? The federal government should spend money to create jobs, even if it means increasing the budget deficit, OR The federal government should NOT spend money to create jobs and should instead focus on reducing the budget deficit. Independent Variable: Governmental Trust Dependent Variable: Create jobs or Reduce budget deficit				
	Governmental Trust (IV)			
Priority (DV)	Just About Always	Most of the time	Only some of the time	Total
Create jobs	68.8%	63.3%	37.6%	42.3%
Reduce budget deficit	31.3%	36.7%	62.4%	57.7%
Pearson Chi-Square Significance: .000 Gamma: .484			Range: 31.2%	

Appendix E

<p>Table 9</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Source: Pew Research Center Poll August-September 2010 Crosstabular Analysis: (N: 2,412)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Question: Please tell me whether the 1st or 2nd statement comes closer to your own views— Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient [OR] Government often does a better job than people give it credit for.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Independent Variable: Governmental Trust Dependent Variable: Perceived Efficiency of Gov</p>					
		Governmental Trust (IV)			
Perceived Efficiency of Gov (DV)		Just About Always	Most of the Time	Only Some of the Time	Total
Gov Does Good Job		69.7%	71.9%	27.7%	38.7%
Inefficient		30.3%	28.1%	72.3%	61.3%
Pearson Chi-Square Significance: .000 Gamma: -.719					

Appendix F

<p>Table 10</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Average Comparison of Gov. Regulation of Biz. (DV) and Level of Trust (IV) Sources: Nine Polls between 2002-2012 (N: 601-16,054)</p>		
<i>Avg. Gamma:</i> <i>.437</i>	Dependent Variable Comparison	
	More Regulation	Less Regulation
	51.2%	48.8%
	Independent Variable Comparison	
	Trust	Distrust
	30.6%	69.4%

Appendix G

<p>Table 11</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Average Comparison of Gov. in Healthcare (DV) and Level of Trust (IV) Sources: Nine Polls between 2009-2012 (N: 403-962)</p>		
<i>Avg. Gamma:</i> <i>.434</i>	Dependent Variable Comparison	
	More Gov in H/C	Less Gov in H/C
	57.3%	42.7%
	Independent Variable Comparison	
	Trust	Distrust
	24.4%	75.6%

Appendix H

Table 12				
Direct vs. Indirect Gov. Presence in H/C Market				
Source: Four Surveys from 2009-2012				
Crosstabular Analysis: (N: 403-962)				
Independent Variable: Governmental Trust				
Dependent Variable: Favor or Oppose <i>Direct</i> Greater Gov. Presence in H/C Market				
	Governmental Trust (IV)			
Direct Control (DV)	Just about always	Most of the time	Only some of the time	Total
Favor	75.7%	72.2%	51.8%	59.2%
Oppose	24.3%	27.8%	48.2%	40.8%
Pearson Chi-Square Significance: .000 Gamma: .468				

Table 13				
Source: Four Surveys from 2009-2012				
Crosstabular Analysis: (N: 728-962)				
Independent Variable: Governmental Trust				
Dependent Variable: Favor or Oppose <i>Indirect</i> Greater Gov. Presence in H/C Market				
	Governmental Trust (IV)			
Indirect Control (DV)	Just About Always	Most of the time	Only some of the time	Total
Favor	69.0%	68.4%	49.1%	53.7%
Oppose	31.0%	31.6%	50.9%	46.3%
Pearson Chi-Square Significance: .000 Gamma: .403				

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