



Apr 17th, 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM

# Chinese Communist Party Leadership in the Countryside: Historical Contradictions and Corrections

Scott Ralston

*Illinois Wesleyan University*

Tom Lutze, Faculty Advisor

*Illinois Wesleyan University*

Follow this and additional works at: <http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/jwprc>

---

Ralston, Scott and Lutze, Faculty Advisor, Tom, "Chinese Communist Party Leadership in the Countryside: Historical Contradictions and Corrections" (1999). *John Wesley Powell Student Research Conference*. 3.  
<http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/jwprc/1999/oralpres3/3>

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact [digitalcommons@iwu.edu](mailto:digitalcommons@iwu.edu).

©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

Oral Presentation 3.2

**CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE COUNTRYSIDE:  
HISTORICAL CONTRADICTIONS AND CORRECTIONS**

Scott Ralston and Tom Lutze\*

Department of History, Illinois Wesleyan University

The key issue that propelled the Chinese Communist Party into prominence before 1931 was agrarian reform. This included land redistribution and the setting up of producer and consumer cooperatives. However, communal relationships would not be established in the countryside until 1958. The reason for this was the devastation that Ching Kai-shek's encirclement campaigns set on the Kiangsi Soviet which was established in November of 1931 and would end in October of 1934. By analyzing the agrarian reform in the Kiangsi Soviet the historical contradictions of Chinese Communism in the countryside are prominently displayed. These contradictions prevented the establishment of communal relationships in the countryside and undermined mass support for the Communists when they needed it most. This paper asserts that had the Chinese Communists moved immediately to establish communal relations they would have had much greater mass support and would have been much more likely to succeed against Chiang's forces.