U.S. Military Aid and Revolutionary Nationalism in China

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For the United States China has always been a land of dreams, potential markets and resources. Although the United States funded the Chinese Nationalists throughout the Chinese civil war to keep the potential for the elusive China market alive, the squandered military aid led to the Nationalists defeat. This presentation will examine the relationship between the military aid by the United States to China and the revolutionary nationalism that defined the period of conflict in China after World War Two, with specific focus on the China White Paper. The situation in China was complicated due to the irreconcilable differences in U.S. policy toward the Nationalist government. The U.S. could not withdraw support for Chiang Kai-shek, but could not force Chiang Kai-shek to make reforms to make military aid effective. Military aid to China kept the U.S. tied to the status of the Nationalist, as well as, to our own emerging Cold War policy.