The Accuracy of Self-Reported Intuitive and Analytical Ability

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The current study aimed to establish whether individuals can accurately report their experiential (intuitive) and rational (analytical) processing abilities on the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) in relation to their performance on the Serial Reaction Time (SRT) and the Operation Span (Ospan) tasks. Previous research has indicated that the rational subscale may have predictive validity, but evidence of the predictive validity of the experiential subscale has been mixed. To determine why previous researchers have struggled to establish this link, a manipulation of the knowledge of the psychological definition of intuition and its value in cognitive processing was provided. We hypothesized that the manipulation might have an impact on the correlations between self-reported intuitive ability and performance on the SRT, and that there would be a correlation between self-reported analytical ability and performance on the Ospan in both conditions. The results indicated that experiential favorability scores and the accuracy of self-reported rational favorability scores differed by condition, but that all participants, regardless of condition, struggled with accurately reporting their intuitive ability. The implications for the use of self-report measures of intuitive and analytical ability are discussed.