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Oral Presentation 1.2

A PROPOSED FAILURE OF THE INTENTIONAL STANCE

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In the contemporary debate in cognitive theory, two dominant trends have emerged concerning belief and desire. In support of a venerable tradition of realism, many theorists affirm a sub-personal cognitive psychology which preserves our folk-psychological intuitions. Alternately, many have bought stock in a promising eliminativism which explains away these complex phenomena in terms of a more ontologically conservative neurophysiology. In response to these dominant schools of thought, Daniel Dennett has developed an increasingly popular philosophy of psychology which culminates in an interpretive method called the Intentional Stance. In this method Dennett attempts to salvage our largely successful folk psychology without the cumbersome problematic of traditional realism. The Intentional Stance, as Dennett envisions it, is rooted in a scientifically respectable objectivity. A consequence of this objectivity will be presented.