Piecing Together the Oslo Peace Process
Major
International and Global Studies
Second Major
Economics
Submission Type
Oral Presentation
Area of Study or Work
International Studies, Political Science
Faculty Advisor
Carmela Ferradáns
Location
CNS E104
Start Date
4-12-2025 8:30 AM
End Date
4-12-2025 9:30 AM
Abstract
The Oslo Peace Process (1993-2000), signaled to the international community that Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were entering a new era of peace and diplomacy. It culminated in the Oslo II Accord, which would have transferred Israeli-occupied territory to a new Palestinian government. Yet by 2000, only a fraction of the land had been returned, further talks had failed, and the start of the 2nd Intifada in September 2000 would place the last nail in the coffin for the Oslo Accords. Using game theory, this paper seeks to model the negotiations between Israel and the PLO, taking into account, (1) the key players in the process, (2) the framework of the negotiations, and (3) the preferences of those involved which shaped the Oslo II Accord. Modeling these negotiations can give insight into why both sides came to the table, how topics for negotiation were decided, and how a deal was reached. Furthermore, it can serve as a starting point for examining the failures of the Oslo Accords. Increased Israeli preferences for national security outweighing preferences for disengagement, political constraints on negotiators, and the motivations of individual leaders all play a role in the Oslo Accords, failing in its implementation.
Piecing Together the Oslo Peace Process
CNS E104
The Oslo Peace Process (1993-2000), signaled to the international community that Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were entering a new era of peace and diplomacy. It culminated in the Oslo II Accord, which would have transferred Israeli-occupied territory to a new Palestinian government. Yet by 2000, only a fraction of the land had been returned, further talks had failed, and the start of the 2nd Intifada in September 2000 would place the last nail in the coffin for the Oslo Accords. Using game theory, this paper seeks to model the negotiations between Israel and the PLO, taking into account, (1) the key players in the process, (2) the framework of the negotiations, and (3) the preferences of those involved which shaped the Oslo II Accord. Modeling these negotiations can give insight into why both sides came to the table, how topics for negotiation were decided, and how a deal was reached. Furthermore, it can serve as a starting point for examining the failures of the Oslo Accords. Increased Israeli preferences for national security outweighing preferences for disengagement, political constraints on negotiators, and the motivations of individual leaders all play a role in the Oslo Accords, failing in its implementation.