A Test of Additional Effort Expenditure in the "Walk Year" for Major League Baseball Players

Authors

Benjamin D. Grad, Princeton University

Abstract

Whether they "overperform" or underperform, it is clear that there is incentive for players to do well in their walk year. This same incentive is not present for players either already tied up in long-term contracts or those without enough major league service time to qualify for free-agent status. This paper seeks to test whether the assertion that players perform better and expend more effort in their "walk year" is empirically observable.

Editor's Note: Figures are missing from this article. We apologize for the inconvenience.

Recommended Citation

Grad, Benjamin D. (1998) "A Test of Additional Effort Expenditure in the "Walk Year" for Major League Baseball Players," University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje/vol2/iss1/2