This same incentive is not present for players either already tied up in long-term contracts or those without enough major league service time to qualify for free-agent status. Were Finley's plan adopted, this incentive would be present for all players in all seasons, instead of just the few hoping for lucrative contracts at the end of the year. While the competitive balance (and aggregate statistics) may not be effected, if work effort is indeed endogenous, overall effort (and "hustle") would likely be increased, and a finer product would be put on the field, potentially increasing attendance and thus revenues. Thus, this paper seeks to test whether the assertion that players perform better and expend more effort in their "walk year" is empirically observable. To do so, section II presents a model of the relationships between performance, effort and walk-year incentive, and reviews previous work done on similar topics. Section III discusses the relationship between performance and marginal revenue product. Section IV presents data and methodology, and section V states conclusions.

Editor's Note: Figures are missing from this article. We apologize for the inconvenience.