Publication Date

2026

Abstract

In Ethiopia, more than 16 million people face hunger and malnutrition due to conflict, poverty, or extreme weather conditions caused by climate change. In 2005, the government launched its flagship social protection strategy, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), to meet the food security needs of the rural population by providing humanitarian food access and boosting productive capacity to reduce vulnerability. This work-for-food/cash transfers program allows beneficiaries to buy food while working on public infrastructure. The transfers can then be used to help participants build livelihood assets and become more resilient to shocks. Although the PSNP has substantially improved food security across different woredas, it has failed to help many households obtain sufficient livelihood assets before exiting the program. This paper examines the reasons for the failures.

It argues that the decentralization institutional structure of the PSNP, designed to increase the responsiveness of the program to local needs and conditions actually has the paradoxical effect of making the program more vulnerable to political manipulation, corruption, and weak management. The analysis focuses on three dimensions of decentralization: political, administrative, and fiscal. It shows that the key mechanisms of the program, selection and graduation process of beneficiaries, are inequitable applied by local officials pursuing their personal professional ambition and political interests. The result is that some eligible candidates and participants are excluded. The research is based on program implementation manuals, peer-reviewed case studies of the PSNP impacts in drought-prone woredas (districts), and relevant literature on decentralization to support the argument.

Disciplines

International and Area Studies

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