Bad Romance: Dominant Party State Patronage Systems in the Era of Globalization
Submission Type
Event
Expected Graduation Date
2014
Location
Room E103, Center for Natural Sciences, Illinois Wesleyan University
Start Date
4-12-2014 10:00 AM
End Date
4-12-2014 11:00 AM
Disciplines
International and Area Studies
Abstract
While much scholarly attention has been paid to national political patronage systems, few works have fully examined how these systems interact with capitol flow and commodity prices. Patronage systems that prop up dominant party states are experiencing new kinds of pressures both economic and cultural. Analyzing three dominant party states from the developing world – Mexico, South Africa, and India – will shed light on how preeminent developing dominant party states pivot in accordance to market-driven forces. As countries turn their attention outward to capitalize on the fruits of globalization, the essential dynamic between domestic patron-client relationships change. Do parties attempt to recoup power through centralization of carefully delegate responsibilities to lower levels of government? Research suggests that globalizing forces encourage states to centralize their benefits and welfare systems. It is also possible that pressure to privatize public commodity industries, like oil behemoth PEMEX in Mexico, pushes states to compensate for shrinking resources by increasing direct welfare transfers to citizens.
Bad Romance: Dominant Party State Patronage Systems in the Era of Globalization
Room E103, Center for Natural Sciences, Illinois Wesleyan University
While much scholarly attention has been paid to national political patronage systems, few works have fully examined how these systems interact with capitol flow and commodity prices. Patronage systems that prop up dominant party states are experiencing new kinds of pressures both economic and cultural. Analyzing three dominant party states from the developing world – Mexico, South Africa, and India – will shed light on how preeminent developing dominant party states pivot in accordance to market-driven forces. As countries turn their attention outward to capitalize on the fruits of globalization, the essential dynamic between domestic patron-client relationships change. Do parties attempt to recoup power through centralization of carefully delegate responsibilities to lower levels of government? Research suggests that globalizing forces encourage states to centralize their benefits and welfare systems. It is also possible that pressure to privatize public commodity industries, like oil behemoth PEMEX in Mexico, pushes states to compensate for shrinking resources by increasing direct welfare transfers to citizens.